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Paul Vertier, Max Viskanic, Matteo Gamalerio

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Dismantling the “Jungle” : Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France

Paul VERTIER

Sciences Po (Economics Department, LIEPP)

paul.vertier@sciencespo.fr

Max VISKANIC

Sciences Po (Economics Department, LIEPP, IC Migrations)

max.viskanic@sciencespo.fr

Matteo GAMALERIO

Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

University of Barcelona

m.gamalerio@ub.edu

www.sciencespo.fr/liepp

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Dismantling the “Jungle”: Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France

Paul Vertier*

Max Viskanic†

Matteo Gamalerio‡

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Abstract

Large migrant inflows have in the past spurred anti-immigrant sentiment, but is there a way small inflows can have a different impact? In this paper, we exploit the redistribution of migrants in the aftermath of the dismantling of the “Calais Jungle” in France to study the impact of the exposure to few migrants. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that in the presence of a migrant center (CAO), the percentage growth rate of vote shares for the main far-right party (Front National, our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment) between 2012 and 2017 is reduced by about 12.3 percentage points. Given that the Front National vote share increased by 20% on average between 2012 and 2017 in French municipalities, this estimation suggests that the growth rate of Front National votes in municipalities with a CAO was only 40% compared to the increase in municipalities without a CAO (which corresponds to a 3.9 percentage points lower increase). These effects, which dissipate spatially and depend on city characteristics, and crucially on the inflow’s size, point towards the contact hypothesis (Allport (1954)).

Keywords: Political Economy; Voting; Migration; EU; France; Migrants

JEL Classifications: C36, D72, J15, P16, R23

*Sciences Po, Economics Department and LIEPP, paul.vertier@sciencespo.fr.

†Sciences Po, Economics Department, LIEPP and IC Migrations, max.viskanic@sciencespo.fr.

‡Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB), University of Barcelona, m.gamalerio@ub.edu.

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1 Introduction and Background

In recent years, the number of asylum applications in the European Union increased from 431 thousand in 2013 to 627 thousand in 2014 and approximately 1.3 million in 2015 (Eurostat (2016)). Given the high numbers of migrants reaching Europe’s shores and the future increased projection of immigration both across and within countries, anticipating how natives shape their political opinions and respond in attitude to interactions with immigrants is crucial. Migrants will influence the labor force’s composition, interact with natives in many commercial transactions, and influence politics both on the supply and demand side.

The considerable rise in the number of asylum applications and the difficulties experienced by European countries in redistributing asylum seekers in a homogenous way across countries have drawn the attention of media, politicians, and scholars in academia. Recent literature shows how rising immigration inflows and stocks can increase electoral support for far-right parties and anti-immigration attitudes. Scholars have provided evidence on this relationship for various countries, among which, for example, Italy (Barone et al. (2016)), Austria (Halla et al. (2017)), and Greece (Hangartner et al. (2019a,b)).

However, the existing literature has provided contradictory evidence, as some studies show that immigration increases the support for far-right parties (Barone et al. (2016); Brunner and Kuhn (2018); Edo et al. (2019); Halla et al. (2017); Hangartner et al. (2019a,b); Harmon (2017); Mendez and Cutillas (2014); Otto and Steinhardt (2014); Viskanic (2017)), while others find opposite results (Gamalerio et al. (2020); Lonsky (2020); Steinmayr (2020)). Specifically for refugee and asylum seekers migration, Hangartner et al. (2019a) and Hangartner et al. (2019b) show that exposure to migrants on the Greek islands, but no contact with them, increases hostility of natives towards them and voting for the xenophobic extreme right-wing party “Golden Dawn”. In contrast, Steinmayr (2020) shows that the interaction between migrants and natives in Upper-Austria has led to a decrease in votes for the Extreme Right “FPÖ” party in Austria. Besides, Dustmann et al. (2019) show that the effects of refugee relocation on voting behavior in Denmark are heterogeneous across rural and urban areas.

This contradictory evidence calls for further research on the potential mechanisms behind these conflicting results. Specifically, what is missing in the existing literature is an analysis of the potential role of the immigration inflows’ size. So far, it is poorly understood if *small* immigration inflows shape the anti-immigrant sentiment of natives differently than large immigration inflows. This gap in our knowledge is particularly problematic for refugees and asylum seekers’ migration inflows. Specifically, this lack of knowledge makes it more challenging to develop fair and efficient relocations of refugees

and asylum seekers across and within countries. The reason is that many national and local governments refuse to host refugees and asylum seekers as they fear a rise in anti-immigrant resentment in the places supposed to host the migrants (Gamalerio (2019)). Hence, understanding whether the effect of refugee migration inflows changes with their size can inform the policymakers. It can also play an essential role in building a proportional relocation mechanism, as supported by most respondents in surveys on the topic (Bansak et al. (2017)).

A few reasons can explain this gap in the literature. First, it is challenging to separate the direct effect of the interaction between migrants and natives on voting behavior from the indirect effect that works through mediating variables. In many of the studies mentioned above, the measured effects are likely to be *indirect*. Indeed, large and sustained migration waves are likely to affect different intermediate variables, such as amenities, public spending, the labor market, or the local economy, which can affect voting. Thus, identifying the direct effects of immigration is empirically challenging, as it requires a particular setting in which indirect effects are likely to be negligible. Second, collecting information on the size and duration of exposure to migrants is a hard task that may require many hours of work. Third, it is well known in the literature that migration inflows are not random, as many economic and social factors can affect the choices of whether and where to migrate (Ravenstein (1885)). These same factors can also apply to the case of asylum seekers (Hangartner et al. (2019a); Neumayer (2005)). Hence, analyzing the direct effect of immigration inflows on voting behavior and how this changes along the inflow size requires a source of exogenous variation in the migrants' final location.

In this paper, we study an interesting event study that enables us to deal with all these challenges. More in detail, we focus on the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle", an encampment just outside the city of Calais, in the North of France. In October 2016, during the migrant crisis, this illegal squatter camp reached nearly 6,400 inhabitants (Le Monde (2016)), shortly before the French government closed it and relocated the migrants in other areas of the country. More specifically, between October 2015 and October 2016, the government relocated the migrants to more than 300 temporary migrant centers called *Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs)* all over the country. This relocation concluded the experience of the Calais "Jungle".

The "Jungle" dismantling presents a series of advantages that we exploit in the analysis below. First, it is highly unlikely that the relocation of migrants in CAOs affected the local economy. The main reasons are that CAOs hosted the migrants for a short period (typically less than three months), and the migrants did not have the right to work. Besides, the central government paid the full cost of the relocation. These conditions enable us to study the effect of the direct contact between migrants and natives while

excluding the potential indirect effects, such as the one on the local economy. Indeed, in the analysis below, we show that migrants’ arrival did not affect the local economic activity. Second, we manually collected information about CAOs’ location through a systematic analysis of national and local newspapers (using Factiva), and combined them with a dataset that was publicly released by the CIMADE (the main association helping migrants) at the time of the final dismantling, on October 24th 2016. Crucially, we also collected precise information on CAOs’ size. Among the 361 municipalities that hosted a CAO, we find that, on average, these centers could host 31 migrants at the same time (for an equivalent of 18 migrants per 1000 inhabitants).

