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Sophie Duchesne, André-Paul Frogner

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Edited by
OSKAR NIEDERMAYER
and
RICHARD SINNOTT

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Is There a European Identity?

SOPHIE DUCHESNE AND ANDRÉ-PAUL FROGNIER



The dream of the Community's founding fathers was, ultimately, to see the emergence of a European identity. That does not mean that European identity should replace national identities but that it should become strong enough, and be perceived as 'inclusive' enough by European citizens, for Europe to develop as a genuine political entity. How has this dream fared among the citizens of the Community? This is the main question we address in this chapter.

'Identity' is a very general term. We do not intend to examine all the dimensions or components of what might constitute a European identity. Instead, we focus on whether or not European citizens consider themselves members of a political community. In this sense, we are interested in people's sense of political identity—a notion which is close to the concept of citizenship. Specifically, we focus on the relationship between the different levels of 'belonging', from the local to the European, and even the world level, and on the feeling of being a 'European citizen' or 'a European'.

A key question is to determine at what point the link between the individual and the European Community can be considered to amount to an 'identity'. As the institutions of the EC have largely been created independently of the expressed will of national populations, we might anticipate that people's attitudes are basically instrumental. The people of the Community could very well have formed a favourable opinion of the EC as an effective decision-making system—in the economic field

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or in specific policy areas such as the environment or international relations—without developing any genuinely 'identitive' link to it as a political community. According to this hypothesis, the fact that they are European citizens would not intrude on people's self-definition.

One difficulty here is that, although the question about identity in the Eurobarometer surveys seems to elicit responses in terms of a feeling of belonging, this might be merely an indicator of instrumental evaluations rather than affective orientations. Our first task, then, is to investigate the extent to which responses to this question differ from responses to the four 'support questions' used in Chapter 4 ('unification', 'membership', 'dissolution', and 'benefit'). For sure, simply on account of the 'spill-over' process of European integration, we do not expect these questions to produce entirely independent responses. None the less, we have to check whether or not there exists a dimension which we can interpret as a European 'identity'.

We also need to investigate the relationships between this putative 'new' identity and national identities. It is likely that this new 'European identity' does not emerge *ex nihilo* but, rather, is built on the basis of existing identities—particularly, of course, national identities. This will lead us to explore the alleged 'antagonism' between national and European identity. Indeed, both Hoffmann (1966) and Inglehart (1970a) have hypothesized that national identity is the springboard, not the gravedigger, of European identity, with national identity providing a model of what it is to belong to a remote political community.

This hypothesis highlights two important elements in the development of political identity: education and 'cognitive mobilization' (Inglehart 1970a, 1977b, 1990). Hence, we extend our analysis to take in a number of socio-demographic variables which can be supposed to interact with education and cognitive mobilization: age, income, gender, and size of locality. We also consider the influence of several political variables, particularly party identification, left-right orientation, postmaterialist values, and satisfaction with democracy. Only then do we attempt to assess the relationship between the evaluative and identitive dimensions which are at issue when one considers people's feeling of belonging to the EC. This will bring us back to the relationship between national and European identity.

One of the questions in the Eurobarometer surveys seems particularly appropriate for measuring European identity. It was asked in 1975, 1978, and 1979, and was explicitly formulated in terms of belonging: 'To which one of the following geographical units would you say you belong to first of all: the locality or town where you live; the region or county where you live; [name of the country] as a whole; Europe; the world as a whole?' Respondents were asked to state a first and second preference. The average percentages of the first and second choice over the three time points are displayed in Figure 9.1.¹

The pattern of responses is pretty much alike across the countries. In the aggregate, 'Europe' and 'the world' were consistently marginal, whereas in all cases 'country' and 'town' were either the first or second preference among some two-thirds, even three-quarters, of respondents. But 'town' shows much higher percentages as first choice than 'country', except in France and Britain (and Denmark in 1979). For example, in 1978, 60 per cent of Irish respondents mentioned their town as a first choice, while 25 per cent mentioned their country; the gap was even greater in Belgium and Germany.

Although 'country' and 'town' share the first place in all cases, followed by the region in third place, there are some differences. In Belgium, Germany, and Denmark, the town is by far the dominant choice; in 1979, for example, 'town' was either first or second choice among three-quarters of respondents. The other alternatives always followed in the order: the country, the region, Europe, and the world. In contrast, in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and particularly in Britain, 'country' dominates, gathering some 60-75 per cent of respondents' first and second choices. Generally, the region and the town share second place, while Europe and the world share fourth place. Ireland is the only country in which the structure of responses varies from one year to the other, with the country and the town alternatively obtaining the highest score.

In most instances, 'Europe' is in fourth position. Between 1 and 9 per cent of the whole sample selected Europe as their first choice; between 6 and 26 per cent selected Europe as either first or second choice. Again, in most instances, there is little point in searching for trends because the percentages are too low and the observed variations seldom significant. But it is worth noting that in the Netherlands and Ireland there was a perceptible growth in the 'Europe' choice (particularly as a




FIGURE 9.1. Sense of belonging to various geographical units, 1975-9

Notes: Entries are the average percentages for 1975, 1978, and 1979; T = town; R = region; C = country; E = Europe; W = world
Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 6, 10a, and 12.

second choice) whereas in Germany and Denmark there was a perceptible decline.

With such uniformly low percentages, this question about 'belonging' provides an inadequate basis for classifying the 'Europeanness' of

the member countries. However, two countries can be singled out as extreme cases: Italy, where some 20-25 per cent of respondents chose Europe as the unit to which they belong (either as first or second choice); and Denmark, where the proportion feeling they belonged to Europe reached 6 per cent in 1979 (and less than 1 per cent as first choice). Finally, we might note that 'Europe' and 'the world' obtain similar scores in France, Italy, and Britain, whereas in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Ireland, the proportion selecting 'Europe' is often about twice as high as 'the world'.

European Identity, 1982-1991

To examine developments since 1979, we rely on a question in which respondents were asked to state if it occurs to them 'often', 'sometimes', or 'never' that they are not only citizens of their country but also citizens of Europe. The question wording varies from one survey to another, and from one country to another; in particular, the term 'citizen' appears in some formulations of the question but not others.² Even so, we consider the wordings sufficiently similar to allow comparisons.

The average results for this indicator over eight time points between 1982 and 1992 are displayed in Figure 9.2. In Figure 9.3 we display a 'net' measure of identity through time, calculated by subtracting the proportion of 'never' responses from the proportion of 'often' and 'sometimes' responses. However, this measure does not yield an unequivocal classification of the 'Europeanness' of each country since the identity variable is not dichotomous. Our estimates depend on whether one considers 'sometimes' to be nearer to 'often' or 'never'. We opted for the first alternative, especially as it is better suited for making comparisons with the indicators of support for integration—even though it risks overestimating European identity.

