

Paul-André Rosental

Eugenics and Social Security in France before and after the Vichy Regime

The apparent decline of eugenics, or rather of the approval of it, should not deceive us. In other forms, and perhaps under other names, it is likely to provoke the liveliest and most radical debates in our future societies.

Alfred Sauvy, preface to Jean Sutter,
L'Eugénique: problèmes, méthodes, résultats,
Paris, PUF-INED, 1950, 10.

Only fifteen or twenty years ago it was thought that, apart from the attempts of a few zealots at the turn of the twentieth century and the Vichy regime's introduction of a premarital medical examination, France was immune to eugenics.¹ This idea of a French exception was based on cultural assumptions. The French republican ideal was thought to preclude any unequal or discriminatory treatment incompatible with individual rights.² French scientists' neo-Lamarckism made them unreceptive to Galton's eugenics across the Channel.³ Another factor, as in all the «Latin» countries, was the opposition of the Catholic Church, made official in the papal encyclical *Casti Connubii* of 31 December 1930. A final reason given for France's opposition to eugenics – wrongly believed to automatically strengthen the catholic argument – was the importance of pro-natalist ideas. In a country whose fertility had begun to fall decades before the rest of Europe, the belief that a state's power depended on its birth rate had emerged in the 1860s in the face of the military threat from Prussia.

1 For a brief historiographical overview, see the introduction to A. Carol, *Histoire de l'eugénisme en France*, Paris 1998 (and Chapter 13 on the history of the premarital certificate).

2 See P.-A. Taguieff, «L'introduction de l'eugénisme en France: du mot à l'idée», in: *Mots* 26 (1991), 23–45; and L. Mucchielli, «Criminologie, hygiénisme et eugénisme en France (1870–1914): dé-

bats médicaux sur l'élimination des criminels réputés «incorrigibles», in: *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* 2 (2000) 3, 57–88.

3 Y. Conry, *L'introduction du darwinisme en France au XIXe siècle*, Paris 1974; J. Léonard, «Le premier Congrès international d'eugénique (Londres, 1912) et ses conséquences françaises», in: *Histoire des Sciences Médicales* 17 (1983), 141–146.

After the First World War, these ideas were commonplace in the world of politics and administration and had sown the seeds for a population policy. Since France was pro-natalist, it could not be eugenicist, or so said common sense, too quick to see a contradiction between quantity and quality of population.

As in other countries,⁴ the 1980s saw the first challenges to this confident view. Michel Foucault's paradigm of examining the links between knowledge and power caused scholars to look again, this time more critically, at the heroic history of public policy. Two controversies concerning the criminal past of the Vichy regime, brought into the limelight after a long silence, arose first in academic circles and then in the media. One was the policy of elimination by malnutrition alleged to have been used against mental hospital patients under the Occupation.⁵ The other controversy, not unconnected with the former, concerned the ideology and legacy of the surgeon Alexis Carrel (1873–1944). After a brilliant career in the United States, Carrel, who won a Nobel Prize in 1912, returned to France under the Occupation and was made regent of the French Foundation for the Study of Human Problems (FFEPH) by Marshal Pétain. His 1935 bestseller, *L'Homme, cet inconnu* [*Man, the Unknown*], remained a standard until the 1960s. But after Carrel became a reference for the «New Right» in the 1970s, some historians denounced the eugenics contained in his ideas – pitiless towards the «weak» and accompanied by racism and anti-Semitism. Not without historiographical disputes, his name was removed in 1996 from a medical faculty in Lyon and from many streets in France.⁶ One relevant feature of the Alexis Carrel case was that he was also known to have been a devout Catholic,⁷ which casts some doubt on the supposedly impossible combination of the two positions.

In both affairs, by focusing on the background of knowledge before the Occupation, the academic approach has tended to neglect the period following the Liberation, the more so since the new Republic has been founded on the rejection of the errors of the past.⁸ In contrast to the English-speaking world⁹, neither has the con-

4 L. Koch, «Past Futures: On the Conceptual History of Eugenics. A Social Technology of the Past», in: *Technology Analysis & Strategic Management* 18 (2006) 3–4, 329–344.

5 M. Lafont, *L'extermination douce: la mort de 40.000 malades mentaux dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques en France, sous le régime de Vichy*, Le Cellier 1987. More recently, I. von Bueltzingsloewen, *L'hécatombe des fous: la famine dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques français sous l'Occupation*, Paris 2007, has shown that the higher death rate from malnutrition among these patients under the Vichy regime was rather the result of worsening food supplies under the Occupation.

6 L. Bonnafé / P. Tort, *L'Homme, cet inconnu? Alexis Carrel, Jean-Marie Le Pen et les chambres à gaz*, Paris 1992. The critic of Alexis Carrel's ideology has

been rather confirmed by subsequent research. See A. H. Reggiani, *God's Eugenicist. Alexis Carrel and the Sociobiology of Decline*, New York-Oxford 2006; P.-A. Rosental, *L'intelligence démographique. Sciences et politiques des populations en France (1930–1960)*, Paris 2003, particularly chapter 3.

7 Among Alexis Carrel's religious texts, see *La Prière*, Paris 1944; *Le voyage de Lourdes & Fragments de journal et de Méditations*, Paris 1949; *Réflexions sur la conduite de la vie*, Paris 1971.

8 «Eugenics is a scientific lost continent, swallowed up in 1945, leaving only a few traces in sociobiology and population genetics», (H. Le Bras, *Marianne et les lapins*, Paris 1991, 204).

9 See M. Ekberg, «The Old Eugenics and the New Genetics Compared», in: *Social History of Medicine* 20 (2007) 3, 581–593.

temporary debate on embryo manipulation techniques challenged this dating. Far from examining any links to earlier models of thought, it has focused on the issues arising from new techniques created by biology and invented the notion of «private eugenics».¹⁰ In asking whether those couples who now choose not to carry a foetus to term that is suffering from severe genetic abnormalities are practising a form of eugenics at their own level, the present debate dismisses any connection with «classical» eugenics, which was concerned rather with the «defence of the race». This omission cannot be taken for granted: in sociological terms, not to mention the attitude of the medical community, it is difficult to reduce these private choices to purely individual preferences, as if they were not grounded in a collective substratum.¹¹ An official report to the French *Conseil d'État* (Council of State) raises such an interrogation, by wondering whether «eugenics may also be the collective result of a sum of convergent individual decisions taken by future parents in a society where the aim was to have the «perfect child», or at least a child free from many serious disorders».¹²

1. French Eugenics as a Latin Eugenics

The initiation of research focusing mainly on the period of the French Third Republic (1870–1940) has led, over the last fifteen years, to the idea of a French eugenics: a largely preventive eugenics with a strong flavour of social hygiene, concentrating more on «environmental» aspects than innate ones.¹³ Its origins were founded in medical circles via a succession of obstetricians, childcare workers and paediatricians, from Adolphe Pinard (1844–1934) to Robert Debré (1882–1978) as well as Charles Richet (1850–1935) and Édouard Toulouse (1865–1947), with significant extensions to such fields as psychiatry, sexology and criminology.¹⁴ A «medical» approach was also adopted by the few authors who took French eugenics after 1945 seriously, an approach marked by categories taken from British eugenics.¹⁵

10 J.-N. Missa / C. Susanne (eds.), *De l'eugénisme d'État à l'eugénisme privé*, Paris-Brussels 1999.

11 See the feminist sociologist Ruth Hubbard's argumentation in *The Politics of Women's Biology*, Chapel Hill/NC 1990. See also D. B. Paul, *Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present*, Atlantic Highlands/NJ 1995.