Third, the framework studied enables us to link municipality level variation in exposure to small numbers of migrants to electoral outcomes. More specifically, we exploit the fact that the 2017 French presidential election was held shortly after the dismantling of the Calais “Jungle”, between April 23 and May 7. The primary two candidates were the centrist pro-Europe Emmanuel Macron, and the far-right and anti-immigration Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Front National (National Front). We use the change in the Front National municipal-level vote shares between the 2012 and the 2017 presidential elections as the main outcome variable in our analysis and as a direct proxy for anti-immigration sentiment at the local level. During the campaign before the presidential election in May 2017, the Front National’s rhetoric was generally anti-immigrant, and it brought the migrant crisis at the heart of the presidential debate. This anti-immigration stance was demonstrated most prominently in the general media, but also on the party’s social media, their public gatherings as well as election manifesto.¹

Finally, the setting analyzed in this paper allows us to deal with the potential endogeneity of CAOs’ location. Indeed, the French government could have chosen the location of CAO centers exploiting information unobservable to us. In case the municipalities chosen were on different trends in terms of voting for the Front National, then we could not identify the causal impact of the CAOs as it would be confounded. To deal with this challenge, we rely on an instrumental variable (IV) approach, and we instrument the location of a CAO in a specific town with the presence of a “Holiday Village” (“Village Vacances” in French) in the same municipality.² The reason why we expect a high positive

¹See, for example, [La Croix \(2017\)](#), [BBC \(2017\)](#), and [Le Monde \(2017a\)](#) amongst others.

²In France, “Holiday Villages” are structures owned by a public company managed by the state. Since those structures were mostly empty during the dismantling and given that they are state-owned, the state decided to use them to host migrants for a short time as the numbers of arrivals were uncertain. It is important to mention that, in the end, some of these structures were not used to host migrants. Still, they were kept as an alternative solution if collective houses or other empty flats did not prove to be sufficient in hosting excessive numbers of migrants. Our analysis does not use structures such as collective houses or empty apartments as an instrument, as they may correlate with many other variables and potentially with past extreme-right vote shares. However, we control for these variables (as well as a proxy for the level of tourism) in all our regressions.

correlation between the presence of a CAO and a holiday village is the fact that one of the many criteria used for choosing the location of the CAOs was potential additional space in those holiday villages. Specifically, given that the “Jungle” was shut down mostly in October 2016, the holiday villages would be unoccupied at that time and could thus be used as temporary shelters for migrants. At the same time, holiday villages were built mainly in the 1970s, much before the current migrant surge that led to the creation of the CAOs, and certainly not to host migrants. Thus, the exclusion restriction assumption is likely warranted, and we are thus able to estimate the causal effect of the migrant relocation on votes in favor of the Front National. Besides, our regressions take into account many potential covariates (explained in the following sections) that control for municipal sociodemographic characteristics.

Our analysis’s main results show that a CAO’s presence at the municipal level negatively affected Front National’s vote shares. More in detail, the growth in Front National’s vote shares between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections was 12.3 percentage points lower in municipalities that hosted a CAO (12.2 according to our reduced-form estimates). As the average increase of Front National’s votes over this period corresponded to about 20%, this indicates that the increase in Front National vote shares was 40% lower in municipalities with a CAO than in municipalities without a CAO. Our interpretation for these findings is that citizens developed a greater degree of acceptance towards migrants and were less likely to vote for the Front National. The fact that we observe an increase in the vote shares received by the far-left party *Front de Gauche*, which had a more open stance towards migrants, but a similar political platform to Front National on other issues, further confirms our interpretation of the results. Furthermore, we find spillover effects of the presence of the CAOs on neighboring municipalities. Municipalities within a five km radius had a lower growth rate of vote share for the Front National by about 1.6 percentage points. Importantly, our analysis shows that the negative effect disappears and eventually becomes positive above a certain number of migrants hosted in the CAO. Specifically, our calculations suggest that in municipalities that, on average, hosted more than 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants, the impact on Front National’s vote shares becomes positive. This finding is consistent with the fact that large inflows of immigrants contributed to the rise of right-wing parties in many western countries, as shown in the literature already described above.³

³Besides, we find a stronger decrease in the vote shares of the Front National in municipalities with a larger share of younger people. On the other hand, the effects are dampened in municipalities where the Front National was historically strong. Additionally, we find that municipalities next to migrant entry points, particularly those close to the *Vallée de la Roya* (one of the most mediatized entry points, at the border between France and Italy, and encompassing the Italian municipality of Ventimiglia) experienced a lower decrease in votes for the Front National. This is consistent with findings by [Hangartner et al. \(2019a\)](#), [Hangartner et al. \(2019b\)](#), and [Steinmayr \(2020\)](#).

The main contributions of our paper are four. First, even though the migrants hosted in CAOs stayed in the same municipality for approximately three months, we think that the event study analyzed led to a proper direct contact between natives and migrants, not to a short and transient exposure ([Hangartner et al. \(2019a,b\)](#); [Steinmayr \(2020\)](#)). Specifically, given that migrants could not work and that the central government paid the full cost for hosting them, we think that this event study enables us to estimate the effect of direct contact while ruling out potential indirect impacts. Furthermore, as described in the next section, we believe that the kind of contact generated by CAOs meets some of the conditions described by contact theory ([Allport \(1954\)](#)), such as the role of authorities in supporting the contact between natives and immigrants. Hence, under these conditions, we can expect the contact generated by small immigration inflows to decrease anti-immigrant sentiments and voting behavior.

Second, our analysis reveals that the negative effect turns positive in municipalities that hosted many migrants. This evidence suggests that natives may perceive the inflow of new immigrants as a threat for their social, cultural, and economic hegemony when the number of migrants received overcomes a certain threshold. As suggested by “realistic group conflict theories” ([Blalock \(1967\)](#); [Blumer \(1958\)](#); [Bobo \(1983\)](#); [Campbell \(1965\)](#); [Lahav \(2004\)](#); [Quillian \(1995\)](#); [Sidanius and Pratto \(1999\)](#); [Taylor \(1998\)](#)), this perceived threat can potentially determine a rise in prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment and voting behavior. However, given that migrants could not work and that we can exclude any effect on the local economy, we do not think that the perceived threat generated by big CAOs should be due to economic concerns related to the potential competition in the labor market ([Bobo and Hutchings \(1996\)](#); [Mayda \(2006\)](#); [Scheve and Slaughter \(2001\)](#)). In the context studied, it is more likely that natives perceive the opening of too big CAOs as a threat to their identity and cultural dominance ([Golder \(2003\)](#)). This intuition is consistent with the evidence that large shares of immigrants hosted may lead to more residential segregation ([Card et al. \(2008\)](#)), making it more complicated to foster direct contact between natives and immigrants.

Third, as anticipated above, we contribute to recent empirical literature studying the causal effect of large migration inflows on the electoral success of far-right and anti-immigration political parties ([Barone et al. \(2016\)](#); [Brunner and Kuhn \(2018\)](#); [Edo et al. \(2019\)](#); [Halla et al. \(2017\)](#); [Hangartner et al. \(2019a,b\)](#); [Harmon \(2017\)](#); [Mendez and Cutillas \(2014\)](#); [Otto and Steinhardt \(2014\)](#); [Viskanic \(2017\)](#)). Finally, the evidence that the effect of immigration inflows on anti-immigration attitudes becomes positive in the presence of large immigration inflows provides a suggestion for a clear and direct policy implication. Specifically, this result suggests that national and local governments in Europe and western countries should try to develop a more proportional relocation mech-

anism (Bansak et al. (2017)), through which redistributing asylum seekers and refugees in a more homogeneous way and hosting them in small and diffuse reception centers. The next section describes the main theories on the contact and the potential conflict between natives and migrants, and how they can guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the institutional framework and data. Section 4 presents the empirical specification and identification. Section 5 presents the main results of the paper. Section 6 describes the robustness checks and falsification exercises implemented. Section 7 concludes.

2 Conceptual framework

In this section, we summarize the main theories that drive our empirical analysis on the effect of the contact between small inflows of immigrants and natives. We provide a brief description of the predictions that originate from these theories and how they apply to the context of the Calais “Jungle” dismantling. For more detailed reviews on these theories, excellent references are the works of Paluck and Green (2009), Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), Hangartner et al. (2019a), and Dustmann et al. (2019).