The most 'European' countries are assuredly France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. It is in these countries—except Portugal—that we usually observe the highest percentage of 'often' answers as well as the lowest percentage of 'never' answers. Germany and Portugal show fairly similar means but opposite trends. Portugal is a stable case, and rather inclined to Europeanism. Germany, however, one of the most favourably disposed countries in 1982, shows such a steadily downward trend during this period that, by the early 1990s, German levels of

'Europeanness' were among the lowest in the Community. The least 'European' countries are Britain and Ireland, although there is an upwards trend in both. Belgium and Denmark show more middle-of-the-road positions, and the Netherlands tends to come closer to Britain and Ireland.

Figure 9.4 displays responses to the European identity question alongside responses to the indicators of support for European integration discussed in Chapter 4: attitudes towards unification, EC membership, possible dissolution of the EC, and benefits associated with participation in the EC.³ Thus, we can compare evaluations of the EC and people's sense of European identity.

Clearly, the level of European identity is consistently lower than the level of positive attitudes towards the EC. This might perhaps be explained by the differential rhythms of political integration, with instrumental acceptance being relatively rapid whereas affective involvement is more internalized and thereby slower.⁴ However, although the level of the identity variable is clearly lower than the levels of the other variables, the shape of the curve is quite similar for the beginning




FIGURE 9.2. Average sense of European identity, 1982-92

Notes: Entries are average proportions in each category of response over eight time points. For question wording see n. 2 in text. Weighted data.

Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 17, 19, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35, and 37.




FIGURE 9.3. Net sense of European identity in original and new member states, 1982-92

Notes: Entries are the proportion of 'Often' and 'Sometimes' responses minus the proportion of 'Never' responses.

Sources: See Figure 9.2.

and the end of the period.⁵ More precisely, three distinct periods are evident from Figure 9.4.

The first period is 1982-6 during which, despite a decline in 1983, there is a general increase in consciousness of European identity, Germany being the notable exception (see Figure 9.3). Except for evaluations of benefits from EC membership, the EC support variables also increase in strength in this period. The second period is 1986-90

Denmark, Britain, and Ireland, European identity progresses, but from a relatively low starting point.

These results clearly run counter to the hypothesis that the sense of European identity depends on the length of EC membership. First, the turning points of 1986-8 and 1991-2 question the idea of a steady increase in this form of belonging; attitudes in the EC founding member states do not seem any more stable than attitudes among more recent member states. Secondly, differences in the levels of the responses do not justify contrasting older and newer member states: early members, especially Germany and the Netherlands, suffer the larger decline during the period; the sense of identity is higher in Greece and Spain than in Britain and Ireland.

We might try to explain the 1986 peak in the sense of European identity, followed by an abrupt decline in 1988, as a consequence of the extension of the EC to Spain and Portugal in 1985, reflecting fear of increased competition in fields such as agrarian policy. However, Greece, the main potential victim of this new competition, is one of the few countries in which European identity does not decline. Alternatively, the downturn might reflect concern amongst northern countries about a southern over-extension of the EC. In that case, we would have to explain the increased sense of European identity in Denmark in 1990.

Another explanation for peaks in the sense of European identity might be the 'notoriety' effect. The 1986 peak perhaps reflected heightened attention to the EC following the 1985 Single European Act while the 1991 peak reflected the 'notoriety' of the EC in the run up to the Maastricht Treaty. If so, the effect is short lived, for the sense of European identity had dropped again by 1988 and by 1992. Moreover, the support variables behaved differently in the wake of these peaks, showing either stability or modest decline after 1986 but a very similar sharp decline after 1991. Probably more to the point is that the Maastricht Treaty represents a much bigger jump towards European identity, a jump into the unknown before the feeling of belonging has had time to stabilize. Indeed, we might surmise that it is not overall evaluations of the Community which have a negative impact on the sense of European identity and citizenship, but, rather, that the approaching reality of European citizenship has a negative impact on evaluations.




FIGURE 9.4. Net support for the EC and sense of European identity, 1982-92

Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 17, 19, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35, and 37.

when we find a decline in European identity, mainly in 1989 or 1990, while the support variables remain rather stable (unification) or increased in strength—despite a short-term reverse in 1988. Clearly there is some loss of the sense of European identity among the original members of the EC, and sometimes the decline is abrupt. For example, in the Netherlands 'never' increases from 44 to 62 per cent; in France, 'never' increases from 30 to 42 per cent. But in Germany, the decline is continuous, the 'never European' group increasing from 31 to 58 per cent! The more recent members of the EC again show more differentiated development. European identity progressed in Denmark, Britain, and Ireland in 1989 but fell back in 1990. The position in Greece is largely stationary, whereas there are ups and downs in Spain and Portugal but with a noticeable decline in European identity in 1990.

The third period is 1990-2 when there was a general increase in European identity in 1991 followed by a sudden fall. The support variables show a rather similar trend for 'dissolution' and 'membership' in 1991, then the fall is general. A glance back at Figure 9.3 shows that this picture is clearest among the original members of the EC, with more recent members again showing more differentiated development. Among these more recent member states, a negative trend is evident only in Spain and Portugal, but from a high starting point, whereas in

National and European Identity

Earlier we noted the view that the completion of European integration would require the creation of a 'supranational' identity, which, some have argued, would be at the expense of national identities. To test this claim, we should see, first, if the two identities are related. We can use the question about 'national pride' in the Eurobarometer data as an indicator of national identity: 'Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to be [nationality]?' In several surveys, this question has been asked at the same time as the question about European identity. In Table 9.1, we report the correlations between national pride and European identity in member states at five time points.

Even a quick look at the correlation coefficients reveals that there is no direct relationship between declaring pride in one's nationality and considering oneself to have a European identity. The coefficients are low and they fluctuate from one year to the other, whereas we would have expected them to be relatively stable. Even worse, in several instances the direction of the relationship switches from one year to another. In other words, the hypothesis of an 'antagonism' between national pride and European identity does not stand up against the data. In so far as they are related, it seems—at least in France, Belgium, Italy,

TABLE 9.1. Relationship between national pride and sense of European identity, 1982-8

	1982	1983	1985	1986	1988
France	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.07	-0.03
Belgium	0.10	0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.02
Netherlands	-0.01	-0.03	-0.10	-0.07	-0.06
Germany	0.18	-0.04	0.11	-0.03	-0.04
Italy	0.07	0.09	0.02	-0.01	0.00
Denmark	-0.00	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03
Ireland	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
Britain	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	-0.09	-0.09
Greece	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.07	-0.11
Spain	—	—	-0.01	0.12	-0.06
Portugal	—	—	0.11	0.00	0.02

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients (Pearson's r).

Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 17, 19, 24, 26, and 30.

