Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study - Sciences Po Access content directly
Journal Articles Political Research Quarterly Year : 2011

Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study

Abstract

The authors test a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate and the candidate’s perceived viability. They test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four in one round and four in two rounds. Results show that the same model applies to both voting systems, although the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two-round elections. The authors conclude that strategic considerations are almost as important in two-round as in one-round elections.
No file

Dates and versions

hal-02186592 , version 1 (17-07-2019)

Identifiers

Cite

André Blais, Simon Labbé-St-Vincent, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger, Karine van Der Straeten. Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study. Political Research Quarterly, 2011, 64 (3), pp.637-645. ⟨10.1177/1065912909358583⟩. ⟨hal-02186592⟩
49 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More