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Turkey/Europe: Space-Border-Identity

Riva Kastoryano

No other enlargement country, nor enlargement itself, has aroused as much debate as Turkey's request for accession to the European Union. Until now, the Brussels commissioners had never been forced to find nuanced and complicated formulations to define the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Europe – a “carefully elaborated compromise” or a “privileged partnership” – in order to finally initiate the negotiations by specifying that it is nevertheless “an open process whose result (membership) cannot be guaranteed in advance.”¹

But can Turkey's accession be assimilated to the enlargement process? To the extent that Turkey has been advised to respect the same political, economic, and social norms as the member states and to adopt the *acquis communautaire*, the law ensuring the functioning of the EU, its accession in principle resembles enlargement. But at the same time the nature of the debates and arguments produced by Turkey's accession make it a candidacy in a class of its own. With Turkey in Europe it is in fact a question of civilizational, cultural, and religious difference, and also of geography and borders: how far does Europe go?

One of the specificities of Turkey's candidacy is that it has served as a “mirror” for Europe – for its identity, its projects, its essence. It has brought out the ambiguities of its definition: a market, a political space, a civilization. It has underscored the paradoxes of its expectations and values: universality formulated in the terms of human rights and a – religious – European particularism which is now added to national particularisms. Turkey at the gate of Europe has thus made explicit a tension between Europe's “heritage,” as expressed in the preamble to the Constitution, and its future, an unprecedented, ongoing political construction.² From this perspective, Turkey has been the alterity that has transformed a rational political project into an irrational discourse in search of a “collective consciousness” to define European belonging as an idea of unity in diversity.

The rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands has not brought an answer to the question of what Europe is; to the contrary, it has led to a crisis that places the project itself in question, at once as market, as supranational political community, and as space. The opponents of the Constitution hung onto “national gains” they feel are threatened; they expressed their fear of losing control of Europe's territorial and institutional limits as well as its diversity. But how are we to imagine the limits of diversity? Within this European space, how could we ignore the contributions of different national and/or minority cultures that make claims as nations, forming a common European culture and the modes

of expression of all collective identities, however complex and heterogeneous they may be? To this must be added the “non-Europeans” who arose from the immigration of the 1960s (including Turkish immigrants), Muslims established in various member states who seek to promote their so-called collective identities of “origin,” be they religious, national, or ethnic, and seek new benchmarks in the European space.

For Turkey, Europe has been a choice of political modernization – a source of pride for the whole nation. The desire to be part of the European Union, to have a place in the “family photo,” could thus be perceived as the confirmation of its choice to westernize at the end of the nineteenth century. Obviously, this is not the image that is returned to it by a united Europe, which, to the contrary, each time reminds it especially of its religious difference, even though by appropriating Western modernity in different historical circumstances and ways the Turkish nation-state had opted for constitutional secularism.

For Turkey, Europe is today an idea, a project, and an inspiration that serves to gear up its political, economic, social, and even cultural life. Social relations, national values, and political culture are evolving under the normative gaze of the European Union and its institutions. Civil society asserts itself through the active effervescence of associations in all domains and has a growing importance in political life.³ The criteria imposed by the Copenhagen Treaty, especially when it comes to human rights, minority rights, and gender relations, find an echo both in civil society and in the political class. All this is leading Turkey along the path of democratization and Europeanization.

But Europe is also a reality. It is a space of reference for the values, action, and mobilization of more than four million Turkish nationals settled in the different EU countries. Even if a large part of Turkish immigration transmits a negative image of Turkey and this image is used by opponents of its membership as an argument to reject it, another part circulating between the European space and Turkey mobilizes for equal rights both in the country of residence and in Turkey. While debates about Turkey place the identity, territory, and limits of the EU in question, this article seeks to show that, for activists in immigrant associations, Europe has already been drawn as a borderless social, cultural, and political space which, through transnational solidarity networks, includes Turkey in Europe. Their mobilization and their claims, directed at once at the countries of residence and at European institutions that act on Turkey, are pushing the latter to behave as a transnational actor subject to the rules of globalization, and, to a lesser extent, of Europeanization.⁴ The equation Turkey/Europe is thus inscribed within the problematic of Europe as a space of reference and action that operates through the integration of Turkish nationals as minorities in national societies and in a supranational political community. Such transnational actors serve as an engine of change and who, as in every interaction, reflect both to Europe and to Turkey their own contradictions in their reciprocal expectations.