Denmark, and Greece—that this relationship is quite the opposite of what might be expected: national pride tends to foster the development of European identity.

The weakness and instability of the coefficients are not sufficient evidence of the independence of the two variables, however. There are two other possibilities: that there is a linear relationship but it is disrupted by a third variable; that there is a relationship but it is non-linear, and thus cannot be detected by correlation analysis. To examine the first possibility, we assumed that age, education level, or political orientation might be intervening variables. For example, perhaps national pride and European identity are positively correlated among respondents on the political left but negatively correlated among respondents on the right. However, all our attempts to uncover a significant intervening variable came to nothing.⁶

The second possibility, that the relationship is non-linear, stems from evidence that a subjective sense of national belonging is the outcome of two distinct processes.⁷ The first is a genuine identification process, since calling oneself 'French' (Belgian, German, . . .) is an assertion about being part of a community. It is about inheriting nationality, about acknowledging duties towards one's country based on fidelity and gratitude to those who made the country what it is—rather than a *priori* sympathy or solidarity with fellow nationals. The ties uniting people with their country are very emotional and give rise to love as well as anger. In that sense, to say that one is 'very proud' or 'not proud' to be French (Italian, or Spanish, . . .) are opposite poles of the same process of belonging.⁸ According to the other process, more appropriately referred to as 'attachment' rather than belonging, individuals consider their birth and life in a particular country as fortuitous. They may call themselves French (Danish, English, . . .),⁹ but their attachment to the national community is based on recognizing that living in this particular country produces a certain community of interests, habits, and feelings. Duties are balanced against benefits. Although people probably say that life is rather better in their own country than abroad, the affective dimension of their 'national consciousness' remains limited. We expect such people to say that they are 'rather' or 'not very proud' to be French (Dutch, Portuguese, . . .) as their orientation towards national identity, positive or negative, is weak.

In our view, these two modes of belonging constitute a fundamental characteristic of the individual which goes far beyond the question of national identity. Some people feel the need to define themselves in

relation to the different circles in which they move, whereas others do not, despite objectively 'belonging' in such circles. The internationalization of the feeling of belonging is an extension of the same process at the national level. People who fully identify with their country will tend to identify with Europe as well, provided 'Europe' is visible enough—hence the importance of the cognitive variable. Similarly, those who are merely attached to their country will also be only attached to Europe. The outcome of both these processes of identification and attachment can be positive or negative, but the key distinction is the different intensities of feeling to which they give rise. Thus, we consider being 'very proud' or 'not proud at all' of one's nationality as indicators of national identification (positive or negative), and 'rather proud' or 'not very proud' as indicators of national attachment. Similarly, at the European level, we treat 'often' or 'never' feeling oneself European as measuring European identification, and 'sometimes' as measuring European attachment. If our hypothesis about the internationalization of identification and attachment is valid, cross-tabulation of the two variables should reveal a structure to these attitudes, as depicted in Table 9.2.

We should find over-representation in the (+) cells, indicating that the same identification process is operating at both the national and the European level. That is, according to our hypothesis, people who identify positively with their nation—by saying they are 'very proud' of being French, Belgian, and so on—also identify positively or negatively with Europe. On the other hand, people who just feel attached to their nation, and are 'rather proud' or 'not very proud' of their nationality are more likely to think only sometimes of themselves as European. Our findings from cross-tabulating the two variables at four time points are shown in Table 9.3.

TABLE 9.2. Expected structure of attitudes towards European identity and national pride

National pride	European citizenship		
	Often	Sometimes	Never
Very proud	+	-	+
Rather proud	-	+	-
Not very proud	-	+	-
Not proud at all	+	-	+

TABLE 9.3. Cross-tabulation between national pride and European identity, 1983-8

National pride	European identity		
	Often	Sometimes	Never
1983			
Very proud	+14	-14	+5
Rather proud	-9	16	-4
Not very proud	+1	9	-6
Not proud at all	+36	-18	0
1985			
Very proud	+12	-11	+3
Rather proud	-14	14	-3
Not very proud	+5	0	-1
Not proud at all	+29	-8	-4
1986			
Very proud	+9	-10	+5
Rather proud	-17	+13	-3
Not very proud	+7	+6	-8
Not proud at all	+56	-32	+2
1988			
Very proud	+2	-9	+6
Rather proud	-8	+9	-4
Not very proud	+6	+2	-4
Not proud at all	+46	-12	-5

Notes: Entries indicate over-representation in comparison with expectations of independence, calculated according to the margins of the table. To obtain the over-representations, the proportional differences between observed and expected frequencies were computed.

Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 19, 24, 26, and 30.

A close look at the table reveals a picture which broadly conforms with what we expected. However, the over-representations in the table are generally weak (the chi-square is seldom significant), and the structure varies from one country to another. Even so, we should note the high over-representation in the bottom left cells, in which being 'not proud at all of one's nationality' goes along with 'often feels a European citizen'. This is probably a compensation process: people who need to define themselves as belonging to something but who, for some reason, lack national identity may find in the European community a valid object of identification.

Do we have to conclude, then, that European identity grows

independently of national pride? This would tend to confirm Hoffmann's claim (1966) that for people who have achieved statehood, 'national consciousness' is neutral. National identity does not imply hostility towards other nations or towards internationalization processes, for 'it is perfectly conceivable that a nation convinces itself that its cohesion and distinctiveness' will be best preserved in a larger entity' (Hoffman 1966: 867). This possibility calls for further exploration of the notion 'national pride'.

To assess more precisely what 'national pride' really measures, we recall Michelat and Thomas's (1966) study of the dimensions of nationalism.¹⁰ One dimension is national pride, centred on the feeling of being better characterized by one's nationality than by one's adherence to other communities. In the typology of various kinds of nationalism, this 'belonging to the nation' is characteristic of left-wing nationalism, which they label 'affective nationalism'. This is described as a 'nationalism of belonging, which accepts the determinism of the national fact', but is free of 'the feeling . . . of this nation's superiority over others' and ideological or dogmatic content (Michelat and Thomas 1966: 119). National pride would thus be the expression of a neutral feeling, in Hoffmann's meaning of the term, since it refers to belonging to the nation without implying superiority or hostility towards other nations. It is thus not surprising that 'national pride' varies independently of 'belonging to Europe', provided the latter is not understood in terms of exclusivity or opposition.¹¹

Other data tend to confirm this interpretation. In 1987 and 1988, the Eurobarometer asked a question designed to measure to what extent European unification is perceived as hostile or favourable to national identities and national interests. Respondents were asked to indicate, on a seven-point scale, how they stand as between two propositions: (1) 'If one day the countries of Europe were really united, this would mark the end of our national, historic, cultural identities and our national economic interests would be sacrificed'; (2) 'The only way of protecting our national, historic, cultural identities and our national economic interests against a challenge put up by the Great World Powers is for the countries of Europe to become truly united.' Responses to this question (data not shown here) proved totally independent of national pride.¹² This confirms that 'pride' measures a dimension of national identity which is not centred on the fear of losing national identity. Thus 'national pride' is not opposed to the process of internationalization, nor, moreover, is it a determinant of attitudes towards the EC.

