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# Governing Diversity in Europe's Plural Spaces: A Path to New Normativities

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## **Abstract**

The question of how to reconcile diversity and integration has occupied public debates, political agendas and social sciences for decades. This WP provides a brief outline of how the project [Negotiating Diversity in Expanded European Public Spaces](#) addresses these matters. Our point of departure is that questions pertaining to the governing and recognition of diversity in Europe cannot be properly addressed without at the same time taking into account the multilevel character of *European public space*, the multiple characters of the groups (national/religion based etc), and the multiple modes of integration. Within such a complex European space, we identify four policy/theoretical approaches to diversity management and understanding of public space: multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Each 'ism' has its own conception of public space, diversity, equality and solidarity. Our main aim is to contribute to the normativities that inform the theory and practice of integration and diversity governance in Europe.

## **Note from the authors**

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In memory of Julia Patricia Carrillo Lerma who started with us on the empirical pursuit of this project but was tragically lost to a long illness at a very young age.

## **Keywords**

Diverse Public Space, Multiculturalism, Interculturalism, Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism

## **Authors' biographical notes (in alphabetical order)**



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2018) treats the relationship between belonging and territory in globalization, built around the question of Transnational nationalism. Her other recent books are *Negotiating Identities. States and Immigrants in France and Germany* Princeton University Press 2002. Further, she edited several books including: *An identity for Europe. Challenge of multiuculturalism in the construction of the European union*, London Palgrave 2007. Finally, one of her last edited books is *Turkey Between Nationalism and Globalization*, London Routledge 2013.



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## Introduction

The question of how to reconcile diversity and integration has occupied public debates, political agendas and social sciences for decades. In Europe, this particular issue pertains to the settlement of post-immigrant ethno-racial, ethno-cultural and ethno-religious groups, along with the expression and organization of collective identities; claims for participation/representation and recognition; the role of religion in public space; and the increasing influence of diaspora and transnational politics.

These questions are hotly contested in today's Europe, which finds itself facing conflicting dynamics and pressures from boundary-spanning technological changes, globalization and transnationalization on the one hand, and nationalist and religious-identitarian, including minority, reactions on the other. Interspersed in this is the effort to institutionalize a level of governance at the European level, mainly through the European Union (EU), but generally supplemented and supported by the Council of Europe and with it the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), with important implications for the governing of diversity across the European public space.

The refugee crisis, Brexit and the corona pandemic have amplified the political importance of and contestation over immigration and integration with important implications for theories and practices of diversity governance. This Working Paper provides a brief outline of how the project [Negotiating Diversity in Expanded European Public Spaces](#) (PLURISPACE)<sup>1</sup> addresses these matters. Our point of departure is that questions pertaining to the governing and recognition of diversity in Europe cannot be properly addressed without at the same time taking into account the multilevel character of the diverse, composite and highly complex *European public space* that they unfold within, the multiple characters of the groups (some identified by national origins, others by religion etc.), and the multiple modes of integration. Within such a complex European space, we identify four policy and theoretical approaches to diversity governing and understanding of public space: multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Each 'ism' has its own conception of public space, diversity, equality and solidarity. PLURISPACE uses the four theoretical approaches to understand how the multilevel and highly composite European public space manages diversity. Our main aim is to contribute to the normativities that inform the theory and practice of integration and diversity governance in Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Funded by HERA, see website: <http://heranet.info/projects/public-spaces-culture-and-integration-in-europe/negotiating-diversity-in-expanded-european-public-spaces/>.

All four “isms” are tailored to managing diversity, not to reduce diversity, which is the main purpose of approaches that rely on assimilation and exclusion. Our focus is justified with reference on the one hand to the fact that we address the European public space, a site of irreducible diversity (across levels of governing (vertically) and across societies (horizontally)) and thus in need of constructive philosophies for governing diversity. On the other hand, the approach is justified with reference to the fact that even if much public rhetoric has changed in a less-diversity-friendly direction, the reality on the ground is one where public policies and activities are often very attentive to diversity governance.<sup>2</sup> PLURISPACE’s analytical framework will thus direct an empirical undertaking that uncovers how diversity is managed across levels in the European public space. This undertaking will help to set the empirical record straight. In addition, and the main purpose of PLURISPACE is to build on the juxtaposing of theory and empirics and thus to contribute to theoretical innovation by seeking to develop a new normativity of diversity management that incorporates insights from all four theoretical approaches and is sensitive to questions of scale (in other words that conditions for diversity management may vary with level of governance (city/local, regional, national, European)). In effect, incorporating all four isms together with issues of scale can bring forth a new normativity in diversity governing and management.

This ambitious objective will benefit from the fact that the four approaches vary with regard to the aspects of public space that they highlight; to their historical constructions and to the way they frame the issues; level of generality; and in terms of proximity to policy-making processes. Studies on integration and public space have generally confined themselves to one approach and considered its relation to laws and policies, and/or as means of claims-making and mobilization. Most analyses of post-immigrant incorporation have been single-theory-oriented, leading to multiple, contested and controversial interpretations of integration and democratic public spaces. No systematic assessment that compares and contrasts them has thus far been undertaken.

PLURISPACE will be designed to examine empirically how these four approaches (multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism) are related across different levels or scales of public space; to assess post-immigrant ethno-religious minorities’ perceptions and adoptions of these different normative approaches; to clarify the nature and relations among multiple conceptions of integration in the European public space that both

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<sup>2</sup> Meer and Modood, 2009; Wessendorf and Vertovec, 2010; Banting and Kymlicka, 2013; Adam and Torreken, 2015.

overlap and diverge; and to create a scheme for untangling the four theoretical approaches, for rendering them comparable, amenable to empirical research, and for considering the degree of complementarities and tensions, especially bearing in mind that they are designed for different levels/forms of public space. It is precisely the articulation of theoretical and empirical insights that will enable PLURISPACE to fulfill its main objective, namely to devise a new composite theory of diversity governance that draws on insights from all four approaches. The research will therefore be adequately tailored to address questions of scale and multilevel dynamics, which mark the European public space, both within and beyond the EU.

