The Geography of External Voting: The 2011 Tunisian Election Abroad
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THIBAUT JAILIN

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From Economic to Social Remittances: an International Overview

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXTERNAL VOTING: 
THE 2011 TUNISIAN ELECTION ABROAD

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CERI, SCIENCES PO
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The Geography of External Voting: The 2011 Tunisian Election Abroad

Thibaut Jaulin
CERI, Sciences Po

In October 2011, more than 200,000 Tunisians abroad participated in the election of the Constituent Assembly, along with their fellow citizens in Tunisia. Out of 217 representatives, the Tunisians abroad elected 18 from 5 extraterritorial constituencies. Based on detailed and original results of the election, this paper presents and discusses innovative maps of the voting behavior of the Tunisians abroad. It highlights the similarities between the Tunisians in Tunisia and abroad, and the differences among latter’s depending on their place of residence at the country level and at the local level (for Paris and its suburbs and for the Arab Gulf and the Middle East). By doing so, the author emphasizes the relevance of electoral geography for the analysis of the formation of transnational political opinions.

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 Tunisian election for the Constituent Assembly, following the Tunisian Revolution, represents a very stimulating case study of external voting.

First, it represents an example of large electoral participation at distance, while external elections are often characterized by a low voter turnout. Indeed, almost one third of the Tunisian voting age population abroad, estimated to 721,000, of which half in France, casted a ballot in 450 polling stations disseminated in five overseas constituencies to elect 18 representatives out of 217 in the assembly.

Furthermore, original and detailed results collected and compiled by the author show that the voting behavior of the Tunisians abroad does not differ on average from that of the Tunisians in Tunisia, but that it differs greatly depending on the place of residence. For example, the score of the Islamist party EnNahda was quite low in France and North America, but high in Italy, Germany and the Arab countries. At the local level, En-Nahda’s score was high in the northern suburbs of Paris, but

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1 Paper presented at the conference ‘Transnational Approaches to Immaterial Remittances’ at Princeton University, 19-20 September, 2014. The research for this paper was financially supported by the Research Executive Agency - European Commission. The author is particularly grateful to Dorian Ryser (CERI/SciencesPo.) for the design of the maps. This paper was initially published in French in L’Espace Politique (n°24, 2014/2). It includes additional developments and figures. Corresponding author: thibaut.jaulin@sciencespo.fr

2 France 1 (consulates of Paris, Pantin, and Strasbourg), France 2 (consulates of Lyon, Grenoble, Nice, Marseille, and Toulouse), Italy, Germany, North America and other EU countries, and Arab countries and rest of the world.

3 The results of the election are available on the website of the independent body in charge of the organization of the election (in French ISIE) (www.isie.tn). However, it does not include detailed results at the local level for the constituencies abroad (in contrast with other constituencies in Tunisia).
relatively low in the inner city and the western suburbs. Similarly, the results of the election differ significantly from one city to another in the Arab Gulf and in the Middle East.

This paper looks at electoral behaviors in a transnational context, and intends to contribute to the discussion on political remittances and their impact at home and abroad. It adopts a geographic and multiscale approach and, by doing so, shows external election maps represent a useful research tool to study the formation of transnational political opinions.

The paper builds on original maps of the 2011 Tunisian election abroad. It argues socio-demographic variables and local dynamics within the Tunisian communities abroad are the main factors that influence the Tunisian external electoral behavior. In contrast, the various social and political regimes of the host countries do not seem to have significant influence. In other words, the geography of external voting reflects migration dynamics (who migrates where, why and how?) and social spaces of migration (with whom the migrants’ are connected at home and abroad?).

The first part of the paper consists in a brief review of the literature on external voting. It highlights the inputs of recent research studies that focus on external electoral behaviors. The second part focuses on the context of the adoption and the implementation of external voting rights in Tunisia. It insists on the legacy of Ben Ali’s regime and on the importance of voting rules and mechanisms to foster the voter turnout. Finally, the last part consists in a geographic and multiscale analysis of the voter turnout and of the vote of the Tunisians abroad in 2011. It first compares the Tunisian electoral behavior at home and abroad, and then focuses on the external electoral behavior at the country level and at the local level for the Ile-de-France (Paris and suburbs) and for the Arab Golf and the Middle East.

TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF EXTERNAL VOTING

External voting is a worldwide trend: since 1991, the number of countries that has formally granted voting rights to non-resident citizens has quadrupled, soaring from 31 to an estimated 120 (IDEA, 2007). External voting has received increasing scholarly attention in recent years as researchers interested in transnational migration have shown that, besides money, migrants are able remit norms, values and practices (Levitt, 1998).

The literature on external voting first includes normative political theory that discusses whether it is legitimate for non-resident citizens to vote from abroad. Some authors insist on organizational and political concerns, such as the cost of such elections, the risks of fraud, and the threat to sovereignty when the diaspora outnumbers the domestic population (Lopez-Guerra, 2005; Rubio-Marín, 2006). External voting calls into question the republican conception of citizenship, indeed, according to which voting rights require both membership of the political community and permanent residency in the country. According to Rainer Bauböck, who develops the concept of stakeholder citizenship, external voting rights should be granted to some categories of migrants (e.g. refugees, temporary migrants), but ruled out for generations born abroad who have no stake in the country of origin (Bauböck, 2007).
The literature on external voting further includes comparative studies, which deal with why and how of external voting (Collyer, 2014).

According to Jean Michel Lafleur (2013), three main reasons explain why States extend the franchise to non-resident citizens: economic dependency on migration (remittances and integration in the global economy), domestic politics (competition between domestic actors and processes of institutional reforms such as democratization, electoral reforms, and regionalization), and emigrant lobbying (depending on the influence and representativeness of migrants’ associations).

Furthermore, comparative studies highlight the heterogeneity of the rules and the mechanisms to register the voters abroad (criteria and deadlines, required documents, place to register); to cast ballots abroad (in person or postal/proxy voting); and to count the votes from abroad (overseas/domestic constituencies) (Collyer and Vathi, 2007; IDEA, 2007; Noheln and Grotz, 2000). Against the idea according to which external electors’ lack of interest in homeland politics explains the low voter turnout in external election, voting procedures have a significant impact on the voter turnout. In others words, electors abroad renounce to vote if the “costs” are too high, like any elector at home (Braconnier & Dormagen, 2007).

Finally, the literature on external voting also includes few and very recent studies on the electoral behavior abroad. Such studies apply electoral sociology methods to external voting, such as multi-sited surveys among migrants scattered in different locations worldwide. Surveys conducted among Latin American and African migrants have shown that electoral behaviors abroad depends both on pre-migration variable (socio-demographic criteria, region of origin, etc.) and post-migration variables (legal status in the host country, length of time abroad, employment, integration, discrimination, etc.) (Escobar & al., 2014; Lafleur & al., 2014; Dedieu & al, 2013). The geographic and multilevel approach adopted by this paper complements such studies and introduces external election maps as an innovative research tool to look at the formation of political opinions abroad as a dynamic process (Jaulin, 2014).

THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTERNAL VOTING IN TUNISIA

The Legacy of Ben Ali’ Regime

The extension of the franchise to the Tunisian abroad is a legacy of the regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Tunisia first experienced external voting in 1989, after Ben Ali seized power in 1987. Such experience was part of a new policy aiming to foster the relations with the Tunisians abroad, after two decades of labor-focused migration policy.

After the Tunisian independence (1956), Habib Bourguiba’s regime first opposed labor migration, which was perceived as a loss in human capital. However, a growing number of Tunisian laborers sought employment abroad, mostly in France. In the mid-1960s, the number of Tunisians in France was estimated to 50 000. Facing growing unemployment in Tunisia, a new policy was initiated to organize and

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4 For example, depending on the length of stay abroad, the country of residence, the size of the emigrant population, the legal status in the host country, etc.
to develop labor migration. The Office for Vocational Training and Employment (OFPE in French) was created in 1967 to define labor demands abroad, to control the migrants, and to prepare their return. It soon collaborated with the French office of migration (ONI in French). In 1973, the number of Tunisian migrants in France was officially 150,000 (a figure probably underestimated), of which three-fourth had come through the OFPE (Simon, 1979).