12 *La révision des lois de bioéthique*, Paris 2009, 30.

13 An early example is J. Léonard, «Premier Congrès». For a synthetic approach, see A. La Vergata, «Lamarckisme et solidarité», in: *Asclepio: Revista de Historia de la Medicina y de la Ciencia* 48 (1996) 1, 273–288.

14 N. Lefaucheur, «La Puériculture d'Adolphe Pinard, une voie française de l'eugénisme», in: G. Raimbault / M. Manciaux (eds.), *Enfance menacée*, Paris 1992, 19–43; A.-L. Simmonot, *Hygiénisme et eugé-*

nisme au XX^e siècle à travers la psychiatrie française, Paris 1999; M. Huteau, *Psychologie, psychiatrie et société sous la troisième république. La biocratie d'Édouard Toulouse (1865–1947)*, Paris 2002; A. Drouard, «Biocratie, eugénisme et sexologie dans l'œuvre d'Édouard Toulouse», in: *Sexologies* 16 (2007) 3, 203–211; S. Chaperon, «La sexologie française contemporaine: un premier bilan historiographique», in: *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* 17 (2007) 2, 7–22; M. Kaluszynski, *La République à l'épreuve du crime*, Paris 2002; J.-J. Yvorel, «L'Université et l'enfance délinquante: 1939–1945», in: *Revue d'histoire de l'enfance «irrégulière»* 3 (2000), 137–157.

15 J.-P. Gaudillière, «Le syndrome nataliste: hérédité, médecine et eugénisme en France et en Grande-Bretagne, 1920–1965», in: J. Gayon / D. Jacobi

Recent developments in historiography – and herein lies some of the inspiration for this paper – suggest that the case of France should be seen in comparison to a transnational model known by its supporters as «Latin eugenics». Regarded in the 1930s as a special case, or even as an alternative to «Anglo-Saxon eugenics», it spanned continents; in Europe it reached from Catholic Italy to Orthodox Romania, and it remained strong after the war in Latin America in countries such as Argentina and Brazil. These two branches formed trans-Atlantic links and were firmly supported by the Mussolini regime.¹⁶

The first typical feature of this model was to establish the apparently unholy alliance between «quantity theories» and «quality theories». Although it had already occurred in France,¹⁷ this particular country should be seen in a wider framework.

Looking at «Latin eugenics» is also a way of identifying the circles, practices and models that were less conspicuous but just as formative as the largely medical framework on which French historians have focused. Going beyond paediatricians and geneticists to demographers and psychologists, beyond eugenics societies to bio-typology organisations, beyond sterilisation to school and vocational career counselling, this wider scope is, however, no less coherent. Indeed, the notion of a Latin eugenics makes it possible to circumscribe a phenomenon that was seen as integrated in the interwar period, whereas its dispersal in Europe after 1945 made the connections between its parts barely visible.

As Elazar Barkan has pointed out, eugenics was politically defeated before all its foundations had been scientifically tested.¹⁸ Although the label faded and shrank in the years after the Second World War, the scientific constructs behind eugenics remained operative for a long time, or more precisely, they were converted and recoded in order to avoid what was now perceived as taboo. This operation of political correctness was no easy task: after the collapse of Nazism, the borderline between the biological and the social might have well been seen as a sensitive matter without it necessarily being clear exactly where it ran. For that reason a diachronic approach is needed to draw parallels between the scientific developments during the twenty years after the war and those during the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁹

(eds.), *L'éternel retour de l'eugénisme*, Paris 2006, 177–199.

16 F. Cassetta, *Building a New Man: Eugenics, Racial Sciences and Genetics in Twentieth Century Italy*, Budapest 2011; A. H. Reggiani, «Dépopulation, fascisme et eugénisme «latin» dans l'Argentine des années 1930», in: *Le Mouvement social* 230 (2010) 1, 7–26. On 1–3 August 1937, the newly formed Latin International Federation of Eugenics Societies met in Paris on the occasion of the World Exposition (see proceedings of the First Latin Eugenics Congress, Masson, 1938).

17 W. H. Schneider, *Quality and Quantity: Eugenics and the Biological Regeneration of Twentieth Century France*, Cambridge 1987.

18 E. Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism. Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between the World Wars*, Cambridge 1992.

19 W. Sztokowski, *Anthropologies rédemptrices. Le monde selon Lévi-Strauss*, Paris 2008, for example, shows how Claude Lévi-Strauss's theories about racism correspond to the obsessions of the 1920s about the global equilibrium between population and resources. P.-A. Rosental / I. Couzon, «Le Pa-

2. Objectivising the Place of «Eugenics» in France

In countries like Great Britain or Germany in the first half of the twentieth century, the term «eugenics» – as broad and as salient an expression in public debate as «social» or «population policy» – covered a wide range of scientific and ideological topics. Founded by Sir Francis Galton on what would now be called a principle of genetic determinism, eugenics was soon used as a theory of human value, expressed with varying degrees of explicitness and sophistication. By supposing differential qualities between individuals or groups, it was a case of a wider critique of the policies of the European democracies which had, over the nineteenth century, gradually introduced forms of political equality within a population considered as citizens.²⁰ As an inegalitarian theory, eugenics was used to cover a wide variety of ideological content, from a conservatism justifying social hierarchy by scientific arguments to a progressivism longing for a social hierarchy based on personal qualities rather than social reproduction.

With the growth of the corpora of digitised literature, it has become possible to find at least approximately objective measures of the relative importance of the word «eugenics» in the vocabulary of its period. The Ngram application may not be able to mine all the works under copyright, but it can use the extensive database of books digitised by Google. For this study I compared France and Great Britain from 1900 to 1960 regarding the use of the word «eugenics» alongside ideas relating to major social and population policy causes: *natalité* and birth control, *assurances sociales* and social insurance, *classes sociales* and social classes.

Graph 1 (Great Britain) and Graph 2 (France)²¹ contain few surprises. «Eugenics» in Great Britain correlates with the major socio-demographic issues of the day, whereas the use of *eugénique* is marginal in France. Should one therefore take up a nominalist position and say that an idea or policy is only eugenicist if its supporters describe it as such? Although this problem applies to any topic in the social sciences, it is particularly difficult in the case of eugenics because of the taboo that followed the Second World War.