This Working Paper sets out the basic elements of this analytical framework. It starts by conceptualizing the European public space, and thereafter outlines in more detail the four diversity governance approaches, organized along a number of relevant analytical dimensions. The final section concludes with a brief overview of overlaps and discrepancies between them.

## **1. Conceptualizing the European public space(s)**

‘Public space’ encompasses values and beliefs as well as formation and appropriation of institutions. Public space includes yet goes beyond ‘public sphere’ (a network for communicating information and points of view, and a space where ‘society’ talks knowingly about itself, cf. Habermas 1989; applied to the EU see Fossum and Schlesinger 2007). In order to understand diversity governance, we need to complement the communicative interactions that take place in Europe’s public spheres with a notion of the public space wherein such communicative interactions unfold. Our notion of public space refers to the material and immaterial sites wherein cultural interaction and societal dynamics take place. This includes physical environments and governing arrangements; “virtual” sites that structure interaction such as media and public spheres; and attributes of persons and groups such as language, ethnicity, and identity.

PLURISPACE conceives of public space from two angles: ideational and structural, and how it is perceived and enacted. In addition, PLURISPACE shows how the very understanding of public space is theory-dependent, as is reflected in the fact that PLURISPACE’s four theoretical approaches come with different conceptions of the nature and operation of public space as well as of the place within it of the minorities of extra-European origin. These differences will become apparent in the below, when we unpack the approaches along a number of relevant analytical dimensions. This includes the question of whether it is most useful to refer to European public space in the singular or European public spaces in plural.

The ideational angle is understood in a broad sense, i.e. how ideas and concepts are linked together in ‘social imaginaries’ (Taylor, 2004). The European public space as a site for governing, socialization and value inculcation today includes such governing units as the municipality (city); the region; the state, the EU and more broadly Europe, covering affiliated non-members (Norway), a new category of ex-EU member (UK), and the transnational dimension of extra-European home countries’ intervention through diaspora politics as well as post-migrants’ solidarities beyond national settings in the European space.

Further, there is an irreducibly inter-subjective element to public space, which can only be understood with reference to individuals’ and groups’ own concepts, experiences and perceptions of the sites within which they operate. Such concepts, experiences and perceptions in turn structure and shape their reactions, and the efforts that they make to reshape public space.

The EU (and the Council of Europe especially through the European Convention of Human Rights and associated Court), despite weak institutional and other socializing mechanisms, can affect the terms of individual and group membership; citizens’ and collectives’ (states and regions) rights; values; and the terms of recognition, participation, and solidarity. As such, ‘Europe’ contributes to shaping perceptions and reactions of public spaces across all levels. It also unleashes international dynamics and seeks to make a European imprint on the broader global scale. Multilevel Europe is marked by contestation over governance (*who* and *how*); over socialization and integration of actors from different backgrounds; and over their *effects*. The instance of Brexit is but one manifestation of a broader contestation over how to balance the national and the supra-national, as well as integration and cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe today. European public space is permeable in that transnational dynamics are not confined to Europe. Today’s Europe is also marked by new modes of political participation occasioned by a space open to the demands of not only its citizens’ but also residents’ interests and identities. This allows both groups to assert some autonomy in relation to state systems that are territorially bounded. By the same token, transnational activity strengthens the demand of populations resulting from immigrants now resident in European countries, for example, for equality of rights and treatment at the European level, as well as struggles against racism; as a means of circumventing the assimilationist approaches of nation-states. Transnationality, thanks to increasing interactions among actors from different

traditions, might even become a means of socialization and training in a new political culture and introduce a practice of citizenship.<sup>3</sup>

We place citizens' rights and their relation to the multiple levels of governance, that is to say, citizenship, at the centre of our understanding of European public space. In this internationally permeable multilevel context, the question of diversity governance is related to a debate on the *re-making of citizenship*. Such a process concerns how to define belonging, public identities, rights and duties, solidarity and participation in diverse societies that constitute European public spaces. The challenge is how to deal with theoretical normative-pluralism and to look for and harness complementarities in addressing questions of integration and multilevel citizenship.

The four theoretical approaches - multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism - vary with regard to the aspects of public space that they highlight; in how they frame issues; in level of generality; and in terms of proximity to policy-making processes. The four normative concepts contribute to European public space in contestatory/complementary ways with the perspective of re-making citizenship and redefining the European public spaces. They offer different prescriptions for the integration of post-immigration ethno-religious minorities across different levels and types of public space within Europe. PLURISPACE will establish through its theoretical and empirical examinations whether relations among the four isms can be approximated to reach some form of correspondence (considering that they have different governing levels as their centre of gravity). PLURISPACE examines this with reference to the theoretical as well as the empirical dimension; hence can draw on both sets of examinations in its search for policy prescriptions. If there is greater compatibility at the theoretical level than in the empirics, then theory guides policy prescriptions. If there is greater compatibility in practice than what the theories depict, then practice directs us to reconsider theories and their interactions.

Multiculturalism is a 'difference'-sensitive approach to integration, emphasising **the need to revise citizenship and national identity** to include group identities.<sup>4</sup> The idea is that equality in the context of 'difference' cannot be achieved by individual rights or equality as sameness but has to be extended to include the **positive inclusion** (not assimilation) of marginalized groups marked by race and their own sense of ethno-cultural identities. Multiculturalism thereby grows from an initial commitment to racial equality into a perspective

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<sup>3</sup> R. Kastoryano (ed.) ; *An Identity for Europe. The Challenge of Multi-culturalism in the Construction of the European Union*, Palgrave, 2009, The introduction

<sup>4</sup> The key texts include Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2006 [2000] and Modood (2013 [2007]).

that allows minorities to publicly oppose negative images of themselves in favour of positive self-definitions and institutional accommodations.