We refer to two main theories. The first is the contact theory (Allport (1954)), which describes how the direct contact between immigrants and natives can reduce anti-immigrant sentiments when the following four conditions are met: equal status between the two groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities. However, as suggested by the literature (Hangartner et al. (2019a)), it is difficult to find natural experiments and event studies in which all these conditions are simultaneously met. Besides, the literature has shown how direct contact can potentially reduce prejudice, even when only a subset of these conditions is met (Paluck et al. (2019); Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)). Specifically, some scholars have suggested and provided evidence that contact between migrants and natives can increase knowledge about the outgroup, leading potentially to a reduction in prejudice (Barlow et al. (2012); Pettigrew and Tropp (2008)).

The second stream of theories is the one that Campbell (1965) labeled “realistic group conflict theories” (Blalock (1967); Blumer (1958); Bobo (1983); Sidanius and Pratto (1999)). According to this theoretical framework, natives can potentially perceive the inflow of a sufficiently big group of immigrants as a threat to their social, cultural, and economic dominance. This perceived threat can then lead to an increase in prejudice against the outside group and a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment. Consistent with these intuitions, Taylor (1998) suggests that an increase in the outside group’s size can lead to a rise in prejudice. Besides, Quillian (1995) and Lahav (2004) indicate that the largest is the size of the outside group, the biggest is the threat perceived by the members of the dominant group.

Which predictions can we generate from these theories that can guide the empirical analysis in the context of the Calais “Jungle” dismantling? According to the original formulation of the contact theory (Allport (1954)), the contact between natives and immigrants should lead to a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes when the four conditions described above apply. However, more recent investigations of the theory suggest that a subset of these conditions can lead to a reduction in anti-immigrant attitudes (Paluck et al. (2019); Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)). In the case of the Calais “Jungle” dismantling, national and local governments had an essential role in managing the dismantling and the relocation of migrants. Hence, given the involvement of national and local authorities in supporting the contact between natives and immigrants, we can expect the opening of CAO centers to reduce the Front National’s vote shares. Besides, the small size of the immigration inflows generated on average by the opening of CAO centers may have reduced the possibility of segregation of the migrants (Card et al. (2008)), potentially increasing the likelihood of contact and intergroup cooperation. Finally, the contact between natives and a small group of migrants should have increased the knowledge about the outside group, potentially generating a reduction in prejudice (Barlow et al. (2012); Pettigrew and Tropp (2008)). Thus, based on the general features of the event studied in this paper, we can expect, on average, the Calais “Jungle” dismantling to affect Front National’s vote shares negatively.

On the other hand, as already described, we know that CAOs centers’ size was heterogeneous across municipalities, with some municipalities receiving more migrants than others. Hence, following the intuitions of the “realistic group conflict theories” (Blalock (1967); Blumer (1958); Bobo (1983); Campbell (1965); Lahav (2004); Quillian (1995); Sidanius and Pratto (1999); Taylor (1998)), we can expect the baseline effect of the opening of CAOs centers on Front National’s vote shares to be heterogeneous along the size of the centers opened. More specifically, we can expect the effect to be negative for small CAOs centers. However, we can also expect this effect to become smaller in magnitude and eventually become positive when the centers’ size becomes sufficiently big. In conclusion, given the theoretical intuitions provided by both the contact theory (Allport (1954)) and the “realistic group conflict theories” (Blalock (1967); Blumer (1958); Bobo (1983); Campbell (1965); Lahav (2004); Quillian (1995); Sidanius and Pratto (1999); Taylor (1998)), we can expect the effect of the CAO centers on Front National’s vote shares to change with the size of the immigration inflow generated.

3 Institutional Framework and Data

In the following subsections, we first provide qualitative and quantitative details on the Calais Camp and its dismantling. We then outline the French presidential elections' functioning and explain our various data sources used and controls employed.

3.1 Migrants and the Calais “Jungle”

The Calais “Jungle” was an informal migrant camp, which first took form in the late 1990s, was progressively extended during the 2000s, and grew massively following the European migrant crisis in 2014-2015, reaching a peak of more than 7,000 inhabitants in late 2015 (Figure 1). Following this massive inflation of the “Jungle”, the government decided to progressively dismantle the camp starting from October 2015, by the creation of CAOs (*Centres d’Accueil et d’Orientation*). These centers, whose creation was ordered on October 27th 2015, aim at receiving migrants who have not yet started any procedure to obtain refugee status. Migrants allocated to the CAOs are thus meant to stay only for a short period, typically for less than three months. During this period, they are offered administrative assistance and bed and board, but they do not receive any financial allocation (nor do they have the right to work legally). The average cost of a day in a CAO is about 25 euros. However, it is the government and not the municipalities which pay for it ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)). The migrants who have started a procedure to obtain a refugee status are redirected to the CADA (*Centres d’Accueil pour Demandeurs d’Asile*), which also offers bed and board together with administrative assistance while awaiting a decision. The first of these centers were created in the 1970s and could host up to 25,000 migrants as of 2015. ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)). Between 2015 and 2017, the number of CADA places increased to around 40,000 places ([La Cimade \(2017\)](#)). Although the network of CADAs is the largest structure used to host asylum-seekers, other structures were created over time, such as the AT-SA (*Accueil Temporaire du Service de l’Asile* - 6,000 places as of 2017), the HUDA (*Hebergement d’Urgence des Demandeurs d’Asile* - 15,000 places as of 2017), the CPH (*Centre Provisoire d’Hebergement* - 2,300 places as of 2017), and PRAHDA (*Programme d’Accueil et d’Hebergement des Demandeurs d’Asile* - 5,351 places as of 2017) ([La Cimade \(2017\)](#)).

The dismantling of the Calais camp occurred in several stages from October 2015 to October 2016. Overall, the government reports having relocated 13,366 migrants since October 2015, and more than 7,000 inhabitants during the sole dismantling of October 2016. This event received considerable media attention, as we can see from Figure 2, showing the number of Google searches for “Jungle de Calais” (“Jungle of Calais”) over time.

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of migrants in the Calais camp





Figure 2: Google Trends for the expression “Jungle de Calais”



Focusing on the dissolution of the “Jungle” raises different challenges. First of all, to the best of our knowledge, the French government did not provide official information on the location of the CAOs. In fact, the total number of CAOs created between October 2015 and October 2016 is itself uncertain ⁴. To circumvent this issue, we combine the

⁴For instance, the 2016 Activity Report of the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) ([French Office for Immigration and Integration \(OFII\) \(2016\)](#)), reports that 168 CAOs were created between January 1st 2016 and October 24th 2016, while 197 CAOs were mobilized during the final dismantling that occurred between October 24th and October 28th 2016. This document does not detail whether the two sets of CAOs overlap. Under a scenario of a total absence of overlap, the total number of CAOs created to dismantle the Calais jungle would then amount to 365. In November 2016, the Ministry of Interior ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)) mentioned that 167 CAOs were opened between November 2015 and September 2016 and that 283 CAOs were opened in October 2016, leading to a total of 450 CAOs. This number is higher than that indicated by a joint statement by the Interior Minister and the

manual collection of information with a public database released by the *CIMADE* in October 2016. Our methodology was the following: using Factiva, a database of newspaper articles containing both local and national layouts, we systematically searched for newspaper articles mentioning the terms “CAO” for each French *départements*, between October 2015 and the 2017 Presidential Election. For each CAO we found, if the information was available, we also recorded the number of sheltered migrants at the time the article was written. Such a methodology enabled us to uncover 291 CAOs. We combined this information with a dataset provided by the *CIMADE* after the final dismantling of October 2016, providing 210 centers and their capacity (i.e., the number of available beds). The union of these two datasets leaves us with 361 centers, which is remarkably close to the number mentioned by the government in January 2017 ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)) and which is in the range of the figures mentioned above. *If* there are still some CAOs missing, there should therefore be few of them. Since we are assigning some treated municipalities into the control group, it should slightly reduce the observed differences between treated and non-treated cities.