The main French post-war reference is *L'Eugénique*, which was published by a physician, Jean Sutter, in 1950.²² It provides a systematic analysis of eugenic theories that might be usable for public policy once they have been purged of their «excesses». A similar concern could be observed in the Nordic countries at that time:


ris dangereux de Louis Chevalier: un projet d'histoire utile», in: B. Lepetit / C. Topalov (eds.), *La ville des sciences sociales*, Paris 2001, 191–226 and 373–386 present Louis Chevalier's classic work, *Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses*, (Paris 1958) as a «reprocessing» of the ethnoracial models of the 1930s.

20 This point of view is not dissimilar to that present-


ed by B. Russell in *Marriage and Morals*, New York 1929.

21 The word *eugenic* is less frequent than *eugenics* and follows a similar pattern. I have chosen therefore to omit it from the graph.

22 J. Sutter, *L'Eugénique: problèmes, méthodes, résultats*, Paris 1950.



Graph 1: Relative use of the terms *eugenics*, *birth control*, *social insurance*, *social classes* and *demography* in British English from 1900 to 1960



Graph 2: Relative use of the terms *natalité*, *assurances sociales*, *classes sociales*, *eugénique* and *démographie* in French from 1900 to 1960

Source of graphs: Corpus of publications digitised by Google Books (Ngram application)

the idea was in no way to prohibit eugenics but rather, as it were, to cleanse it of the criminal use to which it had been put but with a major difference: Sutter's book was a one-off that may be seen in hindsight as the swansong of a dying doctrine.²³

In Great Britain (Graph 1), the Second World War does not seem to have marked a break: as early as the 1930s the use of eugenics by Nazi «scientists» began to discredit it, as scientific doubts arose as to the importance of hereditary determinism. In France (Graph 2), growing anxiety about Nazi Germany led to a critical examination which, together with the rise of xenophobia and racism in the 1930s, caused a greater use of the term *eugénisme*. Still popular as the Occupation began, this curios-

23 Koch, «Past Futures».

ity disappeared after Liberation, when it was important to handle carefully any ideas too closely associated with the Vichy regime. In this context, it is rather the publication of Sutter's book that needs explaining. Far from representing the scientific passion of a single author, it also had a strong institutional dimension connected to the public policy of the period.

After the war, Jean Sutter (1910–1970) was a technical advisor to an institute created as recently as 24 October 1945, the Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED), which published his book in its series *Travaux et Documents* at the Presses Universitaires de France. At that time, INED was still under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health and Population and had less independence than it would have later. Its staff was on renewable short-term contracts, usually for one or two years.²⁴ Its expenditure was meticulously supervised by the Ministry of Finance, which regularly reduced its budget and cut its staff numbers, and even pressed for its abolition.

INED's main safety net was its so-called Technical Committee (the modern term would be Scientific Advisory Board), into which director Alfred Sauvy (1898–1990) had brought eminent personalities from science and administration. In return, the Institute was obliged to carry out «useful» research at a time when central government was expanding and the French social security system was being organised.

The decree establishing INED explicitly gave it the mission of working for the quantitative and qualitative development of the country's population. One of its tasks was to educate the general public about the importance of a viable and vigorous demography, combining a high birth rate, carefully selected and managed immigration and the right conditions of social hygiene.²⁵ The *Travaux et Documents* series, intended for the educated general reader, was intended to contribute to this. There is no doubt that Alfred Sauvy, who ran the series with an iron hand, was determined to publish *L'Eugénique*. In August 1947, he literally fined Jean Sutter for being late with the manuscript by cutting his salary, an exceptional move although he was theoretically entitled to do so.²⁶ The publication of *L'Eugénique* consequently raises issues that go well beyond the personality of the author: for example why, five years after the end of the war, was this book considered necessary for the development of population, health and social policy?

24 P.-A. Rosental, «Le premier monde de la recherche: la gestion du personnel par Alfred Sauvy dans l'INED des années 1950», in: *Genèses* 51 (2003), 128–146.

25 For an introductory view of the relationship between migration and eugenics, which is a subject in itself, see T. Stovall, «Universalisme, différence

et invisibilité. Essai sur la notion de race dans l'histoire de la France contemporaine», in: *Cahiers d'histoire. Revue d'histoire critique* 96–97 (2005), 63–90. See also Footnote 28, below.

26 INED Archives, Fonds de la Direction, décision n° 180, 7 August 1947.

3. Quantitative and Qualitative Demography

The task officially assigned to INED, a small institute with sixteen technical advisors in 1949, was «to contribute to the quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of the population» (Decree 45-2499 of 24 October 1945, Article 2). To understand how these statutory requirements affected the running of the Institute, and in particular Sutter's work, we must examine its immediate, disreputable past. INED was officially a substitute for the «Carrel Foundation», the FFEPPH, whose image was so closely associated with the Pétain regime that it could not survive the Liberation. Institutionally, this «substitution» involved the buildings, in which they were housed, but there was also an obvious continuity in its staff. Although only a tiny proportion of the FFEPPH's hundreds of technical advisors were taken on by INED, roughly half of INED's researchers came from the FFEPPH: this imbalance was due naturally to the vast difference in size between the two establishments.

Since Sauvy was forced to recruit his team in a hurry, he cobbled together little networks of kindred scientific spirits that had formed within the Carrel Foundation. In this way Jean Sutter, in charge of nutrition questions within the FFEPPH, was given the INED research department of Hereditary and Environmental Factors, a definition that included population biology but stopped short of genetics. On 22 June 1946, the Technical Committee actually rejected Alfred Sauvy's proposal to include genetics in the range of disciplines represented at INED.²⁷

This topic-based structure turned out to be relatively rigid in its boundaries. To survive, INED also had to provide expert advice to the government, social establishments and major representatives of civil society, such as family associations, and also gain international scientific recognition. In my book *L'Intelligence Démographique*, I demonstrate that it was the demographers who best met this double constraint, thereby making their discipline the Institute's core competence: Graph 2 reveals the post-war take-off of the term *démographie* in France, whereas «demography» remained at a low level in Great Britain.

The Population Department, which was devoted to demography and staffed by Polytechnique alumni, counterbalanced Jean Sutter's department. A unit named Relationship between Population Numbers and Quality was supposed to link the two. This other department was headed by the physical anthropologist Robert Gessain (1907–1986), but because of his determinist and racial views, he resigned from INED in 1947 after an internal dispute with the sociologist Jean Stoetzel, who argued for a culturalist explanation of differences between peoples. As a sign of the importance Alfred Sauvy placed on this discipline, the department was preserved and Jean Sutter was appointed to head it.