Interculturalism's core is a citizenship-making strategy based on a variety of existing and potential contacts we can foster in public spaces, between people from diverse backgrounds, including nationals, to achieve a cohesive society. The **transformative dimension of people, place and space** is at the core of interculturalism. Through contact, a new public culture arises, a '**culture of diversity**' which includes diversity-awareness, diversity-recognition, diversity-participation, diversity-representation (Zapata-Barrero, 2018). Interculturalism thus provides pragmatic devices for resolving diversity-related conflicts and offers a proactive focus for ways of benefitting from diversity.

Transnationalism recognizes the multiple links and affiliations to home and host country and solidarities beyond borders of settlements that mark the immigration experience.<sup>5</sup> As a new approach to host-country analysis of integration, citizenship, solidarity and recognition by relating it to globalization, transnationalism affects **how public space is structured within and without national and local boundaries**, thereby raising the question of territorial, cultural and political belonging (Basch, Glick Schiller & Blanc-Szanton, 1994, Kastoryano, 2006). At the European level, ethno-religious communities as well as all minorities and majorities are driven to action in a **transnational public space**, defined as a common arena for socialization and the exercise of power, and in this way are in a position to manifest their involvement and their belonging, at least de facto, to two national communities.

Cosmopolitanism comes in many forms and guises.<sup>6</sup> The modern version posits cosmopolitanism as a political doctrine with a specific take on public space, namely as the relevant site and precondition for cosmopolitan *democracy*.<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of PLURISPACE, we have designed it specifically to address PLURISPACE-relevant questions. Cosmopolitanism is tailored to **extending rights-based entitlements beyond nation-state membership**; hence cosmopolitanism understands public space in a very inclusive manner due to its **universalist orientation**. The cosmopolitan re-making of citizenship pertains to the challenge of working out the rights and obligations of citizens across levels in a context of what Habermas has termed 'global domestic policy'.

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<sup>5</sup> The key texts include Bash, Glick Schiller & Blanc-Szanton (1994), Baubock (2003), Faist, Fauser & Reisenauer (2013), Kastoryano & Portes (2006), Kastoryano (2018).

<sup>6</sup> Key texts that refer to cosmopolitanism's moral, democratic and social dimensions, include: Kant (1991; Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann (1997); Habermas (2001); Delanty (2009); Kendall et al (2009).

<sup>7</sup> A brief selection includes Held (1995) Archibugi (2008).

## 2. The four approaches unpacked

This section unpacks the four approaches with reference to the following analytical dimensions. The aim of the unpacking is to render explicit how the four approaches understand and conceptualize European public space, and to clarify the main similarities and differences between the approaches along a range of dimensions of particular relevance to managing diversity. The first dimension is level of governance, which is essential to capture the nature and role of scale. The second is citizenship, which refers to the terms under which persons are members of a political community; the rights they have and their identities. The third is equality and recognition; the fourth is group solidarity and the fifth and final one is policy orientation.

In the following unpacking, we outline each approach on its own terms so to speak. Here the accent is on specifying the distinctive features of each. After this unpacking, we briefly outline the important similarities, overlaps and converges that exist between them. First, however we need to get the specifics of each 'ism'.

### 2.1. Level of governance

As noted above, a critical dimension of European public space is its multi-level character. Governing arrangements, which make binding decisions on individuals, groups and states now exist at the European level (within the EU and across Europe through the Council of Europe), the national level, the regional level and the local/city level. This fact has implications for how we conceptualize the European public space. It adds an irreducible complexity that automatically triggers the notion of a multitude of European spaces or a multi-scalar European space. The four approaches as we will show have different scalar centers of gravity and are differently sensitive to territorially and hierarchically configured forms of difference and diversity.

*Multiculturalism* posits that Europe offers a direction to nation-states on multicultural citizenship and hyphenated nationality, highlighting and endorsing good practice of nation states without expecting uniformity, whilst also fostering a dialogical European identity, adding to without diminishing the national citizenship.

Multiculturalism posits that the national level is in charge of and puts in place provisions for equal citizenship, anti-discrimination and positive action, and codes of good practice. These are bent on ensuring institutional accommodation of minority group identities, and forms of recognition of difference that are attentive to and meeting of distinctive group needs (Kymlicka 1995). The ultimate goal is to produce a national citizenship to which all nationals may achieve a sense of belonging (Modood 2013 [2007]). The local level for multiculturalism will basically

be designed to serve and ensure that the rights and policies formulated at the national level are carried out with due attention to the cultural recognition concerns involved, local variation and the participation of minorities.

*Interculturalism* in Europe is being implemented in all areas of public policies as a mainly a city and regional project. This move from macro-national to micro-local politics is at the foreground of what has been labelled the ‘local turn’ we are witnessing in migration studies (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio & Scholten, 2017). This territorial origin provides interculturalism with two main strengths: proximity as it primarily promotes face-to-face relations and policies at the neighborhood level, and pragmatism because action and practice prevail over any preconception of justice or ideal of equality. Its key-words are closeness and connectedness, namely that the policy is relevant to citizens offering them responses to citizens’ direct concerns. Ethically this also mean ‘empathy’, which involves developing values that promote mutual exchange, and generate a sense of common humanity. Interculturalism encourages positive social values, mutual trust and confidence (Zapata-Barrero, 2019b: 16). The State level of governance need to contribute to these local efforts providing the appropriate legal and political arrangements to ensure the conditions for interculturalism: equality and power-sharing, diversity-representation and diversity-participation.