A study published in December 2002 by the Center for Research on Turkey in Essen⁵ concluded by underlining that “Turks living in the member states of the European Union are responsible for building an important bridge between Turkey and the Union in the civil, economic, and political domains.”⁶ This political and economic role had already been attributed to them by both the media and the political class with the creation of a new social category: *Turks abroad*. This appellation describes Turkey’s desire to see part of its population mobilize for its accession to the EU. But for the populations concerned the same appellation implies a solidarity that transcends the borders of the Union, structured by formal or informal transnational networks. The activists who are building these networks aim, by means of European representation, to make themselves heard in the receiving country and indirectly in their country of origin, Turkey. This de facto includes Turkey in the claims for equal rights and justice especially in minority issues or religious rights. The role of economic, cultural, and/or political intermediary attributed to Europe’s Turkish nationals or migrants from Turkey in this context is expressed by transfers of identities, in most cases are redefined in relation to receiving countries, toward the country of origin. This implies reciprocal influence and interdependence. Mobilization at the European level through solidarity networks is related to Turkey’s European integration, which itself bears on modalities of integration in the European countries – whence the interdependence that makes Turkey part of Europe.

This activism goes back to the 1980s, when migrants from Turkey – like other immigrant populations in Europe – developed a discourse around the permanence of their presence by affirming that they were “here to stay.” For their part, the receiving countries set up policies to assure their integration, notably by providing them with resources to create associations as centers of solidarity and intermediaries with the public authorities in each country. New political actors emerged and reorganized their interests and social, cultural, ethnic, or political identities within the framework of associations created in most cases with the support of the countries of residence in the name of a democracy now concerned to recognize differences. Some of these associations replaced the militant, revolutionary, religious, or ethnic organizations of the right or the left, rooted in Turkey and transposed in “exile,” that were principally oriented toward Turkey; they took the Turkish state as their adversary and protested against Turkish policy, its conception of the nation, its conception of religion, and its practice of democracy. These associations, financed by individuals, (opposition) political parties, or international organizations, found a field of action and an expression of identity in various European countries that they had never known in Turkey. Other associations were created, often with the help of the public authorities of the receiving countries, to promote the integration of immigrant populations, including those from Turkey. Turkish public authorities value their activities, and their representatives are regarded as ideal interlocutors between the two countries. Still others have tried to combine these two aspects (being against official Turkey and for

integration in the receiving country) in order to gain credibility with the Turkish immigrant population as a whole. But, on the whole, whether the associations derive from political groups already active in Turkey, from the conversion of Turkish or European workers' movements, or from local initiatives in the receiving countries, the discourse of their leaders gives a privileged place to culture and identity. The associations thus reflect all the diversity of complex societies: social (class, sex, age), cultural, linguistic (Turk/Kurd), and religious (Sunni/Alevi). It is as if all the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences that had been repressed by the Turkish nation-state's concern for cultural and linguistic homogenization reemerged in one form or another, "liberated" in the country of immigration, where each particular trait is an element of distinction. To these divisions can be added the ideological divisions that affect some Islamic religious associations, the stand they take for or against the powers that be in Turkey as well as the policies of receiving countries.

These associations are included within the existing institutional structures of the receiving countries, and activists in these associations have adopted the political "rules of the game" of these countries in order to position themselves vis-à-vis the state and negotiate their claims on equal terms. The so-called politics of identity and recognition in the European countries found an echo in the actions and discourse of association leaders. Their definition of identity varied depending on their ideology: national identity, religious identity, ethnic identity, political identity... Their claims bear on equal social, cultural, and political rights, the fight against discrimination and racism – in short, citizen rights as well as the recognition and representation of cultural and religious specificities.

