Jihadism in North Africa: A House of Many Mansions
Jean-Pierre Filiu

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A common narrative links the recent developments of the jihadist scene in North Africa to the toppling of the Tunisian and Libyan dictatorships and their tightly controlled security apparatuses. This narrative drives the propaganda of the remaining strongmen in the region, who portray themselves as the best antidote to al-Qaeda in particular, and terrorism in general. Western intelligence, overwhelmingly critical of NATO’s anti-Gadhafi campaign, also tends to share this view, preferring stability and thus placing their trust in collaborative authoritarian regimes.

The main flaw of this ‘counter-revolutionary’ narrative is its lack of historical perspective. The whole story of jihadism in North Africa started two decades ago, when the Algerian army ‘suspended’ the electoral process in 1992 that would have brought the local Islamists to power, precipitating a horrendous civil war. Understanding the roots and mutations of Algerian jihadism reveals how a complex and volatile situation has coalesced today around competing poles and networks.

Its history begins in Algeria, which became the cradle of an enduring version of jihadism that expanded through the Sahara
in the form of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), before being rolled back from Mauritania. It continues with the birth and growth of a new brand of jihadist outfit, Ansar al-Sharia, in the aftermath of the Tunisian and Libyan revolutions. The third section addresses the rise and fall of the AQIM-linked ‘Jihadistan’ in Northern Mali, with the recent development of an ambitious movement, al-Mourabitoun, led by an Algerian veteran. It concludes with a discussion of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and its implications for global and regional jihadism.

**Algeria’s jihadists and Mauritania’s roll-back**

The Islamic Armed Group (GIA) was the main jihadist organisation fighting the Algerian regime in the 1990s. As the civil war dragged on, the GIA also intensified its struggle against the rival Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Although they were often nicknamed ‘Afghans’ because of their Salafist attire, only a small minority of the Algerian jihadists actually fought in Afghanistan against Soviet forces (before their withdrawal in 1989). Among those veterans was Mokhtar Belmokhtar, or Belaouar, ‘the one-eyed man’ (he reportedly lost an eye while fighting in the Afghan province of Khost in 1991).

Belmokhtar, born in the oasis of Ghardaia, was based in the Algerian Sahara, where he handled various logistics operations for the GIA. A shrewd smuggler himself, Belmokhtar built over several years an intricate network of criminal partnerships in the Sahel region. Soon he was nicknamed ‘Mister Marlboro’ for his trafficking of tobacco, though he also smuggled drugs and arms. Such ‘un-Islamic’ dealings were either ignored or justified by an obligation to defeat the kuffâr (infidels) by any means necessary.

On the eastern border with Libya, a much smaller smuggling network operated on behalf of the GIA. One of its main
ringleaders was Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, who boasted of dealing only in computers and tea, in order to enhance his pious credentials. Neither Belmokhtar nor Abou Zeid engaged in insurgency activities then. But they eventually joined the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998 when it broke away from a GIA responsible for a wave of mass killings and plagued by internal purges.

The collapse of the GIA led the Algerian military to proclaim victory, while acknowledging there remained ‘residual terrorism’, mostly in the mountainous range of Kabylia, east of the capital Algiers. Abou Zeid rose in the hierarchy of the GSPC but operated mostly in its smuggling underworld. Belmokhtar, by contrast, sought to emphasise his leadership capacities, naming the katiba (battalion) of his supporters ‘al-Moulathamoun’, the Veiled Ones, with reference to warring tribes who had spread Islam in the Sahara.

In 2004, both Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid pledged allegiance to the new GSPC emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, who had joined the jihadi insurgency at the same time as them and had managed to escape military raids and purges. Droukdel strove to globalise the GSPC network by connecting it to the anti-US jihad in Iraq. GSPC training camps in eastern Algeria attracted hundreds of militants from all over North Africa, eager to fight against the ‘Crusaders’ in the Middle East.

In 2005, Belmokhtar declared jihad against Mauritania, attacking an isolated outpost and slaughtering its whole garrison. He felt the need to boost his jihadist profile against an enemy that lacked the resources to strike back. This escalation led Belmokhtar to endorse Droukdel’s pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, issued on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

In January 2007, the GSPC officially became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Algerian capital was struck by
deadly suicide attacks in April and December that year. But AQIM failed to export its terror north of the Mediterranean, where it had no solid network or pool of supporters. So Droukdel turned to Belmokhtar in order to achieve AQIM’s global ambitions. In the last days of 2007, Belmokhtar’s affiliates killed four French tourists in eastern Mauritania, and the Paris–Dakar car race was consequently moved to Latin America.

