New and Evolving Trends in International Security
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To cite this version:
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, Bastien Irondelle, David Cadier. New and Evolving Trends in International Security. 2013. hal-03460878

HAL Id: hal-03460878
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460878
Preprint submitted on 1 Dec 2021

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This report focuses on selected international security areas. At the theoretical level, it discusses new approaches to security dominated by multiplicity and complexity, with a special emphasis on three emerging concepts that have been increasingly used in security studies: globalization, human security and securitization. At the empirical level, it first looks at a number of new security challenges, namely terrorism, health pandemics, international migration, environmental security, and energy security; assesses the impact of these challenges on the broader international security system; and examines the response these challenges have been given. Second, the report considers the changes to the international security system brought about by the rise of the BRICS. Third, it explores the changing nature of war, with an emphasis on the rise in civil wars, their relation to limited statehood and the role of external actors. Overall, the report presents an overarching analysis of developments in international security that will shape the way the subject is understood and approached in coming years.

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec,
Bastien Irondelle
and David Cadier
1. Introduction

The present report presents an analysis of the evolving trends in international security by looking at specific policy areas, at the rise of new powers and at the changing nature of wars. It is essentially based on an in-depth review of the available literature. However, as thorough as this literature review is, some topics have been omitted due to space and time constraints.

In section 3, five security domains are scrutinized. They have been chosen on the basis of their relative novelty and, foremost, because they exemplify the evolutions outlined above: the effects of terrorism, pandemics or international migration are multiplied by the globalization setting; pandemics, international migration and environmental security have implications foremost in terms of human security; and health, migration, the environment and energy are policy domains that have been increasingly securitized over recent years. In section 4, the rise of new powers and its consequences for the evolution of the parameters of international security are investigated. In section 5, new forms of war and intervention are analysed, with particular reference to the case of civil war in a situation of “limited statehood”.

Some of these new threats may have arisen before the fall of the Wall and the current globalization drive. In any case, energy has for a long time been part of the transatlantic debate about the risks of dependence: disputes over supposed European dependence on Russia have plagued the transatlantic relationship for the past forty years. Yet these new threats have been securitized (i.e. constructed as security issues) in both discourse and practice, with migratory and energy flows and environmental and health concerns being cases in point. Certainly, very few conflicts have been only about resources, and one may add that even fewer conflicts have ever involved the use of biological weapons. However, in societal fabrics weakened by pandemics and in countries ridden by natural disasters or the loss of arable land, access to strategic resources may fuel wars in failed states and lawless regions, although it should be acknowledged that the latter point, i.e. the limited number of conflicts over resources, has been much more documented than the others. Eventually it is the weakening of states...
and societies, combined with indirect or direct opportunities and instruments, which plays into the hands of a very real threat, that of terrorist groups.

Further, in the context of securitization, migration flows are said to carry risks, facilitating the movements and activities of terrorist groups. As a matter of fact, a number of texts produced by the European Union amalgamate migration and terrorism. In short, it is the combination of different variables – weakened social fabrics and political institutions offering opportunities to terrorist groups – rather than any single cause which may create major security concerns in the world of to-day or to-morrow: Mali is a case in point, where weapons were smuggled into the country after the fall of the Gadhafi regime in Libya, and fell into the hands of long-time opponents to the central authorities and of outsiders fighting in the name of radical Islam, which led to the attack on the In Amenas facility in the Algerian desert, demonstrating the vulnerability of the global energy infrastructure on which the world depends. In this context, the report discusses the fate of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in relation to terrorism, but leaves aside other weapon-systems or categories (such as the small weapons smuggled into Mali) and the evolution of the non-proliferation and counter-proliferation regimes, which do not belong to its remit. Cyber-security might have been analyzed as an instrument in the hands of terrorist groups, yet it requires such sophistication and access to resources that the connection between cyber-attacks and terrorist groups is weak at best.

Next to the emergence of risks, the shift of tectonic plates which is occurring with the formidable rise of new powers, China first and foremost, poses the question of classical threats to international security. At first sight, China seems to be putting regional, not international, stability at risk through its claims to the whole South China Sea, which is rich in primary resources. This in turn underlines the fact that, in a world of economic competition, resources do play an increasingly strategic role. Several factors may transform China into a global challenger: first, the role of the United States in Asia and the desire of China’s neighbours to have a counterweight to Beijing; second, the shift in military balance between the US and China; and, last but not least, the fact that none of the emerging powers is fully committed to the maintenance of global stability. At worst, they impede the search for solutions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or compete with other powers over resources.

Finally, the question is raised as to whether the Americans and the Europeans will go on intervening in various areas of the globe. Though the appetite for intervention has certainly decreased since the heyday of the UNSC in the 1990s, intervention might still be necessary, be it in Africa or in Asia. Whether it will be in the name of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) or security against terrorist groups, or both, remains an open question, which further reports of the Transworld program will surely have to address.

Bastien Irondelle

The objective of this report is to give a brief overview of the international security landscape twenty years after the end of the Cold War, a conflict of such magnitude that it shaped the very nature of global security for two generations. Today's picture is radically different not only because actors once prominent have disappeared – most notably the Soviet Union and the military alliance it dominated, the Warsaw Pact – but also because both the concept and the nature of “security” have undergone a process of profound transformation. Perhaps for the first time in history, the military dimension of security has lost its once undisputed pre-eminence. The relative decline of the military component of security is also reflected in the fact that providing security has become a more complex task, which implies the ability to mobilize multiple assets alongside military ones, and which can no longer be entrusted exclusively to the state.

In this section, the emphasis is consequently put on the structural trends that challenge the Westphalian way of thinking about international relations (IR) and its practice of international security: a mix of alliance politics, collective security, multilateralism and national policies that have been the operational context of transatlantic security relations and of an unbalanced relationship between the United States (US) and European countries for decades. Therefore, the focus here is on the structural factors that affect the capacity of single states, even the most powerful ones, to exercise leadership in the security domain. This by no means implies that states are powerless or less important than in the past, but only that they are no longer the only game in town. To a large extent the structural trends highlighted here coexist and interact with traditional international security practices, and states remain, by and large, the key players. But these transformations require new forms of cooperation and leadership.

This transformation is best described as a broadening and a deepening of the security agenda (Paris 2001). “Broadening” the security agenda implies the inclusion of non-military threats such as terrorism, as well as security challenges, such as environmental scarcity, pandemics or mass refugee movements. “Deepening” the security agenda means considering referent-objects other than the state, such as individuals, social groups or planet Earth. These two dynamics are interlinked, since addressing non-military threats and challenges often entails moving beyond states as referent-objects. Yet several authors argue that, while broadening the spectrum of threats taken into consideration, security analysis should retain the state as the main referent-object as it remains, ultimately, the crucial actor in addressing these threats. In light of this debate, the present report places the emphasis on the challenges in terms of capacity and leadership posed to states by novel dynamics in international security.

These new structural trends in international security are multiple and multi-dimensional. In the attempt at making sense of them, three conceptual lenses appear particularly useful: globalization, human security and securitization.

Globalization has been the most important feature in transforming the international security landscape. It has increased the interconnectedness between societies and states, led to a contraction of space and time – thus creating global challenges as well as global public goods – and decreased the capacity of any state to manage global security threats and risks alone. More concretely, new technologies and the ease with which people, goods, money and ideas cross national borders have transformed international security in two ways. First, they have contributed to altering the nature of war, leading to a diminution of inter-state wars and a multiplication of
low-intensity conflicts, insurgencies, and ethnic and civil wars (Van Creveld 1991, Kaldor 1999, Mackinlay 2002). Second, globalization has undermined the capacity of states to address security and military challenges on their own, and has changed the balance between state and non-state actors (Kirshner 1998, Freedman 2002). Particularly illustrative of the consequences of globalization is the centrality of networks in international security (Slaughter 2012), whether epistemic networks fostering the creation of norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or covered networks engaging in illicit activities, ranging from terrorism (see below) to drug and human trafficking and the smuggling of nuclear know-how and materials (Chestnut 2007).

In accounting for new challenges, the notion of human security has emerged as one of the most influential attempts at re-conceptualizing security. This approach advocates a people-centred, universalist and non-military focus that takes due account of threats to human life such as underdevelopment, poverty and deprivation (Commission on Human Security 2003, Thakur and Newman 2004, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2006, UNDP 1994). Among the major conceptual and normative shifts that the concept of human security has brought about are a different view of the state and a questioning of its unsurpassable sovereignty in international security. Human security is premised on the assumption that, for many people around the globe, the state is not so much a security provider as in fact the main threat to the upholding of their basic rights (Miller 2001). The concept of human security has been criticized, however, for its lack of analytical rigour, particularly because it stretches security to such an extent that it becomes conflated with development, health, inequality and overall well-being.

This line of criticism points to a securitization pattern that has affected a growing number of policy areas since the end of the Cold War. “Securitization” refers to the process by which specific problems are constructed as security issues. More specifically, securitization occurs when a concern is identified and declared as posing an existential threat to a designated referent-object and requiring the adoption of extraordinary or even emergency measures that usually extend the legal prerogatives of the securitizing actor while trumping the freedom of society at large (Waever 1995, Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998). Analysts of securitization have overall been rather critical of its consequences. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong (2006), among others, have pointed out that re-conceptualizing development in security terms has neither generated an increased flow of resources (financial, human or political), nor led to an overall improvement in critical development problems. Other scholars go further and argue that defining something as a security issue might actually be counter-productive or even dangerous in that it legitimizes the suspension of civil liberties (Elbe 2006).
References


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3. Evolving Threats and New Security Domains

Bastien Irondelle and David Cadier*

3.1 International Terrorism

The Seriousness of the Threat

Statistics on terrorism should be taken very cautiously for conceptual and methodological reasons, notably the reasoning behind including certain events in the main terrorist attack databases and leaving others out. In general terms, however, it appears that terrorist violence has been on the rise, and has become more dangerous (Lutz and Lutz 2008), to the extent that today it is commonplace to say that terrorism is a major threat to international security.