Belonging and Attachment

We can tackle the question of identity from another direction. Even if one or more dimension(s) of nationalism are, indeed, indifferent to the internationalization of governance, it seems improbable that a feeling of belonging to an international community would arise without any reference to the pre-existing systems of belonging, especially belonging to the national community. To see how these different levels of belonging fit together, we return to the question asked in 1976, 1978, and 1979: 'to which one of the following geographical units . . . do you feel that you belong, in the first place? And in the second place?'

Unfortunately, this question does not express different intensities as between one level and another. However, since all the levels are on an equal footing, we shall assume that the sense of belonging is the same for each level. To analyse the structure of the relationships between the various levels of belonging, we have calculated the under- and over-representation of the second choices compared with the first choices. This is shown in Table 9.4.¹³ In particular, those whose first choice is their town are expected to choose their region or their country as second choice more often than they would if the first and second choices were independent.

The table represents a synthesis of the structures which are observed in all eight countries¹⁴ and at each of the three time points. The positive and negative signs indicate that the combination of first and second

TABLE 9.4. Over- and under-representation of second choice of belonging according to first choice

	Second choice			
	Town	Region	Country	Europe
Town	*	+	+	-
Region	+	*	0	(-)
Country	+	-	*	0
Europe	0	-	(+)	*
World	0	(-)	0	+

Notes: Plus signs indicate over-representation; minus signs indicate under-representation. Brackets around a sign indicate that one or two countries are exceptions to the pattern of over- or under-representation. Zeros indicate no dominant pattern. The diagonal cells, which are by definition empty, are indicated by asterisks.

choices is over- or under-represented in all the countries; the signs in brackets indicate that there is a tendency towards over- or under-representation but that one or two countries, at most, are exceptions to the pattern. The zeros indicate that there is no dominant pattern—both over- and under-representation of that combination is found.

The feelings of belonging are clearly structured around the local and international poles, with 'country' appearing as an intermediate level. Those whose first choice is their town or their region or district tend to choose either the other local level or their country as a second choice. Europe and the world are under-represented in these second choices. By contrast, those whose first choice is 'Europe' tend to favour the world as a second choice, and vice versa. Those whose first choice is their country tend to select either their town or Europe, or even the world (in Britain, Belgium, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands) as their second choice. But in all these cases, 'region' or 'district' is under-represented as a second choice.

In other words, identification with one's country, Europe, and the world do not stand in opposition at all. This confirms the impression one gains from observing the evolution of the choices from one year to the other: whenever choices favouring 'Europe' and 'the world' increase, they seem to do so to the disadvantage of 'town' and 'region', but seldom to the detriment of 'country'. These tendencies can be found in all countries except Britain and the Netherlands, where, moreover, the variables measuring 'national pride' and 'European identity' tended to be negatively correlated.

According to these results, it seems that the development of a European identity—at least in the later 1970s—is accompanied by the weakening of local attachments, not the weakening of national identities. These results also question notions of 'Europe of the Regions': the priority of belonging to a region appears to be at odds with a feeling of belonging to Europe. When the local level is over-represented among those whose first choice is Europe or the world, it is the town—not the region—which is selected.

These findings support the view that it is the nation which enables the individual to learn abstract solidarity stripped of personal life experiences, the very type of solidarity which is needed at the European level. In this respect, our findings concur with Inglehart's (1977b: 337) description of the relationship between support for the European and the national levels: 'The two levels tend to function as one, cosmopolitan communications network rather than as separate competing net-

works.' Inglehart then goes on to attribute this linkage to cognitive mobilization, which 'increases the individual's capacity to receive and interpret messages relating to a remote political community. As such, the process is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of support for a European Community; one must be aware of it before one can develop a sense of commitment.' Accordingly, we now turn to analyse the effects of the main social and political variables which might be influential at the individual level, especially education and cognitive mobilization.

Socio-Demographic Correlates of European Identity

The main socio-demographic variables available in all the Eurobarometer surveys for this period are education level (measured by school-leaving age), income (in quartiles), gender, size of locality (rural municipalities, small and middle-size towns, and large towns), and age (divided into four groups). The correlation coefficients between the independent variables and the feeling of European identity in the member states over time are presented in Table 9.5. Except for age, the relationships follow much the same pattern, although the strength of the relationships vary.

Educational level shows the strongest relationship to a feeling of European identity. In all instances, a larger proportion of the highly educated respondents state that they 'often' consider themselves European, and a smaller proportion of them give the 'never' answer. Exactly the opposite obtains among respondents who left school at fifteen or younger. The correlations between education and the feeling of European identity are sometimes quite high; for example, 0.30 and 0.32 respectively in Greece and Portugal in 1986. Indeed, in Portugal (1986), a mere 10 per cent of the less educated responded 'often' compared with 36 per cent of those who, at twenty, were still studying; conversely, 43 per cent of the former give the 'never' answer, compared with 14 per cent of the latter. Similarly, differences in pro-EC feelings according to education level are commonly in the 20–40 per cent range in Spain, Greece, and Britain. But the influence of education is somewhat weaker in other countries. In Denmark, for example, in 1983, educational level produces variations in the 6–10 per cent range.

Income is the second most influential variable, although its effect is

TABLE 9.5. Relationship between socio-demographic variables and sense of European identity, 1983-91

	Age	Age left school	Gender	Size of locality	Income
France	0.14	-0.15	-0.12	-0.14	-0.13
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Belgium	0.10	-0.16	-0.13	-0.10	-0.20
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Netherlands					
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Germany	0.15	-0.16	-0.13	-0.10	-0.19
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Spain					
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Greece					
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Britain					
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Ireland					
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					

Levels of Legitimacy

Is There a European Identity?

Italy	0.13	-0.24	0.13	-0.14	-0.30
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Denmark	0.12	-0.17	0.13	-0.14	-0.09
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
Portugal	0.19	-0.25	0.18	-0.14	-0.25
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					
EC	0.05	-0.16	0.07	-0.16	-0.07
1983					
1985					
1986					
1988					
1991					

Notes: Entries are correlation coefficients (Pearson's r). Only coefficients significant at $p < 0.001$ are shown. The 'age left school' education variable was coded as those who left school at 15 years or younger, those who have completed their studies between 16 and 19 years, and those who continued to 20 years or older. The EC results are based on weighted data.

