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The Times They Are A-Changing: Generational Renewal and Political Transformations in France

Vincent TIBERJ

Abstract. The impact of generational renewal on political and civic life is often neglected in public and scientific debates. The disinterest is due, among other things, to the contributions and overall pervasiveness of research on primary socialization and life-cycle effects, as well as a tendency in research to adopt a Mannheimian perspective on political generations. In fact, cohort analysis of French self-placement on the left or right of the political spectrum since the 1970s brings to light major changes. Generational renewal is not politically neutral: it handicaps the right while bringing about an increase in the proportion of “non-aligned.” Moreover, studying generational renewal reveals a profound transformation of the notions of left and right in France, due to the new importance of cultural issues and redefined attitudes toward politics generally and voting in particular.

Key words. COHORTS—LEFT/RIGHT SELF-IDENTIFICATION—“NEW POLITICS”—VALUES—DISTRUST

Public debate is not equally attentive to all social and demographic changes. Some are central to our social and political agenda and concerns while others remain on the margins. Inequalities related to position in the life cycle—whether they concern labor market entry or exit—are regularly debated in France, whereas it is hard to gain recognition for the issue of unequal opportunity between individuals born in the 1940s and 50s whose lives dovetailed with the good times of the *Trente Glorieuses* [thirty-year post-war economic boom in France and Europe] (Chauvel 2010; Peugny 2009) and their juniors.

Nor is generational renewal given much public attention, though it would certainly seem just as important to understanding change in French society as the rise of “grey power” (Viriot-Durandal 2003) linked to population ageing. In 1981, when François Mitterrand came to power, 42% of voters had been born before World War II, more than a fourth of them (28%) in 1930 or earlier. In 2012, that category accounted for only 11% of voters (2% if we count only those born in 1930 or earlier). On the other hand, half of voters in 2012 were not old enough to vote in 1981 (18% had not even been born), and when Mitterrand was reelected in 1988, 36% of 2012 voters could not yet vote.

Generational renewal is also too often absent from political sociology research. Age and life-cycle effects are fully accredited ways of apprehending sociopolitical

Translated by Amy Jacobs.

phenomena. The 2012 election polls were used as grounds for widespread debate on what determines how “young people” vote or why older people support the incumbent president. But they seldom served as an opportunity for probing the question of whether people voted “by cohort.”

Yes, “young people” and “seniors” each have their own legitimate collective needs. Yes, the life-cycle question is a major one in the social sciences in general and in political sociology in particular when it comes understanding how young people’s attitudes toward politics develop or how older and oldest persons manage to maintain social ties (Thomas 1996). But does this mean that we should not pay attention to possible cohort effects? Often it seems to. Cannot the fact that people who grew up during a period of mass unemployment and increasingly precarious employment—also a period of record support for France’s extreme right National Front party—are now eligible to vote impact on the political situation in France? Cannot their world views, ideas about the role of the state, even their political priorities sharply differ from those of voters who experienced the abundance and upward social mobility of the 1960s and 70s? And does not the socialization of voters born before World War II play a role in determining their political ideas and the way they understand the debates dividing left and right today?

My purpose here is to test the hypothesis that generational renewal does have political impact. I first examine why cohorts are so seldom studied in electoral sociology, showing that an approach in terms of cohorts can enrich our understanding of French political life on condition that we steer clear of the “political generations” trap. Second, I show that there are clear political differences between cohorts. To do this, I examine one of the strongest structuring characteristics of politics: left/right self-identification. Using the Eurobarometer surveys (1976 to 2009) I show that cohorts are distinguished from each other as much in terms of left/right balances as attitudes toward politics. Third, I explain these distinctions by showing the importance of the shift from “old politics” to “new politics” (Knutsen 1996), namely in connection with the rise of cultural values, and the profound change in attitudes toward politics due to erosion of “duty-based citizenship” (Dalton 2007).

Cohort analysis in political sociology: Why the blind spot?

Cohort analysis developed considerably in French sociology following studies by Claudine Attias-Donfus (1988) and Louis Chauvel (1998). Why did this not also occur in the nearby field of political sociology? Explanations vary. One possible reason is the influence of research results on “life cycle” impact; another is the popularity of Karl Mannheim’s theory of political generations ([1928] 1990); yet another, a kind of empirical culture that has impeded the development of cohort analysis.

Indisputable life-cycle effects

Many studies have observed the effects of position in the life cycle, first on young people but also on the elderly. The young people/old people opposition is

often studied, and different spheres have been examined, ranging from political parties and organizations to the workplace (Cottureau 1979) and the polls (Rouban 2004).

A significant proportion of these studies bear on how “young voters” are socialized and on training for and entry into citizenship. Annick Percheron initiated a particularly fruitful research tradition in France, beginning with her study of how political attitudes get shaped in childhood (1974), research that was related to and that dialogued with the English-language studies of the time (namely Easton and Dennis 1969). Anne Muxel’s concept of “political moratorium” (2001a) has greatly enriched our understanding of the process through which young people gradually assume the role of citizen. On reaching voting age they are characterized by volatility in terms of candidate choice and the decision whether or not to vote altogether. As they proceed through life stages on the path to adulthood (leaving parents’ home, finding a life partner, finishing their education and entering the job market), their political attitudes gradually crystallize. This understanding brings to mind the founding literature in English on the subject, wherein the (relative) stability of identification with a political party in the United States was explained in terms of the gradual structuring of attitudes toward the two major American parties in the course of the individual’s first voting experiences (Campbell *et al.* 1960). David Butler and Daniel Stokes (1970), whose ideas were further developed by Mark Franklin (2004), understood a person’s attitude toward the voting act to develop in their youth: the necessary condition for becoming a regular voter is to have voted in three consecutive elections during one’s young years; people who do not do so become at best intermittent voters and at worst consistent non-voters. These studies contributed a great deal to our understanding of attitudes toward politics, but their success and the phenomena they brought to light worked to limit interest in analysis of other “conjugations of social time,” namely the cohort. And the success in political sociology of the theory of political generations further impeded interest in the cohort approach.

The trompe-l’œil of “generation”

In her account of how the term “generation” is used, Annick Percheron (1993) is representative of researchers’ attraction to Mannheim’s generation model and their relative disinterest in cohorts. She begins by distinguishing several uses from each other. The first refers to the distinction between grandparents, children and grandchildren. The second refers to positions in the life cycle.¹ The third, which later became dominant in political science, applies to individuals who experience a significant event at the same moment in their lives. This use became particularly popular in connection with the notion of “political generation,” at the expense of the fourth meaning: cohort. For Percheron, cohort refers only to the problematic of different ages (which is true if one is working on a single survey). Along with many other researchers in France—for example, those brought together by Marie Cartier and Alexis Spire for a 2011 issue of *Politix*—Percheron chose to research “political generations” in Mannheim’s sense of the term.

1. It is in this connection that social transfers between working and retired persons, for example, are termed intergenerational solidarity.

The conditions for the emergence of political generations thus became a major scientific question in France. Any one event is not enough to create a political generation, and Mannheim himself made an important distinction: "A generation (or potential generation) brings together individuals located at a given moment in a given space. However, this situation is not sufficient to make them a generation. To become a generation, those individuals have to be confronted with a particular, potentially destabilizing event";² "We can only speak of a generation group for cases where real social and intellectual content establishes a real tie between individuals in the same generational situation in that very space of destabilization and renewal." Only under those conditions can a political generation emerge, and even this is not enough: Mannheim recalls the importance of intellectual circles of the sort that create interpretive keys that work to develop and maintain generational self-awareness.

The concept of political generation is seldom encountered in voting sociology, though it is slightly more likely to be used in sociology of political and party elites. On the basis of a panel study of a cohort of high school students in the United States who graduated in 1965, Kent Jennings (1987) brought to light a "protest generation," lastingly affected by the student movements of the time. Not all respondents actually participated in those movements (only a third of those who continued into higher education). But the opinions and attitudes of those who did were lastingly impacted (in terms of judgments on Republican presidential candidates, party identification, opposition to prayer in the schools, support for the federal government and civil liberties). To summarize Jennings' conclusions, there was indeed a "political generation" in this cohort, created by shared participation in crucial events that occurred in respondents' young years. Equivalents in France might be the generations of May '68 and the Algerian war, both cited by Percheron (1993).