Reflecting this perception, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, an attempt was made to clarify the phenomenon conceptually. The United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, set up by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with the goal of outlining the main security and global challenges of the 21st century, defined terrorism as “any action […] that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (2004: para. 164).

This definition has been both hailed as a welcome clarification of a phenomenon that has traditionally stood out for its apparent unsuitability to general categorization, and criticized because (among other things) it runs the risk of conflating terrorism with all forms of political violence and ignoring state-sponsored forms of terrorism. Abrahms and Foley are quite optimistic in asserting that “political scientists are no longer conflating terrorism with government atrocities against civilians. The classic debate over whether states can engage in terrorism has thus fallen to the margins of political science discourse. So too has the question of whether one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Foley and Abrahms 2010). This overall assessment might be true as far as mainstream political science studies on terrorism are concerned, but certainly not as regards critical studies on terrorism or even more classical approaches to terrorism that look at it as a purely security-related affair (Rogers 2008, Dannreuther 2007), and certainly not in the policy world, as the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change report itself admits (2004: para. 161).

Terrorism, Globalization and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Many experts and governments alike argue that terrorism should be recognized as a major threat to national and international security, in contrast to the past, when terrorism was a second-order security issue. Some argue that the 9/11 events established a new form of terrorism, “hyperterrorism” or “superterrorism”, capable of significantly disturbing international security and severely wounding even the most powerful states by inflicting potentially massive damage on civilian targets (Heisbourg 2001, Freedman 2002).

The human security approach underlines that terrorism has come to be the principal challenge to international security (Rogers 2008, Dannreuther 2007), despite the fact that, even in its “hyper” or “super” form, it is still a minor issue in terms of global human security if compared to the impact of wars or malnutrition, whose victims can be in their millions. This is so because terrorism targets civilians and produces a high level of public anxiety.

* Bastien Irondelle is responsible for parts 1 and 2, while David Cadier is responsible for parts 3 to 5.
Securitization specialists instead could not but take stock of the fact that, insofar as it highlights societal vulnerability, terrorism is a “perfect” candidate for threat inflation encouraged by the powerful “terrorism industry”, according to Mueller (2006).

Until the 1990s, the majority of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorist groups. However, in the context of globalization, the distinction between international and domestic security has become blurred. The international security agenda is focused on terrorist groups that are “armed non-State network[s] with global reach” (UN High-level Panel 2004: para. 146). The “Global War on Terror” initiated by the George W. Bush administration also explicitly targeted “terrorists with a global reach”. As a matter of fact, terrorist organizations have indeed been more capable of acting globally, drawing funds, recruits and support from multiple countries and perpetrating attacks far from their bases, reaching a global audience (Crenshaw 2007, Cronin 2002/03).

A striking trend in contemporary terrorism is the greater lethality of terrorist attacks. The 9/11 events, the attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005, the bombings in Madrid in 2004, and the suicide bombing in London in 2005 intended to cause, and in some cases actually caused, large numbers of civilian casualties (Hoffman 1998, Juergensmeyer 2000). This raises the concern that “terrorists – of whatever type, with whatever motivation – will seek to cause mass casualties” (UN High-level Panel 2004: para. 146) by acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The concern about WMD terrorism predates 9/11 (Betts 1998, Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer 1998, Lavoy, Sagan and Wirtz 2000), but indications that al-Qaeda showed an interest in acquiring nuclear material made concern about it much more acute. The jury is still out between the alarmist view (Betts 1998, Allison 2004) and a more cautious assessment of the possibility that a terrorist group could actually perpetrate an attack with WMD, particularly with nuclear weapons (Tucker 2000, Frost 2005, Bunn 2010).

Another conspicuous trend is the rise and diffusion of suicide attacks, which have increased dramatically in recent years (Bloom 2005, Pape 2005, Gambetta 2005, Crenshaw 2007, Horowitz 2010). There were few such attacks in the 1980s, and a slight increase in the second half of the 1990s. But suicide attacks rose from 54 in 2001 to 535 in 2007, and suicide techniques spread rapidly among a greater number of terrorists groups in the same period (Atran 2006, Moghadam 2008).

The “new” terrorists are more transnational, religion-inspired, lethal, indiscriminate, and networked than traditional, mostly nationalist, terrorist groups (Duyvesteyn 2004, Foley and Abrahms 2010). Many authors argue that al-Qaeda and its Jihadist affiliates are *sui generis*, and qualitatively distinct from the terrorists of the past (Benjamin and Simon 2003, Sageman 2008). Others contend that the distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism is exaggerated, and see a greater degree of continuity (Crenshaw 2000 and 2008, Enders and Sandler 2005).

**Terrorism on the International Security Agenda**

Terrorism is not a new issue on the international security policy agenda. But without any doubt, world security entered a new era with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, which caused around 3,000 fatalities. The consequences of these attacks deeply transformed the context of international security for more than a decade.

The reaction to 9/11 entailed the most comprehensive revision of US security since World War II (WWII), including the creation of the Homeland Security Department (HSD) and the reorganization of the intelligence community architecture. A similar process has been in play, to a lesser extent, in Europe. In its 2003 Security Strategy, the European Union (EU) raised terrorism to priority status, while it expanded counterterrorism policies that had
existed since the middle of the 1980s and tightened counterterrorism links with the US authorities (EU Council 2003). International, and especially transatlantic, police, counter-terrorism and intelligence cooperation have since then developed to unprecedented levels.

There are three broad approaches to counter-terrorism that are linked to three different perspectives on the subject (Sederberg 2003). The first approach is based on policing and intelligence. It is the most commonly used method in Europe. It reflects a conception of terrorism based on a criminal analogy. According to this view, terrorism is a recurring phenomenon that cannot be eliminated, but that can be contained, punished and deterred. The second perspective considers terrorism to be a disease, and therefore emphasizes its root causes, such as the environment in which terrorist groups develop and from which they draw support. This perspective requires long-term strategies. The third strategy is to think about terrorism through the lens of a war analogy, implying the use of force, pre-emptive strikes (including against states considered to host or to protect terrorist organizations), and the physical elimination of its leadership. In the most extreme cases, such as the Global War on Terror, this view could imply large-scale war.

Be that as it may, it is evident from the above that terrorism has become a key aspect in debates about international security. This raises a number of questions, firstly concerning the possible conflation of threats (terrorist attacks on networks, such as power grids, and energy providers, such as nuclear plants, the use of computer hacking, and so on), and secondly concerning the forms of cooperation that the US and Europeans can achieve in this respect. Different approaches to the subject will lead different actors to address it in different ways, but it seems evident that some specific policy towards this security threat is a required component of a complete security strategy.

3.2 Health and Pandemics

A Worrying Diagnosis

During the 14th century, the bubonic plague, “the Black Death”, is estimated to have wiped out between a third and a half of the European population. In the aftermath of World War I (WWI), twenty to fifty million people died due to the global Spanish flu pandemic. At the end of 2010, UNAIDS, the UN programme on HIV/AIDS, estimated that thirty-four million people were living with HIV/AIDS. In that year, 1.8 million are thought to have died from AIDS-related illnesses, with an additional 2.7 million people infected. A number of long-established transmittable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis kill millions of people each year. New diseases such as H5N1 (the so-called “avian flu”) threaten to become global pandemics, supposedly with the potential to kill millions of people in a short time (McInnes 2008). Avian flu, swine flu or SARS have caused panic and fear within large communities and many countries across the globe. In July 2003, there were 8,096 reported cases of SARS in 29 countries, with a mortality rate of up to 10 percent among those infected.¹ SARS seemed to confirm all the fears about the rapid diffusion across a globalized world of an emerging infectious disease. It had considerable economic consequences, notably in Asia. It should be noted, however, that the belief in the destructive capacity of pandemics is not unquestioned. Indeed, some question their destructive power or capacity to spread at a pace superior to our ability to find a cure.

Bio-terrorism is the second major concern for public health, and has progressively become more salient as a security issue. The idea of using biological agents as a weapon has a long history. Some events have substan-

tially increased concern and anxiety about the possibility of a terrorist group attempting a mass casualty attack by releasing a biological pathogen, particularly the 2001 “anthrax attacks” in the US, where twenty-two persons were infected by anthrax spores contained in postal letters.\(^2\) In its assessment of the threats to the US by 2020, the National Intelligence Council (2005) concluded that terrorist attacks using biological weapons represent a major concern. Bio-security, and especially bio-terrorism, is also a major concern in the United Kingdom, Canada and France, among a few others.

**Pandemics as an International Security Challenge**

The spread of infectious diseases could endanger national and international security in many ways. Arguments linking transmittable diseases to security studies include: the direct threat to the health and well-being of populations, including for the first time in decades the Western states; and the disruptive impact on the social, economic and political stability of communities, potentially endangering the stability of some states and causing economic decline. In 2000, the specific case of HIV/AIDS was the object of UNSC Resolution 1308,\(^3\) which concluded that HIV/AIDS posed a risk to the stability of regions where the disease was widespread and where state authorities were poorly equipped to deal with it, and that the spread of the disease was exacerbated by war (Elbe 2002 and 2003, Singer 2002, Heinecken 2003). In a widely-echoed article published in *Foreign Affairs*, the US foreign policy journal, Nicholas Eberstadt (2002) argued that the on-going HIV/AIDS Eurasian pandemic in China, India and Russia will "derail the economic prospects of billions and alter the global military balance". A report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also underlined that HIV/AIDS was undermining some large states, such as India, China and Russia (Schneider and Moodie 2002).