27 On all these points, see Rosental, *L'intelligence démographique*, Chapter 7.

The connections between this topic-based structure and that of the Carrel Foundation are obvious. The FFEPPH's mission was «the comprehensive study of measures best suited to preserve, improve and develop the French population in all its activities»,²⁸ a definition which, for its senior officials, included a concern for its quantity and «quality».²⁹ These two dimensions were combined in the huge Population Department in which demographers (Paul Vincent and Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, later INED researchers, and Pierre Depoid, later a member of its Technical Committee) were neither in the majority nor predominant. Its head, Félix-André Missenard, was a specialist in working conditions, particularly industrial heating. One of its teams, named Biology of Descent could, as its head Robert Gessain himself admitted, just as well have been named Population Quality³⁰: it saw its task as identifying and fostering «healthy, fertile French couples»,³¹ meaning those who gave birth to numerous healthy offspring, as the terminology of the period had it. Combining numbers and value, this ambition of the Population Department was in line with French pro-natalism. Gessain, who was politically conservative, and Vincent, a communist, explained this in a 1945 joint text which, significantly, transcended ideology.

This combination of ideas, inconceivable in English-speaking eugenics, went back a long way. It was usually explained and confirmed by referring to athletic performance, such as «the noticeable advances by three prolific nations – Germany, Italy and Japan – and the decline of Malthusian nations – England, France, Sweden» during the 1936 Olympics, with demographers repeating that, in a larger population, the «law of large numbers» and «creative pressure» increased the proportion of high-value individuals.³²

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the notion of «normal fertility» gave population policy the objective of a high fertility rate with low variance, discouraging both small and prolific families, whose «crude brains, incapable of generalising thought, remain closest to those of primitive beasts».³³ Robert Debré, one of the leading medical dignitaries of the post-war period and the real father of INED, argued in 1950 against families of more than six children on economic grounds and in order to combat alcoholism.³⁴ From his experience as a paediatrician

28 Under Article 1 of the Act of 14 January 1942 concerning the FFEPPH (A. Drouard, *Une inconnue des sciences sociales. La Fondation Alexis Carrel, 1941–1945*, Paris 1992, 338).

29 See the section «Le problème de l'enfant» and the sub-section «Comment provoquer la naissance d'enfants héréditairement bien doués» in the FFEPPH's presentation brochure, *Ce qu'elle fait. Cahiers de la Fondation Française pour l'Etude des Problèmes Humains*, Paris 1943, 20–27.

30 R. Gessain / P. Vincent, «Quelques aspects quantitatifs et qualitatifs de la population française»,

in: *Cahiers de la Fondation Française pour l'Etude des Problèmes Humains* 3 (1945), 19–32.

31 FFEPPH, *Ce qu'est la Fondation*, 42.

32 A. Sauvy, *Richesse et population*, Paris 1943, 78.

33 Speech in the French Lower House in 1924 by the influential paediatrician and parliamentarian Adolphe Pinard (1844–1934), quoted in P.-A. Rosental, «Familles «nombreuses» et familles «normales»: un regard historique (1900–1950)», in: *Informations sociales* 115 (2004), 44–57.

34 R. Debré, «La famille heureuse ou l'optimum familial», in: *Population* 5 (1950) 4, 617–624.

he claimed that a child develops best with two to five siblings – a good balance between the disastrous single-child model and large families that «overwhelm parents». ³⁵

Alfred Sauvy, the director of INED, criticised «the single-child household, so frequent these days, [as] an antiphysiological anomaly causing suffering to both parents and child. The self-centredness of the child and the excessive emotionality of the parents form a highly defective psychological complex». ³⁶ Just as virulently, however, he deplored the fact that «there is an inverse selection among families... In the worst case, the defective family of mentally retarded members, giving no thought to the morrow, immune to persuasion, would be the only one to reproduce abundantly. Average quality runs a clear risk with this counter-selection, which affects not only individuals, but also social and ethnic groups. The mad may multiply but not the Malthusian geniuses.» ³⁷

Without descending to the sort of sensationalist diatribe that has long marked the history of demography, or conflating discourses which may use similar terms for ideologically diverse views, the purpose of this historical review is to sketch the outline of «French eugenics», which is harder to discern than that in Great Britain because it was considered more «sensitive» by its own authors. Even under the Vichy regime, the Carrel Foundation avoided the use of the term «eugenics» because it might offend «public opinion». On 15 September 1942, its governing board considered «inappropriate in current circumstances» the proposal submitted by Misenard to give the name «Genetics and eugenics» to one of the teams in his Population department. ³⁸ Alfred Sauvy had learned this lesson. Throughout his post-war career, his image as a scientist ready to break taboos in the name of reason masked his close attention to audience response, and he tailored what he said to the forum concerned.

There is a «hidden agenda» here, because the reference to quality, the deepest substrate of eugenics, immediately raises the question of norms. This was not only true for «normal fertility»: in the 1950s the demographer Sully Ledermann applied a no less prescriptive reasoning to alcoholism – another favourite topic of eugenicist thinking – by defining the threshold between acceptable and pathological levels of consumption. ³⁹ In fact, what the overlap between pre- and post-war models demonstrates is the strong psychosocial dimension of French eugenicist concerns. This observation may seem surprising in relation to a current of thought originally con-

35 A view supported by testimonies of the period cited in C. Jean, *Du Birth Control à la liberté absolue de l'avortement: luttes et acteurs du M.F.P.F. (1956–1975)*, master's thesis at IEP, Paris, supervised by Paul-André Rosental, 2011.

36 A. Sauvy, *Bien-être et population*, Paris 1945, 141.

37 A. Sauvy, «Le malthusianisme anglo-saxon», in: *Population* 2 (1947) 2, 221–242, 224.

38 Drouard, *Une inconnue*, 419.

39 L. Berlivet, «Les démographes et l'alcoolisme: du «fléau social» au «risque de santé»», in: *Vingtième Siècle* 95 (2007) 3, 93–113.

ceived in a more biological framework. Nonetheless, it does have a more general application; witness the rapid conversion in the English-speaking, Latin American and Germanic world in the 1920s of «eugenic clinics» into centres for psychology of couples and marriage counselling.⁴⁰

It is significant that the central position given to psycho-sociology is one of the continuities between the Carrel Foundation and INED. In both bodies, responsibility for the department devoted to this field was given to the sociologist Jean Stoetzel, who, after introducing polling techniques to France, became one of the leading lights in that field after the war while remaining an associate researcher at INED.⁴¹ His colleague Alain Girard completed projects in the 1950s that had been launched by the FFEPPH, such as the major survey of the level of education attained by a cohort of children. Laurent Thévenot has clearly shown the eugenicist foundations of the early questions raised by INED about the conditions for upward social mobility, for example the number of siblings, even though they led to their opposite, namely the revelation about the decisive influence of social factors on social mobility.⁴² This is not dissimilar to developments in the United States in the 1930s in contraception surveys: based on a biological starting point, they ended up showing the importance of social determinations of contraceptive behaviour.