Sources: Eurobarometer, Nos. 19, 24, 26, 30, and 35.

less predictable than education. For instance, none of the correlation coefficients for Germany, Denmark, and Britain is significant except in 1991. Moreover, in some cases, such as Germany in 1983, the proportion of respondents in the lowest income quartile who 'often' feel they are European citizens is higher than among the highest income quartile. Some statistically significant but none of the less weak relationships can be detected in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Ireland. But interestingly, with coefficients often exceeding 0.20, income displays a stronger impact on feelings of European citizenship in the southern countries than in the other member states. Indeed, the impact of income is greater than the impact of educational level in Portugal.

Gender is also a differentiating factor in that, generally, men more often consider themselves to be European than women. Even so, the coefficients are weak,¹⁵ except in the Mediterranean countries. In the tables, we find differences of up to 20 per cent between male and female respondents: in the 1986 data, for example, 40 per cent of Italian men 'never' considered themselves to be European compared to 60 per cent of Italian women. Differences between the attitudes of men and women are becoming narrower in contemporary European societies, and feelings about European identity are no exception. However, this has to be seen in the light of greater educational opportunities for women. Some discrepancies remain but notably less so among the highly educated.

Where people live exerts little influence on feelings of 'European-ness'. But one difference is observed throughout the Community: people living in urban areas are more likely 'often' to feel themselves to be European than people living in rural areas. This relationship is only significant in Ireland, Greece, and, especially, in Portugal. In 1985, among urban Portuguese respondents, 15 per cent 'always' considered themselves to be European and 35 per cent 'never' thought of themselves as European; the corresponding figures among rural respondents were 7 per cent and 47 per cent. All things considered, however, the impact of locality is decidedly modest.

Finally, age is not perceptibly related to feelings about European identity except in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Not only are the correlations seldom significant, but we also find contradictory trends. In the three most recent member states, it is younger respondents who are more likely 'often' to feel European, whereas in the other member states the feeling of belonging to Europe is stronger amongst older respondents. In Britain, the two variables are entirely independent of

each other in each instance. But in the newer member states differences between young and old in the degree of subjective 'Europeanness' rise to as high as 30 per cent.

In assessing these findings, we can separate the countries into two groups. On the one hand, we have countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, Ireland and Italy, where socio-demographic factors clearly influence attitudes towards European identity. On the other hand, in countries such as Denmark, Britain, and even Germany and France, the feeling of belonging to the EC seems to be quite independent of these factors. In the first group of countries, the correlations between education and income are particularly strong (above 0.40): the stronger the influence of education, the greater the influence of income. This suggests that the level of economic development in a country influences, in a specific way, the development of individual feelings of belonging to Europe. In those countries where economic development is more recent and less advanced, the feeling of belonging to Europe is much more dependent on socio-demographic factors than in more economically advanced countries. To put it simply: if we classify EC member states according to the relative impact of socio-demographic factors on the feeling of belonging to Europe, the ordering corresponds closely to a classification of the countries on the basis of gross national product per capita.

Political Correlates of European Identity

In his work on political integration, Inglehart associates both the national and supranational level of belonging not only with a process of cognitive mobilization but also with 'postmaterialist' value change. Cognitive mobilization is a concept derived from Deutsch's notion of 'social mobilization', defined as 'the . . . distribution of the political skills necessary to cope with an extensive political community' (Deutsch 1961: 47). The shift to postmaterialism amounts to stressing the quality of life rather than material considerations such as security and economic well-being.

Inglehart's arguments have been challenged from several directions. In particular, Janssen (1991) shows that if both cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism are linked with a cosmopolitan sense of belonging to Europe, then cognitive mobilization renders spurious the link between postmaterialism and the sense of Europeanness. The rationale

behind the argument is that today's Europe is more oriented towards economic development and trade than towards values. In short: it is difficult to associate postmaterialism with the question of potato prices! To test these claims we examined the effects of five political variables on European identity: two variables measuring 'political mobilization' (cognitive mobilization and party identification) and three variables measuring 'political values' (postmaterialism; left-right self-placement; and satisfaction with democracy). Table 9.6 shows the correlations between these five variables and European identity for the time points when all the relevant variables are available for analysis.¹⁶

We consider cognitive mobilization first, operationalized as an 'opinion leadership' index based on the frequency of political discussion and trying to persuade others to one's own opinion (see also Chapter 6).¹⁷ It is evident from the table that cognitive mobilization is significantly correlated with European identity. The coefficients are significant in every country and in every year, and they have the highest values of all the coefficients in the table. The lower values in Britain and Denmark are the only notable differences between countries. For the EC as a whole, we see a drop in the correlations in 1986 and some recovery in 1988, followed by a decline again in 1991. This general pattern across the Community as a whole is principally reflected in France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

These results accord with Inglehart's findings about the importance of cognitive mobilization. However, the relationship between cognitive mobilization and identity is more complex than appears at first sight. In particular, we find that variations in the strength of the correlations go in the opposite direction to changes in the proportion of people who feel they are European—which increased in 1986, declined in 1988, and increased again in 1991! This is accounted for, in part, by growing polarization. The contingency tables for the two variables (not shown here) reveal that, between 1986 and 1988, among those of high or fairly high cognitive mobilization, there was an increase across the Community as a whole in both the proportion of people who 'often' feel European and people who 'never' feel European. In 1991, when European identity increases but the correlations with cognitive mobilization are lower, there was an increase in the proportion who 'never' feel European among the cognitively more highly mobilized.¹⁸

Party identification has a more variable and generally weaker influence than cognitive mobilization. Across the Community as a whole,

TABLE 9.6. Relationship between five political variables and sense of European identity, 1983-91

	Cognitive mobilization	Party identification	Left-right	Materialist-postmaterialist	Satisfaction with democracy
France					
1983	0.21	0.19			
1985	0.24	0.17		-0.11	0.14
1986	0.12	0.13		-0.16	
1988	0.23	0.17		-0.20	
1991	0.17			-0.10	0.17
Belgium					
1983	0.29	0.12		-0.16	
1985	0.33			-0.18	
1986	0.25	0.14		-0.19	
1988	0.23	0.21		-0.16	n.a.
1991	0.25	0.16		-0.15	
Netherlands					
1983	0.26	0.12		-0.13	
1985	0.22	0.16	0.11	-0.17	
1986	0.19		0.10	-0.12	
1988	0.18			-0.10	n.a.
1991	0.24				
Germany					
1983	0.17	0.12	0.13	-0.23	0.10
1985	0.28	0.15		-0.14	
1986	0.30	0.13		-0.17	n.a.
1988	0.25	0.15			0.13
1991	0.26				
Italy					
1983	0.28	0.11		-0.17	
1985	0.31	0.15		-0.17	
1986	0.25	0.11		-0.18	
1988	0.27			-0.16	n.a.
1991	0.31				
Denmark					
1983	0.17		-0.15		
1985	0.12		-0.13		0.11
1986	0.13		-0.19		
1988	0.17	0.21	-0.13		n.a.
1991	0.13		-0.14		0.10
Ireland					
1983	0.21	0.13		-0.13	
1985	0.20				
1986	0.19		0.12		
1988	0.26			-0.11	
1991	0.19				n.a.