Yet recent epidemiological data show that these predictions are far from certain, and that HIV/AIDS is more likely to remain concentrated in certain pockets of population, without deeply altering the power of these states (Elbe 2010). Prominent arguments linking the HIV/AIDS pandemic to international security have been revised and appear today less alarming, notably with regards to the impact of HIV/AIDS on armed forces (McInnes 2006) and state capacity, with the exception of the worst-affected communities, where a disruptive impact remains plausible (de Waal 2006, Elbe 2009).

**Health on the International Security Agenda**

By the end of the 1990s, health and, in particular, the HIV/AIDS pandemic were framed as a risk to national security and international stability. As indicated above, in 2000, UNSC resolution 1308 warned that “the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security”. In 2000, a CIA report entitled *The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States* concluded that: “New and re-emerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will complicate US and global security over the next 20 years” (CIA 2000). The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (2008: 8) cited pandemics among the “diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine wider international stability”. This way of securitizing health and pandemics within the framework of the traditional national and international security paradigm has been consolidating since the early 2000s (Elbe 2002, 2003 and 2006, Peterson 2002/03, Singer 2002).

Another school of thought places health and pandemics within the framework of human security, and consi-

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\(^2\) Anthrax is a serious disease that can affect both the respiratory and the gastrointestinal apparatuses, as well as the skin.

ders health as a global public good (Lee and McInnes 2006, Fidler 2004a and 2004b). In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report included health (disease, inadequate health care) among the seven key areas of human security (UNDP 1994). Almost ten years later, the Human Security Now report by the Commission on Human Security (2003) dedicated an entire chapter to health security, presenting good health as being essential and instrumental to achieving human security. Drawing from the lessons of HIV/AIDS and SARS, in 2005 the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted a revised set of International Health Regulations that point to the emergence of a system of international health governance in which international organizations, along with states, play a fundamental role in managing global pandemics.

Health, and notably pandemics, has been the object of a securitization process at both the national and the international levels. Some benefits of this process include the allocation of greater funds for medical research, prevention and assistance, a higher priority of health in public policy, a strong visibility of health issues (illustrated by the UNSC debate on the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa in 2000), and greater responsiveness to sudden and urgent threats such as the SARS crisis (Elbe 2006, Caballero-Antony 2006). However, securitization, given its in-built tendency to inflate dangers, is always problematic. The agenda is driven by inflated health risks perceived as threatening international security or regional stability, and is dominated by Western states’ security concerns rather than the promotion of a healthier world (McInnes and Lee 2006). Some authors have pointed out that the securitization of health challenges also carries the risk of inappropriately increasing the appeal of a security-centred approach to health dangers, which often implies military or security measures that could endanger civil liberties, at the expense of a broader, more complex and more appropriate approach to the issue (McInnes and Lee 2006, Elbe 2006, Enemark 2009). On the whole, the breadth of pandemics and their impact on state capacities and global power relations are largely a matter of conjecture.

3.3 International Migration

Key Figures and Dynamics

Over the last twenty years, the number of migrants has increased in volume, but less as a matter of proportion. In 2010 the world counted 214 million people living outside of their country of origin, while this figure was 155 million in 1990 and 75 million in 1960 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009). Yet, the increase in migrants as a share of the world population is marginal: from 2.9 percent in 1990 to 3.1 percent in 2010.

Rather than communities of migrants, it is migratory flows that have captured the attention of security and strategic experts concerned about the effects of huge flows of migrants across the globe. During the last decade, the US received on average one million migrants per year, and EU member states a total of two million. In order to assess the security impacts of migration flows, analysts have endeavoured to distinguish between various categories of migration: voluntary vs. forced (Castles and Miller 2003); economic vs. political (Neumayer 2005); legal vs. illegal (Samers 2004). Forced migration and irregular migration have drawn much of the attention. Yet, all kinds of migration affect the environment in which states formulate their security policies in complex and diffuse ways.

4 Available at: http://www.who.int/ihr.
5 The top ten migrant-receiving countries are (in regional order): the United States, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and India (EUISS/ESPAS 2012).
6 In Europe, Germany (7.5 million), Spain (4 million), France (3.5 million) and the United Kingdom (2.8 million) have the greatest number of foreigners on their soil (Khader and de Wenden 2010).
Migration and International Security

Migration expert Fiona Adamson (2006) distinguishes three areas where migration can impact on national and/or international security: state capacity and autonomy; the distribution of power among states; and the nature of violent conflict (see also Guild and Selm 2005).

International migration dynamics challenge state capacity and autonomy on two fronts: border control and collective identity. While it is certainly true that massive waves of refugees and illicit migration flows undermine the ability of states to control borders, the claim that they jeopardize sovereignty appears exaggerated. Rather, migration management confronts states with the following trade-off: through inter-state cooperation (e.g. information sharing and the harmonization of policies), states relinquish a degree of autonomy, but also increase their capacity to control their borders (Ghosh 2000).

Migration flows also alter the composition of a state’s population which may, in turn, impact on its collective identity. Diasporas for instance might constitute a factor of fragmentation and instability by generating divided loyalties, thereby challenging traditional notions of citizenship, and by forming contested constituencies (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, Shain and Barth 2003). By eroding (or by being perceived as eroding) the cultural basis of national identity, international migration may foster “societal insecurity” (Wæver 1993). Such friction appears more salient in states deriving their identity from ethnic and exclusionary forms of nationalism (Adamson 2006: 182-184). Yet, some authors point out that the net effect of immigration on hosting societies might well be the opposite of insecurity. Insofar as they generally bring about a reconsideration of a state’s collective identity on a liberal, civic platform rather than an ethnic and nationalist platform, in the long run mass migrations may have the potential actually to enhance international stability by reducing the salience of a key trigger for conflict such as ethnic-based nationalism (Van Evera 1994).

Migration flows also have the potential to affect a state’s power, whether economic, military or diplomatic. Receiving states compete to harness well-educated and high-skilled workers who, particularly in the areas of information technology and the knowledge economy, represent assets and vectors of power in the context of globalization (Rudolph 2003). As for the sending country, the effects of emigration are double-edged: while in the short run remittances can contribute to wealth redistribution and economic development, in the long run the loss of skilled workers (“brain drain”), if above a 10 percent threshold, can have dire structural consequences for the economy. Beyond economics, immigrants may, to a lesser degree, enhance the receiving state’s strategic assets by supplying specific technical and intelligence expertise (much as the Afghan community has done in the US). Finally, international migrants, and diasporas in particular, can increase both the country of origin’s and the hosting country’s foreign policy leverage: small states can mobilize their diasporas to reach out to the international community, while hosting countries may capitalize on foreign groups to advance their interests globally (Sheffer 2003, Smith 2000).

Migration flows can impact on the international security environment by contributing to the creation or aggravation of conditions for unrest or even violent conflict. Diasporas have, in the past, fuelled internal conflicts by channelling resources (in Kosovo or Sri Lanka, for instance). A study commissioned by the World Bank showed that states with an important diaspora abroad were much more likely to experience a recurrence of conflicts (Collier 2000, see also Smith and Stares 2007). Similarly, massive displacements of populations fuel instability (such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and refugees can serve as a mobilization base in con-

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7 This number is, presently, 12.9 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 16.9 percent for Central America and 42.8 percent for the Caribbean (EUISS/ESPAS 2012).
flict. Furthermore, migratory flows have been exploited by organized crime networks to generate profits from the smuggling of human beings, as well as by terrorist networks to access target states. On this latter point, Adamson (2006: 195-196) warns that in dealing with this link states may over-react, encroaching on civil liberties and engaging in counter-productive measure in terms of public diplomacy. This exemplifies the conundrum faced by states in addressing the complex implications of the security-migration nexus.

**Migration as a Security Issue**

Migration as a policy issue is illustrative of two of the structural trends emphasized in section 2: its characteristics are to a great extent shaped by the dynamics of globalization, but its treatment remains largely state-centred and often steered by a securitization process. Although by essence a transnational phenomenon, analysts point out that, in the last instance, migration flows remain insufficiently addressed through multilateral policies. In the case of Europe, for instance, “each state endeavours to give the illusion to its public opinion that it remains in full control of its migratory policy” (Khader and de Wenden 2010: 36), while in fact the problem can only be addressed collectively. The functions of national boundaries have been reinforced in the political imaginary, leading to a greater policing of borders (Andreas and Snyder 2000) and an increasing securitization of immigration (Huysmans 2000) – instead of heralding the doom of sovereignty, contemporary migration flows have often led to a “re-bordering” of the state (Albert, Jacobsen and Lapid 2001). The securitization of migration and the obstinate resolve of governments to pretend that they are in control of their borders ultimately find their expression in the resort to symbolic military measures to address migration flows (e.g. interdiction operations, migrant repatriation, or naval patrolling), such as those undertaken by the US in relation to Cuba and Haiti or by a number of EU member states in the Mediterranean (Smith 2007: 627-630). In any case, migratory flows, the establishment of migrants abroad, the existence of diasporas, and the displacement of populations arise from many very different causes, take very different forms and have extremely complex consequences for states and security.

**3.4 Environmental Security**

**The Repercussions of Climate Change**

Climate change is increasingly seen as having major implications for international security. Three main consequences of global warming that are generally put forward are: resource scarcity; sea-level rise; and intensification of natural disasters (IPCC 2007).