*Transnationalism* operates in a context of multilevel governance: local, national, transnational, European and global, but focuses less on vertical and more on horizontal (between home and host countries and cross border - diasporic) relations. It is at the local level that the community first defines its internal and external boundaries, develops networks based on a common identification beyond the local and national territory..Transnational organisation based on networks allows the post migrant ethno-religious populations to escape national policies, and generates a new space of socialisation for immigrants involved in building networks beyond national borders. The cultural and political specificities of national societies (host and home and beyond) are combined with emerging multilevel and multinational activities in a new space beyond territorially delimited nation-states.

*Cosmopolitanism*’s core is moral universalism but as developed here it understands the relationship between governing levels as structured in line with the tenets of *reverse subsidiarity*. Subsidiarity means that the lower level is key and the higher level’s role is to support the lower level to develop its full potential.<sup>8</sup> Most of the decisions also under

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<sup>8</sup> Subsidiarity has a long historical lineage, with roots in Calvinist and Catholic thought. It has also played a key role in discussions of the EU as a multilevel governing system. See for instance Cass (1992). For our purposes an account of subsidiarity that highlights the justificatory dimension is key (cf. Blichner and Sangolt 1994).

cosmopolitanism must be made at a lower level. Reverse subsidiarity entails that the lower levels when taking decisions must align these with the core normative principles and legal requirements that cosmopolitanism privileges and entrenches at the global (or highest possible) level.

The reversal is therefore in the direction of the subsidiarity logic, from bottom-up to top-down, not in the structure of norms, rules and governing institutions that remains pyramidal, in the sense that lower levels intervene more directly in citizens' lives than higher ones. The critical issue is that lower levels must justify differential rules, provisions and policies with reference to human-rights related universal principles and laws. In line with this cosmopolitanism posits that the global level, the European level, and the national level all function as *rights granters*, and that the relationship between rights and obligations across levels are arranged in line with the principle of reverse subsidiarity, with the higher ruling over the lower.

## **2.2. Citizenship**

The public space is occupied by persons, in their various capacities. Citizenship is a legal means for constituting the person as having membership in a political community; as a rights-holder and, beyond law, as participation in a collective. As such, citizenship operates at two levels: horizontally, individuals and groups in relation to each other ('the body of citizens') and vertically, individuals and groups in relation to the polity. The three dimensions of membership, rights/obligations and identity have, as we will show, different manifestations in PLURISPACE's four approaches to governing and managing diversity.

**Multiculturalism** re-works the concept of equal citizenship by extending it from anti-discrimination to a respect for difference, to inclusion of marginalised minority identities into the national identity (Modood 2013 [2007]). In this way, multiculturalism places a high valuation on citizenship and attributes normative importance to other collective identities that matter to people, especially those based on a sense of 'difference' (Parekh 2006 [2000]). These identities are based on our race, ethnicity, language, religion, gender, sexuality etc but they have a political significance by mattering to people. The inclusion of religious or ethno-religious identities within civic belonging means that multiculturalism is opposed to any version of secularism that actively marginalises such identities in the public space (Modood, 2019a).

In this way, multiculturalism combines the universality of citizenship with the particularities of citizenship (eg., its Frenchness) and other identities (eg., being of Arab descent). It provides a perspective on integration, combining a core of equal rights for all

citizens with a communitarian perspective on minorities and a pluralised national identity based on over-lapping and changing multi-level identities (CMEB 2000).

**Interculturalism** shows its pro-active dimension in terms of fostering new forms of citizenship identity and belonging separated from birth and origin. The seminal work of Castells (1999) showed us that the question of personal identity is much more connected to how people relate to each other, rather than the traditional ‘Who am I?’ based on ‘where I was born’ (territory) or ‘who my parents are’ (descent). When we look at citizenship traditions, interculturalism is close to the republican tradition as a strategy combining place-making and identity-making to frame public spaces (Zapata-Barrero, 2020). In this sense, intercultural citizenship highlights a sense of space and place as vital elements in citizenship-formation – and this can include the place where people live now and feel belonging through everyday practices in its neighbourhood (Hellgren, 2018). Akin to the republican tradition, it is through practices in public spaces that we develop a sense of belonging, directly related to a sense of place in the city.

Within these premises, there is the argument that living together in diversity cannot be anything other than the product of citizenship learning and the result of socialization, an action, which public authorities should lead and thereby they should be responsible for providing to the entire population. Through this approach, identities of belonging and membership are formed through spatial interpersonal relations. As a relational-concept, identities are always open with a transformative potential.

**Transnationalism** brings to light multiple membership and loyalties - crystallized around dual citizenship. Such multiple identifications and allegiances raise the question of an individual’s belonging to the national community and decouples the nationality-citizenship union, which implies identity and loyalty to a single political community. With dual citizenship, the country of settlement gives the juridical basis for rights and duties, and citizenship of the country of origin becomes a way to maintain an identity rooted in the home country (Kastoryano, 2002). Such an understanding of citizenship raises the question of the relevance of the multiple links between citizenship, nationality, belonging and territoriality, between political community and an ethno/cultural/religious community, the former as a source of right and legitimacy, and the latter as a source of identity.

Transnationalism draws on an immigration experience linking two national spaces, responds to a transnational citizenship (Bauböck, 1994) that is shaped by a ‘transnational social field’ (Faist, 2017), a new identity space tying together cultural references from the country of origin and the country of settlement.

This development is at the core of ‘diaspora politics’ as a means for home states to maintain the loyalty of their citizens ‘abroad’, through their remittances, or lobbying but increasingly to extend their power beyond territories, redefining thus the nation as extra-territorial. An important question pertains to whether transnationalism will engender a distinct sense of nationhood, non-territorial, where boundaries follow formal and/or informal network connections that transcend the territorial limits of states and nations, thus creating a new form of territorialization – invisible and unbounded – and consequently a form of political community within which individual actions become the basis for a form of non-territorial nationalism that seeks to strengthen itself through speech, symbols, images and objects. These communities are guided by a deterritorialized ‘imagined geography’ that gives rise to a form of transnational nationalism, or a type of nationalism without territory (Kastoryano, 2007). Or will transnationalism borrow from versions of nationalism or cosmopolitanism?