Using the information in both datasets, we also create a measure of CAO capacity through the following procedure. For CAOs recorded only in our manually collected dataset (150), we define a CAO’s capacity as the maximum number of migrants that was ever recorded to reach among all articles mentioning it. For CAOs belonging only to the *CIMADE* dataset (68) or both our manually collected dataset and the *CIMADE* dataset (142), the capacity is measured through the number of beds contained in the *CIMADE* dataset.⁵ This measure of capacity cannot give information about the *total* number of migrants that were sheltered in a given municipality between October 2015 and the 2017 Presidential Election, or the length of their stay.⁶ However, it informs about the *maximum* number of migrants that could be hosted *within a CAO* at any point in time.⁷

Minister of Housing in January 2017([Ministere de l’Interieur \(2017\)](#)), who argued 374 CAOs sheltered 7418 migrants in October 2016 (301 being for adults, and 73 for teenagers), for a total of 13,366 between October 2015 and January 2017. Associations and the government also tended to report very different figures, as highlighted by [Le Monde \(2017c\)](#) in October 2017: “*the CIMADE, the main association helping migrants, and the OFII provide diverging numbers. The latter affirms that “there were 427 CAOs [as of October 2017], while there were 301 during the final dismantling of the Calais Jungle”.*

⁵Reassuringly, even though our capacity measure is not defined in the same way whether the data come from our manual collection or the *CIMADE* dataset, its internal consistency seems warranted. To do so, we compare, among CAOs observed in both datasets, the maximum number of sheltered migrants observed in our manually collected dataset and the capacity registered in the *CIMADE* dataset. Excluding outliers for which the difference between the two measures is more than two standard deviations away from the mean in absolute value, i.e., less than 10% of cases, the correlation between the two measures is 88%. Regressing the capacity measure of our manually-collected dataset on the measure from the *CIMADE* yields a regression coefficient of 0.93, for a R^2 of 0.77. Therefore, our capacity measure is likely to indicate the number of migrants that were actually sheltered in CAOs.

⁶Such numbers would be, in any case, hard to assess since we do not observe every wave of migrants’ arrival, nor their length of stay.

⁷This point is particularly important since they were also used to welcome migrants from other places.

The second challenge is that the criteria of allocation of the CAOs have not been clearly defined, which makes the use of an instrument for its assignment mandatory. During the final dismantling of October 2016, even though the government announced that the allocation of CAOs across regions would be based on “socio-demographic criteria” ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)), no comprehensive list of factors was provided. The only indication that was given was that the Parisian agglomeration (Ile-de-France) and Corsica would not be considered. Those two regions are thus excluded from our analysis, and Corsica will be used as an additional robustness check in section 6. Since no migrants were allocated to Corsica, if our instrument is valid, then holiday villages in Corsica should not be systematically related to any political outcomes.

Finally, the last issue to consider is the extent to which the mayors of concerned municipalities were involved in the process of the allocation of the CAOs. Although many mayors were contacted to receive migrants ([Le Monde \(2015\)](#), [Association des Maires de France \(2016\)](#)), during the final dismantling, the then Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, entrusted the final decision to the local representatives of the government i.e. the *préfets*.⁸ The *préfets* would first identify suitable premises without prior consultation of the concerned municipalities and then negotiate with the mayors. In our analysis, even though mayors’ compliance is not generally observed, we exploit additional information about a list of mayors who publicly declared, in September 2015, their willingness to welcome migrants. We do this to investigate whether the effects are stronger in those municipalities.

3.2 French Presidential Elections


French presidential elections are held every five years since 2002, using a two-round majoritarian system. After the first round, if no candidate received more than 50% of the expressed votes, a second-round is held between the two candidates with the largest vote share. We collect all the candidates’ vote shares in the presidential elections in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 for each French municipality.

Two sets of mediatized relocations involving CAOs occurred after the dismantling of the Calais camp. The first one involves 1,000 migrants, who were relocated to CAOs in April 2017, after the camp of Grande-Synthe caught fire in April 2017 ([Le Monde \(2017b\)](#)). The second one involves migrants located in Paris (notably in the neighborhood called Stalingrad): 3,800 of them were relocated in November 2016 ([Europe 1 \(2016\)](#)), and 1,600 of them were relocated in May 2017 ([Europe 1 \(2017\)](#)). Even though these events are important in terms of magnitude, such facts are unlikely to jeopardize our event study for several reasons. First of all, CAOs were explicitly created for sheltering migrants from Calais. Secondly, while collecting our data, we found extremely scarce evidence that new CAOs were created only for the purpose of sheltering migrants from other places. Finally, many of these migrants were actually people who avoided the evacuation of the Calais camp, or who were evacuated but who fled CAOs ([Europe 1 \(2016\)](#)).

⁸The *préfets* have authority at the provincial level of the *département*.

Our main outcome of interest is the share of votes received by the Front National candidates in the first round of the presidential election. Over the last three decades, the candidates from this party were all members of the Le Pen family: Jean-Marie Le Pen (founder of the Front National) was a candidate from 1988 to 2007, while his daughter Marine Le Pen was a candidate in 2012 and 2017.⁹ Figure 3 shows the geographic repartition of FN voters in the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 in France. The Front National’s strongholds are located in the south-eastern and north-eastern parts of France, where more than 30% of the population voted in favor of Marine Le Pen both in 2012 and 2017. As indicated by the common scale of colors used for both maps, the Front National vote increased substantially between 2012 and 2017 (by 20% on average).

Figure 3: FN vote shares in the first round of 2012 and 2017 presidential elections



3.3 Other Data Description

To conduct our empirical analysis, we use multiple data sources. Presidential election results in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 at the municipality level are taken from the Ministry of Interior. In each of those elections, the vote share of the Front National is expressed in percentage points. The location and size of holiday villages are taken from the 2016 survey on tourism capacity at the municipal level carried out by the French national statistical institute (INSEE). From the same data source, we also collect the number of hotel beds per municipality, which we introduce as a control to filter out the component in migrant relocation not related to tourism. Holiday villages are defined as individual or collective housing, with common sports and entertainment facilities, dedicated to host

⁹The Front National was not the only far-right party represented in these elections. Other conservative candidates, sharing some of the Front National’s rhetoric, were also present in the 2007 election (Philippe de Villiers), as well as in the 2012 and 2017 elections (Nicolas Dupont-Aignan).

leisure stays for a fixed fee. Our dataset lists the number of holiday villages and how many beds they contained per municipality in 2016. To proxy the compliance of French mayors in the implementation of the CAOs, we use a list of mayors who declared to be willing to welcome migrants as of September 2015. This dataset, which is taken from the National French Television ([France Télévision \(2015\)](#)), is neither official nor exhaustive but contains 417 municipalities.

We collect municipalities' characteristics from the 2013 French Census, run by INSEE. In particular, we consider the total population, the share of vacant housing, homeowners, and social housing for each municipality. We also collect the share of individuals aged between 15 and 29, 30 and 44, 45 and 59, 60 and 74, or over 75 respectively per municipality. We consider the share (among the population above 15 years old) of individuals belonging to each of the eight official socio-professional categories (farmers, independent, white collars, intermediary professions, employees, blue collars, retired and inactive). Similarly, we consider the share of unemployment among the population aged between 15 and 64. Finally, we also report migrants' share within the municipality's total population, where migrants are defined as foreign-born individuals who live in France. From the 2013 version of the INSEE file on disposable income, we also collect information on the median disposable income by consumption unit in Euros at the municipality level. Those are available only for municipalities of more than 50 inhabitants. All the variables above are also collected for 2006. We use the variation over time and their stock in 2013 as controls in our regressions to capture municipalities' evolution after the 2008 financial crisis and current economic conditions. From the INSEE, we also collect information about each municipality type, which can be either central, suburban, independent or rural. All these socio-economic characteristics are part of the controls in our regressions.