Global warming is expected to diminish rainfall in several regions, as well as to provoke the melting of glaciers (Morton 2011), thus reducing the availability of fresh water. Similarly, more frequent droughts are expected to affect crop production and, therefore, food security (IPCC 2007: 12). Regions of the world will be very unequally exposed: while water availability will decrease in Africa and the Mediterranean, or while a country like Bangladesh will see its cereal production sharply reduced, other regions, such as Northern Europe, Russia and South-East Asia, will benefit from increased average temperatures and/or increased water availability, thus enhancing their food production potential (EUISS/ESPAS 2012: 79).

A second consequence of global warming is sea-level rise, which is expected to lead to seasonal flooding and soil erosion in coastal cities and farmlands (IPCC 2007: 12). Small islands of the Pacific and Indian oceans as well as low-lying deltas in Asia and Africa are the areas most exposed to coastal hazards.
The third consequence of global warming is the intensification of natural disasters, such as storms, floods, landslides and wildfires. The 20th century saw a substantial increase in hydro-meteorological disasters (CRED 2007). This increase does not necessarily correlate, however, to an increase in the number of casualties, as the impact of a natural disaster is, above all, related to the coping capacity of a society (Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2010: 77-78). Poor countries tend, for instance, to pay the deadliest tributes to earthquakes – in 2010, more people died in Haiti’s earthquake than in all the world’s conflicts combined.

Environmental Change and International Security: The Environmental Conflict Thesis and Its Critics

Environment and security studies draw from these effects of climate change predictions as to their repercussions on states or societies, with a view to determining the potential of global warming to foster conflict. The so-called “environmental conflict thesis”, in particular, focuses on the “role of environmental scarcity as an independent variable in violent conflict” (Floyd 2008: 54). The thesis relates mainly to intra-state conflicts, as most studies – whether quantitative (Diehl and Gleditsch 2001) or qualitative (Peluso and Watts 2001) – tend to conclude that “environmental change does not and is highly unlikely to ever cause war between countries” (Barnett 2010: 127). The few authors who take a different position concentrate on “water wars” (Mason 2006, Klare 2007). They often fail, however, to go beyond speculative predictions, whereas empirical studies actually find that “there has never been a single war fought over water” in the modern international system (Wolf 1999: 256, see also Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009).

Proponents of the environmental conflict thesis point then to the risk of internal “resource wars” (Homer-Dixon 1999, Kahl 2006). Their core argument is that climate change increases the scarcity of natural resources, and that in societies unable to adapt to this challenge – i.e. unequal, low-income and resource-dependent societies with weak political institutions – violence is likely to flare up. More precisely, they focus on three kinds of indirect, resource-related consequence of environmental change. First is political instability: resource scarcity will affect the national economy and thus decrease a state’s revenues, which might, in turn, hinder its distribution capacity and, consequently, undermine its legitimacy. Such “central incapacity and local grievance may prompt insurrection”, according to Herman and Treverton (2009: 138). Other categories of indirect resource-related consequence of environmental change with the potential to precipitate conflict are economic hardship and food insecurity. Environmental scarcity may create conflict-prone situations in agrarian societies, which are evidently much more vulnerable to changes in the environment than industry and service-based economies (Stewart 2008). Some authors have pointed to these economic repercussions of climate change to explain the outbreak of civil warfare, as in Rwanda (Uvin 1996), and political upheaval, such as the “Arab Spring” (Johnstone and Mazo 2011). Finally, the proponents of the environmental conflict thesis point to the multiplying effect of climate change on massive displacements of population (Reuveny 2007, Klare 2007), which could foster violent conflict by provoking a race for diminishing resources, by giving rise to tensions between newcomers and old residents, or by fuelling mistrust between groups and states.

On balance, the environmental conflict thesis remains largely unsubstantiated and appears in fact contested in several respects. First, it remains “theoretically rather than empirically-driven” (Barnett 2000: 271), meaning that it derives its conclusions mostly from speculative predictions of the future rather than inferences made on the basis of empirical analysis. In fact, several studies have pointed to the lack of sufficient empirical evidence so as to contest the thesis as methodologically flawed (Levy 1995, Gleditsch 1998, Theisen 2008). Second, the conceptualization of its independent and dependent variables (resource scarcity and conflict respectively) has been criticized: the first for being too all-encompassing (Peluso and Watts 2001), and the second for being biased.

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8 The last identified case being a war between Sumerian cities 4500 years ago.
towards conflicts that have indeed taken place in part because of resource scarcity.\textsuperscript{9} Third, the causality chain underpinning the environmental conflict thesis has been criticized for being both insufficiently connected and too stretched (see Figure 1).\textsuperscript{10} The fact is that both advocates and critics of the environmental conflict thesis concur that, ultimately, what will be critical in precipitating conflict is not so much environmental change in itself as the reaction of societies, in other words the extent to which they are pre-equipped to cope with it, as well as their prior degree of stability.

\textbf{*Figure 1 | Possible pathways from Climate Change to Conflict*}

\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{climate_change_conflict_diagram.png}
\caption{Possible pathways from Climate Change to Conflict}
\end{figure}

Source: Buhag, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2010: 82.

\textbf{The Environment on the International Security Agenda}

Most recently, environmental security issues have regularly featured on the policy agenda of governments and intergovernmental organizations in two prominent ways. First, national security has been broadened so as to include extraordinary challenges – including the repercussions of climate change mentioned above – that can endanger large numbers of people and provoke the disruption of state institutions.\textsuperscript{11} Second, the environmental conflict thesis has found an echo in the international security agenda, and the link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is now incorporated in the security policies of several states (e.g. Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and others) as well as international organizations (for a comprehensive and unique overview see Kingham 2006).

While environmental security regularly occupies one of the top slots in the list of security concerns of countries and international organizations alike, there are actually very few studies that take up the challenge of translating academic insights and forecasts on the topic into concrete policy proposals. A notable exception in this regard

\textsuperscript{9} In fact, antagonistic theories have emerged, arguing that it is the abundance rather than the scarcity of resources that leads to conflict (De Soysa 1999), or pointing out that environmental degradation can actually foster cooperation and, ultimately, peace-building (Conca and Dabelko 2002, Ali 2007).

\textsuperscript{10} As emphasized by Levy (1995: 58): “by the time one arrives at the end of the logical chain-violent conflict-so many intervening variables have been added that it is difficult to see the independent contribution of environmental degradation” Thus he makes the case for discarding the very concept of environmental security in favour of renewed attention to the regional, societal and economic roots of conflicts.

\textsuperscript{11} Some countries appear directly and critically vulnerable to such risks – Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka, the world’s fourth most populated city, is exposed to sea-level rise, as are several low-lying small island states (Barnett and Campbell 2010).
is Joshua Busby’s analysis of the potential US environment and security policy agenda. Busby maintains that extreme weather events in US territory (hurricanes in particular) are already “sufficiently credible to warrant attention of security scholars and practitioners” (Busby 2008: 481), but that evidence is still missing as regards the security implications of temperature change, sea-level rise or Arctic frost meltdown. Concerning US overseas security interests, Busby argues that “effects [of global warming] on Asian countries would more likely qualify as strategic threats, while crises in African countries would likely constitute moral challenges” (Busby 2008: 499).

Overall, in his endeavour to draw policy lessons from the environmental security literature, Busby notes that the novel and prospective nature of the problem often leads to non-falsifiable claims and excessive alarmism (Busby 2008: 471). Several analysts have taken this critique further (Deudney 1990, Floyd 2008). Some have argued that elevating environmental matters to the security realm is actually counter-productive, as these issues are often better addressed through “low politics” (Levy 1995: 47-50, Tertrais 2011: 19-20). Others have criticised the concept of environmental security for being more concerned with securing the state and legitimizing its security institutions than with actually advancing the resolution of environmental issues (Barnett 2010). In any case, the diversity of risks posed, from natural disasters and man-made problems to competition for scarce resources, is so vast that the nature of responses may vary widely.

3.5 Energy Security*

Current and Future Trends

Regions where the availability, extraction and production of oil and gas is concentrated have monopolized the spotlight in the energy security debate. Most significant is the macro-area stretching from Siberia to the Caspian Basin and from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Peninsula, which holds 56 percent of global oil reserves and 74 percent of global gas reserves (BP 2012: 6, 20). Political upheavals in these regions have had an impact on the international energy market. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the Gulf have been at the centre of attention, particularly since the outbreak of the Arab Spring (Darbouche and Fattouh 2011).

The most anticipated future development in the energy sector is a possible depletion of hydrocarbons. While predictions diverge in this regard (e.g. Westphal 2011: 5), one of the most respected studies in the field, prepared by the International Energy Agency (IEA), recently concluded that the world’s endowment of economically-exploitable fossil fuels and hydroelectric, uranium and renewable energy resources is “more than sufficient to meet the projected increase in consumption to 2035” (IEA 2010: 117).

Other trends call for attention and prospective analysis. One is the composition of future energy demand: of the 43 percent increase in energy consumption projected over the next twenty years (BP 2013b), 93 percent will be driven by countries which are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (BP 2013a, IEA 2010). The potential geopolitical consequences of this evolution could be significant, particularly in the Gulf and MENA regions. Prospective studies on the consequences, in terms of regional politics, of this shift in oil consumption are still lacking: while 75 percent of oil exports from the Gulf and MENA go to Asia, the US now imports less than 13 percent of its oil from the region (Flintoff 2012).

* The author would like to acknowledge Samantha Kleinfield’s research assistance with, and contribution to, this part.

12 For instance, by 2030 China’s oil consumption is projected to be greater than that of the US, while its gas consumption is projected to be comparable to that of the EU (BP 2013b).
Energy and International Security

Two approaches appear particularly relevant when looking at the security implications of energy dynamics: energy security in relation to conflict and in relation to subsistence.