At this point what matters is that population phenomena were addressed by a variety of disciplines and approaches that went well beyond demographic statistics and analysis. Although the Carrel Foundation was not the instigator of this combination, it did accelerate and consolidate it by providing an institutional underpinning. As late as the 1960s, Paul Vincent, a researcher distant from any ideological complicity with the Vichy regime, echoed this purpose in the introduction to his book which concluded the research that had been designed at the FFEPPH on «healthy, fertile couples»,⁴³ saying that it should be «mentally placed in the framework of the research programme it initially belonged to. The programme aimed to collect a large amount of biological data on the French population. It was designed to implement a vast research plan that went well beyond strict «demography» to connected and less connected disciplines such as genetics, physiology, dietetics and sociology».

40 See L. Ladd-Taylor, «Eugenics, Sterilisation and Modern Marriage», in: *Gender and History* 13 (2001) 2, 298–327; N. Leys Stepan, «*The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America*», Ithaca/NY 1991; E. R. Dickinson, «Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about «Modernity»», in: *Central European History* 37 (2004) 1, 1–48, 14.

41 J.-C. Marcel, «Jean Stoetzel élève de Maurice Halbwachs: les origines françaises de la théorie

des opinions», in: *L'Année Sociologique* 48 (1998) 2, 319–351; P.-A. Rosental, «Jean Stoetzel, Demography and Public Opinion», in: *Population* 61 (2006) 1, 29–40.

42 L. Thévenot, «La politique des statistiques: les origines sociales des enquêtes de mobilité sociale», in: *Annales ESC* 45 (1990) 6, 1275–1300.

43 P. Vincent, *Recherches sur la fécondité biologique. Étude d'un groupe de familles nombreuses*, Paris 1961.

Alfred Sauvy used this structure in the many papers and «theoretical» treatises that he devoted to the topic of «population» after the war, repeating *ad nauseam* that the borderline between quantitative and qualitative questions was vague and to some extent conventional. Some factors for instance are called qualitative «simply because they are not amenable, or not yet amenable, to precise measurement», such as age for a population with no vital records.⁴⁴ The word *eugénisme*, which Sauvy only uses in the British sense of eugenics, occurs as part of a larger domain that the author finds hard to qualify. «Qualitative demography» was an initial attempt at naming it. As a counterpart to the burgeoning field of «quantitative demography», the expression was most used in the 1950s, competing with the term *eugénique*⁴⁵ and was adopted by the authorities as a category of government (Table 1)⁴⁶.

Table 1

Number of articles in the journal *Population* using the terms *eugénique*, *eugénisme* or *démographie qualitative* at least once in the body of the text.

	1945–1950	1951–1955	1956–1960	1961–1970
<i>eugénique</i>	9	9	6	7
<i>eugénisme</i>	4		1	1
<i>démographie qualitative</i>	5	3	6	2
<i>biologie sociale</i>	4	1		4

Source: JSTOR.

4. Social Biology and Utilitarianism

Another expression used to qualify the new framework for eugenicist thinking was «social biology». It was used in 1952 in the title of Volume 2 of Sauvy's *Théorie générale de la population*, but its roots go back even further. The secretary-general of the Institute, Roger Peltier, designated social biology as the «ultimate goal of demography» in the presentation of INED he wrote in 1949 and confirmed this point six years later.⁴⁷ Given his background (a career in the oil industry before becoming

44 See A. Sauvy, *Théorie générale de la population*, vol. 2: *Biologie sociale*, Paris 1954, 334.

45 For a medical approach to «qualitative demography», see J.-J. Gillon, «Importance de la natalité différentielle dans une politique de la population», in: *Connaitre. Cahiers de l'humanisme médical* 2 (1945), 25–30.

46 *Rapport du Haut Comité consultatif de la Population*

et de la Famille sur la situation et les perspectives démographiques de tous les territoires de la République, Paris 1955, Centre d'Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 860269/1.

47 R. Peltier, «L'Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques», in: *Population* 4 (1949) 1, 9–38, 11; and idem, *L'Institut national d'études démographiques. Organisation, travaux et résultats*, Paris 1955, 6.

secretary-general of the FFEPH) and his function, it is hardly likely that he would have worded the expression in this way without referring to Alfred Sauvy: more probably he simply wrote down what his director said. The expression usefully reveals the construct that French eugenics belonged to: a «qualitative» approach that was not only rife within the medical community in the broad sense but also in the field of public action on demography, the family, public health, housing, labour and school career counselling. The issue at hand was the rationalisation of the individual's environment, private life (family, birth rate, housing), vocational life (training, career advice and employment) and both (nutrition), in the light of its effects on health and productivity. As Alfred Sauvy summed it up, «if human yield were doubled, it would be as if each individual counted as two; quality would substitute for quantity and the optimum size of the population would be halved». ⁴⁸ As we shall see, however, one of the difficulties during the post-war period was the institutional fragmentation of this model: unlike the FFEPH, where most of these components were, at least formally, represented, it received only partial support from INED.

We have seen in Jean Sutter's career how INED abandoned nutrition questions, which had been crucial to the FFEPH and a standard topic of early twentieth-century eugenics. The same happened to housing, where the FFEPH had had a team working on the effect of interior amenities on the «wear and tear» of residents. Not least, compared with the Carrel Foundation, INED was short of teams devoted to what might be called the biological approach to work. Within the FFEPH's Work Department, the Biology of Trades team led by Jean-Jacques Gillon was one of the best staffed and most prolific in publication. Its aim was to «obtain an optimum yield for a minimum human wear and tear, by harmonising the inert and living elements of production», ⁴⁹ in other words reconciling productivist ends with employees' interests.

This approach went back to the debates from the early twentieth century about fatigue and the «human motor». ⁵⁰ In the field of social medicine it took the form of the establishment of an occupational health profession that was supposed to reconcile the points of view of labour and capital, actively supported by the Vichy regime, which was hostile to the idea of class struggle. ⁵¹ The FFEPH extended this model under the name «biological counselling for labour» (*orientation biologique de la main-d'œuvre*), a term used until the 1960s.

48 Sauvy, *Richesse et population*, 77 (taken from chapter 6 «Le point de vue de la qualité. Eugénisme et sélection»).

49 FFEPH, *Ce qu'est la Fondation*, 42.

50 A. Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy,*

Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity, New York 1990.

51 S. Buzzi / J.-C. Devinck / P.-A. Rosental, *La Santé au Travail, 1880–2006*, Paris 2006.

The Vichy regime also hoped to replace school examinations, which it saw as too closely related to a cerebral, cosmopolitan culture, with tests to assess «natural» qualities in order to find the «leaders» who were key to its new political order.⁵² These ideas bore the mark of a bio-typological model that was initiated by the clinic run by the endocrinologist Nicola Pende in Genoa and was one of the salient features of Latin eugenics. Although the ideal may have varied, the means proposed were not incompatible with those designed by progressive researchers. As within the British eugenics community, socialist and communist psychologists (Henri Laugier and Henri Wallon) counted on psychotechnological tests to break down social reproduction and install a fairer society. This approach gradually spread throughout major companies from the 1920s onward and also influenced the idea of school career counselling in the interwar period.