To control the municipalities' political characteristics, we collect background information on the mayors, using the *Repertoire National des Elus* from the Ministry of Interior. This dataset provides information on the mayor's occupation, i.e., if she is a private employee or a civil servant, a teacher, a farmer, or an individual working in an industrial or liberal occupation. It also indicates the mayor's age and party affiliation, which we reclassify in 5 categories: left-wing, right-wing, extreme left, extreme right, or others.

From the *CIMADE*, we also collect information on the presence of other types of migrant centers (as of July 2017), including CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH, and PRAHDA. The data is most detailed for the CADA, where we can obtain the number of places between 2012 and 2016 on a yearly basis. This allows us to compute the evolution of the number of places in the CADA at the municipality level during this period. Combining all this information with a GIS dataset of French municipalities (provided by the French national geographic institute (IGN)), we are able to compute for each municipality, the

distance to each of these centers, i.e., the distance to the closest center among all CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH, and PRAHDA. Furthermore, we also use this GIS data to compute the distance to the closest CAO for each municipality, which is used to estimate spillover effects.

Finally, to identify whether our results can be attributed to a variation of economic activity at the local level, we use a dataset from [Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi \(2017\)](#), which reports job destructions and creations at the municipal level in France between January 2009 and June 2017. This dataset has the advantage of providing a measure of local employment dynamics at the municipal level with higher frequency than traditional indicators. However, in the context of our study, it might suffer from two drawbacks. First, since it is based on monitoring, it might only cover job destructions and creations that are of a magnitude to be mentioned in local media (for example, local newspapers). Furthermore, this data is likely to be more accurate in depicting labor markets at the employment zone level than at the level of the municipality, which is the administrative unit of interest in this paper. Therefore, we do not include this data in our main analysis, but we investigate their relationship to migrant inflows in Section 5.4.

4 Empirical Specification and Instrumental Variable Approach

We estimate the effect of temporary migrant centers on the FN vote's evolution between 2012 and 2017. We estimate the following equation:

$$\Delta FN \equiv \log(FN_{2017})_i - \log(FN_{2012})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CAO_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where $\log(FN_{2017})_i - \log(FN_{2012})_i$ is the difference of log voting shares for the Front National in 2017 and 2012; CAO_i is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality i has a CAO and 0 otherwise, while X_i are control variables for municipality i , which were outlined in the data description. Specifically, we use all the socio-economic controls (notably their evolution between 2013 and 2006), the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution in the number of CADA places between 2012 and 2016, the log of hotel rooms, as well as political and administrative characteristics of the municipality and demographics of the mayors. The standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

However, the assignment of the CAOs is not random and is likely to be endogenous to political outcomes. First of all, it is possible to show that municipalities that volunteered to receive migrants and with historically lower Front National votes were also more likely to receive a CAO eventually. Since this measure is only an imperfect measure of mu-

nicipality compliance, and as we do not observe the bargaining which might have taken place between municipalities and the government, simple OLS estimates are likely to be biased towards zero, given that citizens of volunteering cities are arguably more tolerant toward migrants and less likely to be affected by the presence of a CAO. Furthermore, many CAOs were established in vacant buildings owned or rented by the state, such as old military bases or hospitals. They were also more likely to be located in places with a higher number of vacant housing units and in rural areas. Therefore, simple OLS estimations might capture part of these effects, which are likely to be factors increasing the share of votes in favor of the Front National over time.


Consequently, to circumvent these potential biases, we propose to instrument the probability of the location of a CAO with the presence of holiday villages (or “*Village Vacances*”, thereafter noted VV), i.e., the holiday villages mentioned above, as of 2016. Even though the government considered several types of venues, a strong emphasis was put on holiday villages (and especially the ones belonging to companies such as *La Poste* or *EDF*) ([Libération \(2016\)](#)). We argue that, once we control for a proxy for overall tourism (i.e., the number of sleeping places in hotels), holiday villages provide a good instrument to achieve exogenous variation in migrants’ assignment. The residency in those holiday villages is seasonal rather than permanent and is thus most likely not associated with any differential trends in a municipality’s political characteristics. What reinforces this argument is that the holiday villages were established in the past and certainly not to host migrants. In fact, the stock of beds in holiday villages seems to be very stable over time. For example, the correlation coefficient between the number of beds in a municipality in 2014 and in 2016 is equal to 0.98. On the other hand, ancient military bases or hospitals and total vacant units might indicate a municipality’s progressive isolation. Therefore, we think that holiday villages can capture exactly this exogenous variation in migrant allocation that we are looking for. Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the First Stage, where the red dots are the CAOs, and the black shadings are the number of beds in holiday villages.

We take advantage of the binary nature of our instrumental variable by using a methodology proposed by [Wooldridge \(2010\)](#). More specifically, we run a 2SLS regression, where the instrument is the predicted value of the treatment variable, taken from a Probit regression where the latter is regressed on our instrument (namely, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a holiday village in the municipality). Our first stage therefore writes:¹⁰

$$CAO_i = \beta'_0 + \beta'_1 \hat{CAO}_i + \delta' X_i + \epsilon'_i \quad (2)$$

¹⁰We estimate this specification using the *ivtreatreg* routine in STATA.

Figure 4: CAOs and density of holiday villages capacity



where \hat{CAO}_i is the predicted value of CAO_i taken from the following Probit model, through which we regress the dummy variable CAO_i on the dummy VV_i for the presence of a holiday village in the municipality:

$$Pr(CAO_i) = \Phi(VV_i, X_i) \quad (3)$$

To confirm the validity of this instrumentation strategy, we run several tests in Section 6. In particular, we show that before the Calais camp's dismantling, municipalities with a CAO did not seem to be on different electoral pre-trends than municipalities without a CAO, and that controlling for past evolutions of the FN vote does not affect our results. We also show that our results are unaffected by instrumenting with the number of beds in holiday villages in 2014. Finally, we run a falsification test using Corsica's particular case: while this region has several holiday villages, it did not receive any CAOs. Yet, in this region, we do not find that municipalities with the presence of a holiday village had

different trends of the vote for the Front National between 2012 and 2017.

Finally, we investigate the presence of spillover effects of migrant relocation by estimating the effect of distance to the closest CAO (using radiuses of 5km, 10km, and 15km). To estimate spillovers we have to assume that the decision to create a CAO in a given municipality is unrelated to politics in localities in the radius of 5km, 10km, and 15km. This assumption seems warranted given the high number of observations and is reinforced when looking at our empirical results: the estimate of β_1 is affected only slightly when spatial dummies are introduced.

5 Empirical Results

This section first describes the main estimates of the effect of migrant relocation on the Front National’s vote shares, the electoral turnout, and the vote shares of extreme-left parties in the 2017 presidential election. Second, we estimate the heterogeneous effects of migrant relocation to determine which particular factors drive our results, with a specific focus on the size of immigration inflows. Lastly, we discuss the results and interpret them based on the main theories on the interaction between natives and immigrants described above.

5.1 Baseline results

Table 1 reports the baseline results of this paper. As we can see, the first stage is very strong. The F-Statistic for the excluded instrument with controls is 20.5, which is much higher than the customary value of 16.38 and the weak instrument guidelines given in [Stock and Yogo \(2005\)](#). We observe a negative, but not significant, correlation between a CAO’s presence and the evolution of Front National voting shares when looking at the OLS regression (Column 2). When we use our instrumental variables approach, the effect is more negative and highly significant. As we previously discussed, not instrumenting the allocation of CAOs biases our estimates towards zero. A CAO’s presence decreases the growth rate of Front National votes by 12.3 percentage points (Column (4)). Our reduced form in Column 3 is very similar, as the $\text{Pr}(\text{CAO})$ coefficient is very significant, and with a magnitude equal to 12.2 percentage points. Since the FN vote increased by 20% on average in French municipalities between 2012 and 2017 (which corresponds to a 5.1 points increase on average), this estimation suggests that the growth rate of FN vote in municipalities with a CAO was only 40% the one of municipalities without a CAO (corresponding to an increase lower by about 3.9 points - which amounts to what we find using shares as outcome variables rather than logs).