TABLE 9.6. *Cont.*

	Cognitive mobilization	Party identification	Left-right	Materialist-postmaterialist	Satisfaction with democracy
Britain					
1983	0.17				
1985	0.11	0.11			
1986	0.15	0.12			
1988	0.27	0.15		-0.11	n.a.
1991	0.25	0.08			
Greece					
1983	0.18				
1985	0.22			-0.12	
1986	0.24			-0.17	
1988	0.24	0.15		-0.13	n.a.
1991	0.20		-0.20		0.21
Spain					
1985	0.23	0.17		-0.21	
1986	0.26	0.14	0.15	-0.14	0.18
1988	0.30	0.16	0.11	-0.14	n.a.
1991	0.23				
Portugal					
1985	0.29	0.16		-0.14	
1986	0.23	0.11			
1988	0.27	0.21		-0.11	n.a.
1991	0.33				
EC					
1983	0.23	0.12	0.07	-0.12	
1985	0.23	0.14	0.09	-0.11	0.06
1986	0.21	0.14	0.03	-0.13	0.05
1988	0.24	0.15	0.09	-0.13	n.a.
1991	0.21	0.06	0.05	-0.14	

Notes: Entries are correlation coefficients (Pearson's r). Only coefficients significant at $p < 0.001$ are shown; n.a. = not available (in 1988 the formulation of the question is different, so comparison could be misleading). The EC results are based on weighted data. For question wordings, see n. 16, in text.

and in several countries, from 1983 to 1988 the correlations come second in importance among the variables shown in Table 9.6. Then, suddenly, in 1991 the coefficients drop. Only in Belgium and Britain does the correlation between party identification and European citizenship remain significant in 1991. This finding suggests that we might be witnessing a general weakening of party mobilization as a factor in building a sense of European identity.

Turning to the indicators for political values, the correlations

between left-right self-placement and a sense of European identity are generally positive. However, they are seldom significant—except in Denmark where people on the right consistently feel more European. Even so, it is interesting to note the contrast between the steadily growing sense of European identity among the right in France and Belgium but among the left in Spain, and the constant, and sharp, opposition towards Europe among the right in Spain and Portugal.

In most countries, the correlations between European identity and postmaterialist values are significant. The exceptions are Denmark and Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Ireland and Portugal. These results, too, are in the line with Inglehart's findings about the relevance of postmaterialism for political integration. We noted earlier, however, that Inglehart combined postmaterialism and cognitive mobilization to explain support for political integration whereas Janssen argued that cognitive mobilization renders spurious the link between postmaterialism and Europeanism. We report below on our tests of these relationships.

Finally, the correlations between European identity and satisfaction with democracy are intermittent, appearing in some years and not in others. An examination of country-by-country cross-tabulations of the two variables suggests that part of the explanation for these low correlations is the existence of a degree of curvilinearity in the relationship, with those who often see themselves as European being found disproportionately among the most satisfied and the most dissatisfied with democracy in their own country. On the whole, then, identification with Europe does not appear to be a 'democratic resort' for those who are dissatisfied with democracy in their own country—which is consistent with the findings reported in the previous chapter.

The analysis reported in this section suggests that cognitive mobilization, party identification, and postmaterialist orientations are directly relevant to the development of a European identity. But, so far, we have looked only at the bivariate relationships between these variables and the sense of being a European citizen. How do these variables interact with one another to foster European identity?

Pathways to European Identity

Along with the significance of cognitive mobilization, Inglehart (1970a) also showed that in the absence of the cognitive mobilization variable, level of education became the most important determinant of

Europeanism. But when cognitive mobilization was introduced, the impact of education vanished. Inglehart also demonstrated that among pro-Europeanists, high cognitive mobilization notably reduces the effect of education but does not abolish it (1970a: 54).

In Table 9.7 we report our findings on the interaction between cognitive mobilization and education and its impact on people's sense of European identity. The more recent picture is clearly different from the picture reported by Inglehart: high cognitive mobilization does not eliminate the link between education and Europeanism. Indeed, in 1983, 1986, and 1991 the two variables seem to be quite independent of each other.¹⁹ Education appears to have become an important factor in its own right and cannot be replaced by cognitive mobilization. In 1991, in particular, the increase in European identity is more evident among the highly educated than among those who are high in cognitive mobilization.

What of the interaction between cognitive mobilization and party identification? In other words, has cognitive mobilization taken over from party identification in shaping people's sense of European identity? Our findings here, reported in Table 9.8, are qualified. The correlations between European identity and party identification are positive and not insubstantial, but when we control for cognitive mobilization, the coefficients fall to about half the size up until 1988, and then, in 1991, vanish. Evidently, cognitive mobilization is the major factor and its influence has increased with time.

Finally, we return to the question of whether or not cognitive mobilization renders spurious the relationship between postmaterialist orientations and European identity. Our findings, reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 9.8, reveal intermediate results. The partial correlations between postmaterialism and European identity, after controlling for cognitive mobilization, are about 50-70 per cent of the zero-order correlations between postmaterialism and European citizenship. In other words, cognitive mobilization only partially eliminates the effect of postmaterialist values. This persistence of postmaterialist values is rather close to Janssen's results for the intermediate category of European identity. People's sense of European identity is perhaps less 'idealistic' than a generally positive attitude towards integration, but it is more value-laden than simply support for a specific policy.

We conclude, then, that while cognitive mobilization and postmaterialist values are highly relevant for European identity, their influence on a sense of 'Europeanness' is not straightforward. Moreover, recall

TABLE 9.7. Sense of European identity by education and high cognitive mobilization, 1983-91

Age when left school	'Often' feeling European				High cognitive mobilization and 'often' feeling European			
	1983	1985	1986	1988	1983	1985	1986	1988
Under 15	12	31	30	30	28	31	30	30
N	4,431	3,921	4,291	3,441	3,101	3,921	4,291	3,441
16-19	17	36	37	33	33	36	37	33
N	2,999	3,681	4,311	4,861	3,501	3,681	4,311	4,861
20 and over	27	40	48	39	40	39	48	39
N	1,127	2,731	2,891	4,671	2,331	2,731	2,891	4,671
Difference	15	8	18	9	12	8	18	9
	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
	15	12	12	12	15	12	12	12
	19	15	15	15	19	15	15	15
	3.635	3,519	3,519	3,519	3,635	3,519	3,519	3,519
	1,473	2,314	2,314	2,314	1,473	2,314	2,314	2,314
	20	14	14	14	20	14	14	14
	1,419	2,406	2,406	2,406	1,419	2,406	2,406	2,406

Note: Entries are percentages in each cell.
Sources: See Table 9.5.