As a consequence of the energy crisis, developed countries closed the doors to labor migration and patterns of migration from Tunisia progressively changed (similarly to other North African labor sending countries). Return migration policies failed and most migrants settled in their host country and their family progressively joined them. In parallel, Arab oil producing countries, in particular Libya, attracted large numbers of Tunisian migrants. However, such flows were contingent to the host country's discretionary policies. Finally, Tunisia faced an upsurge of migrant migration since the 1990s due to growing unemployment, in particular among university graduates. Although France remained the first destination for Tunisian migrants, growing numbers started to migrate to Southern Europe and North American. At the end of the 2000s, the number of Tunisians abroad was estimated to one million of which half in France, 150,000 in Italy, and 150,000 in the Arab Gulf (CARIM, 2010).

As a response to such changes, state agencies in charge of migration issues were reorganized on several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s. A major shift occurred after Ben Ali came to power in 1987. A new policy was initiated to foster economic, social and cultural relations with the Tunisians abroad. Among various policy initiatives, the official term Tunisian Laborers Abroad (TTE in French) was changed for Tunisian Living Abroad (TRE in French), the Office of the Tunisians Abroad (OTE in French) was created in 1988, and social attachés in charge of the Tunisians abroad were assigned in each consulate (Brand, 2006). In addition, the right to vote from abroad was adopted and 75,000 Tunisians abroad (of a total population abroad estimated to 400,000) participated in the 1989 presidential election, which took place in a context of political liberalization.

However, in the following elections, voting from abroad progressively turned into a sign of allegiance to the regime, due the generalization of election fraud and the authoritarian turn of Ben Ali's regime. Ben Ali, as Bourguiba before him, monitored very closely movements of political opponents among the migrants, in particular the Islamic political opposition and social and human rights movements. To do so, the regime relied on the very large consular network and state-sponsored migrants' association, so called Amicales des travailleurs tunisiens, commonly seen as branches of Ben Ali's single-party, the Constitutionnal Democratic Rally (RCD in French) (Brand, 2010).

Ben Ali's legacy in regard with external voting thus appears paradoxical: on the one hand, consulates and state-sponsored organizations controlled severely any form of political opposition abroad; on the other hand, Ben Ali initiated major policy reforms that contributed to foster the relations with the Tunisians abroad. For example, in regard with external voting, it is noteworthy that the number and the location of the

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5 The Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation (ATCP) was created in 1972 and progressively specialized in labor migration to Arab oil producing countries. Moreover, the OFPE was restructured on several occasions and eventually became in 1993 the National Agency for Employment and Independent Laborers (ANETI).
polling stations abroad in 2011 (about 450 worldwide) was actually almost the same than during Ben Ali’s regime.

An Unquestioned Claim After the Revolution

After Ben Ali’s fall, the Higher Instance for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution and the Higher Independent Instance for the Election (in French ISIE) confirmed the right for the Tunisians abroad to participate in the upcoming election for the Constituent Assembly. Such decision was supported by almost all political organizations and movements and, as shown in the following, the rules and mechanisms to vote from abroad contributed to foster the voter turnout.

From March to May 2011, Tunisian associations abroad launched the Tunisian Migration Gathering (Assises de l’immigration tunisienne in French) and drafted a Register of grievances (Cahier de doléances), to be presented to the transition government. Among numerous demands dealing mostly with migrants’ rights⁶, the Register included the right to vote from abroad in both presidential and legislative elections, fair representation of the Tunisians abroad within the parliament, and the right to be elected, including for dual citizens. The Register was not yet finalized when the Higher Instance for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, which was in charge of organizing the transition “from the revolution to the election”, adopted a new electoral law, which included the right to vote from abroad (Lieckefett, 2012).