*Cosmopolitanism*’s conception of citizenship is embedded in the notion of reverse subsidiarity as briefly outlined above. That implies a set of human rights, mainly tailored to a limited range of basic protective rights (ensuring private autonomy) at the global level, with the global level a relevant site for the right to have rights for individuals. Cosmopolitanism envisages a thicker set of rights at the European and even more so at national level. There are different views among cosmopolitans as to the ability of political systems to regulate access and rights acquisition for outsiders. The position taken here is that borders can be compatible with cosmopolitanism, especially when referring to cosmopolitan democracy, provided that borders are permeable and there is no discrimination with regard to the terms of access, and with regard to the provisions for persons to acquire citizenship.

Cosmopolitanism is compatible with European citizenship and national citizenship; the category of citizenship is not confined to the national level. European citizenship is ‘thinner’ than national citizenship, in line with the more limited range of tasks to be performed at the European versus the national level. Cosmopolitanism prioritizes certain types of rights over others: its main priority is private protective rights; it also places importance on political participatory rights, in accordance with the tenets of cosmopolitan democracy. It also is very attentive to mobility rights, but places little emphasis on social and cultural rights. With regard to identity, cosmopolitanism underlines the role of rights and institutions in fostering allegiance, and is especially concerned with the provisions for socializing persons as democratic citizens.

### 2.3. *Equality and recognition*

A critical concern in governing and managing diversity pertains to equality, not only in terms of legal and social equality, but in terms of equal recognition. Again, the four approaches vary on what they emphasize and how they combine legal equality on the one hand and equal social and cultural recognition on the other.

**Multicultural** equality consists of two concepts of equality. Firstly and fundamentally is the concept of anti-discrimination, sameness of rights and treatment. Secondly, there is Respect for ‘difference’ or Recognition. This is the distinctive multiculturalist contribution to equality (Taylor 1994; Modood 2013 [2006]: 47-49)). It begins with the fact of negative difference (racism, misrecognition, marginalisation) and consists in seeking to turn the negative into a positive, not the erasure of difference but its transformation into something for which civic respect can be won. The subordinate group in question does not just begin to take charge of its positive self-definition, of revaluing the group, but also to define the ways it has been inferiorized, its mode of oppression. The group begins to speak for itself, not just in terms of its positivity but also about its pain. An example is when British Muslims begin to redefine the racism that they experience, from a colour-racism, the experience of not being white in a white society, to a racism, which targets Muslims in the form of distinctive stereotypes and vilifies aspects of their religion and culture (Modood 2019a). The primary interest of multiculturalism is not in culture per se but in the political uses of non-European origin ethnic and related identities, especially in turning their negative and stigmatic status into a positive feature of the societies that they are now part of. This means that multiculturalism is characterized by the challenging, the dismantling and the remaking of public identities (Modood, 2013 [2007]: 34-40).

The foundation of *interculturalism* lies in Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. This theory states that under conditions of equality and power sharing inter-personal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice and ignorance of others. We can extend this hypothesis to accept that this also assumes recognizing diversity and that oneself belongs to this diversity. If a person has the opportunity to communicate with others, s/he will also be able to understand and appreciate different points of view involving his/her way of life, and may also be open to change his/her views as a direct outcome of contact. This assumes that issues of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination commonly occur between people who are in a competitive logic. Therefore, prejudices not only have an identity component, but also a social-class one (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Festenstein (2005: 13), for instance, affirms that the relationship between diversity and tolerance is not clear. Sometimes exposure to ‘the other’

evokes greater understanding, but if lifestyles are too incompatible, it only heightens prejudice. Allport's proposal was that properly managed contact should reduce these problems and lead to better interactions. These conditions for interculturalism include equal status within difference, common goals' interdependence, cooperation and support of authorities, law or customs. This follows that diversity-awareness, recognition and shared public spaces becomes one of the most important conditions for positive contact-promotion.

*Transnationalized* community sentiments are one consequence of multicultural policies applied in liberal democracies, which uphold ethnic pluralism, and foster cultural activities led by immigrant associations in their fight for equality and against discrimination (Kastoryano, 2006). Identities are structured and redefined so as to gain recognition and representation in the state of settlement. Thus the emergence of transnational communities is sustained by an applied *multiculturalism* that gives legitimacy to the recognition of collective identities that are organized and redefined, but where the country of origin, provides the emotional factor and sense of belonging, and the country of settlement merely the legal and political support for their action (Kastoryano, 2006).

The extension of solidarities and activities beyond borders leads to political participation in both spaces, carrying political norms and values from one culture to another. Such transnational communities aim at acting as pressure groups for political recognition in both political spaces. In the European context, their mobilization search for legitimacy before supranational institutions as well in order to use the normative leverage of such institutions and act as pressure groups on states, both home and host (Kastoryano, 2007).

*Cosmopolitanism* highlights legal equality and is against all types of group-based and collective rights that deprive individuals of equal dignity, engender exclusion or discrimination. It follows that cosmopolitanism stresses equal rights, and the type of recognition that emanates from rights, rights-based recognition (what Honneth [1995] refers to as equal dignity). These are mainly private protective and public participatory rights. Cosmopolitanism's approach to equality is tailored to the individual; not the group or community. This also includes the state and the question of states' rights. In a world of states, cosmopolitanism prioritizes individual equality, not equality of states. Cosmopolitanism's approach to equality focuses on equal treatment and equality of opportunity, not equality of results. The cosmopolitan approach to equality is therefore also substantively speaking quite narrow. With that is meant that it does not posit comprehensive policies for social redistribution because these can easily engender dominance. It envisages a large amount of difference and diversity to unfold in the private sphere. From the above it follows that cosmopolitanism is far more concerned with preventing

abuses than with protecting or giving specific forms of recognition or rights to cultures and communities.