With the European construction, the quest to have identities represented went beyond the framework of the state and now extended to the European level. Just like claims for residency, citizenship rights, or protection against deportation now addressed to European institutions, interests expressed in terms of the identities of populations of immigrant origin, like states themselves, find a field of action in a Europe in construction, leading to new forms and structures of representation and new negotiations.

Whence the elaboration of new strategies that go beyond national frameworks and situate immigrant populations beyond their relations to their host countries. This allows them to strengthen their claims on both the national and the European level; transnational networks are woven and new structures of solidarity are drawn across across European borders, stimulating associational networks to join the "spider's web" of professional networks that cover already the European space. The aspirations and activities of Turkish associations were connected to a European Parliament project, which in 1986 provided so-called immigrant associations with funds to coordinate their activities. Out of this initiative a new transnational structure was born: the "Migrants' Forum," dissolved in 2001. While the Forum owed its creation to Union budgetary policy, it nonetheless

sought to become “a place of expression for non-Community populations established in Europe, through which they can make their claims but also diffuse information from the European authorities.”⁷ The associations, whose activities were supported by the welfare states of the member countries and whose activists elaborated a discourse of human rights and their universality, saw transnational mobilization as an effective way of struggling against racism and xenophobia.⁸

The Forum was not very significant in itself. But it had the merit of presenting Europe to populations of immigrant origin as a new transnational political space where solidarity networks compete to circumvent states by acting directly on supranational European institutions. This allowed them to strengthen their action on both the national and the European level, eliciting identification among immigrant populations with a political ensemble that transcends national frontiers. This is due to the very nature of the EU, where the logic of supranationality created a transnational civil society in which (national, regional, religious, and professional) compete and collaborate, manifesting all the fragmentation of democratic societies. The politicization of each network is the root of the emergence of a transnational space. Owing to the density of interactions among different actors from different national traditions, this creates a new space of political socialization for the individuals and groups that create it. It becomes a space in which these actors learn a new political culture that takes shape beyond national frameworks and institutions. For Turkish migrants, this new stage of political socialization was added to others – for some, Turkey before immigration; for others, the associational framework of the receiving countries. This dynamic, born of political participation in several spaces at once and accelerating the interactions among different value institutions and political cultures, constitutes the basis of transnational action.⁹

The transnational activism of Turks in Europe includes the populations that have resulted from Turkish immigration into various European countries and Turkey itself, making the latter a source of ethnicity and Europe a source of legitimacy for mobilization and claim-making. But the identity constitutive of their action does not necessarily correspond to the “official” identity proclaimed by Turkey. Indeed, the demand for recognition makes all the differences within the national group reappear in the public space. These differences are not only expressed in relation to France or Germany; they also and above all emerge within representations of Turkey. Each particular trait now constitutes an element of distinction redefined through a process of “reappropriating” identity suggested by identity politics of European countries – Kurds, Turks, Alevis, Sunnis – that transcends the territorial borders between Turkey and Europe. Their goal is to increase the influence of these identities in immigration and thereby to act more effectively in Turkish political life by sensitizing international opinion and supranational institutions to their cause. This influences juridical practices in Turkey, especially

concerning the Kurdish minority, and is expressed by the constantly rising number of appeals against Turkey to the European Court of Human Rights.¹⁰

Turkish migrants thus circulate between these spaces, carrying the values and political norms acquired in immigration, institutionalized within the framework of associations, and legitimized by national and European authorities. This is the case of the Kurds, for example; through the voice of their activists, Kurdish immigrants seek recognition as a “Kurdish community” with a culture, history, and language distinct from those of the “Turkish community,” mainly in Germany. This differentiation, which takes the form of a conflict of “nationalisms” in Turkey, puts the Kurds in a “minority” position within a transnational Turkish community. Their demand for recognition brings forth claims elaborated not only as immigrants but based on the status of a double minority: a minority within a minority in Germany and a minority in Turkey. So it is that, possessing more political resources in Europe than in Turkey, they bring their claims to the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament in order to return to Turkey to obtain recognition as a “minority” from Ankara and secure respect for their cultural and linguistic specificities in public institutions. It is thus now by means of European institutions that populations defined as “minorities” or “communities” in a national (and European) context obtain both recognition and the ability to negotiate with the country in which they live as well as in Turkey.