In all columns, we control for the type of the city, many locality level covariates

(political, socio-economic), and the log of hotel beds in the municipality.¹¹ Considering spillover effects, we can see that localities in a five km radius also experience a negative impact on the Front National vote, but not as strong as the municipalities that have a CAO (Column (5)). This effect dissipates spatially.

[Table 1 about here]

In Table 2, we refine our analysis by investigating what impact the relocation of migrants had on abstention and votes on the extreme left-wing political spectrum (particularly the votes of the *Front de Gauche*). We can see that a CAO location is associated with a slightly lower abstention, therefore a higher turnout. There is some evidence that migrants have causally increased turnout in those municipalities. Controlling for the change in abstention, we can see that the electoral effects on the vote for the *Front National* are unaffected (Column (3)). When looking at the effect on extreme-left vote shares, we find a pronounced effect in favor of vote shares of the *Front de Gauche* (Column (5)), which is similar in magnitude to the negative effect on the votes for the *Front National*.¹² Therefore, we can establish that the causal impact of migrant relocation has led to a decrease in votes for the *Front National* and an increase in both turnout and votes in favor of the major left-wing pro-immigrant party.

[Table 2 about here]

5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Migrant Relocation

As part of our main analysis, we conduct regressions showing heterogeneous effects in Table 3. We interact the treatment variable with variables capturing socio-economic characteristics at the municipal level. To instrument for these interaction terms, we interact the prediction from the first stage with the municipal socio-economic variables,

¹¹A full list of controls is outlined in the data description and mentioned in the associated notes under the tables.

¹²We do not carry out a separate analysis for electoral outcomes in favor of center-left and center-right parties, given that the candidacy of Emmanuel Macron, an ex-socialist minister and self-proclaimed centrist, makes it difficult to compare those votes with the election in 2012.

following the procedure in [Wooldridge \(2010\)](#).¹³ We want to test whether communities with certain characteristics respond in differing ways to receiving migrants. As described in the introduction, the main focus is on the size of the immigration inflow generated by the opening of CAO centers (Column (1)). Interestingly, the Front National’s vote share’s negative effect is reduced in places where more migrants were allocated. The analysis of the intensive margin yields important results for the understanding of electoral reaction to migrant inflows. We indeed find that FN’s negative effect is stronger in municipalities with fewer migrants per inhabitant hosted in the CAOs. Based on this heterogeneity analysis, we estimate that municipalities that decreased their FN vote upon receiving migrants were those that, on average, hosted less than 32 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Above this threshold, which corresponds to a bit less than twice the average capacity per inhabitant of observed CAOs and is inferior to the average share of migrants in municipalities in the 2013 Census (39 per 1,000 inhabitants), the estimated average effect of CAO on FN vote becomes positive. This result is in line with the literature on the impacts of immigrants’ large inflows on political outcomes ([Barone et al. \(2016\)](#); [Brunner and Kuhn \(2018\)](#); [Edo et al. \(2019\)](#); [Halla et al. \(2017\)](#); [Hangartner et al. \(2019a,b\)](#); [Harmon \(2017\)](#); [Mendez and Cutillas \(2014\)](#); [Otto and Steinhardt \(2014\)](#); [Viskanic \(2017\)](#)). This evidence indicates that, while small immigration inflows can reduce prejudice, inflows above a certain threshold can produce the opposite effect, suggesting the potential presence of a “Tipping point”.

In Table 3, we also investigate the potential role of other socio-economic factors. Specifically, we find a stronger decrease in municipalities with a larger share of younger inhabitants (column 2). This result could be because younger people have less fortified opinions towards migrants and thus might be more willing to get in touch with the new people joining their municipality. Besides, we find that the effect is less strong in places where the Front National was historically strong (Column (4)). This could be the case for two reasons: one is that places where people historically voted for the Front National, and not only in recent times, might find it more difficult to switch away from voting for that party. In column 6, we show that the decrease of votes for the Front National is more pronounced in places that already hosted a higher share of immigrants in the past years. This result suggests that pre-existing communities from the same country of origin as the migrants facilitate initial contact. Finally, we also find that effects on the Front National vote share are less strong in municipalities close to routes that immigrants take such as the *Vallee de la Roya*.¹⁴ The further away from this entry point, the stronger the

¹³In this Table, all the interaction effects are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable, except for the capacity of the CAO per 1,000 inhabitants (where it is compared to the minimum CAO capacity), and for voluntary mayors (which is a dummy variable).

¹⁴We measure the distance to this area which was an important entry point of migrants at the bor-

decrease. This finding is in line with findings from [Steinmayr \(2020\)](#) in Austria. Overall, once we introduce all interactions in the main estimation, what remains significant is the coefficient on CAO size, the coefficient for the Front National share in 2007, and the coefficient on the pre-existing share of immigrants.¹⁵

[Table 3 about here]

5.3 Discussion of the results: Contact theory and Realistic Group Conflict theories

In this section, we discuss and interpret the main results of this paper. As already described, we think that the negative baseline effect in Table 1 is in line with the contact theory ([Allport \(1954\)](#)), which suggests that the contact between natives and immigrants should lead to a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes when certain conditions apply. As anticipated above, we think that national and local authorities' involvement and the small size of the immigration inflows generated by the opening of CAO centers should have increased the likelihood of contact and intergroup cooperation between natives and immigrants, potentially leading to a reduction in prejudice.

The anecdotal evidence on the CAOs' experience seems to confirm this idea. Specifically, when collecting our data on the location of the CAOs, we came across many instances of anecdotal evidence which suggests that the interactions between migrants and local populations were generally successful. While at the onset of the dismantling process, protests seemed to be widespread ([La Depeche \(2016\)](#)), and sometimes violent ([La Croix \(2016\)](#)), several newspaper articles mention that local populations regret migrants have to leave after only a few months, even within municipalities where protests took place upon their

der between France and Italy through the distance of each municipality to Breil-sur-Roya, the central municipality in the area

¹⁵In Table A1 in the Appendix, we run the same regressions with standardized variables, to directly compare the magnitude of these interaction effects: we find that the interaction effects of the share of immigrants and of the share of young people are of the same magnitude (one standard deviation above the mean reinforces the treatment effect by respectively 3 percentage points and 2.3 percentage points). The interaction effect on the Roya Valley distance is slightly higher (one standard deviation above from the mean distance increases the treatment effect by 6.7 percentage points). The two biggest interaction effects are those involving the share of votes for the Front National in 2007, and the size of the CAO per 1,000 inhabitants: one standard deviation above from the mean FN vote dampens the treatment effect by 15.8 percentage points, while one standard deviation above from the minimum capacity of CAO per inhabitant dampens the treatment effect by 18.7 percentage points. Here again, combining all interaction terms, we obtain significant results only for the share of immigrants, the vote share in favor of the Front National in 2007, and the size of the CAO.

arrival ([Liberation \(2017\)](#), [Charente Libre \(2018\)](#)). Many forms of interactions seemed to emerge, through charity dinners ([La Nouvelle Republique du Centre Ouest \(2017\)](#)), car-pooling ([Liberation \(2017\)](#)), or football games. Several officials of small municipalities argued that the arrival of migrants helped revitalize football teams in rural areas, which lacked players to compete in amateur leagues ([20 Minutes \(2016\)](#)). Although we cannot carry out a systematic analysis of those events of integration in French municipalities after the establishment of the CAOs, these events do not seem to be rare and come up repeatedly in local and national newspapers. A map released by [Le Monde \(2017d\)](#) shows that initiatives helping migrants being integrated were far from scarce.¹⁶