Simultaneously, the Higher Instance created the ISIE and elected a college of 16 members to direct it. Among the latter’s, Kamal Jendoubi, who represented the Tunisians abroad, was elected as president. The ISIE contributed to design the electoral system that allocated 18 seats to the Tunisians abroad, out of 217 in the Constituent Assembly. Tunisia thus became one of the thirteen countries worldwide with specific parliamentary representatives for its citizens abroad and one of the very few having an equal level of representation among the residents and the expatriates (Collyer, 2014).

Furthermore, the voting procedures adopted by ISIE aimed to foster the voter turnout, which was viewed as the main indicator of the citizens’ confidence in the process of democratic transition. The ISIE’s efforts encompassed both the Tunisians at home and abroad, but the ISIE faced numerous challenges during the process of registration on the electoral rolls, in particular abroad. Because of the inaccuracy of existing rolls, the electoral law required all citizens to register. In the constituencies abroad, the law stipulated that the consulates were in charge of the registration process and that the electors needed to register in person. This obviously represented a severe constraint for those living far away from a consulate. In addition, the consulates often lacked human and technical resources.

The campaign of registration launched by the ISIE in July 2011, at home and abroad, resulted in the enrollment of approximately one third of the voting age population. As a consequence, the ISIE decided to register “automatically” those who had not done “voluntarily”. Simultaneously, in some constituencies abroad, as France 1, the local team of the ISIE accepted late registration by phone, Internet and text messages, and mobilized large teams of volunteers to compile the electoral rolls. In

other constituencies, as Italy, where the Italian community is not as organized as in France, the registration process was left to the consulates.

In such context, the ISIE eventually decided that even those who would not found their name on the electoral rolls (both at home and abroad) would have the right to vote, providing that they present their ID or passport on the day of the election. Such decision, which aimed at avoiding problems in polling stations, contributed to foster the voter turnout, especially among the Tunisians abroad, as shown in the following.

A GEOGRAPHY OF TUNISIAN EXTERNAL VOTING

The Voter Turnout

The records of the 2011 election include three different electoral rolls as a consequence of the ISIE’s decisions regarding the registration process and the voting procedures. The first includes those who registered “voluntarily”; the second includes those who did not registered, but whose name was register “automatically”; and the third includes those whose name was not found on either lists (“voluntary” or “automatic”), but voted anyhow and registered on a “complementary” record. This obviously makes very difficult the estimation of the voter turnout.

According to declarations of the ISIE on the day of the election, the voter turnout was exceptionally high, between 70% and 90% of those who registered “voluntarily”. However, figures based on the voting age population showed that half of the electors in Tunisia went to the poll and one third abroad. Although such result was disappointing, in regard with the political importance of this “first democratic election in Tunisia”, the voter turnout among the Tunisians abroad can be viewed as quite high in comparison with external voting standards.

The voter turnout varied significantly from one constituency to another: from 39% to 64% in Tunisia (Verdeil, 2012) and from 21.3% to 40.3% abroad (table 1). Research studies on the voter turnout in Tunisia show that abstention was lower in larger coastal cities and regions of the south-west of Tunisia, and higher in the center of country, the north-west, and the extreme south. In other words, people living in areas that faced under-development and greater socio-economic problems felt less concerned by the election (Gana & al., 2012). Similar patterns can be found in the constituencies abroad, which include two groups of countries: Germany, Italy, and France 2 where the turnout is below 25%, and France 1, North America and other European countries, and Arab countries and the rest of the world where the turnout is above 35%.

Such results suggest that the turnout is higher in countries that favor high skilled migration, such as Canada and the United States, or migration of semi-skilled professionals, such as the Arab Gulf. In contrast, it is lower in Italy, which has

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7 See http://mobile.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/desinformation-la-veritable-103350 and estimations by the ISIE base on the voting age population (databases of the Ministry of Interior and of the National Statistic Institute) (www.isie.tn).