Quantitative sociological research into political generations in France has not been very fruitful because there are not enough crucial events, a factor also cited to explain infrequent use of cohort analysis. April 21, 2002³ was a crucial political moment in France for that decade, but can we conclude that it created a political generation? It is hardly surprising that the political generation concept is more likely to be used in study of political elites and activists. Researchers in the afore-cited issue of *Politix* discovered political generations in tobacco sellers' and lawyer's organizations as well as those of secondary school teachers and Dominicans. But in these closed social organizations this is understandable. First, the mere play of social and political selection that decides who belongs to a political or professional organization makes activists stand out from the rest of the population because they are more interested in politics and have higher levels of political competence. Events of the sort that supposedly turn a given group into a generation are therefore not likely to have escaped their awareness. Above all, they operate in social networks where the same events are highly likely to be recalled on a regular basis, thereby keeping memory of them very much alive. Marie-Claude Lavabre (1994) identified distinct generations of communist activists that differ from each other in terms of the moment they joined the party and the strata of

2. Quoted by Vincent Drouin (1995: 22).

3. [The winners of this first round of the 2002 presidential election, held on April 21,

were the traditional right candidate and, unexpectedly, the extreme right candidate.]

communist memory they experienced. In the same vein, Florence Joshua (2007) identified different generations of Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) activists: there are the 1960s and 70s “guardians of the temple,” and there are those who joined in the 1990s and 2000s, socialized by “alter” culture.⁴ A politicized world based on inter-acquaintanceship and memory maintenance is propitious for the “political generation” concept.

Focusing on how political generations get constituted—an approach that has proven its value for understanding several phenomena—also works to limit apprehension of effects possibly associated with cohorts. By concentrating on conditions for the emergence of generations, conditions that are by definition rare and striking, we have left aside “low-intensity” events and movements that may also leave their mark on individuals at varying levels of consciousness. In other words, by looking for “big events,” we may miss gradual, diffuse processes that have just as much power to forge opinions or attitudes and that distinguish certain cohorts from those that precede or follow them. April 21, 2002, hardly changed the given situation, and in particular had no impact on voter turnout, but does this mean that the new voters of the 2000s are identical to their counterparts born in the 1970s? And surely the former are even less similar to those born in the 60s. For these new citizens, the Berlin Wall is already history, and communism and anti-communism—so crucial in shaping the electoral order of the 1970s (Martin 2000)—probably do not mean much to them. Likewise Mitterrand and the social battles of the 1970s that led to his victory in 1981 are at best a “second-hand” memory transmitted during family gatherings, if indeed such reminiscing is done. However, another context may have had a role in structuring this recent cohort that was strong enough to account for its specific attitude toward politics, an attitude strong enough to persist even at those moments when those individuals cross the thresholds between the different stages in their life cycle. Cohort effects make theoretical sense, even if they do not meet “political generation” criteria.

One question does remain, however: with the exception of a few remarkable studies—Drouin 1995; Tournier 2004; Schweisguth 1998; Mayer and Roux 2004—why has French quantitative political sociology so thoroughly disregarded cohorts? Behind the theoretical prism that makes it so difficult to imagine or conceptualize cohort effects can also be seen a kind of empirical prism—what could be called a data culture problem.

Analyses too often based on single surveys

Polling institute reports clearly reveal the influence of this empirical culture. They present us with “routinized” social science thinking and approaches to classification that legitimate certain readings of survey results rather than others. The persistence of “head-of-household’s occupation” as an indicator shows how the notion of household is dominated in France by the “male breadwinner” model (Lewis 1992). Routinized data-sorting variables are used even when their impact on survey questions is only marginal. Choice of these variables is therefore determined not by the aim of explaining the phenomenon in question but by pollsters’ ways of conceiving the social world. Otherwise we would see more “variation in variables.”

4. [The “alter”native movement, seeking alternatives to globalization or alternative ways of globalizing.]

One variable that is systematically used is age. The life span is broken up into segments whose relevance is seldom questioned or debated⁵ at a time when the boundaries between life-cycle periods are becoming increasingly blurred (Van de Velde 2008; Le Hay *et al.* 2011). The birth cohort variable, on the other hand, is systematically absent. This is probably due to information availability, since age—i.e., year of birth—is an everyday analytic category. But the pervasiveness of that indicator also reveals how the life-cycle notion dominates our representations. Moreover, only in the case of a single survey can age and cohort be thought of as two sides of the same coin: for a survey conducted in 2008, the 18-24 age group forms the cohort of individuals born between 1984 and 1990.

But when responses at several moments of inquiry are available, assuming that those moments are sufficiently distanced from each other, then it becomes possible to distinguish what in an individuals' opinions may be attributed to their moment in the life cycle and what may be due to the moment at which they were born, assuming that there are no period effects to complicate matters. Having two surveys, one conducted in 2008 and the other in 2018, would allow for following the 1984-90 cohort at two moments in "its" life cycle. In 2018, those individuals will be between 28 and 34, and may reasonably be assumed to have moved into a new stage in their lives.

French electoral sociology suffers from a lack of surveys. The first academic study was done in 1978; the second in 1988 and the third in 1995. It was in that year that Drouin (1995) first analyzed the effects of cohort on voting in France, but his approach was not widely adopted: the vast majority of recent studies still rely on single surveys. Though the results of past surveys on one or several questions are often cited in connection with new surveys for comparison purposes, this is usually at the level of the electorate as a whole or "canonical" groups such as social class, gender, religious practice and, of course, age group.

Cohort analysis thus suffers in France from a polling culture and a research culture that do not allow it to develop fully. One reason for this is how sociopolitical surveys are funded: French institutions are not likely to subsidize polls that extend beyond a single, short-term purpose. Political panel surveys (Le Hay 2009) are developing in France, but often they cover only a brief time lapse (April-June 2002 to April-June 2007, for example).⁶ Muxel's panel study (2001b) is the only long-term French survey of this kind; she apprehended the gradual entry into political life of persons voting for the first time in 1988. But even in this framework, cohort analysis came second to probing the effects of the life cycle. Only one cohort was followed, and it is of course difficult to identify a single cohort's specificities. Muxel explained the sympathy of rightwing and centrist respondents for the 1995 strikes in France by the fact that those individuals had participated in the French high school demonstrations of 1986-87. But is this cohort so different from others that reached voting age in the 1980s? Was it not instead part of a wider movement for acceptance of unconventional political participation? Clearly there have been both theoretical and empirical obstacles to the development of cohort analysis in France. And yet surveys that could be used to do cohort analysis do exist.

5. Annick Percheron and Jean Chiche (1988) expressed surprise at this.

6. The ELIPSS panel may change this in the near future.

Left and right—a matter of cohorts?

In this article I use the Eurobarometer Trend File assembled by the University of Mannheim and covering the period 1970-2002, supplemented by me for the period 2003-09. In 2009 the question on left/right self-identification disappears from the surveys. This type of data does not, of course, allow us to follow the same individuals at different moments of their lives, so we will not be able to reason on changes at the individual level. But it does allow for following and analyzing groups—cohorts—over time.

I have analyzed changes in left/right self-identification (Figure 1) to demonstrate the impact of generational renewal. Despite discourse dismissing such identifications as no longer relevant, left and right are among the most central, stable political categories. Not only have they been references in France for two centuries, but they are among the first interpretive keys that children encounter in the socialization process in France (Percheron 1974) and they are still individuals' primary means of political self-definition in this country, in contrast to the United States, where people identify first and foremost with a party.⁷

I have also chosen this variable to facilitate comparisons over time. I could have chosen others, such as identification with a given party or voting choices, but the party system has greatly changed in France since the “*quadriga bipolaire*” of the 1970s⁸: the institutionalization of the National Front and the ecologists makes comparison more complex. Above all, as Muxel points out, voting choices “do not really engage individuals, or in any case less so than other attributes of their political identity, and they are subject to the immediate economic context. Individuals may hesitate and even change their vote without calling into question their initial, more or less founding political attachments” (Muxel 2011: 26). Moreover, as Muxel understands it, left/right identification is still the strongest, most pervasive political attachment.

Left/right identification also gives the analysis greater density. It is a means of covering the whole period, including ordinary political years in which there are no elections, which is useful since elections years are by definition particularly sensitive to immediate context. Still, this choice has a cost in terms of political nuances both within the left and in relation to the extreme right National Front.⁹

7. On the general question of types of political categories and different cognitive rankings of them in France and the United States, see, among others, Converse and Pierce (1993); Fleury and Lewis-Beck (1993); Percheron and Jennings (1981); Tiberj (2004).

8. [“*Quadriga bipolaire*”: understanding of French politics as organized into two left-identified and two right-identified parties.]

9. For some authors (Chiche *et al.* 2000; Grunberg and Schweisguth 1997), politics in the 1990s in France was tripartite: left/right/ National Front. This idea is certainly a means of understanding how people voted in the first


rounds of elections from 1995 to 2002, but it only accounts for part of the phenomenon: 1) it does not apply to the second rounds of presidential or legislative elections, which were usually played out between left and right; 2) it is based on party attachments and actual voting decisions that we know to be fragile and unstable (Chiche, Haegel and Tiberj 2004), in contrast to left/right self-identification, as we have already seen; 3) recent political developments have frittered away fundamental differences between the right and the extreme right in France (Mayer 2007; Tiberj 2012).

