This paper contributes to the debate about the interplay between administrative reforms and public policies. It focuses on the effects of the autonomization of structures in charge for the "efficient management" and/or the privatization of Public Real Estate (PRE), which emerged in many European countries since the 1990s. Based upon a comparative analysis carried out in Italy and France, this paper analyses negotiations within the central State, central-local negotiations and policy outcomes in the re-use of military assets (which constitute the majority of PRE of State administrations). It is showed how MRE shifted from being a resource for defence policies to become the target of policies aimed both at improving its management and selling those buildings and lands "exceeding" administrative needs. First, this generated in both countries institutional conflicts and failures. Secondly, a contradiction emerged between two conflicting visions of PRE: the financial-budgetary one, and the planning-oriented one, which include the need for local governments to manage land use and mobilize PRE as a resource for local policies. Thirdly, the autonomization of the function of PRE management within the central State modifies long-term patterns of negotiation between Ministries of Defence and local governments and diminishes legal and political resources the latter have for negotiating prices, parcels and future land use.