8 For example, the voter turnout among the French expatriates in the 2012 legislative election in 2012 did not exceeded 20/25% of the voters registered in the consulates (which means an even smaller percentage of the French voting age population abroad) See http://www.elections-legislatives.fr/circonscriptions/099.asp#?acirconscription
massively attracted low skilled migrants working for low paid jobs since the 1990s. Similarly, the gap between France 1 and France 2 can be explained by different migration patterns in the country’s regions. For example, educational and technological hubs attract students and skilled migrants, while intensive farming and real estate development attract low skilled migrants.

### Table 1

**The Voter Turnout in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting age pop.</th>
<th>Voter turnout (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7 993 924</td>
<td>51,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>721 596</td>
<td>29,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1</td>
<td>194 968</td>
<td>35,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>239 408</td>
<td>23,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>102 663</td>
<td>23,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>63 429</td>
<td>21,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/Can/other Europe...</td>
<td>72 162</td>
<td>39,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries/others...</td>
<td>48 966</td>
<td>40,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISIE, compiled by author*

In contrast with the migrants’ socioeconomic profile, the political regime of the host country does not seem to be a relevant variable to explain the voter turnout abroad. To put it schematically, living in a democratic country does not seem to foster democratic participation at distance and, *vice-versa*, living in an authoritarian regime does not impede such participation. However, more research is needed to assess the relation between the turnout and the integration regime, that is to say the migrants’ legal status and rights in the host country (access to nationality and to economic, social, political and cultural rights).

At the local level, the estimation of the voter turnout abroad is very difficult due to the lack of data or their inaccuracies. In the constituency of France 1, according to the database compiled by the local team of the ISIE, the number of ballots in each polling station often differs with the number of voters registered on the electoral rolls. This is due to mistakes in the registration of the voters whose name was not found on the roll on the day of the election. Such inaccuracies do not impact the result of the election, as the number of ballots is consistent with the number of voters, but makes it very difficult to estimate the voter turnout in each polling station.

However, some observations can be made on the basis of the results of 22 polling stations, out of 68 in France 1, which show consistent records. First, the voter turnout varies very significantly from one polling station to another (from 18,9% in Auxerre to 57,7% in Nantes) and there is no geographic patterns, with exception to
The Geography of External Voting

region of Strasbourg (East of France) where the turnout is higher (42.7% on average). Second, the percentage of those who registered "voluntarily" is low (one-fourth on average) and varies from one polling station to another. Such variations are often consistent with the voter turnout (only 12.7% in Auxerre, but 51.7% in the polling stations attached to the consulate of Strasbourg). Third, the percentage of voters on the complementary record (whose name was not on the electoral rolls or who voted in a different pooling station) is quite high on average (38%), but very low (and even equal to zero) in some polling stations, which indicates that the campaign of registration reached all potential voters in these areas.

Significant variations of the voter turnout from one polling station to another suggest that local dynamics within the migrants' community, in particular family and community networks, are key to foster (or impede) the decision to vote. Moreover, the case of the polling stations attached to the consulate of Strasbourg highlights the importance of accurate consular records to foster participation and to produce reliable estimation of the turnout. It also raises questions regarding a potential underestimation of the voter turnout abroad due to outdated electoral rolls including persons who have moved to another place, have returned to Tunisia, or are dead. The above observations partly confirms that limited enrollment to register is usually followed by limited mobilization to vote, as observed by Eric Verdeil (2012) who looks at the relation between registration and participation in Tunisia. However, the high percentage of voters on the complementary record also indicates that the mobilization to vote was much larger than to register.

A Transnational Political Sphere

The next sections analyzes the results on the six parties that ranked first in the 2011 election: EnNahda (the Renaissance in Arabic), the Congress for the Republic (CPR in French), Ettakatol (abbreviation of Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty in Arabic), the Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM in French); the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP in French), and AlAridha (abbreviation of Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice, and Development in Arabic).