The concept of a minority is not, however, without ambiguity. It is the source of uncertainties in establishing juridical forms of recognition. The definition proposed by the European Convention on Human Rights is broad: “the term minority designates a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population whose members seek to preserve their culture, traditions, religion, or language.” In Turkey, Kurds assimilated to the Turkish nation-state by virtue of belonging to Islam do not enjoy institutional representation of a specific cultural identity. The combination of cultural, linguistic, and territorial belonging that defines the Kurds as a minority in Turkey is accompanied by a politics of recognition that today is officially imposed on Turkey by the Copenhagen criteria.

Another, more controversial identitarian element is Islam, the “national faith,”¹¹ and its political use in Europe, which is not unconnected to the evolution of Islam in Turkey. Indeed, the Islamist association *Millî Görüş* (National Vision), an organ of the prosperity party in the *Refah* period, was initially founded in Germany, later becoming the *Fazilet* (Virtue) Party – the ancestors of today’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). The *raison d’être* of organization in immigration was associated with cultural associations in order to assist affected populations by responding to their cultural and religious needs. In 1990 Secretary General Ali Yüksel, a 45 year-old engineer and theology graduate described by the media as “modern,” was declared *Seyhülislam*, religious head of all Muslims (a status abolished with the Ottoman Empire). By creating the seat of the “European Organization of the National Vision” in Cologne, he declared this

Rhineland city the node of the Turkish Islamic network in Europe.¹² Since the 1980s, this organization, banned in Turkey until the AKP won power, was not only the largest in the immigrant community but also the best established in Europe, with 28 branches. Was it not this political know-how, acquired in a democratic space (Germany) and transposed into Turkish political life and more specifically into power, that has made a place for the expression “moderate Islam,” which the AKP represents in the eyes of international and Turkish opinion? Should we then be surprised that the AKP is assimilated to a Christian Democratic party?

For its part, in 1981 the Turkish state, at war against political Islam in Turkey and in the immigrant community, established the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), connected to the Prime Minister through a network association called the DITIB in all European countries. Its objective is to fight political Islam as it has developed among immigrants influenced by *Millî Görüş* and fraternal associations and the “dissident” Islam spread by political parties that oppose the secular principles of the Republic. The secular state thus explicitly introduces and institutionalizes religion into its principles as an element of national identity.

As for fraternal associations (*tarikat*), freed in immigration from the “republican prohibition,” they reappear in Turkey as civil society associations and correspond to interest groups that participate in politics. Their role is incontestable in restoring the relations of forces within national political life and defining the place of Islam as popular culture and as belief to be taken into account while seeking an equilibrium.¹³ On the other hand, the Alevis, who had been assimilated to the *tarikats*, their system of belief maintained in secret, even taboo, and consequently banned from the public space, have benefited from increased visibility since the 1990s.¹⁴ The question is to what extent their current visibility and integration into Turkish political life is connected to their image in immigration. In fact, the Alevis attracted the attention of public authorities in European cities by their “distance” from religion and radical Islamic practices. To what extent has their representation of an undogmatic Islam, even a modern Islam (some question whether it is Islam at all), in Turkey as well as in immigration, played a role in changing the attitude of the political class in Turkey, which has all but recognized them officially? Or is it because the Alevis affirm the principles of a secular state, so that recognizing them is a way of combating ethnic and religious divisions?