The variable of interest was recoded into three positions: left/right/center or refusal to specify (also termed “non-aligned”). Given the scale of 1 to 10 used in Eurobarometer surveys, this breakdown is open to objection. See Appendix 1 for justification of it.

To test the hypothesis that generational renewal does have an impact, I broke down the respondent population into cohorts using the neutral criterion of birth decade. I could have broken it down by important moments in French political life (Denni 2011), but this would have turned the proceeding into a search for political generations in Mannheim’s sense. Moreover, testing on the basis of purely arithmetic (and therefore arbitrary) breakdowns makes the cohort impact test particularly conservative and conclusive.

The highs and lows of left/right self-identification

FIGURE 1. *Political identification in France from 1976 to 2009*



Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented by Tiberj for 2003-09. The data were smoothed over a period of three years.

Reading: Proportions of respondents identifying with the left, the right, or neither left nor right, year by year.

Left/right self-identification has changed in France—considerably. Over the period, an average of 34% of respondents identified with the left, but this frequency ranges between an annual minimum of 30% (in 1985) and an annual maximum of 38% (in 1996).¹⁰ Standard deviation for the series is 1.8 percentage points. Right identification variation is even wider: while the average for the period is 29%, the minimum was 21% (in 2000) and the maximum 36% (in 1985), standard deviation of 3.8. Consequently, the third response category has also changed: a period average of 37% of respondents either refused to identify themselves or positioned themselves in the center of the left/right axis; the minimum was 31% in 1979 and the maximum, 45% in 2001 (standard deviation of 3.9).

These highs and lows are worth analyzing in and of themselves, but that is beyond the scope of this article. However, three remarks should be made. First, these changes seem to follow thermostatic logic (Wlezien 1995): when one side is in power, the number of people identifying with it decreases. This is particularly striking from the 1970s to the beginning of the second term of Jacques Chirac [Gaullist, traditional right].¹¹ In this respect, France's profile is fairly comparable to party identification in the United States (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Second, the increase in French voters' distrust of politics is expressed by an increase in number of respondents positioning themselves in the center of the left/right axis or refusing to position themselves.¹² Third, the right was on the rise in the 2000s, at the expense of "non-aligneds," which partially explains Nicolas Sarkozy's success in 2007.

Cohorts' ideological destiny

Cohorts differ from each other on two points: internal left/right balance and proportion of "neither left nor right."

Left/right balance differences between cohorts are particularly striking. Cohorts born before World War II seem the most favorable to the right both at the beginning and end of the period (Figure 2) while those born in the 1950s or later seem particularly favorable to the left. For example, in the cohort of voters born in 1930 or earlier, the right is an average of 8 points ahead of the left. The only exception is the period when the Socialist Lionel Jospin was in power; slightly more individuals identified with the left than the right. The second most right-identified cohort is made up of individuals born in the 1930s. Across the period, the left was behind an average of 4 points in this cohort, with a maximum


10. The same phenomenon was found in TNS-Sofres polls conducted in the 1980s and 1990s (Marcel and Witkowski 2003).

11. The number of left-identified persons fell 3.5 points from 1981 to 1985, rose during the two years Chirac was prime minister (+ 5 points), fell again from 1988 to 1992 (- 3 points), rose again until President Chirac dissolved the parliament in 1997 (+ 5 points), then once again declined, until 2002 (- 5 points).

12. We observe two gradual rises of this phenomenon. The first began with Mitterrand's reelection; the second corresponds to the years that the Socialist Lionel Jospin was in power. In both cases, the fall in number of persons supporting the side in power—anticipated by the thermostat effect—led to an increase in number of non-aligned rather than in supporters for the opposite side, as if neither of the two political alternatives satisfied the voters. This phenomenon culminated in 2001, when 45% of respondents were non-aligned (against 30% in the late 1970s).

deficit of 10 points (in the mid 1980s, Chirac's second term as prime minister). In some periods—e.g., during the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—the left did just as well as the right.

FIGURE 2. *Ideological balances within cohorts*



Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented for 2003-09 by Tiberj. Data smoothed over a three-year period.

Reading: The proportion of right-identified individuals was subtracted from the proportion of left-identified individuals for each year and each cohort. A zero score signifies perfect left-right balance; a negative score indicates right alignment; a positive score left alignment.

One cohort alone gradually moved right over the period: individuals born in the 1940s. On average, the left was 4 points ahead of the right in this cohort (an advantage that reached almost 15 points in the late 1970s), but in 2007, the right pulled ahead of the left and has remained there. This cohort encompasses the oldest baby-boomers and stands in contrast to the youngest baby-boomer cohort, born between 1951 and 1960. In that cohort, the right was an average of 14 points behind the left throughout the period, and in 2007 the left not only did not recede but gained ground. So with the exception of the mid-80s, the proportion of left-identified individuals in this cohort has systematically exceeded the proportion of right-identified ones by at least 10 points.

The three cohorts that arrived during the period alongside those four cohorts already “established” in civic life by the mid-1970s also leaned heavily to the left. That side enjoyed an advantage ranging from 11 points among individuals born between 1961 and 1970 to 16 points among individuals born in 1981 or later.¹³ However, at the moment the 1961-70 cohort appeared on the electoral scene, left and right fared equally with respondents. This occurred during the left’s worse years: the Socialist governments of Pierre Mauroy and Laurent Fabius. Later, the left gradually pulled ahead in this cohort. A similar though not as marked phenomenon is found for voters born between 1971 and 1980: they reached voting age during the Socialist governments of Michel Rocard, Edith Cresson and Pierre Bérégovoy. The left made spectacular strides forward in this cohort as soon as the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR [Gaullist])-Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF [center-right]) right alliance came back to power. Moreover, the strong ideological power balances in favor of the left in the cohorts of the 1960s through the 1980s are explained primarily by low right-identification rates among these individuals. In these three cohorts, the proportion of right-identified individuals was systematically below the 25% threshold, whereas in cohorts more favorable to the right overall, the figure for right-identified respondents was between 30% and 40%.

Period has an impact on left/right power balances in cohorts just as it does at the scale of the electorate as a whole. This is clear if we look at the 1981-88 period. In the four cohorts called upon to choose between Mitterrand and Giscard d’Estaing, the left/right power balance changed, first in favor of the right (10 to 16 points), then the left (5 to 20 points). We also observe period effects between 1992 and 2002; namely a rise of the left until it came to power, then a fall until 2002. Lastly, from that year on it is reasonable to hypothesize political polarization between individuals born before 1951 and those born later: the former seem to have moved right, namely after 2004, in contrast to individuals born in or after 1951.

Choosing not to choose


Up to now we have been focusing on political balances between two of the three possible positions. But changes in “non-aligned” identification are also highly informative (Figure 3). First, we find the period effects already noted at the scale of the population as a whole: highs in “withdrawal” from political concerns in the early 1990s and early 2000s. Here too this seems to hold for all cohorts, including the oldest. Second, we find the political moratorium effect (Muxel 2001a), particularly visible for the two newest cohorts, born between 1971 and 1980 and in 1981 or after: they encompass a large proportion of individuals who identified with neither left nor right before drawing closer to the average electorate. This life-cycle effect is probably also at work in the cohort born between 1961-70, though it is less visible at this analytic level.¹⁴ And it is indeed a

13. The same result was found in 2007 (Michelat and Tiberj 2007).

14. However, when we control for such variables as education level, the phenomenon becomes even more marked compared to the oldest cohorts. I return to this point further on.

life-cycle effect: it generally takes “new entrants” some time to determine their political identification. Moreover, their politicization seems to have worked to the advantage of the left rather than the right, namely for the last two cohorts in the 1990s and 2000s. However, when the moratorium was over, the “non-aligned” level in post-baby-boom cohorts remained fairly high, surely a sign that they have been affected by the climate of distrust¹⁵ of political officials felt in France since the 1980s.

FIGURE 3. *Proportion of non-aligned in cohorts*



Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented by Tiberj for 2003-09. Data smoothed over a three-year period.

Reading: Proportions of respondents in each cohort identifying with neither the left nor right, year by year.

A real cohort effect?

Is there an age effect lurking behind cohorts?

