%0 Journal Article %T Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities %+ Universität Bern [Bern] (UNIBE) %A Bochet, Olivier %A Gordon, Sidartha %< avec comité de lecture %Z 2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m11gl71ro %@ 0899-8256 %J Games and Economic Behavior %I Elsevier %V 74 %N 1 %P 52 - 67 %8 2012-01 %D 2012 %K Multiple public facilities %K Priority rules %K Hierarchical rules %K Object-population monotonicity %K Sovereignty %K Strategy-proofness %K Generalized median voter rules %K No-show paradox %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJournal articles %X A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe. %G English %L hal-03417535 %U https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03417535 %~ SHS %~ SCIENCESPO %~ AO-ECONOMIE