#### **2.4. Group solidarity**

A key concern when governing and managing diversity pertains to clarifying the nature of the group solidarity that is at stake and how to relate to that. Again, the four approaches provide different responses.

**Multiculturalists** (like all difference theorists) operate with the assumption that culture-free or identity-neutral or merely civic polities/citizenships or public space or solidarity is impossible – contrary to the classical liberal presumption (Young 2011 [1992]; Kymlicka 1995). So, if liberal neutrality is impossible, our normative concepts must embrace national and cultural identities as the basis of solidarity. The important thing is the inclusion of minorities into or as well as those cultural identities and sense of national belonging that are currently dominant. Just as in equality so in solidarity, we are working with inclusive particularities not just abstract individualism or universalism. These particularities are of course not static; indeed, they must be re-made or multiculturalised on the basis of multicultural equality above.

Multiculturalism is, thus, not against nation-building projects; the ‘multiculturalist point is that the predominance that the cultural majority enjoys in shaping the national culture, symbols, and institutions should not be exercised in a non-minority accommodating way’ (Modood, 2019b: 235). Indeed, at its fullest multiculturalism is a country-remaking project in which the majority and the minorities can see themselves in the national story that connects the past, the present and the future. Indeed, some multiculturalists are currently exploring how to give not just minorities but the majority, too, a normative significance (Modood, 2014, 2019b). The imagined common identity can be a powerful basis of meeting the needs of the worst off in the country while extending assistance to others outside the country who are even worse off.

Interculturalism’s primary concerns are not about abstract or universal notions of justice or rights and goods in the context of diversity, but about a society that takes advantage of the resource that diversity offers while also ensuring community cohesion (Cantle, 2012). Therefore, interculturalism may also lead to campaigns to garner a sense of solidarity. Against the status-quo narrative, the great intercultural’s efforts is to rebut those who ground their xenophobic narratives on the assumption that cohesion is only possible in homogeneous societies (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011).

Following Kymlicka (2016), solidarity refers to the practice of sharing material/immaterial resources based on a sense of belonging and group loyalty. Traditionally

the concept has assumed a certain sense of community with a shared (national) history and shared (national) norms and values, which is the basis of action. Behind these statements, there is a sense of belonging but also some emotional ties (empathy) to the situation of disadvantage of certain people who require external help. Today, in complex diverse societies, solidarity has real difficulties to remain within this national-state paradigm. Hence, a need to reboot the traditional view of solidarity is necessary to interculturalism. Indeed, inverting the argument, non-solidarity situations reveal a certain failure of community cohesion and shared values. This supposes breaking down some epistemological barriers around diversity management basically related to methodological nationalism (Zapata-Barrero, 2019a). Group solidarity can be produced by cultural exchange. If we assume that the European space embraces people with various ethnic, racial, economic, cultural and religious categories, this cooperation between individuals becomes a value that needs to be promoted.

*Transnationalism* recognizes the links and affiliations beyond borders. Such an evolution led to a sense of solidarity that migrant groups develop in both political, social and cultural spaces. Individuals and groups settled in different national societies, sharing common interests and references – regional, religious, linguistic – use transnational networks to consolidate solidarity beyond borders (Faist, 1998). Some of the networks are formal, others are informal; some are based on identity, others on interest; and most of the time on both (interest and identity). Applied identity politics have privileged ethno-religious communities and collective identities to be expressed in public spaces giving legitimacy to the development of transnational networks creating therefore a new political space for collective claims and representation beyond territorial setting of nation-states and cities, leading to new forms of membership and political participation (Kastoryano, 2007).

Transnational networks portray bonds of intra-group solidarity across national borders and lead to the formation of transnational communities, characterized by the internal diversity of the members (defined sometimes by common nationality or ethnicity and/or religion). For Muslim populations in Europe, for example, fragmented from within by various home and host national identities and denominations, the internal diversity is ‘recentered’ around norms and values diffused by normative supranational institutions on human rights, the fight against racism or any other form of social, political and cultural exclusion. The same diversity is also ‘recentered’ around a common identity element that provides the cement of the networks such as religion, particularly Islam, the religion of the majority of post-colonial immigration in Europe, a minority religion that communities are formed in Europe to legitimate their demands for recognition and to spawn a multiculturalist politics (Kastoryano, 2007)

*Cosmopolitanism* highlights constitutional democracy and constitutional patriotism<sup>9</sup> as key ingredients in its highly conditional notion of group solidarity. This implies that group attachments will be considered against the requirements of inclusion (or openness) and reflexivity. 'Inclusion' refers both to the physical inclusion of others (non-nationals, members of other cultures, *etc.*), as well as to the taking into account of the ideas, values, interests and concerns of non-nationals. Furthermore, the institutional and cultural setting must leave space for, or be compatible with, reflexivity, which is closely-connected with moral universalism. The implication is that cosmopolitanism would consider all claims to difference and distinctness in relation to these two criteria of inclusiveness and reflexivity; hence, as noted, would be naturally disinclined towards strong claims for protecting/preserving group-based forms of difference. It is important to note that this extends to the majority's ability to impose its views on minorities. A deeply-entrenched national culture is as imbued with difference as is a minority's but the former is likely to have a greater repressive potential insofar as it has the socializing powers of the state under its control. Cosmopolitanism presupposes a state with low barriers to entry/exit and a socializing apparatus that is structurally inclined towards voice (explain and justify the use of power) rather than loyalty (as acceptance or permissive consensus).

## **2.5. Policy orientation**

Each approach, as the above unpacking has shown, has its center of gravity in a certain territorial and vertical-horizontal (though for interculturalism the focus is on the horizontal level of the city, and for transnationalism it is horizontal and unbounded center of gravity). A similar logic applies to policy orientation; in other words, each approach's core policy orientation and the range of relevant policies vary across the approaches.