TABLE 9.8. Correlations between European identity, materialism-postmaterialism, party identification, and cognitive mobilization

	1983	1985	1986	1988	1991
European citizenship by party identification controlling for cognitive mobilization	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.06
European citizenship by materialism-postmaterialism controlling for cognitive mobilization	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.09	-0.14
European citizenship by materialism-postmaterialism	-0.12	-0.11	-0.13	-0.13	-0.10
European citizenship by party identification	0.06	0.08	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
European citizenship by materialism-postmaterialism	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.10
European citizenship by party identification controlling for cognitive mobilization	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.06

Notes: Entries are correlation coefficients (Pearson's r). Data pooled and weighted.
Sources: See Table 9.5.

the division among highly mobilized people between those who 'often' feel European and those who 'never' feel European. Hence, we suggest that, during 1983-8, there were two distinct paths leading to a European identity: one path ran cognitive mobilization \rightarrow party identification \rightarrow European identity; the other path ran cognitive mobilization \rightarrow post-materialist values \rightarrow European identity. The distinctiveness of these two paths is borne out by the low correlations between party identification and postmaterialist values.²⁰ Moreover, such weak relationships are congruent with postmaterialist theory which claims that postmaterialists are more detached from party identification and its associations with 'old' politics (cf. Dalton 1988: 177-205; Inglehart 1990: 363ff.). Thus, we might describe one path as relating to 'old politics' and one to 'new politics'. In 1991, only the latter path is significant. Finally, we can confirm the importance of education and cognitive mobilization—although it is also clear that we should not confuse them. Moreover, what also emerges is the importance of postmaterialist values, and that their relevance seems to grow with time.

Too Soon to Speak of a European Identity?

We noted earlier (see Figure 9.4) that a sense of European identity is far weaker than four other measures of attitudes to European integration. However, the evolution of a sense of identity shows similarities with these other variables. We interpret this as a transitional or formative phase of political identity resulting from the spill-over effects of European integration. Moreover, this sense of identity is not linked, negatively or positively, with national pride. Rather, it seems to challenge only local feelings of belonging. According to our analysis, the main feature of this sense of identity is its link with education, cognitive mobilization, and postmaterialism—which reflect basic capacities for coping with an extended community. If this sense of identity is to become autonomous, it will have to be less linked with instrumental evaluations and more affective in nature. The only known model of such a form of political identity is the nation state. Indeed, we already see an affective element in the desire for integration associated with postmaterialist orientations, but that is probably inadequate compared with the classical idea of 'love of the motherland' associated with the nation state. But will an affective European identity develop?

Moreover, will it develop in a conflictual way, in opposition to the nation state, or in a co-operative way, integrating a European identity along with national identity?

To explore these questions, we carried out a factor analysis using seven variables: national pride, the four support indicators, sense of European identity, and whether or not national and European identities are contradictory. Pooling the data and analysing all the countries together, produces only two factors, shown in Table 9.9. All the support questions and both 'identity' questions load on the first factor; national pride and, less strongly, 'being a European' load on the second factor. Similar results are obtained for each country, except for the Netherlands and Ireland.²¹ In the Netherlands, the two identity questions load on a third factor; in Ireland, the two identity indicators load on the second factor along with the item 'for or against European unification' but national pride does not load on either factor.

Thus, the identity variable shows the strongest links with the four evaluative, or support, variables—confirming our earlier findings. Yet the loading of European identity on the national pride factor as well appears to question our earlier conclusion that national pride and citizenship are not correlated (see Table 9.1). Does this mean that a specific European identity is in the process of formation in opposition to, or in contrast to, national pride?

Two simple models of such a new identity can be formulated. In the first, identity is a characteristic acquired through formative socialization,

with the implication that the geopolitical frame of reference already exists. According to this model, we would expect to find the new 'European identity' only among younger people, as a generational phenomenon, and only in the older member states (thus not in Greece, Spain, and Portugal). A second model proposes that before a European identity can be a reality for younger generations, it has to be 'constituted' by a symbolic transformation, producing a new complex of affective attitudes. This process is more likely among those with high 'cultural capital'—that is, among the most highly educated.²² If a European identity is in the process of developing according to either of these two models, a factor analysis based on pooling the data for 'first', 'second wave', and 'recent' member states, and differentiating between age groups and education levels, should produce different results. Our analyses produced no such differences. On the contrary, we found the same two factors for each group of countries, with the same variables loading on the same factor in each group.

As an economic, political, and administrative construction, Europe evidently elicits evaluative attitudes, but not a real community of belonging of the kind experienced in nation states. If the European Union is able, in the future, to generate a new system of belonging, it is difficult to imagine, from what we know, what it will be like. We could imagine a new form of citizenship based on a commitment *à la carte*. This might be linked with the apparently contradictory characteristics of postmaterialism: a desire for belonging and, at the same time, a higher level of individualism which is translated, in the political sphere, into more direct participation in resolving issues (and is thus based on instrumental evaluations) than on an all-encompassing political loyalty. As far as people's attitudes are concerned, such a stance would generate affective orientations based more on sympathy than on love, for sympathy implies a certain distancing which allows individuals to elaborate a self-definition independently of the group to which, nevertheless, they feel attached.

Such observations are speculative. Meanwhile our empirical analysis makes clear that, whatever the tendencies and processes involved, it is too soon to speak of the internationalization of identities. For the present, a European identity is a vanguard phenomenon.

TABLE 9.9. Factor analysis of attitudes towards identity and European integration

Variables	Factor	
	I	II
1. National pride	0.088	0.931
2. Unification of Western Europe	0.774	-0.020
3. Membership of country in EC	0.832	0.076
4. Country has benefited from EC membership	0.694	0.107
5. Sorry if Common Market scrapped	0.817	0.105
6. European identity	0.487	-0.347
7. European unity and rational identity contradictory?	-0.632	0.132
Proportion of variance explained	44%	15%

Note: Entries are factor loadings from orthogonal rotation.
Source: Eurobarometer. No. 30.