On the other hand, the results in [Table 3](#) indicate that the negative effect of CAO centers on FN votes shares can turn positive when the centers' size passes a certain threshold. As argued above, we believe that this evidence indicates that natives can potentially perceive the inflow of new immigrants as a threat to their social, cultural, and economic hegemony when the number of immigrants is too big. This evidence is consistent with the “realistic group conflict theories” ([Blalock \(1967\)](#); [Blumer \(1958\)](#); [Bobo \(1983\)](#); [Campbell \(1965\)](#); [Lahav \(2004\)](#); [Quillian \(1995\)](#); [Sidanius and Pratto \(1999\)](#); [Taylor \(1998\)](#)). Specifically, for the event study studied in this paper, we think that the potential threat generated by big CAOs should be due more to cultural concerns rather than to economic concerns related to the potential competition in the labor market ([Bobo and Hutchings \(1996\)](#); [Mayda \(2006\)](#); [Scheve and Slaughter \(2001\)](#)). In fact, in [Table 4](#), we use data from [Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi \(2017\)](#), which reports the number of job creations and destructions at the municipality level from January 2009 to June 2017, to test the potential economic consequences of CAO centers. As shown in [Table 4](#), whether we consider OLS or IV estimates, we do not find any significant relationship between the presence of a CAO and net job creation. Similarly, controlling for net job creation per inhabitant before and after the creation of a CAO does not affect our IV estimates of the impact of CAOs on the evolution of the FN vote. Therefore, given this clear evidence, we think that, in this context, it is more likely that when entering in contact with a large group of outsiders, natives perceived the opening of big CAOs as a threat to their identity and cultural dominance ([Golder \(2003\)](#)).

[[Table 4](#) about here]

¹⁶One pathway for future research could be to systematically investigate newspapers mentioning the local presence of migrants and carrying out a sentiment analysis of these texts using text-mining methods.

6 Falsification Exercises and Robustness checks

In the following sections, we carry out a battery of falsification exercises and robustness checks. First, we test our instrumental variable’s validity by regressing our main instrumented treatment variable on the Front National vote’s past evolution. We also show that controlling for differential trends in the Front National vote in our main analysis does change the results. Subsequently, we examine Corsica’s case, where we show that an OLS regression of the presence of a holiday village has no impact on the vote share of the Front National between 2012 and 2017 (given that Corsica received no CAOs). Furthermore, we show that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of Department fixed effects and whether we control for past vote shares of the Front National linearly, in a non-parametric way or in terms of polynomials (both for 2007 and 2012). Lastly, we carry out a sensitivity analysis by excluding groups of control variables, i.e., migrant hosting infrastructure, city characteristics, the evolution of city characteristics, evolution and level of city characteristics, and mayor characteristics. We also carry out the main regressions by using the presence of a holiday village in 2014 rather than 2016 as in the rest of the paper, and the results are virtually unchanged.¹⁷


6.1 Falsification Exercises

This section will carry out three main falsification exercises, which will then be supplemented by additional robustness checks in the next section. First, we consider whether we might be picking up a pre-eminent electoral trend in certain municipalities. To do so, we run a panel regression at the municipality level, where we evaluate the effect of CAO presence on various elections since the 2012 presidential election (namely, the Presidential elections of 2012, the European elections of 2014, the Regional elections of 2015 and the Presidential election of 2017), controlling for the municipality and election fixed-effects. In Figure 5, where the effect of CAO in the Presidential elections of 2007 is normalized to be zero, the coefficient on CAO is never statistically different from zero except for the 2017 Presidential elections. This result shows that the treated municipalities were not on different political pre-trends before the election. We focus on the elections since 2012 as other robustness checks and falsification exercises will consider more dated voting outcomes for the Front National.

In Table A2, we regress our main CAO coefficient on past change in vote shares for the Front National in the three prior Presidential elections using our instrumental variables approach (Columns 1 to 3). In this case, we make sure that our instrument is unrelated

¹⁷The point estimate on the instrumented CAO coefficient is 12.64; this regression is available upon request.

Figure 5: Absence of Pretrends



to the Front National vote share's past evolutions. In columns 4 to 6, we add different Front National voting share trends starting with the difference between 1995 and 2002 up to 2007 and 2012. We find that our point estimate of the main instrumented coefficient remains highly significant and of a very similar magnitude.

[Table A2 about here]

As a last check, we consider Corsica (Table A3), which represents an interesting indirect test of our exclusion restriction. Indeed, no migrants were relocated to Corsica, even though it contains many holiday villages given its appeal as a holiday destination. To re-enforce the fact that our regressions are not picking up a pre-eminent trend in very touristic places, we regress our instruments on voting outcomes for the Front National vote in the French Presidential elections. Table A3 shows that no coefficient is significant. These additional regressions underline the validity of our instrumental variable approach.

[Table A3 about here]

6.2 Robustness checks

We also carry out some Robustness checks. In Table A4, we carry out our main instrumental variables regression of the change in vote shares for the Front National between 2017 and 2012 introducing Department fixed effects (Column 1), controlling for the Front National vote in 2007 in a non-parametric manner (Column 2) and controlling for the Front National vote in 2007 up to the third polynomial to make sure some non-linearities or other statistical anomalies do not drive our results. Carrying out those regressions with our instrumented coefficient gives us very similar results in magnitude and precision to our main estimation. In Columns 4 to 6, we control for the Front National vote outcome in 2012 first linearly, then in a non-parametric manner, and then up to the third polynomial. Our instrumented CAO coefficient remains significant, but the effects are stronger. This result could be because we control for the Front national votes in 2012, which is already included in our main outcome variable.

[Table A4 about here]

Table A5 shows the CAO coefficient of our main instrumental variables regression on the vote share difference of the Front National between 2017 and 2012 considering different sets of control variables. We divide our control variables into several groupings. One is the infrastructure that should determine or be correlated to hosting the migrants in a CAO. In this grouping (“Infrastructure”), we have the log number of hotel rooms, the share of votes for the Front National in 2007, the minimum distance to any other form of government-sponsored center hosting refugees, the evolution of migrants hosted in CADAs as well as the dummy of whether the municipality (through its mayor) had volunteered to receive migrants. In the grouping “City characteristics”, we include all the main characteristics of the municipalities, mostly derived from the Census such as population, vacant housing units, population structure, employment structure, unemployment rate, share of home owners and social housing as well as share of immigrants in 2013 as well as a dummy indicating whether the municipality is rural, independent or centre (Suburb being the excluded category). $\Delta Citycharacteristics$, on the other hand, are the aforementioned characteristics, but in evolution between 2006 and 2013. Lastly, mayor characteristics are all the characteristics associated with the mayor of a municipality, i.e., her political affiliation, age, and mayor’s main employment. The first column presents the baseline regression in which we control for all the different control variables. As we can see from

the other columns, even if we exclude the different groups of control variables, we find that the point estimate on our instrumented CAO coefficient does not change much in precision or size.

[Table A5 about here]

7 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have tried to answer important questions regarding the electoral impact of the migrants' relocation after the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle". We find a negative effect on the Front National's vote shares, consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport (1954)). We provide some anecdotal evidence that supports this claim. We also provide empirical evidence on the heterogeneity behind the baseline effect. More in detail, we show that the effect can potentially turn positive for municipalities that received a larger number of migrants. This second piece of evidence is consistent with "realistic group conflict theories" (Blalock (1967); Blumer (1958); Bobo (1983); Campbell (1965); Lahav (2004); Quillian (1995); Sidanius and Pratto (1999); Taylor (1998)). Specifically, given that CAO centers did not have any local economic impact, we think that big reception centers' positive effect on FN votes shares is likely due to cultural and identitarian concerns rather than economic concerns. In conclusion, this paper gives some indication about the small scale impact of immigration and provides new insights to the debate on migration's electoral impact. Overall, our results suggest that there is a difference in perceived immigration through the media compared with actual immigration. The electoral reaction to actual migration seems to depend crucially on the size of the inflow.