This is where the comparison between the FFEPPH and INED is most useful. Rather than being the ultimate incarnation of the Carrel Foundation, INED and demography were only a truncated version, cut back by the ideological shifts of the post-war period and, not least, by the institutional upheavals of the Liberation. The creation of INED was not a foregone conclusion; a number of influential dignitaries were fighting over the spoils from the Carrel Foundation. When Robert Debré successfully pleaded for INED's case with General de Gaulle, the head of the provisional government, it was at the expense of projects proposed by major representatives of psychology and psychotechnology (Henri Laugier and Henri Wallon mentioned above, and Henri Piéron, the pioneer of «docimology», the scientific study of school examinations).

The cost for the new Institute was the loss of these fields of research, which were crucial for the FFEPPH. The director did what he could by bringing Georges Darmon, responsible for quantitative psychology, and especially Henri Laugier onto the Technical Committee; both men had been founding and active members of the Société de Biotypologie from 1932.⁵³ This severe pruning only increased the relative position of Stoetzel-type psycho-sociology, the last representative of an organic link with psychology.

Alfred Sauvy certainly wished to retrieve for INED all the aspects contained in the FFEPPH's Population Department. The attributions of the Section for the Study of Relationships between Population Numbers and Quality included topics such as «the value of children», alcohol, nutrition, abortion and sterilisation, and it remained within a scientific framework that included «bio-typology, eugenics, genetics and psychiatry». Its director, Jean Sutter, was in regular contact with prominent scientific

52 F. Muel-Dreyfus, «La rééducation de la sociologie sous le régime de Vichy», in: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 153 (2004) 3, 65–77.

53 «L'activité de la société de biotypologie», in: *Bioty-*

pologie 1 (1932) 1, 35–41. Concerning Laugier, see C. Morelle / P. Jakob, *Henri Laugier. Un esprit sans frontières*, Brussels-Paris 1997.

figures of those pre-war fields, including «Drs Schreiber and Heuyer, board members of the Eugenics Society of France».⁵⁴

This whole «qualitative» approach that we may call social biology had high ambitions: to be of influence as a tool of economic regulation through its productivist methods (rationalisation of the environment and techniques for educational and vocational selection) and political aspects (using scientific judgment to overcome class conflict). In Alfred Sauvy's *Théorie générale de la population*, the volume devoted to social biology follows one called *Économie et population*, published two years earlier. Not only did this division reflect the interests of a man who from 1922 to 1945 had been an economic forecaster, it also corresponded to the scientific equilibrium of the Carrel Foundation: a strong biological tendency counterbalanced by a secondary but substantial economic strand, embodied by François Perroux, secretary-general of the Foundation and director of the Economics Department until he resigned in December 1943. To go back further, this equilibrium reflected the utilitarian dimension that marked the early acceptance of eugenics.⁵⁵ In 1945, Robert Debré's dream was to stand up to the predominance of the economic ministries by creating a vast ministry of public health and population to cover «all the country's *human* problems»,⁵⁶ the very adjective that had been chosen by the Carrel Foundation. It also echoed François Perroux's stated purpose of constructing a humanistic economy, to change «man» rather than society, by improving his integration into the environment. The ambiguity in this slogan of eugenics was reflected in the use of a key concept of social economics in the 1930s, the «human factor», intended to adapt man to work. In many European countries, one understanding of eugenics – the one directly linked to the development of social democracy – was to optimise the use of collective resources by focusing them on what could be improved (investment in human capital) rather than on what could be compensated for (assistance). Could this reasoning also be found in France, where the language of eugenics was less often used to dress up social and economic reform? The answer may be found in an analysis of a post-war project put forward by the highest circles and which explicitly referred to eugenicist ideas.

5. Eugenics and Public Policy

In 1952, Jacques Doublet (1907–1984), in his capacity as Master of Requests on the Council of State, published a long article entitled «Population and Eugenics» in the family policy journal *Pour la Vie*.⁵⁷ It was a paper he had presented in Montpellier in

54 See the monthly activity reports of the *Section d'étude des relations entre le nombre et la qualité de la population*, archives cited.

55 See Carol, *Histoire de l'eugénisme*, 196.

56 Rosental, *L'intelligence démographique*, 84.

57 J. Doublet, «Population et eugénisme», in: *Pour la Vie. Revue d'études familiales* 46 (1952) 1, 3–34.

July 1951 to the *Semaines sociales de France* conference⁵⁸, an annual forum that for nearly fifty years was a major occasion for discussion among Catholics involved in the social sector.⁵⁹ It is much less well known now than Jean Sutter's book published two years earlier, but its political significance was much greater. It proposes a way of interpreting post-war policy in demographics, public health and labour issues that draws its value from the job occupied by its author when it was published. In October 1951, between the conference and the publication of the article, Doublet succeeded Pierre Laroque as the head of the recently established social security system.

This promotion was a just recognition of the pre-eminent position Doublet had gained in the circles that designed and oversaw social and demographic policy. In 1939, he was appointed general secretary of the recently created High Committee on Population, the major administrative body devoted to population policy at the time. He took up this mission with a pro-natalist fervour that led to him later becoming honorary president of the Alliance Nationale, the main lobby for the cause. During the Vichy period, he moved back to the Council of State and provided the Carrel Foundation with his expertise on family legislation. His appointment to INED's Technical Committee on its creation in 1945 confirmed his position in the network of those men – including two of his mentors, Adolphe Landry and, later, Pierre Laroque – who attempted to bring together social, demographic and family policy. Doublet's career, convictions and contacts gave him an extensive overview of population questions in the broadest sense, and he used his skills as a doctor of law to express his opinions in memoranda and essays published in specialist journals.

His paper, «Population and Eugenics», delivered in 1951, is no doubt Doublet's fullest exposition of the principles that guided his action. The title is no misnomer. With the principles of «classical» eugenics as formulated in early twentieth-century Great Britain in mind, he takes their scientific basis to state the need for a deliberate management by the social community of its own biological characteristics. Not surprisingly, Doublet, the very model of an interventionist French senior civil servant of the 1930s, sees this management as the task of central government. He bases this policy, which he sees not merely as a programme but as an existing reality, on value judgements establishing a hierarchy among human beings, continually contrasting those who are «evolved» or «healthy» with the «defective» (*tarés*), «abnormal» and other «human waste» (*déchets*).

Just as «classical» is the objective he sets for policy: to intervene in the differential reproduction of human groups, lest it lead to a reduction in the average «quality»

58 *Santé et société. Les découvertes biologiques et la médecine au service de l'homme*, Actes des Semaines sociales de France, Montpellier, 17–23 July 1951, Librairie Gabalda.