NOTES

1. Luxembourg and Northern Ireland are excluded due to small sample size.
2. In Britain, for example, the wordings were as follows. 1982: 'Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?' (often, sometimes, never, don't know/no reply); 1983, 1985, and 1986: 'Do you ever think of yourself not only as a British citizen but also as a citizen of Europe?' (often, sometimes, never, don't know); 1988, 1989, and 1990: 'Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only British but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes, never, don't know?' 1991: 'Do you ever think of yourself as not only British, but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes, never, don't know?' In most of the other countries, the changes of wording were along the same lines but the introduction to the question varied. In the French wording (used also in French-speaking Belgium), 'un citoyen' was reintroduced in 1989 and 1990: 'Vous arrive-t-il de penser que vous êtes non seulement un citoyen de la France (ou de la Belgique) mais aussi un citoyen de l'Europe? Cela vous arrive-t-il souvent, parfois, jamais, ne sait pas?' In Portugal, 'cidadão' was used until 1991. The term 'citoyen', 'Bürger', 'citizen', 'ciudadino', 'ciudadano' or the like might be expected to lead to quite strong national differences in the understanding of the question. In some countries, the word 'citizen' is frequently used in public discourse, incorporating notions of political and social equality, and is clearly affectively loaded. In other countries, the word is primarily an administrative term, and is rarely used to stimulate emotional reactions. The designers of the Eurobarometer questions are, of course, aware of these complexities—hence the frequent changes to the question, and the dropping of 'citizen' from the question since 1988 (except in 1989 and 1990 in France and Belgium). Fortunately, the effect of including/excluding the word 'citizen' has been tested. In 1992, a split-half sample was taken, using both formulations of the question. The results show that the different wordings make little or no difference to the pattern of responses. Hence, we can use the variable to analyse sense of European identity without taking into account changes in wording. We thank Juergen Hofrichter (ZEUS, University of Mannheim), who retrieved the question formulation in every language and for every year.
3. For the evaluative variables, we subtracted the positive responses from the negative responses, without taking into account the neutral answers, or don't know/no answer.
4. These findings are in line with the results obtained by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), who found that 'utilitarian' commitments were, on average, more frequent than 'affective' commitments. They used evaluations of policies as indicators of utilitarian commitments and 'approve or disapprove of the Common Market idea'. For affectivity, they used questions similar to those of the evaluative type; for example, 'for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe'. Questions more directly linked to the issue of citizenship were not used (1970: 55–60).
5. Indeed, the five measures are intercorrelated. But the evaluative variables are more correlated with each other than with identity. These results are almost the same in each Eurobarometer.
6. Several four-dimensional cross-tabulations were constructed, examining European

identity by national pride and the following variables: age, level of education, sex, urban-rural residence, income level, regret if the EC was to disappear, frequency of political discussion, and the postmaterialism index.

7. The following hypotheses are based on the qualitative interviews conducted by Sophie Duchesne as part of her doctoral research about feelings of citizenship in France. Part of the analysis seeks to understand what 'to feel French' means. See Duchesne, 'Citoyenneté à la Française', doctoral thesis, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1994.
8. Indeed, rejection and hatred go along with the same need to define oneself as a 'member of', or 'part of a whole', when this need is not satisfied. It is not inconsequential to be positively or negatively identified with one's country, but what matters here is that it is a full identification process, a real sense of belonging.
9. Especially if respondents are being asked this question! During the interviews, respondents often turned the question round to ask themselves when they actually feel French.
10. Michelat and Thomas (1966) stress the limits of their survey. It was based on a small sample (223) of students during the Algerian war, which was an untypical period marked by 'maximum politicization in the student milieu'.
11. Remember that, after 1987, the Eurobarometer question implies the complementarity of the feelings of belonging: 'Have you ever considered yourself not only a German/Belgian/Danish/... citizen, but also as a citizen of Europe?'
12. Only in Britain is the coefficient significant (although weakly). The question on the complementarity of national and European identities has been asked three times, but only one of these surveys also includes the question on national pride. However, a significant coefficient of about 0.1 is unlikely to be stable over time.
13. Since it is not possible to give the same answer for the first and second choice, the diagonal cells are empty. We have thus had to adjust the expected frequencies per line which means that the table can only be read horizontally.
14. Luxembourg is not included due to the small sample size. As the data are for the late 1970s, Greece, Spain, and Portugal are not included.
15. We computed such correlations in order to give a common measure for all the independent variables. However, Pearson's r is not, strictly, an appropriate measure of dependence for dichotomous variables.
16. The cognitive mobilization index is based on two questions: 'When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?' and 'When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?' The left-right self-placement scale (1–10) is based on the question: 'In political matters, people talk of the "left" and the "right"'. How would you place your views on this scale? Materialism-postmaterialism is based on Inglehart's standard four-item battery (1990: 132). The party identification question is: 'Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer?' Satisfaction with democracy is based on the question: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?'.

17. Operational definitions of cognitive mobilization which include education make it impossible to analyse the specific effects of education. Introducing the level of information might have been useful, as information is relevant to both cognitive mobilization and opinion leadership. Unfortunately, the relevant questions are not available in the Eurobarometer surveys which include the citizenship variable. These problems are reflected in Eurobarometer publications where the index we use is sometimes labelled 'cognitive mobilization' and sometimes (more recently) 'opinion leadership'. Also, see Inglehart (1977b: 339-40; 1990: 359).
18. Among people who are high and fairly high in cognitive mobilization, the proportion who 'often' feel European increases from 56 per cent in 1986 to 62 per cent in 1988; the proportion who 'never' feel European increases from 32 per cent in 1986 to 35 per cent in 1988, and to 41 per cent in 1991.
19. One could argue that this difference is due to operationalizing cognitive mobilization as opinion leadership. But opinion leadership could be supposed to be linked with educational level, and probably more strongly than in Inglehart's (1970a) operationalization of cognitive mobilization based simply on general information.
20. The correlations are: -0.07 in 1983, -0.06 in 1985 and 1986, -0.07 in 1988. But the correlation is not significant (at the 0.001 level) in 1991.
21. Germany and Denmark are also exceptions, as only one factor emerged. However, this factor regroups all the Europe-related questions, whereas the contribution of the variable 'national pride' is almost nil.
22. See Percheron (1991), who analyses attitudes towards Europe in terms of reaction to innovation.

Trust and Sense of Community

OSKAR NIEDERMAYER



Discussion of European integration usually means talking about institutional integration. Theoretical approaches to this subject, however, stress that institutional integration has to be accompanied by other forms of integration. According to the classification schema outlined in Chapter 3, these other forms can be defined in terms of orientations towards the personal element of the political collectivity. Nye (1971) argues that integration must be disaggregated into economic, social, and political dimensions, and further sub-divides the political dimension into institutional, policy, security-community, and attitudinal integration. The latter can also be referred to as 'identitive appeal'. Wallace (1990a) considers expectations, common identity, and a sense of community as essential elements of political integration. Both themes derive in part from the work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues describes transactionalism approach of Deutsch and his colleagues describes integration as 'the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population' (Deutsch *et al.* 1957: 5). The sense of community is further specified as 'a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it' (Deutsch *et al.* 1957: 36).

To establish empirically whether such a sense of community exists between the peoples of the European Community, we have to analyse the orientations of citizens towards both aspects of the personal element