We are thus seeing an inversion that implies a redefinition of relations between spaces and political actions. At the beginning of immigration, populations from Turkey transposed the cleavages and political and ideological conflicts of social classes to the European countries, making Europe an extension of Turkish political life. Today, the mobilization in Turkey of organizations enjoying recognition and legitimacy in immigration expresses a political transfer that gives new élan to mobilizations and claims in Turkey and leaves neither public opinion nor the political class indifferent.

These transfers operate in the cultural, economic, and social domain and act in both directions. They are amplified by new means of communication, especially satellite broadcasting, which burst upon Kurdish or Turkish, Sunni or Alevi families from Turkey. Just as Turkish immigrant families in Europe experience Turkey everyday via images transmitted by 12 or 14 private and public channels, Turks in Turkey watch European channels.¹⁵ These evolutions blur the connection between territory and identity: the territory of belonging remains regional, the territory of reference becomes national or religious (still to be negotiated), and the territory of residence is French, German, Dutch, or simply European.

These transfers integrate both the Turkish state and Turkish civil society associations into Europe as a political, social, or economic actor. Indeed, the Turkish state has acted on Turkish immigration from the beginning through language instruction. Its intervention is included within the framework of bilateral agreements between different receiving countries. The constant presence of the Turkish state in immigration helps maintain immigrants' attachment to their country of origin as if to maintain the idea of Turkish citizenship as extraterritorial belonging, beyond the national territory. From this perspective Turkey dovetails with one the characteristics of the European space, which *de facto* and *de jure* encourages extraterritorial citizenship by granting political rights (local and European elections) to citizens of the Union (Maastricht Treaty, Art. 8). This deterritorializes, even denationalizes, the European space. Obviously the Turkish state opposes this process to the extent that it seeks to reclaim its citizens at a distance, but all the same it behaves as an actor that is integrated into the process of Europeanization.

The Turkish state intervenes also in the mobilization of nationalist forces beyond its national territory, opposing movements that oppose its national interests and nation-state principles. By helping official Turkish organizations reconstitute themselves as associations in Europe, the Turkish state contributes to the development of state nationalism just like the nationalist movements that oppose it, like the Kurdish movement or Turkish Islamic movements. Many Kemalist associations are active in Turkey, like the Association of the Thought of Atatürk, amplifying their mobilization and diversifying their activities in Germany and affirming their presence with and against other associations. This shows that the Turkish state participates at the same time in the associative movement and their claims to "difference" which are integrated into the framework of legitimacy of European states.

In short, the politicization of identities reshapes relations between migrants from Turkey and receiving countries. Turkey, driven by a concern with democracy and human rights, cooperates with some associations, participating in the multicultural policies of European countries. In addition, through its consular network it cultivates relations with social and cultural associations created by migrants, opening relations with them that have a local and national impact on families. This does not contradict the claims of the Kurds, whose nationalist

movements developed in Europe and then found an echo in Turkey, nor those of religious associations, even if it sometimes complicates diplomatic relations between European countries and Turkey. They act as “guarantors” of the Copenhagen criteria, and consequently of the path to European accession.

The objective of the Turkish state is clear: it seeks to present an image of *Turks abroad*, united around Turkey as a national community, as an ideal by situating itself in relation to different aspects of Turkish identity – national, ethnic, religious, political. The implicit objective is to oppose political forces that act against Turkey and openly oppose Turkey’s accession to Europe, always in the name of human rights, minority rights, or religious freedom, with demonstrations at the European Commission or the European Parliament. Political actors who come out of Turkish immigration in Europe respond to the expectations of the Turkish state by trying to form lobbies recognized in both countries, based on Community institutions, determined not only by Turkish political life but situating themselves in the German system or opposing it. They also react to all statements by the German, French, or Austrian government concerning Turkey and to Ankara’s policies when they thwart EU expectations.

Their power is based on the economic success of some. Especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall, transnational economic actors, increasingly organized in many regions into Turkish businessmen’s associations in Germany, have sought influence in the national politics both of their country of residence and Turkey.¹⁶ Putting economics at the service of politics, businessmen of Turkish origin, who are more and more numerous in Europe, have the power to negotiate with the authorities in both spaces.