To categorize these parties according to criteria such as left/right, conservative/progressive, secular/religious, populist/elitist, centrist/extremist, appears difficult for at least two reasons: these categories are exogenous to the Tunisian political sphere and the Tunisian political landscape since 2011 is characterized by incessant transformations (fusion, creation, and destruction of parties; switches from one party to another, etc.). However, to put schematically, the CPR, the PDM, the PDP, and Ettakatol can be described as secular ranging from center right to left; EnNahda as a moderate Islamist, and AlAridha as populist with an Islamist background.

The first level of analysis compares the results of the election at home and abroad (table 2). It highlights the symmetry of the voting behavior in Tunisia and abroad. EnNahda, which ranked first in the election, secured almost the same percentage of the votes in Tunisia and abroad. AlAridha, which surprisingly ranked sixth in the election, also secured the same percentage of the vote in Tunisia and abroad.

9 According to Azzem Ben Aissa, treasurer of IRIE France 1 in 2011, interviewed on 26 October 2012 in Paris, the records of the consulate of Strasbourg were extremely accurate, in contrast with other consulate, thanks to the small size of the Tunisian community in this region (estimated to 6000 persons), which greatly facilitated the registration of the voters.
main secular parties (Ettakatol, PDP, PDM, CPR), which scored less than forecasted, with exception to the CPR that unexpectedly ranked second after EnNahda, have in contrast higher scores abroad than in Tunisia. Finally, table 2 shows that the score of the small parties ("others") is much lower abroad than in Tunisia.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abroad</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ballots</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EnNahda.........</td>
<td>36,6%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR..............</td>
<td>6,1%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettakatol.......</td>
<td>12,1%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP..............</td>
<td>10,5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM..............</td>
<td>7,0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AlAridha.........</td>
<td>6,7%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others..........</td>
<td>21,0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL...........</td>
<td>207 701</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISIE, compiled by author

Such results indicate, first of all, that the social and political issues that divide Tunisia (secularism versus Islamism, conservative versus progressive, Arab identity versus Tunisian identity, regional divides, etc.) also divide the Tunisians abroad and that the latter’s represents the different segment of the Tunisian society. Furthermore, the relative success of the main secular parties abroad appears as a consequence of a more limited dispersion of the vote abroad (for small parties), rather than a clear preference of the Tunisians abroad for these parties. Such dispersion eventually appears as a distinctive characteristic of the electoral behavior abroad, which can be explained by the absence of the small parties in the Tunisian media, especially satellite TV, and their lack of financial and human resources to campaign abroad.

Spaces of Migration

The second level of analysis, by country, relies on the results of the election in the constituencies of France 1, France 2, Italy and Germany, and desegregated results by country or by regions (for countries with small contingents of voters) for the constituencies of North America and other European countries, and Arab countries and the rest of the world.

A geographic representation of the electoral behavior in overseas constituencies raises methodical issues due to the unequal size of the constituencies abroad and to the voters’ unequal dispersion in the world. The following maps are thus centered on Europe, which hosts the largest number of Tunisian migrants, while the rest of
The world appears in the upper-left corner. Moreover, circles of different sizes represent the number of voters in each country, which also gives an indication of the relative size of the different Tunisian communities abroad. Finally, three different scales of colors represent the results of EnNahda (red), the CPR and Ettakatol (blue), and the PDP, the PDM, and Al-Aridha (green), in order to highlight differences between countries, rather than between parties.

The first map presents the results of EnNahda (map 1). It first highlights the success of the Islamist party, which obtains at the lowest 24.5% of the votes in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, three groups of countries can be identified depending on EnNahda’s score: above 40% of the votes as in the Gulf (52%), in Italy (49%), and Germany (42.9%); between 30% and 40% as in France (33.7% in France 1 and 30.9% in France 2) and North America (32.7%); and below 30%, which actually includes few countries with limited numbers of voters (Maghreb, Middle East, Eastern Europe).