Until now I have been using cohorts to interpret Eurobarometer data, but might those data be better explained by age? Here we encounter the problematics of Age-Period-Cohort thinking and modeling (APC).¹⁶ I could have used recent

15. In 1977, 42% of respondents in a Sofres poll expressed the opinion that politicians care “slightly or not at all” about their voters; in 1990 the figure rose to 69%. In the 2000s, it never fell below 63%, reaching a record high of 78% in 2009. In 1977, 38% of the French thought that

politicians were fairly corrupt. In 2000, 64% thought so, and in 2009 the figure reached 72%.

16. This thinking takes off from an equation in which individual’s age can be analyzed entirely in terms of period and year of birth.

research in connection with those models, but I chose instead the approach in terms of “side information” (Converse 1976).¹⁷ The point is to accept the limitations of available methods, including when we are confronted with techniques as powerful as logistic regression, and to focus on theoretical aspects and information provided by other variables. Here, for example, we can posit that age does affect political identification, that there is indeed a life-cycle effect. Logically, then, cohorts should be affected similarly when their members reach a given age. But though the political moratorium hypothesis (a life-cycle effect if ever there was one) is confirmed by information on arriving cohorts, it is hard to find any other such effects.

For example, we do not observe an advance of the right in most cohorts. The 1941-50 cohort began shifting rightward after Mitterrand was elected, at a time when the individuals in question were between 31 and 40. But no such move seems detectable for their juniors, born between 1951 and 1960, when *they* reached the same life-cycle stage, starting in 1991. The same holds for voters born between 1961 and 1970, who began reaching that life-cycle stage in 2001. Age effects are hard to find, though each of the cohorts “already there” did age thirty years between the beginning and end of our period. In other words, the observed cohort effects do not translate into age effects. The 1931-40 cohort was already one of the two most right-identified cohorts when Mitterrand was elected; i.e., when the individuals in it were between 41 and 50 years of age. And this was still the case when Chirac won, at which time they were between 55 and 64, not to mention Sarkozy’s victory, when they were between 67 and 76. The 1951-60 cohort was the most strongly left-identified of all cohorts in 1981 (the year Mitterrand was first elected), when the individuals in it were between 21 and 30. And it remained so, even when Sarkozy was elected and cohort members were between 47 and 56. Period effects, on the other hand, understood as an effect of the time and affecting all or some segment of voters, did indeed occur, as we have seen.

Composition effects?

Up to this point, I have remained within the bounds of descriptive analysis of relations between cohorts and political identification. Even on this basis we can specify a potential impact of generational renewal: the next majority will not favor the right because the weakness of right identification is what most distinguishes recent cohorts, and that weakness benefits non-alignment or withdrawal. But is that relation significant once we have controlled for other social characteristics? And if it is, how can we explain it?

Differences between cohorts can be explained among other things by hypotheses about composition. All or some political differences between cohorts may be due not to being born and socialized at a given time but rather to a “mere” difference in cohort composition. Recent cohorts differ from older ones by level of education and attitude toward religion, among other variables. The new ones are characterized by strong atheism: 41% for the 1961-70 cohort, 45% for the

17. See the special section on this question in *Sociological Methods and Research* (2008).

1971-80 cohort, and 48% for 1981 and later. We can also note the rise of Islam in the most recent cohort (5% of its members identify themselves as Muslim). This profile already sets these cohorts off, as only 13% of the cohort born in 1930 or earlier, 18% of the 1931-40 cohort, 25% of the 1941-50 cohort, and barely one-third of the 1951-60 cohort stated “no religion.” Furthermore, Catholics account for approximately 80% of cohorts born before World War II and are still the majority in the 1961-70 cohort. Religions differences have always constituted one of the most influential sociological explanations for how the French vote (Michelat and Simon 1977; Dargent 2004; Tiberj 2012). Recent cohorts may be more left-identified because less Catholic.¹⁸

Cohorts also differ from each other by education level. Fifty-six percent of individuals born in 1930 or earlier left school before age 14/15. The figure is 39% for individuals born between 1931 and 1940 and 23% for those born between 1941 and 1950. For individuals born after 1960 it falls to 3%. On the other hand, only 8% and 12% respectively of voters born before World War II say they left the education system at 21 or over; the proportions are 21% and 24% for the two baby-boomer cohorts, 32% for voters born between 1961 and 1970, 52% for the 1971-80 cohort of individuals and 63% for those born in 1981 or later.¹⁹ Educational level would not necessarily be thought of as a traditional explanation of left/right self-identification except that it was undeniably influential in the rise of new professional groups, a development that in turn brought about strong political reconfigurations (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1983). This applies to sociocultural professionals in the medical-social or educational sectors, said to be one of the new bastions of the left (Kriesi 1998). Likewise, educational level is generally associated with the shift to post-materialist society and its new issues, such as the environment, male/female equality, and cultural openness (Inglehart 1977) but also economic globalization, with its “winners” and “losers” (Kriesi *et al.* 2008). Lastly, educational level, along with sex and occupation, is a standard sociological explanation of individuals’ level of political competence (Converse 1964; Bourdieu 1977; Gaxie 1978): a higher educational level usually goes together with greater ease in choosing political sides.

It is important, then, to check the impact of the cohort variable by controlling for other variables of the same kind. However, the Eurobarometer surveys make this difficult: the number of socio-demographic variables is low compared to other French and international surveys; more importantly (and as happens in other surveys), choices were made that limit available data. The questions—including socio-demographic ones—were not systematically repeated from survey to survey. Survey teams altered questions themselves, making certain comparisons over time impossible.²⁰ I have therefore concentrated on Eurobarometer surveys

18. The political impact of Islam is a subject of debate in France. Claude Dargent hypothesizes that being Muslim in and of itself inclines people to the left, whereas other researchers posit that Muslims’ political self-identification is an effect of migrant origin (Dargent 2003; Tiberj and Simon 2012).

19. “Clearly,” age on completing education is exaggerated—this is often the case for surveys in France. In this respect, the Eurobarometer surveys suffer from a bias present in

many other French studies, including academic ones.

20. This holds for religion: for example, the question of religious affiliation was not asked in 1982, 1983, 1985, from 1999 to 2004, in 2007 or 2009, no explanation given. It was tempting to combine it with the practice of attending mass but this changed over time (in some cases from one year to the next) and that question was actually asked less often than the one on religious affiliation.

that include the following variables: cohort, age at end of education, respondent's occupation (or most recent occupation), religion, sex. The analysis is based on 29,306 respondents, and the period (1976-2008) and number of usable waves (36) are still considerable. A model-specification problem arises: What about the time factor and the variations it induces? Here the point is not so much to model (and thereby understand) how and why left/right/non-aligned identification changes from one year to the next but rather to check whether belonging to a given cohort has an impact on political identification. I therefore adopted the statistically costly solution of handling years as if they were categorical data (Table 1).²¹

Clearly, some of the observed differences between cohorts are due to composition effects, but this is only a partial explanation. Independently of the other individual characteristics tested here, being born and socialized in a given period does have a significant impact on an individual's political identification. If we consider left or right identification without any control variable, respondents born after World War II are between 1.5 times (for the 1971-80 cohort) and 2.25 times (for the cohort born in 1981 or later) less likely to identify with the right than the left compared to the 1931-40 cohort. The 1941-50 cohort differs slightly from the reference cohort: it is 1.25 time less likely to identify with the right than the left. The 1930 or earlier cohort, on the other hand, is 1.5 times more likely to be right-than left-identified. If we compare the cohorts at opposite ends of the period—i.e., the oldest and the most recent—for left/right identification we see that the most recent is 3 times less likely to be right-identified than the oldest. Introducing educational level does not change this cohort-related observation and even tends to accentuate it (though we are still within margins of error for the coefficients). This does not hold for religion or occupation. In fact, all odds ratios tend toward 1 (or equal probability) between Model 2 and Model 3, and Model 4 respectively. Some differences between cohorts are due to composition effects, then; namely differences in religion and occupation. Recent cohorts are more left-identified in part because they have fewer Catholics, more Muslims and more atheists than the older, most strongly right-identified cohorts.²²

21. This leads to calculating 38 coefficients (20-minus-1 years for two tests), which consumes degrees of freedom and makes no substantial contribution, but that point is secondary here.

22. In Model 4, Muslims and atheists are 4 times more likely than Catholics to be left-instead of right-identified, while "other religion" respondents are 1.5 times more likely.