Energy is often put forward as epitomizing the risk of countries resorting to military force in their competition over scarce resources (Klare 2008). Yet, in what is probably the most comprehensive study on the issue to date, the Heidelberg Institute reported that, while 80 of the 363 conflicts recorded in the year 2010 had a resource component, only seven were solely about resources (Mildner, Richter and Lauster 2011).

Beyond inter-state conflicts, over-dependence on energy revenues can lead to domestic unrest. Not only does energy over-dependence appear to have harmed economic growth and governance in some countries (the so-called “resource curse”; see Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007), but it has had tremendous disruptive potentials at certain junctures. A state like Mexico, for instance, which derives two thirds of its federal budget from energy revenues, would see its functioning capacities deeply affected by a sharp drop in oil prices. A further element is the use of energy as a foreign policy tool, as oil and gas have the potential to shape political relationships. Energy-importing states, particularly if economically and politically weak, have been forced to adjust to the energy policies of powerful suppliers (e.g. Belarus in relation to Russia), while some more powerful energy-consuming countries have rewarded suppliers with the provision of infrastructure, or arms sales (e.g. China in Africa).

Last but not least, the role of non-state actors ought to be considered. The behaviour of national energy companies in particular has come under scrutiny: analysts have raised concerns over their inefficiency, their interference with decision-making and their instrumentalization by elites vying to remain in power (Chen and Jaffe 2007). Similarly, studies point out that insurgent groups and terrorist organizations have in the past tapped oil resources to finance their activities (Crane et al. 2009).

In America and especially Europe, the strategic debate over energy security refers less to its potential to foster conflict than to the second approach referred to above, i.e. that of subsistence. In these terms, energy (in)security is a result of the fact that states rely on imports to secure the continued functionality of their societies, economies and militaries (Orttung and Perovic 2010). In fact, energy security is understood in this context as a public good consisting of intertwined segments and multiple-level interactions. Each actor, according to its relative position, tries to “securitize energy in ways that generate preferred policy outputs” (Ciuta 2010: 133). Hence energy security might be formulated in terms of security of supply, of demand or of infrastructure. The case of EU-Russia relations best illustrates this understanding of energy security, both as regards the variety of threats and as regards the multiplicity of actors (Dellecker and Gomart 2011).

Energy on the International Security Agenda

Today, the main challenge as regards international energy governance is the development of new regulations and enforcement mechanisms to manage transformations in the energy sector and to ensure that energy trade is not disturbed by non-economic factors. Beyond rules and policy, challenges in international energy governance are also to be found in the development of new technologies (Koranyi 2011). To this end, analysts have called for collaborative governance between, but also beyond, states, i.e. “through interactions between organizations, institutions, and individual actors among the public, private, and civil society sectors” (Andrews-Speed et al. 2012: 8).
To sum up, as highlighted when reviewing the inherent ambiguity in, and the profusion of meanings attached to, the very concept of energy security, contemporary energy politics stands out as a classic case of securitization. Rather than constituting an independent array of threats, energy insecurity remains in large part what states make of it. Energy policies often tend indeed to be “non-specific”, and sometimes hide the fact the fact that they have been influenced by other considerations (Ciuta 2010). This is illustrated, for instance, by the denunciation by some European states of Russia’s “energy imperialism”, which concerns less energy per se than Moscow’s pursuit of its geopolitical interests (Burrows and Treverton 2007; see also Cadier 2012). Furthermore, the securitization of energy policies has also, in some cases, led to militarization patterns (Stokes 2007, Campbell 2005), such as when the argument was made that voluntary disruptions to the energy imports of a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could amount to an “article V” case, triggering the armed response of the whole organization (Monaghan 2008).

So, although energy resources remain a key component of the international security landscape, it is far from clear if they will be at the heart of future inter-state conflicts. This is particularly the case in relation to sources of energy other than oil, which has monopolised much of the debate. What energy can do, however, is fuel intra-state conflict, becoming a source of concern for the largest stakeholders in the international system, including the US and the EU. Beyond that, energy will quite probably simply be one modest part of a large selection of areas of concern for states on both side of the Atlantic.

3.6 Conclusions

Firstly, we can conclude that migration, energy, the environment and health have increasingly been securitized on the international agenda. Security challenges emerging in these domains are, however, often indirect and complex, with securitization patterns often in fact running counter to effective ways of addressing these issues.

Secondly, it can be said that the acuteness of the risks and threats stemming from migratory, energy and environmental dynamics lies less with these phenomena per se than with states’ ability to cope with them. Thus research on state capacities and societal conflicts appears more promising in terms of generating valuable insights into these issues than the literature which views them strictly through a lens of migration security, energy security or environmental security.

Finally, the US, Europe and the rest of the world are unevenly exposed to the security challenges linked to these three domains. The US and the EU are the two top destinations for migrants, which in both cases has led to a re-bordering of the state. The EU remains heavily dependent on Russian gas and on oil from MENA, oil while the Americas are emerging as a self-sufficient energy island. Moreover, the US and the EU appear less exposed to the consequences of climate change than Asia or Africa.
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4. Preserving or Compromising International Security?
The Role of the Rising Powers

Nelli Babayan*

4.1 Introduction

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are rising powers with economies “set to grow again by more than the G7” economies (O’Neill 2001: 3), an undisputable fact that has led some authors to argue that they will inevitably aim to convert “their growing economic power into greater geopolitical clout” (Faulconbridge 2008) so as to “challenge the dominance of the United States” (Halpin 2009). This, in turn, is likely to stoke the fire of rivalries between old and new “poles” across the globe, and to destabilize the international security picture.

However, the argument of the imminent instability (Ikenberry and Wright 2008) to be brought about by the rise of the BRICS may be overstated. The fear of international instability is associated not with countries that openly threaten the existing world order, but with countries that have been recording rapid economic growth. But does the economic rise of new powers necessarily translate into international instability? From the perspectives of democratic peace theory and liberal institutionalism, the potential to challenge international security does not primarily stem from a rising power’s economic or military strength, but from the combination of power and an autocratic form of government. In other words, in order to upset the global security equation, a rising power would need not only economic and military capabilities, but also an alternative vision of world order and the preparedness, along with the willingness, to put its vision into practice.

This section examines whether the BRICS have the ability or the will to overthrow the existing world order, or at least to alter significantly the international security landscape, by focusing on three broad dimensions: the BRICS’s military might; the nature of their domestic governments; and the overall direction of their foreign policies.

4.2 The Military Strength of the BRICS

The economic potential of the BRICS seems to be beyond doubt. However, this report is primarily interested in ascertaining whether their economic growth has also resulted in greater military power, and whether this increase in capabilities is accompanied by an alternative world vision and a corresponding willingness to alter the current world order accordingly. This report therefore assesses increased military power in terms of growing military expenditure. Military expenditure is understood here as a single phenomenon, i.e. a cumulative of such expenses as the armed forces, defence ministry operations, maintenance, and so on.13 It is important to trace not only expenditure in real terms, but also any increase in military expenditure as a share of GDP, since this serves to indicate whether military power is being given higher priority than in the past.

All BRICS countries were among the top ten military spenders in 2011, with China occupying second place (after the US), Russia third, India eighth, and Brazil tenth. Russia has increased its military expenditure in real terms by

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* The author would like to thank Thomas Risse for very helpful comments on a first draft of this section.

13 The definition of military expenditure used in this report is based on that of the SIPRI, available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/miles/resultoutput/sources_methods/definitions. Further, more detailed research on the correlation between military expenditure and the potential to compromise international security may look into different types of military expenditure to identify those with the greatest potential to cause such compromise.
16 percent since 2008, which includes a 9.3 percent increase in 2011, and it is projected that it will continue to increase it in the near future, up to 53 percent by 2014. Yet, as a share of GDP, Russia’s military spending has not increased since 2001-2002, with the exception of 2009. China has increased its military spending even more than Russia, namely by an outstanding 170 percent since 2002. While this increase may seem dramatic and indicative of growing military ambitions, the ratio of China’s military expenditure to GDP has remained unchanged (Table 1). Increased military spending has coincided with an increased overall budget, allowing better conditions and higher salaries for troops (SIPRI 2012). While India has increased its military expenditure by 66 percent since 2002, and Brazil reduced its military budget by 25 percent in 2011 to reduce inflation, both have slightly decreased their military expenditures as a share of GDP since 2001. A similar gradual decrease in military expenditure as a share of GDP is noticeable in the case of South Africa, probably because it “does not perceive major threats in its neighbourhood or abroad and consequently has largely neglected border security and arms purchases” (Brookings Institution 2011b: 20). While none of the BRICS has increased its military budget in terms of GDP share, the stable expenditure by China and increased expenditure in real terms by both China and Russia may add to Western suspicions as to the peacefulness of their intentions.

- Table 1 | BRIC military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database.

4.3 Regime Type: Aspiring Democrats and Reluctant Autocrats

Brazil

Brazil’s steady and progressive democratization has encouraged US President Obama to single it out as an example for other democratizing states to follow (Obama 2011). Brazil faces a number of issues that may hinder its democratic consolidation: corruption, illiteracy, high rates of homicides linked with the illegal drug trade, police misconduct, an ineffective prison system, and racial discrimination. However, all these socio-economic factors have not prevented the country’s democratic culture from putting down deeper roots (Hagopian and Mainwaring 1987). Brazil has now consolidated as an electoral democracy, with regular free and fair elections. The constitution, the electoral system and, most importantly, the political willingness of the authorities all provide for a vibrant, competitive political party landscape. While journalists are often targets of violence as a result of organized crime, freedom of expression has improved, especially after the 2009 decriminalization of libel and the adoption of legislation on freedom of information in 2012. Organized crime seems to be one of Brazil’s main domestic problems, also influencing its judiciary, which is largely independent of government control.