Furthermore, maps of the results of the CPR and Ettakatol (maps 2 and 3) present numerous similarities, although the CPR has usually better results. Four groups of countries can be identified. The first two groups correspond to countries where the CPR and Ettakatol have their best scores, as North America and few small countries, and their lowest scores, as Italy and France 2. The third group includes countries where the score of the CPR and Ettakatol is close to their average abroad; such as France 1 and Scandinavia. The last group includes countries where the score of the CPR and/or Ettakatol is significantly above the average: Germany for both, the Gulf for the CPR, Belgium and the UK for Ettakatol (where it manages to obtain a higher score than the CPR).

Finally, maps of the results of the PDM, the PDP, and AlAridha highlight the differences between these parties. The PDP obtains quite good score in several small European countries, but remains close to its average in France and North America, and faces counter results in Italy and the Gulf. The PDP also faces counter results in these countries and in France 2, but manages to have a very good score in North America. Finally, the results of AlAridha are extremely contrasted with low scores in most countries, with exception to Italy, France 2, and, in a lesser extent, Germany.

The following maps suggest, first of all, that the social and political regime of the country of residence is insufficient, as a variable, to understand the formation of political opinions abroad. Indeed, the voting behavior among the Tunisians abroad differs greatly among western countries as well as among Arab countries (Gulf versus Middle East and Maghreb). Such observation invalidates dichotomous views according to which the “progressive” and “democratic” nature of political remittances depends on the migrants’ socialization in western democratic and secular countries, as opposed to southern authoritarian and religious regimes.

Furthermore, regarding the relation between En-Nahda and the four main secular parties, these maps suggest to distinguish between two different situations: countries where EnNahda and the secular parties follow opposite trends (e.g. North America and Italy) and countries were they follow the same trend (Germany and France 2). This observation highlights the importance of the voter turnout and the dispersal of the votes (for small parties) as key variables.

Finally, the lack of detailed and reliable statistical data on the Tunisian migrants renders hazardous any correlation between the election results and key
demographic and socioeconomic variables, as Alia Gana does for Tunisia (2012). However, as mentioned above for the voter turnout, it is noteworthy that secular parties have better scores in countries where the share of qualified migrants is higher (North America), in contrast with countries that attract low skilled migrants (Italy).

**MAP 1
SHARE OF THE VOTES FOR ENNAHDA**

Unequal Localities

The third level of analysis presents two series of maps for the region of the Ile-de-France (Paris and suburbs) and for the Arab Gulf and the Middle East. It consists in the results of the polling stations aggregated at the level of the eight *departments* (French administrative division) of the Ile-de-France, and at the level of the twenty-three major cities of the Arab Gulf and the Middle East. As previously, these two series maps include circles to represent the number of voters and two scales of colors for En-Nahda (red) and for the five other parties (green).
MAP 2
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR THE CPR

MAP 3
SHARE OF THE VOTES FOR ETTAKATOL
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MAP 4
SHARE OF THE VOTES FOR THE PDP

MAP 5
SHARE OF THE VOTES FOR THE PDM
In 2011, the Ile-de-France attracted 80% of the votes of the constituency of France 1. Polling stations were disseminated in different places, either in buildings belonging to Tunisia or in city halls\(^\text{10}\). Polling stations situated in Paris and the Seine-Saint-Denis have attracted most of the votes, which can be explained by the fact that anyone could vote in any polling station providing that he/she had a valid Tunisian ID or passport. Therefore, it is likely that in some polling stations, especially in Paris, part of the voters did not resided in the same area. Besides such limitation, maps of the results of the six main parties in the Ile-de-France show interesting geographic patterns.