59 J.-D. Durand (ed.), *Les semaines sociales de France. Cent ans d'engagement social des Catholiques français 1904–2004*, Paris, 2006.

of the population. In order to combat the «dysgenic» circulation of social groups, here in the middle of the twentieth century he is stating a principle for action directly inherited from Galton and Pareto. Since birth control is most practised by the elites, it condemns them to gradual dilution by the many offspring of the lower classes, who are more fertile but of lower «quality».

The message contained in the article is clear. Since «social legislation [and] health measures [have] obstructed the effects of natural action», it is important that central government's «biopolitical» intervention should be guided by eugenicist principles in the name of both holistic and utilitarian considerations: the «existence [of human waste] lays a heavy burden on society ...; could not the resources devoted to maintaining this category of person be used for more useful social ends?» In addition to this maximising goal, «in order to be effective», eugenics needs «to comprise well-being and health», hence the article's central assertion: «*eugenics merges with effective social policy*», as seen in the example of the Great Britain's family allowance system.⁶⁰

Doublet does, however, temper his argument to the scientific criticism of the hereditary determinism that underlay Galton's theories, while stressing the importance of what one might call the initial biological endowment of human beings. His other nuance is to make his eugenics «more French» by combining rather than contrasting quantity and quality in the name of the psycho-sociological considerations traditionally invoked by French experts concerning the optimal number of siblings.

This combination of ideas only increases the urgent need for a consistent eugenicist policy. Doublet repeats word for word the concerns of the demographers at the time about the necessary expansion of the population, the fragility of the occurring baby boom and the risk of an ageing population. More distinctive is his undisguised formulation of the geopolitical importance of his programme. As a man of order who began his career as a writer for the aliens department of the Ministry of the Interior, he explains the risks of France's demographic weakness for its colonial dominance in North Africa and the preservation of its position in the world. He takes up the standard interwar classification of a France in the «white world» (the industrialised countries) under threat from population growth in the South.⁶¹ To this he adds the «duty to give life to bolster the presence of one's country and the continuity of Christianity».⁶²

60 The quotations in this paragraph are from Doublet, «Population et eugénisme», 4. My emphasis.

61 P.-A. Rosental, «Wissenschaftlicher Internationalismus und Verbreitung der Demographie zwischen den Weltkriegen», in: P. Overath / P. Krassnitzer (eds.), *Bevölkerungsfragen. Prozesse*

des Wissenstransfers in Deutschland und Frankreich (1870–1939), Cologne 2007, 255–291. See also the success in 1930s France of Henri Decugis's essay, *Le destin des races blanches*, Paris 1935.

62 Doublet, «Population et eugénisme», 32.

6. Proactive Policy and Consent

Doublet's article objectivises the nexus of demographic, public health, economic and geopolitical considerations that call for a eugenicist policy. But do the instruments he recommends correspond to the scientific construct I have cited above? He gives a resoundingly positive answer to the question. To the special fields entrusted to INED – such as demography, naturally, and the fight against alcoholism and insanitary housing – Doublet adds those that had been removed from the Carrel Foundation, as mentioned above, such as school career counselling and occupational health, including techniques, still new in France, for «rehabilitating» workers.

Rather than dwell on this close correspondence with the cognitive system described in my earlier sections, I would like to detail how the director of social security envisaged the implementation of his explicitly eugenic considerations. The psychologisation of eugenics I emphasise above is a constitutive part of his programme. His rather ambivalently worded justification merits direct quotation: «society's solicitude should extend as far as those who are abnormal or deficient». This confirms the hierarchy established between people, while displaying towards them a sort of openness of attitude within limits that are evident to the contemporary observer.

This toned-down approach is partly due to the forum Doublet chose for his 1951 paper. One of the distinctive features of his text is the way he mixes spirituality and statism, Catholicism and eugenics, and establishes a dichotomy – while rejecting both extremes – between what he calls «hereditary eugenics» (based on a deterministic conception of the transmission of capabilities from one generation to the next) and «authoritarian eugenics».

This construct is not based on the usual line of defence of eugenics, which distinguishes between the «positive» and «negative» types, nor is it merely the reflection of Doublet's personal need to be consistent with his conscience as a believer. While serving as a high civil servant of the *Conseil d'État*, the new director of the social security system had needed to display a cognitive «habitus» of synthesis and the reconciliation of opposites.⁶³ Historically revealing is how, in his new functions, he is seeking by trial and error how best to implement eugenics as public policy, rather than challenging its foundations and instruments. Only four years before the influential American eugenicist Frederick Osborn (1889–1981) called for a means of selection that did not «humiliate one half of the individuals who comprise the human race by telling them that they are not as fit as the other half to procreate the

63 On these skills, see A. Chatriot, *La démocratie sociale à la française. L'expérience du Conseil National Economique, 1924–1940*, Paris 2002, 163 and 219;

and for the contemporary period, B. Latour, *La fabrique du droit: une ethnographie du Conseil d'État*, Paris 2004.

next generation»,⁶⁴ Doublet does not merely denounce, in the name of the primacy of the human person, the abuses of authority that may accompany the implementation of eugenicist policies, he asserts the need to ensure the «consent»⁶⁵ of the population, or rather of the couples concerned. Although he was a typical example of the proactive senior civil servants of France's post-war boom years (*Trente Glorieuses*), he does support citizens' agency by asserting that «a man or a family cannot be treated as a passive object on which all action is possible».⁶⁶ In addition to the spiritual convictions he most likely shared with the audience at the *Semaines sociales*, this reservation was also connected to the desire for determined and effective public intervention, relying on «citizens' sense of responsibility» and «the good will of all».⁶⁷

This reference to «responsibility», actually parents' responsibility, is a key concept in post-war eugenics. Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, leading figures in the Swedish Social Democratic Party, then at its height, considered it so central to the proper operation of population policy that they were prepared to sanction any couples who did not display it with sterilisation.⁶⁸ «Parental responsibility» combined all the facets of eugenics under a neutral term better suited for use with a variety of audiences. As a project, it referred to one of the deepest roots of eugenics, namely projection into the future: «the end of all politics is the parentage of the future», as a British economist summarised the purpose of eugenics in 1909.⁶⁹ In the early twentieth century, this focus on parenthood was not merely a matter of biological determinism. It also responded to the revolution that was just occurring: couples' control of their fertility, a control that particularly worried the political and scientific elite because it largely escaped their own influence.⁷⁰

Forty years later, parenthood had become «deliberate» and «responsible». The new vocabulary was intended to combine the objectives of public policy with the wishes of couples, which the more politically aware eugenicists understood was an important factor in the post-war period. For someone like Doublet, it also solved the problems of conscience involved in discussing fertility restrictions for «overpopulated» and «insufficiently developed» countries.