14 From 2001 to 2011, US military expenditure increased by 1.7 percent as a share of GDP (84 percent in real terms). It is expected to decrease after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. See further SIPRI 2012.
**China**

Despite a number of sporadic democratic movements (Brown 2010), China has not transformed into an electoral democracy, thus leaving the promising “people’s democratic dictatorship” a reality on paper only. Nevertheless, there are several scholars who continue to argue that an autocratic China can settle in the existing international liberal order (Johnston 2003, Bergsten et al. 2008, Ikenberry 2008, Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). This conviction may stem from the multifaceted understanding of democracy in China. Despite abysmal democracy rankings, analysts and democracy promoters find that some progress has been made, in addition to the local belief that a new type of democracy can be established, where one party would remain in control (Brown 2010). However, the monopoly of the Communist Party over political power, the lack of political competition and participation, regular political arrests for “endangering state security”, and heavy control over the media and the internet, accompanied by economic growth, make China the West’s prime suspect for threatening radical change to the international security equation.

**India**

India is the least of the West’s worries. An electoral democracy since its independence in 1947, India holds regular free and fair elections, with a constantly decreasing number of irregularities (Freedom House 2012). Political competition and participation have become embedded in the system, where national coalition governments have become a norm. Although journalists are occasionally restricted from covering security issues, the media in India is vibrant and largely fulfils its watchdog function. Despite recent allegations of corruption and a failure to provide equal treatment for minorities and lower caste members, the judiciary is perceived as independent from the executive branch. Notwithstanding persisting social and economic issues, there is no noticeable trend of reversal of India’s democracy; on the contrary, India’s government seems firm in its resolve to consolidate democracy within its borders (Carothers and Youngs 2011).

**South Africa**

Despite a comparative increase in incidents of electoral violence in 2009, and accusations levelled against the South African Broadcasting Corporation for being biased towards the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa is considered a democracy, having held generally free and fair elections since 1994 (Freedom House 2012). South Africa’s successful transition to democracy prompted initial assumptions that it would play a prominent role as a democracy promoter (Mandela 1993), assumptions which were, however, later substituted by “broad skepticism about democracy promotion” (Brookings Institution 2011b: 20). Though remnants of the apartheid regime persist—80 percent of land is still owned by the white minority, resulting in occasional attacks on white farmers, insecure tenure rights of black farm workers and illegal squatting—the government aims to transfer 30 percent of land to black owners by 2014. In spite of holding 45 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and heading four out of nine provincial governments, women are still subject to widespread sexual harassment and wage discrimination. However, even if not a strong democracy supporter abroad, South Africa seems to have consolidated its democratic institutions, while its democratic deficiencies stem from socio-economic discrepancies.

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Russia

Russia’s growing authoritarianism has been disguised by neologisms and euphemisms such as suverennaya demokratija (sovereign democracy) and vertikal vlasti (which might be translated in English as ‘vertical axis of power’). It has often adopted democracy promotion rhetoric, particularly when supporting friendly regimes (Shapovalova and Zarembo 2010). For instance, in the same statement in which he pointed to the former Soviet space as Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” (Averre 2009: 1697), former President Dmitry Medvedev (2008) insisted on Russia’s commitment to “the full development of rights and freedoms [and] the fight against corruption”. However, the swap of positions in 2012 between former Prime Minister and President Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, and Putin’s plans to build a Eurasian Union (BBC 2011), are likely to further consolidate authoritarianism in Russia and its neighbourhood (Ambrosio 2008, Abushov 2009).

4.4 The Foreign Policies of the BRICS

Brazil

Having experienced social and economic improvements, Brazil has been expected “to make its name on the global stage and balance the other power [...] the United States” (Sweig 2010b). While supporting “the improvement of multilateralism and the global governance processes”, Brazil has based its foreign policy on the principle of national sovereignty, with a strong association with the developing world (Carothers and Youngs 2011). This has meant positioning itself as a “representative of emerging countries and as a staunch defender of poorer countries” (European Commission 2007: 7). Being a “firm believer in multilateralism” (Amorim 2010: 218), Brazil has seemed more intent on positioning itself as a stabilizing regional power (de Sousa 2008: 1), promoting cooperation and sustainable development in a multipolar world (European Commission 2007), than on advancing a claim to great power status (Spektor 2009). While working on deepening its commercial dominance in South America (Sweig 2010b), Brazil has aimed to increase its influence on the multilateral stage, though with some differences in approach between presidential administrations. While former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was a firm supporter of a traditional non-interventionist policy, under his successor, Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s voting record in the UNSC has shifted slightly towards greater activism. Brazil pursues a soft power image, which may actually be more effective in winning not only the hearts and minds of developing countries but also the pockets of both democratic and autocratic countries. However, whether this approach is in fact deliberately directed at shaking the US’ position as a dominant power, and if so whether it is effective, is yet to be seen.

China

By taking a comparatively low international profile and referring to its new security concept and good neighbour policy (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002), China maintains that the Cold War approach of building security alliances is outdated and should be replaced by economic and diplomatic cooperation. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Chinese foreign policy was directed at improving its relations with its neighbours. The signing of a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation in 2001, the establishment in the same year of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the resolution of the forty-year-old border dispute in 2008 (Economist 2008) have visibly improved China’s relations with Russia. China has also improved its relations with India, despite the outstanding border disputes over Aksai Chin and South Tibet. Its regular military aid to Pakistan has not prevented China from becoming India’s largest trading partner.

16 “Суверенная демократия” (suverennaya demokratija) and “вертикаль власти” (vertikal’ vlasti).

China’s behaviour and use of its veto in the UNSC has indicated that its main aim has been to safeguard its own sovereignty (Gill and Reilly 2000, Wuthnow 2010) and to resist its own democratization, rather than to promote its specific governance pattern abroad. Seen by some as a soft power (Thompson 2005, Gill and Huang 2008), China has announced that it “seeks no hegemony” and will not “impose its own values or ideology on others” (Qin 2007). China emphasises that its aid to Africa is exempt of the democratic conditionality often employed by the US and the EU, showing that it is more interested in the development of economic relations than in changing governance regimes. Even in its claims over the South China Sea and opposition to oil exploration there, China’s rhetoric has emphasized its territorial integrity rather than its foreign policy ambitions (Ninvalle 2007, Williams 2008).

**India**

Similarly to Brazil, India emphasizes South-South cooperation. However, the similarities end here. In fact, India’s foreign policy has stood out for being astonishingly void of “great projects” or initiatives, to the extent that one author has found no better way to describe it than “anaemic” (Khandekar 2012: 2). India’s unwillingness to take on global responsibilities has often frustrated Western powers (Carothers and Youngs 2011). Nevertheless, while not attempting to influence the political environments of other countries and being “very reluctant” (Brookings Institution 2011a: 14) to engage in democracy promotion, India’s own democratization within a multi-cultural society can serve as an example, and provide room for contagion.

What is frustrating, especially for the US, is that the non-alignment approach of the first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, still dominates India’s foreign policy, and prevents it from siding with the US on a number of issues. “Nonalignment 2.0” (Khilnani et al. 2012), a foreign policy blueprint developed by a group of Indian foreign policy analysts and government officials, encourages India to collaborate with Russia or China in international issues ahead of countries which are closer to it in terms of their democratic regimes – a move often seen as “implicit opposition to the U.S.-led international order” (Dhume 2012). Thus, even if some see India as “undermin[ing] a core U.S. security concern” (Dhume 2012), it seems that India is simply following its own interests, without an overarching international agenda, inadvertently making it an important player for other powers to court.

**South Africa**

South Africa initially established itself as “a regional power with global aspirations” (Carothers and Youngs 2011: 9), including in the field of human rights and democracy promotion, although in these cases it directed its attention more towards its neighbourhood and the wider region than towards faraway places. Such aspirations were especially noticeable in the 1990s, when it recalled its representative from Nigeria in protest against human rights abuses (van der Westhuizen 2010), and led an intervention in Lesotho to protect a democratically-elected government (Brookings Institution 2011b: 20).

However, South Africa’s support for democracy abroad subsided after accusations of pursuing regional and global hegemony (Brookings Institution 2011b). Both former President Thabo Mbeki and his current successor Jacob Zuma have concentrated more on South-South cooperation and trade partnerships, and shown an apparent lack of interest in a strong human rights and democracy-oriented foreign policy. In fact, South Africa has apparently shifted away from its policy of supporting democracy in its neighbourhood towards a policy of supporting democracy in countries of marginal strategic importance. While condoning human rights violations in close-by Zimbabwe, Swaziland or even in more distant Sudan, South Africa voted in the UNSC to sanction...
Iran, and withdrew its representative from Israel in 2010 after the latter’s attack on a ship reported to be carrying humanitarian aid to Palestine (S Africa MFA).

Meanwhile, the decision to abandon its policy of recognizing Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China in favour of the People’s Republic, along with its refusal to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2011, have emphasized the importance that South Africa places on its growing trade relations with China, whose “political discipline” has been publicly praised by President Zuma (2010). The denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama, the symbol of Tibet’s struggle for autonomy in China, coincided with the trip of the South African Vice-President to China and the announcement of a USD 2.5 billion deal between Pretoria and Beijing (Martina 2011, Fairbanks 2012). South Africa’s active lobbying to join the BRIC group and increased emphasis on economic relations have clearly indicated that it now focuses mainly on its own development, with democracy support abroad becoming a relic of the past.