*Multiculturalism* advocates antidiscrimination and institutional accommodation of minority group identities at all levels of society. Policies follow the two concepts of multicultural equality:

- i) Anti-discrimination/racism/Islamophobia *etc.*
- ii) Positive inclusion – the distinctive multiculturalism's contribution to policy.

These operate at least at two levels in regard to public space:

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<sup>9</sup> There is by now a large body of work on this term. For a brief selection, see Habermas (1996); Fossum (2008); Müller (2007).

- a) The symbolic, discursive and social imaginaries, including the fostering of inclusive national identities and belonging
- b) Institutional accommodation, eg., Schools, eg. BBC.

The distinctive feature of multiculturalist policies is the willingness to be explicit about race, ethnicity, religion and so on and to address exclusions and cultural needs, whether that is increasing ethnic minority representation, provision for minority languages and arts, or prayer-space at work. It should be clear that multiculturalism can lead to large-scale policy changes such as radically revising the school curriculum or remaking national identity. Multiculturalist policies, if not individually, certainly as a package, should balance commonality and difference. For example, the state may give support to the historic religion of the majority but should extend this to respectfully include minority faiths, whether this be at the level of national ceremonies, funding for faith schools or the place of religion in state schools (Modood, 2019a).

*Interculturalism*'s business card is that it is a policy strategy targeting all the population and not only migrants, that it is best promoted through micro-politics and neighborhood policies. For interculturalism public space provides a critical setting for interpersonal contact. Streets, squares, parks and markets provide the appropriate social conditions to reduce prejudices and build knowledge among people from different cultures, including national citizens. It also ensures the best conditions of proximity. In fact, the origin of interculturalism is not the product of laboratory or universities, but from the streets or with a local policy-maker's concerns on how to solve diversity conflicts and see how to take advantage of the potentialities of diversity by transforming potential conflicts into opportunities and resources for social and economic development. Diversity can no longer be used as a euphemism of others-against-us, that instead of fighting against, maintain the inequalities and unbalanced power relations in diverse public spaces.

In this sense, interculturalism charts the course, the focus, the horizon and the direction of small-scale programmes, and is becoming a strategic local project. Implementation areas can have a variable focal length within the territorial limits of the city: as an overall local project, and on a smaller scale, at the level of districts, and even streets and concrete public settings (market, playground, etc.), particular projects either thematic and topic-oriented or targeting particular profiles of people (young people, women, artists, intergenerational projects, etc.) or seeking to foster determinate values, beliefs and life prospects.

*Transnationalism* and multiple identifications compel home states to position themselves and develop what is called '*diaspora politics*' as a means of maintaining the loyalty of their citizens on both their territory of settlement and 'abroad'. For the countries of origin,

the process involves them extending their power *beyond* their territories, which leads to the *de-territorialisation* of nationhood. This means maintaining a link with citizens ‘abroad’; it involves, at the same time, the extension of the power of the state beyond its territories. States’ action beyond boundaries makes of the question of integration a transnational issue: to have their ‘citizens’ of both states to be integrated ‘here’ and ‘there’. Receiving countries are driven to collaborate with the home countries in order to insure the integration to ‘re-territorialise’ citizenship and identities. (Kastoryano, 2018)

Morocco and Turkey have the most important numbers of migrants in Europe. They both have created specific ministries for immigration and integration for their ‘citizens abroad’. Yet other countries too are experiencing high emigration are developing so-called diaspora politics to sustain the presumptive identity of departure and loyalty to the territorialized nation. Tunisia, for example, seeks to promote the economic integration of its compatriots in receiving countries but to prevent their cultural integration by maintaining institutionalized identity ties with Tunisia. Other research describes similar processes at work in China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Through such actions, home countries help to create perpetual allegiance and control the integration process abroad, as if to safeguard ties of citizenship, but a citizenship that is extraterritorial. It amounts to maintaining the tie between nation and citizenship on the basis of a derritorialized attachment.

*Cosmopolitanism*’ policy orientation is configured along the lines of reverse subsidiarity, as set out above. That in turn entails that the policy profile at the global level is very narrow; broader at the European level; and basically all-encompassing at the national level. Further, cosmopolitanism’ policy orientation is closely tailored to the strong onus that cosmopolitanism places on basic rights and the role of the legal system to ensure that citizens understand each other as equal under the law. Cosmopolitanism’s policy orientation is tailored to ensuring openness to the world and individual autonomy and prescribes a limited scope for public action in diversity management. Since cosmopolitanism is more geared to individual basic rights protection than to cultural protection/preservation, it does not prescribe a significant role for policies for cultural and linguistic protection/preservation; neither does it prescribe a significant role for policies for economic (re)distribution. The main function of the public space is to ensure openness to the world and that political systems socialize and empower persons to be and understand themselves as democratic citizens. Those policies that support and sustain that are at the heart of cosmopolitanism.

### **3. Programme of research**

(1) PLURISPACE spells out the four analytical perspectives, and develops a conceptual grid that renders explicit how the perspectives relate to each other: points of correspondence and divergence along a number of dimensions, which helps to orientate the framework to empirical research (WP1). This WP has provided the nuts and bolts of that. We will develop and specify this as the research proceeds.

(2) In a second step, we specify the analytical framework to render it amenable to the study of how multilevel Europe handles post-immigrant ethno-religious diversity (WP2). We focus on those institutional arrangements and legislation that seek to include and socialize persons with emphasis on how they relate to post-immigrant ethno-religious diversity at in four countries: at the European level, national level; and in two cities in each country.

(3) In a third step, PLURISPACE empirically assesses how a selection of individuals and groups perceive, receive and react to the systems of post-immigrant integration at the different levels of governance in the four countries under study (WP3). We conduct interviews with members and/or leaders of voluntary associations (cultural and faith based), city councils and neighborhood associations in two cities each in the four countries under study: France, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries have different political traditions in dealing with minorities and post-immigrant ethno-religious groups.