The map of the votes for EnNahda (map 7) highlights its domination, but also a clear East/West opposition. EnNahda has its best score in Seine-Saint-Denis (44.2\%) and its lowest in Paris (24.2\%) and the Haut-de-Seine (30.6\%). In addition, EnNahda's results are also characterized by a North/South dichotomy, which does not appear in the map. EnNahda's score is close to 40\% in the Val d'Oise (39.5\%) and close to 35\% in the Essonne (36.1\%). Such East/West and North/South divides can also be

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\(^{10}\) Polling stations were available at the consulate, the embassy, and the Tunisian cultural center in Paris, and the city halls of the 11\(^{\text{th}}\) and 12\(^{\text{th}}\) arrondissements of Paris; at the consulate of Pantin and the Tunisian cultural center of Aubervilliers in Seine-Saint-Denis; and in city halls for the other départements (Asnières for the Hauts-de-Seine; Créteil for the Val-de-Marne; Sarcelles and Argenteuil for the Val-d'Oise; Melun, Meaux and Lognes for the Seine-et-Marne; Corbeil, Les Ulis, Epinay, and Massy for the Essonne; and Trappes for the Yvelines).
found in the maps of results of the CPR and Ettakatol (maps 8 and 9), which present an inverted symmetry.

Furthermore, the vote for the PDP, the PDM, and AlAridha (maps 10 to 12) confirms the East/West opposition, but also introduces as another geographic pattern an opposition between the center and the periphery. Indeed, the PDP and the PDM follow the same trend than the CPR and Ettakatol in Paris and the Hauts-de-Seine, on the one hand, and in the Seine-Saint-Denis, on the other hand, but differ in the other départements. In the latter's, the East/West opposition is not relevant anymore and is partly replaced by an opposition between the center and the periphery, which characterizes the vote for AlAridha.

The geographic pattern of the vote in the Ile-de-France reproduces quite strikingly the socioeconomic inequalities of this region. Beyond simplistic oppositions between an Islamist voting behavior in the northern suburbs and a progressive behavior in the inner city, such results suggest to look at the role of community associations as substitutes of the political parties and the (unofficial) support offered by political movements and associations of the country of residence on the basis of common values and political agenda.

MAP 7
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR ENNAHDA IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE
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MAP 8
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR THE CPR IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE

MAP 9
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR ETTAKATOL IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE
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MAP 10
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR THE PDP IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE

MAP 11
SHARE OF THE VOTE FOR THE PDM IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE
Finally, maps of the voting behavior at the local level in the Arab Gulf and the Middle East shows, first of all, a very strong domination of EnNahda, which obtains up to 78.5% of the votes in Salalah (Oman) and more than 60% in 7 others cities in Oman and Saudi Arabi.

However, the results of EnNahda in the Gulf and in the Middle are not homogeneous. First, there is a strong opposition between middle-eastern cities and Gulf cities, as already observed at the country level. In addition, EnNahda tends to have relatively lower scores in cities that host large Tunisian migrants communities (such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Koweit, Doha, Jeddah), with some exceptions however (Doha, Riyadh, Muscat).

Furthermore, maps of the results of the four main secular parties often show opposite symmetries, as in the Ile-de-France. However, the results of the secular parties in the Gulf are quite contrasted. The CPR has relatively high scores in most cities and few counter-results, which is not the case of Ettakatol, although it has quite good scores in most cities that host large Tunisian migrant communities (with exception to Riyadh and Muscat). Finally, the PDP, the PDM, and Al-Ariadh all show low scores in all Gulf cities (with the exception of PDM in Dubai).

Such differences among cities of the Gulf and the Middle East further highlight the relations between external voting behavior and the spaces of migration at the country and the local level.
CONCLUSION

This paper first highlights the relevance electoral geography and multilevel analysis for the study of external voting. Maps of the Tunisian voting behavior abroad at the global level, the country level, and local level thus illustrates how transnational political participation consists in a process of re-territorialization (Itzigsohn, 2000). In other words, external voting simultaneously reproduces the main cleavages of the country of origin, but also depends on social, economic and political variables and dynamics that are deeply connected with the territories (countries, cities) where the migrants actually reside. The geography of the vote at distance thus appears as a stimulating research tool to analyze unequal opportunities among the migrants to move and settle abroad, and their asymmetrical insertion in migration networks.

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