**Russia**

In the 1990s Russia maintained its democratizing image *inter alia* by emphasising friendly relations with Western leaders, with the “Boris [Yeltsin] and Bill [Clinton]” friendship (Pushkov 2001) being the most notable trait of a supposedly rosy picture. The nostalgia for the imperial past, which increased as Russia’s political influence declined, became more pronounced after NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, which was carried out despite strong Russian opposition. Vladimir Putin, in his various stints as Russia’s President (from 2000-2008, and then again since 2012), has opted for a “harder” approach towards foreign affairs and economic development. Dismissing any chance of Russia liberalizing to the extent hoped for in the US and the West, Putin stated that Russia’s main interest was that of remaining a global power (Putin 1999). Unlike China, Russia does not premise its foreign policy on its territorial integrity, but rather insists on its great power status, being interested in regional rather than global dominance. In 2000, President Putin approved a foreign policy strategy that openly called the US a threat to a multipolar world and recalled Russia’s interests as a great power, and made repossession of its traditional sphere of influence its primary task (Secrieru 2006). Understanding that the Soviet-forced allegiance of Eastern Europe is long lost to NATO and the EU, Russia has given foreign policy priority to the states that were once part of the Soviet Union (Babayan and Braghiroli 2011). Through military cooperation and economic investment, Russia has taken direct action to stabilize authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space (Grävingholt et al. 2011). Its own energy resources, the initial Western neglect, and the economic indebtedness of the former Soviet republics have together provided rather fertile ground for Russia’s authoritarian manoeuvring to block Western and mainly EU policies (Babayan 2013).

**4.5 Conclusion: the King is Dead, Long Live the Kings?**

None of the BRICS has attempted to influence global governance in any systematic way, other than the occasional exertion by Russia and China of their veto power in the UNSC. Consequently, concluding that the “rise of the BRICS” presents a challenge to the Western-dominated world order, let alone to international security, seems rooted more in speculation than in empirical evidence. China’s economic growth is unlikely to create a new world order unless the Chinese decide on an expansionist foreign policy of military conquest or on promotion of their type of governance. While there is some global foreign policy rhetoric, China’s current aspirations are mainly centred toward the East Asian region and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Latin America. If an aggressive Chinese foreign policy were to emerge, it would threaten regional rather than international security. The same holds true for Russia. While it shows more interest in the re-establishment of its great power status, it has re-acquired influence only in its historical sphere of influence. Brazil has neither increased its military expenditure nor made
bellicose statements about its superpower ambitions. India is too preoccupied with internal political and social dynamics to extend the scope of its foreign policy far beyond its national borders. South Africa has almost abandoned its democracy promotion efforts and has concentrated on its own development and regional relations.

This section has shown that rapid economic growth does not necessarily result in greater military ambitions, especially when the rising economy in question is a democracy. Neither does economic growth necessarily result in greater foreign policy ambitions. The only potential challenger to a world order dominated by Western ideas and principles is China, but only in the long run and only if China is able to tackle its enormous domestic problems.
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Thomas Risse

5.1 Introduction

The number of civil wars has steadily increased since 1940 (Walter 2013: 656). Since 1991, almost all armed conflicts fought in the various world regions have been civil wars, defined here as armed conflicts in which at least one group of non-state actors – either domestic or transnational – is involved, e.g. rebel groups, warlords, or others. Civil wars generally last longer than interstate wars, the average duration of civil wars between 1991 and 2009 being eight years, while interstate wars only lasted an average of two years during the same period (see figures 2 and 3). Civil wars inflict enormous economic, social, and political costs, not just on the state on whose territory the war takes place, but usually on neighbouring states as well. In addition, states exposed to civil war are also highly likely to experience large-scale violence again (Walter 2013).

- Figure 2 | Number and Duration of Civil Wars in Progress

Some commentators have, therefore, called civil wars in which non-state actors are involved “new wars”, as opposed to the “old” interstate wars (Kaldor 1999, Münkler 2002). The number and severity of civil wars has certainly increased since World War II – partly because of the increasing obsolescence of interstate wars (see figure 3) (Mueller 1989). But there is little “new” about civil wars, which have been around in the history of humankind for millennia (Chojnacki 2006). The same holds true for asymmetric warfare, which has also been around for a long time.

This section is divided in three parts. First, I look at major theories explaining civil wars. I then discuss the relationship between limited statehood and the occurrence of civil wars. Finally, I examine the role of external actors.

5.2 Causes of Civil War: Grievances, Greed, and Opportunities

We can identify at least three major sets of theories of civil war (Cederman 2013, Walter 2013). The first concerns grievances which social groups hold against the central state or against each other. Groups might feel that they are discriminated against, for instance because a dominant ethnic group holds on to power and institutes systematic repression of minorities. In this context, the “ancient hatred” theory of ethnic warfare has been rejected time and again as essentializing ethnicity and treating it as a natural feature of social groups, rather than as a social construction. James Fearon and Laitin have argued in this context that ethno-nationalism serves as a powerful strategic construction pursued by elites in order to further their own political goals (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011, Cedermann, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009, Fearon and Laitin 2000). Moreover, macro-quantitative studies have in particular demonstrated that “ex ante measures of grievance levels are not good predictors of the transformation of latent grievances into manifest ones. And it is the factors that turn latent grievances into violent action that should be considered as explanatory for that violence” (Laitin 2007: 25, Cederman 2013: 536).
As a result, development economists in particular have come up with theoretical arguments for civil war which focus not so much on the ethnic or other political grievances felt by social groups who perceive themselves to be discriminated against, but on greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2002 and 2004). Rebels fight civil wars because they profit from resources and/or try to gain access to such resources. War economies result, whereby violent conflicts are perpetuated through the economic gains which the fighting parties are able to generate through war (Elwert 1999). These economic causes for war have led to the thesis of a “resource curse”, according to which countries with large endowments of natural extractive resources are particularly prone to civil war. The problem is that there are many countries with large reserves of oil, diamonds and other resources which are nevertheless not beset by civil war.

Thus, greed and grievances might be necessary causes for civil wars to occur, but they are by no means sufficient. “For groups to initiate a civil war, they must also have the opportunity to organize into an armed movement,” as Barbara Walter points out (Walter 2013: 658). She then discusses popular support, access to financial resources and arms, and state capacity as providing opportunity structures for rebel groups to fight. Popular support relates to the old quote by Mao Zedong according to which people are like water and guerrillas are like fish. Without access to financial resources (see the references to war economies above), transnational and domestic non-state violent actors cannot fight. Last but not least, if national governments control the territory, rebels are unlikely to stage a civil war. This point refers to the relationship between limited statehood and civil war.

5.3 Civil Wars and Limited Statehood

Today’s civil wars are inextricably linked to the phenomenon of limited statehood (Risse 2011). Most countries in the contemporary international system contain areas of limited statehood, defined as areas in which the central authorities – usually central governments – are too weak to exert a (legitimate) monopoly over the means of violence and/or implement and enforce central decisions. In other words, areas of limited statehood are those parts of a country in which the hierarchical rule or authority of the state is lacking. As a result, civil wars occur in areas of limited statehood almost by definition, since transnational or domestic non-state violent actors such as rebels constitute a challenge to the state monopoly over the means of violence. While limited statehood is a necessary condition for civil wars to occur, it is by no means sufficient. In fact, the literature on fragile and failed states – that is, countries in which areas of limited statehood cover almost the entire territory – often overlooks the fact that anarchy, chaos, and violence is absent most of the time and in most of the territory, even under such adverse conditions (Rotberg 2003 and 2004, Schneckener 2004). While civil wars are the most widespread type of violent conflict (probably in history), they are still rare phenomena in the international system. Take Somalia, the quintessential failed state for the past twenty years. Event data for 1990-2007 show, for example, that violent conflict is concentrated around Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, the capital, and major roads, but is rather rare in the northern provinces of Puntland and Somaliland (see figure 4) (Chojnacki and Branović 2011, Chojnacki et al. 2012). It is, therefore, wrong to assume that state fragility and failure automatically results in widespread unrest and violence, even though a lack of capacity on the part of the state to uphold the monopoly over the means of violence is a necessary condition for civil wars to occur.
So, what explains the widespread absence of violence, even if the state is too weak to maintain control over the means of violence? Sven Chojnacki and Željko Branović (2011) take on a particularly hard case here by dealing with the conditions under which security as a collective rather than privatized good can be provided even under the most adverse conditions of fragile, failing, and failed states. State collapse and armed conflict give rise to areas where security is provided selectively by a variety of state, quasi-state or non-state actors. In order to systematically differentiate and analyse the provision of security in areas of limited statehood, Chojnacki and Branović trace several modes of security leading to varying forms of security governance (security as a public good, as a club good, and as a private commodity). They use a market analogy to argue that the emergence of different modes of security results from the strategies used by collective actors on hazardous markets of pro-
tection. These hazardous markets are characterized by areas where different public and private actors compete for territorial control, natural resources and the recruitment of members. The emergence of security governance depends on economic and geographic opportunity structures and on the expected utility of investing in productive means instead of in unproductive arming and fighting. Chojnacki and Branović then discuss the conditions under which even violent non-state actors such as warlords or rebel groups deem it in their interests to provide security as a public good for a given population. They claim, therefore, that stable security governance without a state is possible even under seemingly adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood.

While security governance is possible even under conditions of fragile and failed statehood, limited statehood explains to some degree why civil wars last so long and are so difficult to end, irrespective of their causes. As Barbara Walter argues, the real puzzle of civil wars "is not why they begin […], but why they are so difficult to end" (Walter 2013: 656-657). Bargaining theory tells us that war is inefficient (Fearon 1995), and thus fails spectacularly to explain both why they occur and why they are difficult to end. One problem of civil war settlements concerns the question of enforcing the deals. If national governments cannot commit to a negotiated termination of a civil war because they are too weak to enforce the bargaining result, they are likely to fight the war to the end. In other words, limited statehood crucially affects the commitment problem as a pre-condition for civil wars to end. This is where external actors can change the equation.