64 Quoted in M. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*, Cambridge/Mass. 2008, 165.

65 I use here a term taken from the historiography of the First World War (C. Prochasson, 1914–1918. *Retours d'expériences*, Paris 2008) that is now common in the history of public policy (see also N. Delalande, *Les Batailles de l'impôt. Consentement et résistances de 1789 à nos jours*, Paris 2011).

66 Doublet, «Population et eugénisme», 23.

67 *Ibid.*, 32.

68 Ö. Appelqvist, «L'argument démographique dans la genèse de l'État providence suédois», in: *Vingt-ème Siècle* 95 (2007) 3, 15–28.

69 J. A. Hobson, quoted in M. Freeden, «Eugenics and Progressive Thought: a Study in Ideological Affinity», in: *The Historical Journal* 22 (1979) 3, 645–671 (citation 657).

70 Dickinson, «Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy», 43.

While psychologisation became a pre-condition for eugenics, reproductive issues in the 1950s helped spread the culture of psychoanalysis in television programmes presenting its exponents alongside demographers, gynaecologists and clerics.⁷¹ The *Mouvement Français pour le Planning Familial* was one driver of this shift: this movement had roots in a eugenics that have been more widely studied in the English-speaking world than in France. Significantly, one of its most eminent representatives, the gynaecologist Marie-Andrée Lagroua-Weill-Hallé, in a 1955 paper to the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, called for the creation of «eugenic centres», her name for places «where young couples could seek advice in matters of psychology and morals as well as family planning and problems of sterility and fertility».⁷²

7. Conclusion

After the Liberation of France, the social security system's new range of family benefits was established, focusing on second and third children, as its director Pierre Laroque admitted, «to encourage families to have children quickly, in the belief that the children of young parents were naturally healthier and more vigorous and received a better upbringing».⁷³ This example, a crucial one, since at that time family benefits were the largest item in the social security budget, gives an idea of what eugenics meant for French socio-demographic and health policy: a rationale taken for granted and based on normative principles shared by a proactive and varied «epistemic community» that comprised not only, on the medical side, paediatricians, gynaecologists, psychiatrists and occupational health officers but also demographers and psychologists, administrators and politicians, school and vocational career counsellors and birth control activists. For some twenty years, this alliance, embodied in the coupling of «quantitative/qualitative demography», provided a framework taken straight from the 1930s for public policies that extended their reach but began to fragment.

Although in the latter half of the 1960s, in France and elsewhere, new models of action emerged, the idea of «improving the quality of the population» had left its mark on organisations, objectives and forms of action, many of which remained to some extent operative. This institutional support has made it possible to transmit, up to the present day, its underlying principle, namely the desire to influence the biological constraints on individuals and groups. This historical review is not intended to invalidate these practices, which are the subject of a vigorous and wide-

71 See the *Faire Face* programme of 13 October 1960 on birth control, <http://www.ina.fr/economie-et-societe/vie-sociale/video/CPF86614334/le-control-des-naissances.fr.html>

72 J. Mossuz, «La régulation des naissances: les as-

pects politiques du débat», in: *Revue française de science politique* 16 (1996) 5, 913–939.

73 P. Laroque, «Famille et sécurité sociale», in: *Revue française du travail* 19 (1947) 10, 829–845.

ranging ethical debate in civil society as a whole. Rather I have sought to direct a critical eye toward ourselves as members of industrialised societies and ask if we are not perhaps more eugenicist than we think.

ABSTRACTS

Eugenics and Social Security in France before and after the Vichy Regime

Historiography of French eugenics has long been hindered by a mechanistic conception derived from history of ideas, which postulated that it was incompatible with pronatalism and catholicism, with republicanism and Lamarckism; and that it simply collapsed after World War II. The reference to the transnational model of «Latin eugenics» redirects the thinking around a more plastic definition of eugenics that stresses its connections with social hygiene, in order to better understand the conversions it has undergone after 1945 in connection with the circulation of scientific and administrative models. Beyond medicine and psychiatry, genetics and occupational medicine, are particularly concerned demography, biotypology, educational and occupational choice, the fight against alcoholism, and of course family planning. Eugenics has also paradoxically contributed to the psychologization of human relationships. Taking it seriously allows historians to return to the issue of norms underlying population, social and health policies over the past century.

Französische Eugenik und Sozialversicherung vor und nach dem Vichy-Regime

Lange litt die Geschichtsschreibung der französischen Eugenik unter einer der Ideengeschichte entlehnten mechanistischen Sichtweise, die postulierte, dass sie mit (Pro)Natalismus, Katholizismus, Republikanismus und Lamarckismus unvereinbar und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg schlicht in sich zusammengebrochen sei. Bezieht man sich aber auf das transnationale Modell «romanischer Eugenik», reflektiert man einen viel plastischeren Eugenik-Begriff, der die Verbindungslinien zur Sozialhygiene freilegt und die Wandlungsprozesse ausleuchtet, die er nach 1945 im Kontext von zirkulierenden Bürokratie- und Wissenschaftsmodellen durchgemacht hat. Neben Medizin, Psychiatrie, Genetik und Arbeitsmedizin sind vor allem Demographie, Biotypologie, Bildungs- und Berufswahl, sowie der Kampf gegen Alkoholismus und natürlich auch die Familienplanungs-Bewegung davon betroffen. Ferner trug die Eugenik paradoxerweise auch zur Psychologisierung der menschlichen Beziehungen bei. Reflektiert der Historiker sie gewissenhaft, kann er das Problem der Normen neu beleuchten, die bevölkerungs-, sozial- und gesundheitspolitischen Programmen im vergangenen Jahrhundert zugrunde lagen.

L'eugénisme et la sécurité sociale en France avant et après le régime de Vichy

L'historiographie de l'eugénisme français s'est affranchie d'une histoire idéaliste des idées qui tendait à limiter son aire d'investigation en présupposant son incompatibilité avec le catholicisme ou le natalisme, le républicanisme ou le lamarckisme ainsi que son effondrement après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La référence au modèle transnational d'«eugénisme latin» réoriente la réflexion autour d'une définition plus plastique de l'eugénisme qui, en insistant sur ses connexions avec l'hygiène sociale, permet de mieux comprendre les reconversions qu'il a connues après 1945 en liaison avec la circulation des modèles administratifs et savants. Au-delà de la médecine et de la psychiatrie, de la génétique et de la médecine du travail, sont notamment concernés la démographie, la biotypologie, l'orientation scolaire et professionnelle, la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, et bien sûr le mouvement pour le planning familial. L'eugénisme apporte également une contribution paradoxale à la psychologisation des rapports humains. Sa prise en considération permet de revenir sur la question des normes sous-jacentes aux politiques démographiques, sociales et sanitaires depuis un siècle.

Paul-André Rosental

Sciences Po

27 rue Saint-Guillaume

F-75337 Paris Cedex 07

e-mail: rosental@sciences-po.fr