TABLE 1. *A resistant cohort effect:
Four nesting multinomial regression models*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Non-aligned vs left	Right vs left	Non-aligned vs left	Right vs left	Non-aligned vs left	Right vs left	Non-aligned vs left	Right vs left
Cohort								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	1.16***	1.23***	1.12**	1.26***	1.09*	1.20***	1.07	1.14***
<i>1941-50</i>	.807***	.824***	.857***	.809***	.891***	.867***	.904*	.915
<i>1951-60</i>	.859***	.568***	.953	.545***	1.03	.628***	1.03	.685***
<i>1961-70</i>	1.00	.581***	1.18***	.558***	1.33***	.699***	1.32***	.768***
<i>1971-80</i>	1.11*	.687***	1.48***	.679***	1.73***	.913	1.65***	.959
<i>1981 and later</i>	.915	.448***	1.22	.440***	1.50***	.653***	1.41***	.713**
<i>1931-40</i>	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Age at end of education								
<i>15-17</i>	-	-	.923*	1.19***	.957	1.27***	1.00	1.31***
<i>18-20s</i>	-	-	.808***	1.24***	.849***	1.36***	.908**	1.35***
<i>21 ≥</i>	-	-	.533***	1.09*	.580***	1.28***	.645***	1.15**
<i>14 ≤</i>	-	-	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Religion								
<i>Muslim</i>	-	-	-	-	.589***	.241***	.591***	.236***
<i>Other</i>	-	-	-	-	.788***	.608***	.795***	.591***
<i>None</i>	-	-	-	-	.527***	.261***	.543***	.262***
<i>Catholic</i>	-	-	-	-	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Occupation or former occupation								
<i>Self-employed or farmer</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.02***	3.85***
<i>Manager and higher intellectual professions</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	.866***	1.52***
<i>Office worker</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	.973	1.33***
<i>Not working</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.11**	1.79***
<i>Manual worker</i>	(ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	(ref.)	(ref.)
Sex								
<i>Woman</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.17***	.874***
<i>Man</i>	(ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	(ref.)	(ref.)
<i>N</i>	29,306	-	29,306	-	29,306	-	29,306	-
<i>Log likelihood</i>	- 31,533		- 31,362		- 30,627		- 30,263	
<i>R2</i>	0.0136	-	0.0189	-	0.0419	-	0.0520	-

Note: There was not enough space here to include the coefficients for each year. Several are significant, either for left or right self-identification or non-alignment compared to left identification. In other words, the developments noted at the overall level are not artifacts.

Reading: The coefficients are odds ratios. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$.

But cohort differences, though reduced, remain significant in most cases. The 1951-60, 1961-70 and 1981-and-later cohorts are between 1.3 and 1.5 times more likely to be left- rather than right-identified than 1931-40 cohort members. And with religion, sex, occupational and educational level controlled for, that reference cohort is not different from voters born between 1941 and 1950 or between 1971 and 1980. What differentiates them is not the cohort they belong to but their attitude toward religion and other characteristics. On the other hand, individuals born before 1931 are distinguished by a stronger attraction to the right. Moreover, when this cohort is used as reference, all the cohorts that followed it are significantly less right-identified.

If we look at non-alignment, post-baby-boom cohorts show an interesting particularity. The two pre-World War II cohorts seem initially to differ from the two baby-boomer cohorts on probability of center identification or refusal to position themselves, with the more recent cohorts being significantly less likely not to choose and the oldest more likely not to choose. But once we take into account the classic social patterns associated with political competence (educational level, occupation, sex), these four cohorts are no longer different from each other. If the baby-boomers are less likely to choose not to choose, this is not because they were born and socialized at a specific time (e.g., the 1970s) but because they are more highly educated and more likely to work as managers or supervisors. In other words, classic patterns of socio-political domination are at work in these four cohorts.

The situation is very different for the 1961-70 cohort and those that followed *it*. Differences between this set of cohorts and the reference cohort (1931-40) deepen once we have controlled for educational level, sex, occupation and religion. This set of cohorts is not different from the cohort born in the 1930s in Model 1, but once the other variables are taken into account it is from 1.25 to 1.5 times more likely not to choose between left or right. In sum, given its education level, this set of cohorts should be more often left- or right-identified than the reference individuals, but what happens is just the opposite. This reveals a new phenomenon: the disinterest in politics affecting certain members of these cohorts is clearly not due to the usual suspects; i.e., domination and political incompetence. In sum, cohorts do differ from each other, and this differential is only partially explained by composition effects, namely education level and attitude to religion. Generational renewal is therefore not neutral for politics and seems to have two major consequences: first, an increasing disadvantage for the right, since the cohorts that lean most heavily to that side are also the ones that will be leaving the scene, replaced by cohorts more inclined not to choose the right; second, a rise in the proportion of disaffected citizens. We now must try to understand these two trends.

The rise of new politics

Since differences in left/right self-identification by cohort cannot be explained by divisions along the social lines of class and religion, we have to turn to other factors, namely value systems. Might these cohorts differ from each other because their opinions on the major issues dividing French society differ? If so, do they differ along classic dividing lines such as preferred size and role of the state, wealth redistribution, social welfare and economic freedom—i.e., the substance of

“old politics”? Or do they differ because they stand opposed on socio-cultural issues like immigration and multiculturalism, sexual minority rights, permissiveness—i.e., “new politics”?²³ Another hypothesis: Is it because the various cohorts do not attribute the same content to the notions of left and right, the older cohorts thinking in terms of economic issues and freedoms whereas recent cohorts think also or solely in terms of what may be called cultural issues? My aim here is to test Ronald Inglehart’s hypothesis (1977) that post-materialist politics is replacing materialist politics and the possibility that France has shifted from politics anchored in socio-economic issues to “two-axis” politics where individuals’ political positions are produced by their degree of liberalism, be it economic (i.e., laissez-faire) or cultural (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1990; Chiche *et al.* 2000; Tiberj 2012).

Cohort values:

Cultural divergence, socio-economic convergence

The Eurobarometer surveys lack the necessary questions, so I compiled the results of French presidential polls from 1988, polls conducted by the Centre de Recherches Politiques of Sciences Po (CEVIPOF 1988, 1995, 2007), the CEVIPOF and other institutions (2002), or the TriÉlec network (2012). With these surveys we observe the same two generational renewal phenomena brought to light in the Eurobarometer surveys:²⁴ the more recent a cohort is, the more it leans to the left, at the expense of the right, and the larger its proportion of non-aligned. The surveys I assembled allow for capturing the values and individual norm systems aspect, but there is still the major problem of comparing indicators over time. Only two questions in the four surveys from 1988 to 2007 can be used for measuring socio-economic preferences, and only four can be used for the cultural preferences dimension—not at all sufficient. I have made do with what there is. Using principal component analysis, I extracted socio-economic and cultural preference factors from the set of value indicators available over time (a guarantee of relatively high quality). This enables us to compare individuals from a single survey on these two dimensions. For details on the method used see Appendix 2 and for an in-depth analysis on the subject, see Tiberj 2012. I use the terms “economic” and “socio-economic” to discuss “old politics” values; e.g., values related to wealth redistribution and preferred size and economic role of the state. The terms “cultural” and “socio-cultural” refer instead to the values associated with “new politics”; i.e., those concerned with authoritarianism, mores and lifestyles, tolerance of homosexuality, immigration, multiculturalism.

Political differentiation between cohorts cannot be explained by socio-economic preferences. The gaps between old and recent cohorts on this point are slight.²⁵ For example, in 1995, individuals born in 1930 or earlier barely differed from those born after 1960, though the more recent cohort is strongly

23. This distinction between new and old politics appeared following publication of studies by Oddbjørn Knutsen and Ronald Inglehart (see in particular Houtman, Achterberg and Derks 2008).

24. The corresponding figures are available on request from the author.

25. They even prove non-significant once we take into account education level, sex, occupation and attitude toward religion. This is not the case

left-identified in comparison: 20% of the former fall into the strongly “pro-government intervention in the economy” quartile as opposed to 26% of those born between 1961 and 1970 and 25% of those born in the following cohort. In four of the five surveys used, the cohort with the strongest presence in the strongly “pro-government intervention” quartile was the one made up of individuals born between 1951 and 1960. The range is still relatively narrow (0 to 8 points). By contrast, for 2012 it widened significantly (+ 22), as if the cohort born in 1930 or earlier were “moving right” while the others were not.

Variations on socio-economic preferences are particularly slight compared to those for cultural preferences. As the different Cramér’s V show, the gap between the null hypothesis (cohorts distributed exactly the same way on the factors) and the actual data is systematically greater for cultural preferences than for socio-economic ones—as much as four times greater in 2002. When it comes to normative positioning, then, the cohorts differ from each other first by attitudes and preferences on immigrants, authoritarianism, and tolerance in general before differing on the state’s economic role or preferences with regard to wealth redistribution. The more recent a cohort is, the more of its individuals fall into the culturally most liberal quartile, and the fewer fall into the culturally most conservative quartile.²⁶ This holds for both 1988 and 2012. For instance, 38% of voters born in 1930 or earlier were among the most conservative fourth of voters in 1988 and only 9% fell into the most liberal fourth of voters, as against 14% and 37% for the 1961-70 cohort. In 2012, the respective figures for voters born in 1930 or earlier were 46% and 13%, whereas the corresponding proportions for the most recent cohort were respectively 12% and 35%. The stability of results from one presidential election to another is striking (Table 2).