5.4 Ending Civil Wars: The Role of External Actors

The international community as a whole has gradually come to accept its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) as part of its commitment to international peace and security in cases of severe violations of human rights standards (Bellamy 2011, Ladwig and Rudolf 2011). While the state itself has the “duty to protect” its own citizens, it lacks the capacity to do so in areas of limited statehood. This is where R2P comes in as a subsidiary responsibility of the international community in cases where central governments are either unwilling (as in Libya in 2011) or incapable of protecting their own citizens. But this responsibility of other states is severely circumscribed by procedural considerations, such as, for example, authorization by the UNSC, as a result of which a discrepancy between international law and moral obligations remains (see the case of Syria in 2012). Moreover, R2P cannot be used to justify long-term military interventions, occupations, or trusteeships, as in the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Ladwig and Rudolph argue, however, that R2P as a subsidiary responsibility can only be morally justified if the international community aims at re-establishing the material, structural, and societal preconditions for consolidated statehood. In other words, intruders into the “Westphalian sovereignty” of states that lack domestic sovereignty have to engage in state-building (Krasner 1999, Ladwig and Rudolf 2011).

The record of these state-building efforts remains decidedly mixed. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that peace-keeping operations generally accomplish their task of containing violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). On the other hand, the various state-building strategies, such as “liberalization first,” “security first,” “institutionalization first,” and “civil society first,” inevitably produce unintended consequences (Schneckener 2011). “Liberalization first” often underestimates the destabilizing effects of rapid democratization and market liberalization. In contrast, “security first” risks perpetuating the status quo, including authoritarian rule. While an emphasis on institution-building tends to empower those elites who profit from the status quo, focusing on civil society can lead to the opposite pitfalls by undermining local social structures.

All strategies have in common that they overlook the multi-level governance character of external efforts at state-building. As a result, incompatibilities between the goals and time-horizons of external actors, on the one hand, and local communities, on the other, are inevitable. David Lake and Chris Farris argue, therefore, that
modern trusteeships and whole-sale efforts at state-building are bound to fail, precisely because international actors often lack local legitimacy (and UNSC authorizations are no substitute for this), and because the goals of the external actors and those of local elites on the ground often clash (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, Lake and Farris forthcoming).

While most state-building efforts by external actors, including military interventions to restore political authority, have failed due to incompatible goals between the international community and local actors, more circumscribed external efforts at security governance have proven to be more effective and successful. Aila Matanock has shown, for example, that governance delegation agreements between (weak) states (such as, in her case study, the Solomon Islands) and international organizations and foreign governments are more likely to achieve their goals (Matanock forthcoming). The same holds true for various external efforts at security governance, for example with regard to the post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of rebel groups (Schröder 2010 and 2011).

Ulrich Schneckener (2011) concludes from these contradictory results that the key issue for external actors is not how to avoid the counter-productive effects and unintended consequences of their interference in the domestic sovereignty of states, but how to cope with them. First and foremost, they have to understand that they are not external to local developments, but part of the process and its dynamics. Since external efforts at stabilizing post-conflict situations result in multi-level governance structures, the “internationals” have to realize therefore that they are bound up with the political, social, economic, and cultural developments on the ground. “Exit strategies” then amount to self-betrayal. Rather, external actors have to understand that interventions in the governance arrangements of areas of limited statehood change both those being interfered with and the interveners.
References


6. Conclusions

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec

This first report of the Transworld security work package analyzes the concept of security, which has been transformed by the rise of new actors, both state and non-state, by the multiplication of risks (some of them new, some of them old, replacing former threats under new guises), and by new challenges. Based on secondary literature, this report is necessarily limited in its scope and ambitions. It aims at helping us move to further stages in the research, as it highlights the changing nature of security and the evolving role of security actors, particularly (but not only) states, so that eventually it becomes easier to grasp the way the United States, on the one hand, and the European Union, on the other, have adjusted to these new parameters and paradigms.

Security is understood differently from how it was understood prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. As stressed by Bastien Irondelle, the concept of security has been both broadened and deepened: it has been broadened to include new types of threat, from migrations and pandemics to terrorism, and it has been deepened to encompass new objects to secure, from human beings to planet Earth. The concept of R2P, which by means of the fact that it legitimizes a form of armed intervention is the most significant departure from the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, epitomises the former evolution (although it must be said that responsibility continues to fall in the first place on the relevant government, which has to protect its own population, and that no obligation ensues for the international community under R2P). R2P raises then the question of the legitimacy (and desirability) of armed intervention. There is nothing new about intervention, yet the tasks involved have taken on a totally new dimension, from post-war reconstruction to peace- and state-building in a context of limited statehood, prone to civil war, which Thomas Risse analyzes. As he underlines, “the record of […] state-building efforts remains decidedly mixed”. Side-effects, perverse consequences etc. abound. Linked with the mixed records and results, but not entirely related, the willingness to intervene has lessened, even if the intervention in Libya seems to contradict this assertion.

Stretching the concept of security may eventually trigger/increase a process of securitization, which has been criticized not only by academics in security studies, but also by legal students, lawyers, civil society, etc. The Bush administration-era “Global War on Terror” is a good case in point, as the imperative to fight international terrorism seemed to be used in an extensive way to legitimize controversial government choices both on the domestic front (for instance, conferring increased powers on law enforcement agencies) and in the international arena (the case for the invasion of Iraq, for instance, was strengthened by insisting on fictional relations between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime). Securitization in itself is not new, nor are threats, such as terrorism, civil wars, and so on, significant novelties. What is new is the conflation of local and global – “glocal” – and the way globalization is “transforming the international security landscape (by increasing) the interconnectedness between societies and states, [by leading] to a contraction of space and time [and by] creating global challenges as well as global public goods”.

Bastien Irondelle and David Cadier both go on to explore how these structural transformations impact on the security agenda. Yet apart from nuclear proliferation, these issues, such as terrorism, pandemics, environmental problems and energy security, are not security issues per se, though they may conflate with existing or upcoming security issues. David Cadier in particular recalls that environmental degradation, pollution, natural hazards and related resource scarcities have so far been illegitimately linked with interstate conflicts, yet may interact with security issues by weakening the state and state capacity. Interaction with security issues is also one aspect of the polysemic notion of energy security (e.g. a blockade of the Straits of Hormuz in the case of an Israeli or US strike against Iran’s nuclear programme). In any case, it is the impact (of food deprivation, pandemics, etc.) on state capacities, or the conflation of several issues, which leads to including policy fields as diverse as health, environment or energy policies in the security agenda.

One of the most important questions on the international security agenda pertains to the role of rising states. First and foremost, what does “rising” mean? Is it economic or military? Do the rising states offer an alternative version of international relations? According to Nelli Babayan, they do not. Rather, rising states follow their own interests, without an overarching international agenda, inadvertently making them an important player for other powers to court. Rising states are mostly regional, rather than global, in their focus: Nelli Babayan argues that an aggressive China or an aggressive Russia threatens
regional rather than international security. However, not all contributors to the report share this view. Firstly, regional threats might percolate at the global level: this did not happen in the case of Russia’s war against Georgia, but the United States has been playing a role for a number of decades in Eastern Asia, and China’s neighbors turn to it. Second, the sheer rise of Chinese military power creates concerns in the United States and elsewhere, while China does not contribute much to global governance, and even undermines the global system as it currently exists, be it through its quest for resources or through its role at the UNSC.

These analyses raise important questions. Is power still a currency in the 21st century? Are there resources, and are there the instruments to convert these resources into action? And primarily, is there space for leadership? As Bastien Irondelle puts it, “globalization has … [transformed] the international security landscape” in many ways, and he goes on to argue that it has “decreased the capacity of any state to manage global security threats and risks alone”. This question might be the prism, or one of the prisms, through which we can analyze the various issues.

Another fundamental question concerns global security governance, particularly in the field of war prevention and management. Are interventions doomed to fail? As Thomas Risse recalls, “while most state-building efforts by external actors, including military interventions to restore political authority, have failed due to incompatible goals between the international community and local actors, more circumscribed external efforts at security governance have proven to be more effective and successful”. Do the rising states covet global power ambitions, or do they sting only regionally, if at all? Beyond the claim for a new order, involving a redistribution of power and respect for sovereignty (including the right to pollute, to grab foreign lands, etc., all things the West did in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries), the BRICS do not contribute to the current world order (R2P in particular) more than marginally. Rather, they are more inclined to undermine it by calling into question the very principles and practices which the West sought to develop and promote. On these bases, how will cooperation emerge? And prior to that, how are the EU and the US adjusting?
In an era of global flux, emerging powers and growing interconnectedness, transatlantic relations appear to have lost their bearings. As the international system fragments into different constellations of state and non-state powers across different policy domains, the US and the EU can no longer claim exclusive leadership in global governance. Traditional paradigms to understand the transatlantic relationship are thus wanting. A new approach is needed to pinpoint the direction transatlantic relations are taking. TRANSWORLD provides such an approach by a) ascertaining, differentiating among four policy domains (economic, security, environment, and human rights/democracy), whether transatlantic relations are drifting apart, adapting along an ad hoc cooperation-based pattern, or evolving into a different but resilient special partnership; b) assessing the role of a re-defined transatlantic relationship in the global governance architecture; c) providing tested policy recommendations on how the US and the EU could best cooperate to enhance the viability, effectiveness, and accountability of governance structures.

Mainly funded under the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme, TRANSWORLD is carried out by a consortium of 13 academic and research centres from the EU, the US and Turkey:

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