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Journal Articles American Economic Review Year : 2005

Contracting on Time

Sergei Guriev

Abstract

The paper shows how time considerations, especially those concerning contract duration, affect incomplete contract theory. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds, but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. We show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof "evergreen" contract—a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts.
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Dates and versions

hal-03459064 , version 1 (30-11-2021)

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Sergei Guriev, Dmitriy Kvasov. Contracting on Time. American Economic Review, 2005, 5 (5), pp.1369 - 1385. ⟨10.1257/000282805775014452⟩. ⟨hal-03459064⟩

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