“Cultural change” and the two ways it influences politics

The cultural values dimension is indeed the source of political differences between cohorts. To demonstrate this, I integrated individuals’ positions on socio-economic and cultural factors into multinomial regression models, a means of explaining the ideological positioning of each cohort, namely for each presidential election.

Two conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, in 1988 in all cohorts, preferences on the state’s economic role and wealth redistribution heavily influenced probability of left identification (Figure 4). For individuals born in 1930 or earlier, the probability of left identification is between 2% and 7% (depending on cultural positions) if they belonged to the most laissez-faire fourth of voters, and between 84% and 90% if they belonged to the fourth of voters most strongly in favor of government intervention in the economy.²⁷ “Old politics” was the key here, at a time when France’s leftist governments were already well along in the process of converting to market economics. Second, cultural factor impact varies by cohort.

for cultural preferences (Tiberj 2012).

26. These results corroborate those found by Mayer and Roux (2004), Schweisguth

(1998) and Stimson, Tiberj and Thibaut (2010).


27. Left rather than right or neither left nor right.

TABLE 2. *Distribution of cohorts along normative socio-economic and cultural dimensions (1988-2012)*

	Socio-economic factor				Cultural factor			
	Soc-ec--	2	3	Soc-ec++	Cult--	2	3	Cult++
1988								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	33	24	18	26	38	35	18	9
<i>1931-40</i>	33	21	25	21	28	34	23	16
<i>1941-50</i>	24	23	28	25	23	30	24	23
<i>1951-60</i>	21	26	29	25	15	25	28	32
<i>1961-70</i>	23	26	30	22	14	23	26	37
<i>Cramér's V</i>	0.0814				0.1858			
1995								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	28	27	25	20	41	30	20	9
<i>1931-40</i>	26	30	21	23	38	26	24	12
<i>1941-50</i>	29	21	27	24	27	31	21	21
<i>1951-60</i>	23	23	25	29	22	25	25	28
<i>1961-70</i>	26	25	22	26	19	26	26	29
<i>1971-80</i>	19	24	32	25	11	22	25	42
<i>Cramér's V</i>	0.0686				0.1774			
2002								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	26	28	23	23	50	27	14	8
<i>1931-40</i>	27	26	21	26	35	29	19	17
<i>1941-50</i>	22	29	25	24	34	24	25	17
<i>1951-60</i>	26	26	20	28	27	23	23	27
<i>1961-70</i>	24	27	21	27	15	23	30	31
<i>1971-80</i>	17	29	26	27	10	17	34	39
<i>1981-90</i>	14	29	28	29	6	18	31	45
<i>Cramér's V</i>	0.0594				0.2120			
2007								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	38	20	21	21	36	28	28	9
<i>1931-40</i>	34	20	28	19	38	29	21	12
<i>1941-50</i>	32	21	24	23	33	27	22	18
<i>1951-60</i>	25	25	21	29	31	23	25	20
<i>1961-70</i>	20	27	27	26	25	22	26	27
<i>1971-80</i>	25	21	31	23	15	17	33	36
<i>1981-</i>	17	26	29	29	12	14	29	46
<i>Cramér's V</i>	0.0985				0.1853			
2012								
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	45	21	23	11	46	21	21	13
<i>1931-40</i>	37	25	20	19	42	25	18	15
<i>1941-50</i>	33	26	19	22	39	26	20	15
<i>1951-60</i>	20	23	24	33	28	25	22	25
<i>1961-70</i>	23	26	25	27	21	27	26	25
<i>1971-80</i>	21	24	30	25	16	25	30	29
<i>1981-</i>	20	27	29	24	12	23	30	35
<i>Cramér's V</i>	0.1051				0.1624			

Note: Quartiles were calculated for each factor and each presidential election. Percentages indicate the proportion of the cohort falling into the given quartile.

FIGURE 4. *Impact of socio-economic and cultural factors on left identification in 1988*



Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres voter survey, 1988.

Reading: Shown here are average probabilities (expressed in %) of left identification as predicted by the model as a function of birth cohort and individuals' positions on socio-economic and cultural factors. A probability of 0% (or 0) indicates certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100% (or 1) means certain left identification.

In the oldest cohort, born in 1930 or before, which at the time still accounted for 30% of the electorate, cultural values have the least influence on whether individuals feel they belong to the left or not. That influence is much stronger in the two baby-boomer cohorts. Let us consider the hard core of pro-government intervention voters; i.e., the fourth of voters most likely to identify with the left given their socio-economic preferences. Depending on whether they belong to the culturally most conservative voters or the culturally most liberal, left identification probability ranges from 6 points for individuals born before 1931 to 20 points for the 1931-40 cohort to 22 points for the 1951-60 cohort and 26 for the 1941-50 cohort. And if the change is already considerable among these voters, who, once again, strongly favor state intervention in the economy, the impact of cultural values is even more forceful among individuals whose socio-economic preferences are fairly "centrist" (quartiles 2 and 3): variations in the baby-boomer cohorts range from 33 to 40 points. On the other hand, the hard core of laissez-faire voters remains relatively insensitive to cultural values.

In other words, in 1988, people belonging to the oldest cohorts identified with the left for socio-economic reasons whereas baby-boomers and their juniors identified with the left for both socio-economic and cultural reasons. For the first group, questions of xenophobia or "openness,"²⁸ homophobia or tolerance,

authoritarianism or “permissiveness” are beside the point; these individuals identify with the left because they want greater wealth distribution and more state intervention in the economy. Baby-boomers, on the other hand, can very well identify with the left while being laissez-faire in their socio-economic preferences, as long as they are also culturally liberal. Cultural preferences were already influential when Mitterrand was reelected, and they explain why certain cohorts voted more for the left than others in that election: those cohorts may be more or less conservative overall, but the more recent they are, the more determinant cultural preferences are for their political identification. The causes of the “new social movements” of the 1970s (the environment, women’s rights, new personal freedoms) but also the issues of immigration and xenophobia that emerged in the 1980s weighed heavily on post-war cohort individuals’ political identification. These differences between cohorts constitute the first way in which the cultural factor influences left/right self-identification.

But the influence of the “cultural dimension” does not stop there, as we see when we analyze the impact of our two normative preference factors on probability of left identification in 2011-12 (Figure 5). Clearly “old politics,” rooted in socio-economic oppositions, has not disappeared; regardless of birth cohort or cultural position, the likelihood of individuals’ choosing the left is not the same if they are more strongly economic-laissez-faire than economic-interventionist. For example, even among the culturally most conservative voters born in 1981 or later, the probability of left identification ranges from 4% (for the most strongly laissez-faire) to 32% (for the most strongly in favor of government intervention).


“New politics” issues weigh much more heavily now than in 1988; more importantly, their influence is felt in all cohorts. If we come back to the hard core of “economic interventionist” voters of 1988, we see that the maximum impact of cultural preferences was 26 points. In 2012 the differences ranged from 35 points for the 1951-60 cohort to 70 points for the cohort born before 1931. The ranges are considerable even for the hard core of laissez-faire voters: 14 points for the 1931-40 cohort, 26 points for the baby-boomer cohorts, 30 to 38 points for the cohorts that succeeded them, and 51 points for the oldest cohort. Left identification is clearly polysemous: some individuals identify with the left because of their socio-economic preferences, others because of their cultural preferences and many because of both factors. In other words, “*le peuple de gauche*”²⁹ (but also the *peuple* of the “*droite*” [right]) is increasingly diverse, whereas it used to cohere solely around its set of socio-economic values.

Not only is an individual’s left/right self-identification not stable over time but the motivations for that identification also change. We might have predicted this given the highs and lows of the left/right divide; my analysis confirms it. This means we have to revise the dominant understanding in electoral sociology that left and right are particularly stable attitudes constructed in youth and the first years of adult life and are not likely to change later on. Individuals belonging to the oldest cohorts identified with the left or right in 1988 because of their socio-economic values, whereas in 2012 they did so for both socio-economic and cultural reasons. Individuals’ left or right self-identifications are surely more stable than their voting intentions, actual voting records or even party

28. Word used by Chiche *et al.* (2000).

identifications, but at a scale of several years even this characteristic changes considerably, and in accordance with clear criteria; namely, the policies of governments in place and the grounds on which political parties do battle.

FIGURE 5. *Impact of socio-economic and cultural factors on left identification in 2011-12*




Source: TNS-Sofres/TriElec opinion polls, July 2011, October 2011, December 2011, February 2012, March 2012, funded by Sciences Po Bordeaux, Grenoble and Paris and the Interior Ministry.