These organizations are supported by the associations of Turkish civil society, especially TUSIAD, which is very influential in national political life as well as in Turkey-US and Turkey-EU relations. The objective of this association of Turkish industrialists and businessmen, founded in 1971, is “to promote public wellbeing through private enterprise”; it is most active in national politics, but extended its field of action with an office in Brussels in 1996 and in Washington in 1998. In September 2003 the association opened its Berlin office. In his speech at the opening, the president of the association’s administrative council explained the choice of Berlin:

Berlin is a historically important city and will be more so in the future. It is the capital of our largest economic partner, Germany. It is the center of German citizens of Turkish origin, whose number is continually growing. It is becoming the premier economic and political center in Europe. By virtue of its dynamism and creativity, combined with its history, this city is now at the same time a world capital.

Thus, actions and political strategies emanating from Turkey (state and civil society) are conjugated with those of Turkish immigrants established in Europe. Together they contribute to the integration of Turkey into Europe. Political

experience, the democratic know-how acquired in Turkish immigrants' struggle for equal rights and legal citizenship, are appropriated by Turkey in its strategies of Europeanization.

The presence of a Turkish immigrant population in Europe and its transnational mobilization underlines the role of minorities in international relations and their influence in European national as well as international opinion. The issue is not new. Many studies, especially in the United States, have shown the role of migrants in international relations.¹⁷ In Europe the intervention of supranational institutions in creating networks and diffusing norms vis-à-vis both states and organizations that act directly at the European level orients actions.¹⁸ The mobilization of immigrant activists is thus at once a challenge and an opportunity for Turkey: a challenge with respect to its ability to respond to their expectations, all the more so since these expectations dovetail with those imposed by European normative supranationalism; an opportunity by taking Turkey into a process of globalization that assures its inclusion in a process of Europeanization.

The effects of this mobilization also underline the political importance of Turks abroad in redefining the representation of the Turkish nation, its values, its culture, and its official identity. The claims for recognition of the Kurdish identity in particular have put the Kemalist-based official discourse, a nationalism considered "natural" until recently, into an increasingly defensive position among immigrant populations and in Turkey. Similarly, Islam as a culture and an identity that is, like other religions in various European countries, finding a place within the framework of public institutions is today leading Turkey to redefine its secularism and to seek other models than the French, which is also on the defensive.¹⁹ Here we see one of the paradoxical effects of Europe, which, despite the talk of rejection as the reality approaches, has considered Turkey an "eligible" country from the beginning thanks to this exemplary combination of secularism and Islam, which is now leading Turkey to reexamine precisely what makes for its exceptionality in the Muslim world. From this perspective, European integration is a challenge for Turkey in its quest for a new equilibrium of politics and religion.

Turkey's membership is a challenge for Europe. Europe will need to define its identity – another way of identifying itself than "othering Turkey," to take up Nilüfer Göle's expression,²⁰ and if need be defining its borders. On a pessimistic note, Philippe Reynaud thinks that "if immigrants become Europeans it is because, having had to disavow themselves, they are integrated into a historical community that has been constituted through the tensions between Christianity and modernity"; he adds that "today it is hard to see how a community with no identity aside from human rights could be a stabilizing factor in a world where the decline of classic wars has by no means made tensions disappear."²¹ Can we not see Turkey's accession as a contribution to stability and the reduction of the tensions and conflicts Huntington called conflicts of civilizations? As for the

definition of borders, at this stage nothing can prevent Europe from being a transnational space, but we could not think that “re-territorialization” would consolidate Europe as a supranational entity.

Expert reports already emphasize a change in the course of the European construction. The rejections of the Constitution have plunged Europe into a crisis and decision-makers into deep reflection on anticipated changes. The prospect of Turkish membership can only accelerate new dynamics, which should be considered for their functioning and acceptance by the “peoples of Europe.”

