%0 Journal Article
%T Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
%+ Universität Bern [Bern] (UNIBE)
%A Bochet, Olivier
%A Gordon, Sidartha
%< avec comité de lecture
%Z 2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m11gl71ro
%@ 0899-8256
%J Games and Economic Behavior
%I Elsevier
%V 74
%N 1
%P 52 - 67
%8 2012-01
%D 2012
%K Multiple public facilities
%K Priority rules
%K Hierarchical rules
%K Object-population monotonicity
%K Sovereignty
%K Strategy-proofness
%K Generalized median voter rules
%K No-show paradox
%Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJournal articles
%X A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
%G English
%L hal-03417535
%U https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03417535
%~ SHS
%~ SCIENCESPO
%~ AO-ECONOMIE