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Tables

Table 1: Main Results on the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pr(CAO)	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
VV	0.463*** (0.100)				
CAO		-0.009 (0.008)		-0.123*** (0.038)	-0.133*** (0.037)
Pr(CAO)			-0.122*** (0.034)		
Spillover(5km)					-0.016*** (0.004)
Spillover(10km)					-0.003 (0.003)
Spillover(15km)					-0.006 (0.004)
Regression	Probit	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic				20.5	20.5
Observations	27922	27938	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2		0.073	0.074	0.069	0.069

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 is the probit first stage regression showing the coefficient of the presence of a holiday village on the CAO variable. Columns 2 to 4 are the second stage run in OLS, then in Instrumental variables and in instrumental variables adding different perimeter rings respectively. The rings denote municipalities within the 5, 10 and 15 km radius respectively. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2: Effect of migrant Relocation on Abstention and Extreme-left wing votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FG}	Δ_{FG}
CAO	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.170*** (0.053)	-0.087** (0.038)	0.012 (0.008)	0.187*** (0.060)
Δ_{Abst}			-0.005 (0.007)		
Regression	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic					
Observations	27926	27908	27906	27925	27907
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.013	0.063	0.019	0.016

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Column 1 reports the coefficients of an OLS regression where the variation of abstention rate between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO. Column 2 reports the coefficient of CAO on the variation of abstention after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. Column 3 reports the second stage of the main instrumental variable specification, where the outcome variable is the variation of FN log vote shares between 2012 and 2017, but controlling for the variation in the abstention rate. Column 4 reports the CAO coefficient in an OLS regression where the outcome variable is the variation in log vote shares obtained by the *Front de Gauche* between 2012 and 2017. Column 5 reports the estimated effect of CAO on the variation of the Front de Gauche vote share after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects of the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.118*** (0.036)	-0.064 (0.051)	-0.138** (0.056)	0.019 (0.063)	-0.124 (0.088)	-0.075* (0.041)	-0.128*** (0.041)	-0.066 (0.130)
CAO $\times \frac{CAO-migrants}{Population} \times 1000$	0.004*** (0.001)							0.005* (0.003)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.513** (0.226)						-0.234 (0.449)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.023 (0.045)					0.077 (0.056)
CAO $\times FN_{2007}$				0.029*** (0.008)				0.034*** (0.009)
CAO $\times \log(Population)$					0.000 (0.014)			0.047 (0.031)
CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$						-0.764* (0.444)		-1.871*** (0.573)
CAO $\times dist.Roya$							-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.018 (0.012)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27918	27918
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.072	0.068	0.069	0.069	0.071	0.069	0.064

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to second stage IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. Interaction terms of the presence of a CAO and a covariate are instrumented with the interaction of VV and the covariate following Wooldridge (2010). All interaction terms are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable - except for the number of places in CAO and voluntary mayors. The coefficient for the distance to the la Roya Valley is multiplied by 100 and thus expressed in units of 100 km. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 4: Effect of Migrant Relocation on Net job creation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
	<i>Post - 10/2015</i>	<i>Post - 10/2016</i>	<i>Post - 10/2015</i>	<i>Post - 10/2016</i>		
CAO	0.574 (1.276)	0.526 (0.895)	-4.486 (3.091)	-1.769 (2.083)	-0.085** (0.038)	-0.085** (0.038)
Regression	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: <i>NJC</i> ₂₀₁₂₋₂₀₁₄	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: <i>NJC</i> _{<i>Post</i>-10/2015}	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: <i>NJC</i> _{<i>Post</i>-10/2016}	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-Statistic						
Observations	27940	27940	27922	27922	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.016	0.023	0.015	0.063	0.063

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of an OLS regression where we regress the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015 (Column 1) and after October 2016 (Column 2) on the presence of a CAO. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients of the same specification where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village. Column 5 is an instrumental variable regression where the outcome variable is the variation of log FN vote share between 2012 and 2017, where we control for the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015. Column 6 is the same specification as Column 5, but controlling for net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2016. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

NJC stands for Net Job Creation (per thousand inhabitants)

A1 Appendix [For Online Publication]

Table A1: Heterogeneous Effects of the Impact of Migrants on the Front National Vote, with standardized variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.112*** (0.034)	-0.065 (0.051)	-0.138** (0.056)	0.018 (0.063)	-0.124 (0.087)	-0.075* (0.041)	-0.127*** (0.041)	-0.079 (0.133)
CAO $\times \frac{CAO-migrants}{Population} \times 1000$	0.187*** (0.056)							0.200* (0.117)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.023** (0.010)						-0.011 (0.020)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.023 (0.045)					0.077 (0.056)
CAO $\times FN_{2007}$				0.158*** (0.044)				0.186*** (0.051)
CAO $\times \log(Population)$					0.000 (0.018)			0.061 (0.041)
[1em] CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$						-0.030* (0.018)		-0.075*** (0.023)
CAO $\times dist.Roya$							-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.034 (0.023)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27918	27918
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.072	0.068	0.069	0.069	0.071	0.069	0.064

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to second stage IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. Interaction terms of the presence of a CAO and a covariate are instrumented with the interaction of VV and the covariate following Wooldridge (2010). All interaction variables are standardized. All interaction terms are expressed with respect to the mean value of the standardized interacted variable - except for the number of places in CAO and voluntary mayors. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A2: Pre-Trends: CAO Coefficients on Past Presidential Elections and Controls for Different Front National Trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	$\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	$\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	$\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	$\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	$\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$
CAO	-0.074 (0.052)	0.088 (0.055)	-0.084 (0.059)	-0.080** (0.037)	-0.083** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.037)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-Statistic						
Observations	27914	27906	27880	27878	27904	27914
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.173	0.083	0.063	0.063	0.109

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 3 are instrumental variables regression lagging the dependent variable in our standard specification by one, then two and then three presidential elections respectively. Column 4 to 6 are instrumental variables regressions controlling first for the evolution of the vote share of the Front National between 1995 and 2002, then 2002 and 2007 and then 2007 and 2012 respectively. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A3: No Link between Holiday Villages and FN trend in Corsica

	(1)	(2)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
VV	-0.009 (0.082)	-0.065 (0.087)
Regression	OLS	OLS
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	352	199
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.188

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 2 report the results of OLS regressions of the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 on the dummy for a holiday village (VV). The regression in Column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A4: Main Results Controlling for Department Fixed Effects and Past Front National Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.140*** (0.024)	-0.122*** (0.038)	-0.113*** (0.037)	-0.237*** (0.045)	-0.232*** (0.045)	-0.240*** (0.045)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department fixed effects	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2007}	No	Non-parametric	Polynomials	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2012}	No	No	No	Yes	Non-parametric	Polynomials
F-Statistic	25.1	21.2	21.2	20.8	19.7	20.2
Observations	27497	27920	27914	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.068	0.072	0.141	0.132	0.150

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the Front National on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for department fixed effects. In Column 2 we control non-parametrically for the Front National Vote share in 2007. In Column 3 we control for the log of the Front National vote share in 2007 up to the third polynomial. In Column 4 we control for the Front National vote share in 2012. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A5: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Results varying the Type of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.123***	-0.140***	-0.103**	-0.101**	-0.119**	-0.120***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.039)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls: Infrastructure	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: City characteristics	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls: Δ city characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls: Mayor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
F-Statistic						
Observations	27920	27920	27920	30052	33248	28127
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.058	0.022	0.052	0.004	0.068

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the Front National on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for all major groups of controls, which is exactly the baseline specification. In column 2 we do not control for infrastructure in cities related to the hosting of migrants. In column 3 we exclude city characteristics in 2013. In column 4 we exclude the change in city characteristics between 2006 and 2013. In column 5 we exclude both city characteristics in 2013 and its evolution between 2006 and 2013. In Column 6 we exclude characteristics of the Mayor. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.



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Directrice de publication :

Anne Revillard

Comité de rédaction :

Sofia Cerda Aparicio, Andreana Khristova

Sciences Po - LIEPP
27 rue Saint Guillaume
75007 Paris - France
+33(0)1.45.49.83.61
liepp@sciencespo.fr