It is here that the true challenge still lies for Europe: accepting Turkey as part of the “peoples of Europe.” At the time of the opening of TUSIAD in Berlin, its president expressed his wish to “see Europe succeed in maintaining its multiculturalism in the face of the test of Turkey.” Referring above all to Turkish immigration in Germany, he added that “using the gains of Turkish-Germans or German-Turks and their economic and cultural contributions to Germany, Germany and the other European countries will have to have a rational approach to the question of Turkey’s accession.”

But European multiculturalism is beyond relations between immigrants and states; it is located in the relations and reciprocal recognition of member states.²² The question of European multiculturalism always raises the question of combining Europe’s universalistic ideology and the cultural-historical particularism that characterizes each of its member states. The European political project cannot ignore the factual plurality within which different national cultures already express and impose themselves. But the irrationality of the debates around Turkey’s accession threatens to lead to the transformation of the European “project” into a particularism that could easily be qualified as a “Euro-nationalism” and would obliterate the bases of its creation and the values it has sought to embody and spread.

The debates and reports on relations between Turkey and Europe recall the path to be travelled on each side.²³ For the Turkish side it is a matter of meeting the conditions to become part of European multiculturalism, from its plurality to its equality. On the side of the member states at stake is a true universal opening, and their effort to influence public opinion on this view of Europe. For this, it is necessary that good will agree to embrace the idea that Turkey as member state is not a “threat” to European identity, but to the contrary a trump in its representation of universality.

Translated by James Ingram

NOTES

1. *Le Monde*, July 1, 2005.

2. J-L., Bourlanges, “De l’identité de l’Europe aux frontières de l’Union,” *Etudes* 4006 (June 2004): 729–43.

3. See Murat Belge, "Between Turkey and Europe: Why Friendship is Welcome," *Open Democracy*, December 15, 2004.

4. R. Kastoryano, "Les Turcs d'Europe et leur désir d'Europe," *CEMOTI*, July–Dec. 2003, 141–58.

5. I would like to thank Ayça Kiliçli for giving me all the recent studies of the Center for Turkey Studies at Essen on Turkish immigration in Germany and the integration of Turkey into the EU. According to this study, 3,767,000 people of Turkish origin, 33.7 percent of them citizens of their country of residence, live in EU member countries. Despite a decrease in the statistics owing to naturalizations, their numbers are constantly growing.

6. According to a study published by the Center for Turkey Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen), December 2002, 39.1 percent in Belgium, 26.4 percent in Denmark, 27.6 percent in Germany, 47 percent in France, 64.4 in the Netherlands, 40 percent in Austria, 62.2 percent in Sweden, and 47.1 percent in Britain have the nationality of their country of residence.

7. C. Neveu, "Citoyenneté ou racisme en Europe: exception et complémentarité britanniques," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 10, no. 1 (1994): 95–109.

8. In 1990, 29 percent of those interviewed wanted the rights of immigrants to be restricted. In 1992, this rate rose to 34 percent. Similarly, in 1991 60 percent of would accept the arrival of migrants from the Mediterranean with restrictions; in 1993 only 46 percent agreed. *Eurobarometer*, December 1992.

9. Transnational action is the basis of the formation of a transnational community, i.e., a community that shares points of reference and interests across borders. It would be impossible to cite all the studies that have appeared and continue to appear on the phenomenon of transnationalism since the 1990s, but it is important to emphasize that they all agree on the fact that transnational community is built on the basis of solidarity networks across national frontiers, of populations with a common identity, be it religious, national, regional, or ethnic. See Basch, Glick-Shiller, and Blanc-Szanton *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-states* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994); P. Levitt, *Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); T. Faist, "Transnational social spaces out of international migration: Evolution, significance and future prospects," *Archives européennes de sociologie* XXXIX, no. 2 (1998): 213–47; L. Pries, ed., *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Adelshot: Ashgate, 1999).

10. See the CEDH website. See also, Alain Bockel, "La Turquie et l'espace juridique européen," in Ahmet Insel, ed., *La Turquie et l'Europe: Une coopération tumultueuse* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), 29–43.

11. T.S. Halman, "Islam in Turkey," in P.H. Stoddard and C.D. Cutnell, M.W. Sullivan, eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 156.