Reading: Shown here are average probabilities (expressed in %) of left identification as predicted by the models as a function of individuals' birth cohort and positions on socio-economic and cultural factors. A probability of 0% (or 0) means certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100% (or 1) means certain left identification.

Diachronic comparison of the models applied to voters born in 1930 or earlier allows for pinpointing moments when the influence of the cultural factor on left identification was particularly strong (Figure 6). Influence was weakest in 1988; strongest in 2012. But the trend is not regular. Already for the 1995 presidential election cultural values were assuming importance as a reason for left identification, but that impact seems to have diminished in 2002. Political context may have had an important role here, both in determining the left/right balance in the electorate and defining what individuals meant by left and right. It is surely not by chance that cultural values weighed so heavily given that the political parties themselves, including the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP; right-identified), had begun integrating them into the ways they differentiate themselves and compete with one another. Today's major presidential candidates diverge as much if not more on "cultural" questions than socio-economic ones.

FIGURE 6. *The rise of the cultural factor in the 1930-or-earlier cohort*



Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres post-election surveys, 1988 and 1995; French electoral panel survey, 2002; CEVIPOF-Interior Ministry-IFOP post-election survey, 2007; TNS-Sofres/TriElec surveys.

Reading: Shown here are average probabilities of left identification (expressed as %) as predicted by the models as a function of positions of individuals born in 1930 or earlier on socio-economic and cultural factors. A probability of 0% (or 0) means certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100% (or 1) means certain left identification.

Another relationship to politics?

Value systems explain trends in left and right self-identification within cohorts but cannot account for the advance of non-alignment in recent cohorts. This advance is particularly unexpected because it goes against the cognitive mobilization theory put forward in the 1970s and 80s by Ronald Inglehart (1977) and Russell J. Dalton (1988). In the 1950s, political science cast the “ordinary citizen” as an ill-informed person not much interested in politics who does not really understand the fundamental political concepts and whose opinions are inconsistent and changeable (Converse 1964). Inglehart and Dalton broke with this, putting forward instead an optimistic interpretation of development in advanced political societies: though the citizens of the time certainly did not meet the demands of theorists of democracy, they would gradually be replaced by other, more educated individuals who would therefore be better equipped to engage politically. It was and is true that the higher an individual’s educational level, the more likely he or she is to be a competent citizen. However, in comparison with their counterparts born in the 1940s and earlier, the real “new citizens” who have come on the scene do not comply very clearly with cognitive revolution theory predictions. This phenomenon, already perceptible in the fact that people are more

likely now not to indicate either left or right identification, may be found for other indicators of attitude toward politics, used either in the Eurobarometer surveys or French voter surveys. The latter cover different aspects, such as distrust of political officials and interest and engagement in public affairs.

Clearly, cohorts born after 1950 are less invested in politics, in terms of frequency of political discussions, interest in public affairs, and image they have of political officials (Table 3). The results are particularly robust given that “cohort effects” are controlled for by other socio-demographic variables—the most important being education level, sex and occupation—and that they derive from several surveys and therefore several years of observation. In other words, cohort effects cannot be reduced to a life-cycle effect. For example, individuals born between 1961 and 1970 are 2.5 times more likely never to discuss politics (than to discuss politics often) than are individuals born in the 1930s. This result holds for the entire period in which the question was asked, be it in 1990, when those individuals were between 20 and 29, or in 2006 when they were between 36 and 45. It may seem to substantiate pessimistic views of the impact of generational renewal on attitude toward politics, the idea that we are entering an era of “disenchantment with democracy” (Perrineau 2003) or a “society of distrust” (Algan and Cahuc 2007). But there is another possible explanation.

First, in response to the rise of political distrust characterizing France and other countries (Schweisguth 2002), analysis has often focused on citizens, seldom on the responsibility of political actors themselves, whereas that might be relevant in explaining, for example, the specificity of a cohort that shows a particularly negative attitude toward politics for all three indicators—the 1971-80 cohort. With other variables kept equal, individuals from this cohort are 1.9 times more likely than individuals from the 1931-40 cohort to discuss politics sometimes (and 3.5 times more likely never to discuss politics) than often. They are also 1.9 times more likely not to be interested in politics and 1.4 times more likely to think that “political officials don’t care about people like [us]” than the opposite.

TABLE 3. *Impact of cohort on different indicators of attitude toward politics*

	Occasionally discuss politics vs often	Never discuss politics vs often	Not interested in politics vs interested	Think that political officials don’t care about people like us vs think that political officials care about people like us
<i>1930 and earlier</i>	.960	1.20***	1.12*	.972
<i>1941-50</i>	1.03	.975	1.03	1.12*
<i>1951-60</i>	1.27***	1.32***	1.24***	1.19**
<i>1961-70</i>	1.72***	2.51***	1.73***	1.17*
<i>1971-80</i>	1.91***	3.48***	1.94***	1.37***
<i>1981 and later</i>	1.45*	1.94***	1.76***	1.03
<i>1931-40</i>	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)

Reading: Shown here are odds ratios for the cohort variable with educational level, occupation or former occupation, attitude toward religion, and survey year controlled for. The “political discussion” variable comes from the Eurobarometer survey; for the “interest in politics” and “politicians care about people like us,” I used the French presidential election and TriElec surveys mentioned above.


These individuals arrived on the French political scene in the 1990s, a period when both right and left were implicated in public finance scandals, the period in which Jospin declared, “The state cannot do everything”—whereas sixteen years earlier the left claimed it wanted to “change people’s lives.” A significant proportion of the 1971-80 cohort was surely affected by this political climate in their first years of adulthood. The socialization hypothesis becomes relevant here. To push a bit further in this direction, it is worth noting that the cohort of individuals born in 1981 and later seems less withdrawn than its immediate predecessor: it is less likely to be politically non-aligned, not to be interested in politics, and not to discuss politics. This can also be understood in terms of the impact of the period in which these individuals reached voting age, a time of fewer political scandals but sharper left/right polarization, notably due to Sarkozy’s actions.

Lastly, we can reason with reference to Dalton’s interpretation (2007) of observed trends in Western countries. As he sees it, we are shifting from “duty-based citizenship” to “engaged citizenship.” This means that the norms associated with the “good citizen” have changed considerably in recent decades. The duty dimension (voting, obeying the law, pledging allegiance to the nation-state, being ready to die for one’s country), also present in “scruple-based citizenship” (Duchesne 1997), is declining, overtaken by a vision of citizenship based on individual autonomy and engagement (determining one’s own opinions, being active oneself in politics and associations, supporting the have-nots).

The hypothesis of an erosion of duty-based citizenship dovetails well with trends in voting attitudes. Clearly, voting is no longer something people do automatically. As early as 1997, abstention signaled more than rejection of the political system; a segment of voters “abstain within the game” (Muxel 2003) and voting and abstaining alike are becoming more intermittent (Héran 2004). Stéphane Jugnot (2007) estimates the proportion of intermittent voters in France at 40.2%. As predicted by the political moratorium theory, young people are the most likely to vote intermittently (over 50% of under-35s). What is more surprising is the figure of 40% for citizens from 45 to 49, an age when the political moratorium would seem to be behind one.

Underlying the persistence of intermittent voting we find the impact of generational renewal and the changed attitude toward citizenship that seems to be characteristic of current generational renewal. I compared cohorts’ reported voting in French presidential elections, known to mobilize the greatest numbers of voters, and European Union parliamentary elections, the least likely to mobilize French voters (Figure 7).

FIGURE 7. *Cohorts at the polls:*
A comparison between French presidential and EU elections



Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres post-electoral surveys, 1988 and 1995; French electoral panel survey, 2002; CEVIPOF-Interior Ministry-IFOP post-electoral survey, 2007; French electoral survey, 2012; European Electoral Studies 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009.

Reading: Proportions of respondents in the different cohorts reporting that they voted (rather than abstained) in French presidential and European Union elections since 1988.