France is known for its assimilationist and laic ideology. Identity politics since the 1980s has given legitimacy to collective identities expressed within the framework of associations recognized as intermediaries between state and community, while rejecting any multiculturalist approach to integration.

Norway is not an EU-member but is part of the European Economic Area and as an associated member of Schengen (and Dublin I, II and III) is inside the EU's external borders. Norway has a generous welfare state, high socio-economic equality and public funding for religious organizations. An important goal of immigrant integration has been to stimulate social and political participation.

Spain is a clear example of a pragmatic approach and 'multiple diversity', as it has been theorized by Zapata-Barrero (2013), where two frameworks interact, what Kymlicka described as plurinational and poly-ethnic. Spain is an EU border country and has been facing significant immigration flows from the South.

The United Kingdom is a multi-national, ex-EU country with an established Church yet with the most developed multiculturalism in Europe. The latter is manifest in terms of the

strongest anti-discrimination legislation in Europe, a high level of religious pluralism and selective accommodation and it is commonplace to include ‘multicultural’ in definitions of Britishness today. Racial and religious egalitarian discourses and programmes are to be found in many institutions and across civil society in a self-critical way, which together with ethnic diversity across public life gives Britain many plural, albeit often argumentative, spaces. The UK was a leading drafter of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the ECHR.

We have chosen two cities in each of these countries, which comply with the following criteria:

- The composition of post-immigrant ethno-religious population;
- The presence in the public debate of integration as the target of policies, media and political discourse;
- Specific policies of the city.

#### **4. Concluding Remarks: A path to new normativities**

PLURISPACE conceives of public space as constituted by multi-level forms of governance, rights, identities, discourse, conversations and interactions, in short by citizenship. The European space consists of a plurality of such spaces, vertically and horizontally linked and stretching outwards beyond Europe on the basis of histories of recent migrations as well as moral and legal universalisms at the core of contemporary humanity. These spaces, constituted by different conceptions of citizenship, do not form a simple unity and are in a constantly changing relationships of complementarity and contestation. With the presence of extra-European settlements comes the challenge of diversity and of the normative character of integrating this diversity into the spaces of citizenship, including where necessary in modifying citizenship. Here we work with four different normative perspectives of integration. Namely, the identity recognition of multiculturalism, the interpersonal contact of interculturalism, the non-territorialities of transnationalism and the moral and legal universalism of cosmopolitanism. Each has its own understanding of public space and pushes for the re-making of citizenship in a particular direction and/or at particular levels.

Our project is to explore the relation between these four ‘isms’ in Europe today. We do this empirically by looking to see which of the isms, and to what extent, informs governance and policies in relation to the management of diversity in two cities in four countries (Britain, France, Norway and Scotland), and a European level. We also examine to what extent the isms inform minority activism and claims-making in those locations. We seek also to advance the

normative understanding of these four isms by seeing each of them in relation to each other. This means identifying points of common ground as well as divergences and to see if some additional complementarities or combinations can be forged. Our ultimate ambition is to offer a new, composite normative perspective. We will, more modestly, conclude this paper by a few comparative remarks about our isms.

Cosmopolitanism is the most extensive of our four isms because it is not specifically focused on the question of ethnic diversity. Centred on human personhood and the equal moral worth of all persons it is remote from specific policies, and close to universal moral principles. It seeks to ensure that its moral egalitarianism is observed in core human-rights based laws and policies at all levels of governance. It thus sets limit to the other isms. Moral cosmopolitanism's central form of expression of this moral egalitarianism is however tempered in cosmopolitan democracy. Democracy refers to citizens' ability to govern themselves and as such is communally bounded through the delineation of the democratic demos. Democracy's built-in paradox - there is no democratic way of determining the bounds of the demos – spills over into cosmopolitanism, which thus seeks to reconcile universalism and boundedness. The communal bounding in cosmopolitanism is nevertheless in tension with multiculturalism that gives value to ethnocultural group identifications and seeks to have those identities modify a national citizenship, which multiculturalism too sees in normative and not merely instrumental terms – forms of normativity that are group-specific rather than centred on individual persons as members of the human race.

On the other hand, the moral-legal individualism of cosmopolitanism sits well with interculturalism's preference for interpersonal contact and eschewing of policies that target all the users of public space, including nationals. At the same time, cosmopolitanism is in tension with transnationalism and its focus on diasporic groups, but may be of assistance to transnationalism in its devaluation of national citizenship in favour of 'playing off' one national citizenship (home country) with another (host country). The challenge then is whether this combination of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism can come up with a form of citizenship that has a universalist rather than merely a transactional, self-interested character and can safeguard one state from morally impermissible (eg., anti-democratic) undermining of the other.

If we begin with multiculturalism, an avowedly macro-normative philosophy, centred on making national citizenship difference-friendly but is often silent on micro-relations, then, given also, that multicultural equality and recognition are a normative condition of interculturalism, then it seems that multiculturalism are complementary, as has recently been

argued (Mansouri & Modood, 2020). Similarly, transnationalism is no less group-focused than multiculturalism and seems to incorporate the multicultural recognition of groups even while disavowing the normative significance of national citizenship that for multiculturalism is the normative ground for extending equal citizenship as sameness of rights to include respect for difference. So again, from this angle, transnationalism seems to be closer to multiculturalism than the moral individualism of cosmopolitanism.

In our next paper we shall explore these and other comparative convergences and divergences more. In this paper our purpose was to set out the four isms, as understood by their own exponents, and to show how the project of bringing them together, theoretically and empirically, offers a new and exciting opportunity to reconsider citizenship and diversity in the European public spaces and the promise of a new normative framework at a time when each of the existing frameworks captures part of our reality but is not compelling to European publics, including its minorities, and policy-makers.

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