12. Also in Cologne, in 1992, a disciple of Khomeini, Cemalettin Kaplan, also known as *Kara Ses* (the black voice), created an association called the Federated Islamic State of Anatolia in 1985. He declared himself the Calif of believers who "had waited 70 years," i.e., since the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Republic. Upon his death May 17, 1995, his adepts, arguing that "Muslims cannot wait an hour without a Calif," named his son successor. The *Sheyhulislam* is only the leader of the National Vision movements, while the Calif calls in his speeches for an Islamic Republic following the Iranian example. The ideological cleavage between the two Turkish religious leaders in Germany refers to a Turkish Muslim identification in the first case and an international Muslim identification in the second.

13. This is at least the message of Fetullah Gülen, head of the *Nurcu* movement. For more on the brotherhood, see Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Turkey: The Case of Beddiuzzaman Said Nursi* (New York: SUNY Press, 1989). Since the 1980s, Gülen has preached conciliation between Islam and secularism and its importance in the definition of "being Turkish," and this beyond national borders. The importance this movement has attained through the media and public opinion as well as among the political class and intellectuals is the result of its schools – more than 400 around the world, from Central Asia to Europe – which aim to teach Islam, naturally, but also Turkish along with the language of the country in which the school is based. Still more important, at least in the Turkish context, are his statements on Turkish Islam, which have made him a kind of

“negotiator of the Turkish identity,” combining the force of the state and the nation with that of the religion.

14. Since the late 1980s state representatives as well as members of successive governments have indirectly assisted the celebration of the pilgrimage which take place every August in central Anatolia.

15. See A. Gökalp, R. Kastoryano, and S. de Tapia, eds., *L’immigration turque et kurde: La dynamique ségmentaire, la nouvelle donne générationnelle, et le nouvel ordre communicationnel*, report for the FAS, Paris, January 1997.

16. A report published in Brussels in 1991 estimated the direct or indirect economic support from Turks to be about 57 billion deutschmarks – a sum that far exceeds state welfare expenditures for foreigners, which reached only 16 billion marks. Indeed, among the 1,800,000 Turks in Germany, there were 35,000 entrepreneurs, from restaurants to the industrial sector, employing a total of 150,000 Turks and 75,000 Germans, for a total turnover of 25 billion marks, who paid a total of one billion marks in taxes; in *Migrations New Sheet*, Brussels, December 1991, cited in *The Economic and Political Impact of Turkish Migration in Germany*, Center for Turkey Studies, March 1993. See also the statistic of the Union of Turkish Entrepreneurs in Berlin and the Center for Turkey Studies, *Konsumgewohnheiten und wirtschaftliche situation der türkischen Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Essen, September 1992. Since 1992, the Center has regularly published reports on business created by Turkish nationals in Germany with their turnover, number of employees, and taxes paid. The most recent report shows that 0.7 percent of the economically active population in Germany are independent businesspeople. The proportion among those of Turkish origin is 32 percent.

17. On this, see M. Wiener and R. Münz, *Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy: US and German Policies Toward the Countries of Origin* (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997); G. Sheffer, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); T. Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of the American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Y. Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad. Diasporas in the US and their Homelands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

18. See J. Smith, C. Chatfield, and R. Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

19. Ingmar Karlsson, “Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heritage – An Asset to the EU,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* (Fall 2004): 39–47.

20. N. Göle, *Interpénétrations. L’Islam et l’Europe* (Paris: Galaade, 2005), 127.

21. Ph. Reynaud, “L’Europe peut-elle avoir des frontières?,” in Jean-Paul Burdy, ed., *La Turquie est-elle européenne?* (Paris: Turquoise, 2004), 97–102.

22. R. Kastoryano, ed., *Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve*, 2e (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2005).

23. Heather Grabbe, “From drift to strategy: The case of Turkey’s accession,” in *Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey*, ed. Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, and Heather Grabbe (London: Centre for European Forum, September 2005), 11–23.

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