Studies of abstention based on the results of self-reporting surveys are often criticized for bias. Some respondents may in fact conceal their real behavior, choosing to report behavior that complies with the socially approved “civic norm.”³⁰ Still, the differences in reported behavior for the two elections are striking. For presidential elections the cohorts are practically indistinguishable. This holds regardless of how old or recent the cohort is and whether the elections were characterized by overall high or (relatively) low voter turnout. Presidential elections, then, seem to elicit maximum voter turnout in all cohorts if we take into account systemic abstention (e.g., for sickness or other disabilities, etc.). For European Union elections the situation is fundamentally different. Here, the more recent a cohort is, the less likely its members are to turn out. This is particularly true for cohorts born after 1950, as in the preceding analyses. There are two possible interpretations of these cohort variations: 1) they are due to real behavioral differences; 2) the relevance and resonance of the civic norm varies by cohort. Whatever the answer, the result denotes differentiated attitudes toward voting. Older cohorts tend to be either constant voters or more sensitive to voting “as duty” (and are therefore more likely to conceal any abstaining). Recent cohorts have a much more context-bound attitude toward voting, shifting from

29. [Mass of supporters for the left. The term *peuple* was initially strongly left-identified.]

heavy turnout for French presidential elections to low turnout for European elections. While reported turnout varies by only 8 points in the cohort of individuals born between 1931 and 1940, the range is 14 points in the baby boomer cohorts, 22 points among individuals born in the 1960s, and reaches as high as 31 points among those born in 1970 and later. Clearly election type counts for recent cohorts. If the election seems important (issues, campaign, etc.) then turnout is high, and similar to levels among the older cohorts. When the election seems of secondary importance, the proportion of abstainers rises considerably. What characterizes these individuals, then, is not that they have broken the political tie; if that were true they would not go to the polls for major elections. These intermittent voters—who choose whether or not to turn out—are fairly representative of the emergence of “citizenship as a set of individual rights (rather than duties),” which they exercise when they think they have good reason to.

*
* *

Sociopolitical analysis is too often based on only two of the three forms of sociological time: period and age. The third—generational renewal—should not be neglected, especially since it is not politically neutral. The electorate to come will not be the same as the departing one, either in terms of values, ideological perspectives, or attitude toward the role of citizen. Above all, if the trends shown here turn out to apply to future cohorts, they will have an increasing impact on France’s electoral future. Already today turnout from one election to the next varies at an unprecedented scale. In the late 1970s the difference between the EU election (1979) and the French legislative elections (1978) came to only 22 percentage points. The gap between turnout for the 2007 presidential election and the European elections of 2009 was 43 points. As “duty-based voting” cohorts are replaced by “individual right-based voting,” it is highly likely that these gaps will widen. Regardless of whether we consider this an unfortunate development, it is one that seems at present difficult to reverse. The rise of intermittent, context-based voting is not new evidence that democracy is in crisis. Recent cohorts are less interested in politics and discuss it less than their other social characteristics (namely education level) seem to suggest. They also feel more distant from political personnel. But first, this does not apply to all individuals in these cohorts. Second, these cohorts do turn out and play their role at the polls whenever what is at stake seems important enough to them. Lastly, generational renewal is going hand in hand with progress in the value of tolerance. In this, my results confirm studies on trends for xenophobia and homophobia in France (Mayer and Roux 2004; Schweisguth 1998).

All in all, generational renewal seems a crucial key for understanding French social and political trends—one that is as important as population ageing, immigration or labor market trends. It is only reasonable to plead for more systematic use of cohort analysis in political sociology.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1. *Recoding the left/right self-identification variable*

The way the Eurobarometer surveys measure left/right self-identification makes it something of a challenge to recode this variable. The question reads as follows:

“People talk about ‘right’ and ‘left’ in politics. Could you indicate your position on this scale?” (SHOW RESPONDENT THE CARD)

(INTERVIEWER: DON’T MAKE ANY SUGGESTION. IF RESPONDENT HESITATES, INSIST)

LEFT									RIGHT
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Refuse to answer.....	11
Don’t know.....	12

The French and American tradition is to ask respondents to locate themselves on a 7-point scale. The European Social Survey uses an 11-point scale. In both cases there is a clear central position—in contrast to the Eurobarometer surveys where, mathematically, the center is 5.5. If we calculate strictly, then, the “5” and “6” response categories in the Eurobarometers correspond to “center”; 1 to 4 to “left,” and 7 and above to “right.”

But we can also posit that respondents do not calculate this way and that for them the only “neither-left-nor right” box is “5.” In this case, “left” response categories remain the same and “6” indicates right identification. In both cases, refusal to answer and “don’t know” responses were ranked with “center” responses.


The essential point here is to determine the boundary between “neither-left-nor-right” and right. To find the accurate dividing line, I analyzed voting intentions as measured in the Eurobarometer surveys.³¹ Caution is in order, because doing so means combining survey waves; i.e., extremely varied political contexts (in connection with the National Front party, for example, or the ecologists) from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. Likewise, voting intentions measured in election years are not likely to have the same meaning as intentions measured during ordinary political years or periods. However, the heterogeneous data do provide us with sufficient information for the purposes of this appendix.

There is of course no strict correspondence between ideologically identifying with a given side and intending to vote for a party identified with that side. The relative porosity can be explained either by lack of political competence or “defection,” a phenomenon found in many elections and countries. Lastly, in some contexts left-identified voters in France may vote for the right to sanction socialist governments just as right-identified voters might vote for the left in the opposite circumstances.

However this may be, the simple cross-tabulation above supports my recoding choice. The difference between individuals choosing box 4 rather than 5 is striking: 65% expressed an intention to vote for the communists or socialists and nearly 10% for the ecologists (though the meaning of this last vote is polysemous), while 21% planned to abstain or refused to answer. The right won less than 5% of their votes. Individuals who chose box 5 are distinct in two ways: their high level of indecision or withdrawal, as 42% say they do not know, refuse to answer or plan to abstain; the drastic fall in intentions to vote for the left (down to 28%), whereas the right and extreme right together win 18% of their voting intentions. This set of respondents recall the polysemy of “center-identified” ones in other political identification measurements: it encompasses true ideological centrists, ordinary voters who in choosing this response reveal their political incompetence, and voters who identify with none of the traditional parties.

30. Using signed voting lists obviously enables researchers to steer clear of this bias.
31. The variable in question, designated “VOTEINT” in the Eurobarometer Trend File, measures

FIGURE 8. *Reported voting intentions by left/right self-identification*



Source: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002.

Reading: Percentage of voting intentions by left/right self-identification.

The boundary between left and non-left, then, is quite clear. What about the right? Here we are concerned with the status of box 6. Respondents who chose it are politically different from those choosing box 5. The right and extreme right win 49% of their votes while the traditional left gets no more than 11% and the ecologists 7%. However, these voters are also characterized by withdrawal, as nearly a third of them reported an intention to abstain or said they did not know who to vote for. Box 6 respondents clearly fall between those in boxes 5 and 7, but they are closer to box 7 than 5, namely in terms of their rightward electoral leanings (especially if we consider reported voting intentions only). Consequently, it seems more accurate to rank them with the right than to think of them as alter egos of box 5 respondents.

By choosing not to exclude “don’t know” and “refuse to answer” respondents but rather grouping them with box 5 respondents, I am aware that I have accentuated the “withdrawal from politics” feature of this code, at the expense of ideological centrism.

APPENDIX 2. *Measuring normative preferences*

The point here is to present the major features of the method I used to construct measures of voters' cultural and socio-economic preferences. Readers wishing to know more about the method should see my article, "La politique des deux axes: variables sociologiques, valeurs et votes en France (1988-2007)," specifically the appendix on method.

I had two objectives: 1) comparability over time; 2) robust empirical measurements of socio-economic and cultural dimensions.

French electoral surveys are characterized by a weak time series culture. From 1988 to 2012, only two questions on socio-economic values were systematically asked: opinions on privatizations and profits. The situation is slightly better for cultural values: we have series on the death penalty, immigrant numbers and the role of the schools. But in neither case do we have the minimum number of questions needed over the entire period to generate sufficiently robust and reliable attitude scales.

On the basis this situation I made the following three assumptions:

- 1) If we follow the literature on the question, there are indeed two value dimensions, one cultural, the other socio-economic;
- 2) The survey questions available therefore amount to tests that allow for measuring these normative preferences;
- 3) Certain questions are more useful for doing this than others.

With these points in mind, the idea was to extract factors for each value dimension and each survey (a total of 5*2 cases) using data analysis methods. I did principal component analysis, factorial analyses and multiple correspondence analysis, obtaining strongly corroborative results.

To ensure factor comparability I selected a subset of questions, those asked at least twice, the assumption being that this was a guarantee of their intrinsic quality; the various factors were normalized and centered: all have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1; relations between factors over time were analyzed with different variables of interest to check that they do measure the same phenomenon.

This way of proceeding does not allow for measuring trends in voters' socio-economic or political preferences over time (as would have been possible with an attitude scale or techniques like "mood"), but it does give a measure of their positions on these dimensions compared to the entire sample. We can determine, for instance, whether they belonged to the 10% of culturally most conservative voters in 2012 or 1988. Once again, the aim here is to check if a difference in individual position on the socio-economic factor, the cultural factor, or both induces different ideological identifications.

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