After years of restraint, Abou Zeid also escalated attacks. He initiated a chase for Western hostages all over the Sahara, compelling Belmokhtar to join the fray. The extremely mobile commandos struck from the coast of Mauritania to Southern Tunisia. The abductions brought unprecedented media exposure to the two jihadist leaders, along with hefty ransoms that further extended their reach and influence.

Mauritania was hit repeatedly, even in the capital, Nouakchott. It took three years for the local army to gather the military and intelligence capabilities to launch a fully fledged offensive against AQIM. But in 2008–09, the organisation was rolled back from Mauritanian territory. That the Mauritanian state proclaimed its own jihad against those claiming to represent jihadists contributed significantly to the success of this campaign.

Conversely, in Mali the failure of a military operation in July 2009 led to the local army’s de facto abandonment of the north, limiting its control to the cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Northern Mali became a safe haven for both Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid. Algerian cadres still formed the top leadership of AQIM, even in the Sahara, which convinced African jihadists to form their own outfit, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

On the eve of the Tunisian revolution, Droukdel had become dependent on his subordinates in the Sahara. They supplied him with the financial resources and media exposure he badly
needed in his isolated stronghold of Kabylia. Mauritania had successfully liberated its territory from AQIM and often undertook raids in neighbouring Mali. In Algeria, outbursts of residual terrorism occurred, but without affecting the political scene.

The Tunisian and Libyan revolutions
AQIM remained quiet during the Tunisian uprising that ousted President Ben Ali in January 2011, ending 23 years of his dictatorship. In the euphoria of the revolution, all political detainees were unconditionally released. One was particularly problematic. Seifallah Benhassine, nicknamed ‘Abou Iyad al-Tounissi’ (the Tunisian), was not a prisoner of conscience but the former leader of the Tunisian guest house in the radical community in Peshawar during anti-Soviet jihad.

Abou Iyad became a key leader of the Islamic Tunisian Fighting Group (GICT), a partner of al-Qaeda, whose leadership he interacted with frequently. In 2003, during one of his liaison missions in Turkey, he was arrested by the local police and extradited to Tunisia. He was condemned to 63 years in jail for terrorist activities, including masterminding the killing of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Afghan commander of the anti-Taliban resistance, two days before 9/11.

The revolution also prompted the return from exile of Rached Ghannouchi and the legalisation of his Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) Party. The Islamist movement had been plagued by years of repression that had deepened a generational divide between the historic leadership, now released from jails or back from exile, and younger grassroots militants. Ennahda, despite its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, had grown into a catch-all Islamist party that also included significant representation from Tunisia’s Salafists.

The post-revolutionary Tunisian landscape was therefore quite different from the Egyptian one, where a fully-fledged
Salafist party had developed independently of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ennahda, however, sought to absorb and moderate most of the Salafist militants. This would be crucial in the coming debates about the Tunisian Second Republic, whose constitution would replace the founding charter adopted after the end of the French protectorate in 1956.

Ennahda won 36% of the votes, but received 89 out of 217 seats in the October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly. It entered into a coalition with a socialist party and a nationalist one to form a tripartite government chaired by Hamadi Jebali, Ennahda’s secretary-general. Throughout this period, Ghannouchi kept cajoling the Salafist ‘brothers’ in an effort to win over their networks instead of suppressing or marginalising them.

This tolerance substantially helped Abou Iyad expand his own organisation, which he named Ansar al-Sharia. Jebali and his minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh, silently disapproved of Ghannouchi’s lenient stance, but ultimately endured provocations by Ansar al-Sharia. The secular opposition criticised Ennahda’s double standard, accusing the Islamist-led government of playing with jihadi fire.

In contrast to the relatively peaceful revolution in Tunisia, the struggle against Gadhafi’s regime in Libya quickly became a full-blown civil war that lasted from February to October 2011. Dissidents from the government army joined forces in the insurgency with jihadist veterans of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).5 In 2007, the LIFG had split between a Pakistan-based nucleus that merged into al-Qaeda, including Abu Anas al-Libi, and its Libyan members who eventually rejected bin Laden’s mentorship and jihadist dogma in 2010.6

After Gadhafi’s fall, the leader of this ‘reformed’ LIFG, Abdelhakim Belhaj,7 moved to Tripoli. He became the new military governor and founded a political party, al-Watan
(The Motherland). Meanwhile, in Benghazi, the cradle of the Libyan revolution, Muhammad al-Zahawi developed his own Ansar al-Sharia. Zahawi, like Abou Iyad, had been previously imprisoned. But he had never fought outside Libya, let alone in Afghanistan. There was no organisational or operational link between the Tunisian and Libyan Ansar al-Sharia groups, just a shared motivation to defy the paths chosen by the legalised Islamist or reformed jihadist parties.

In another contrast with the Tunisian revolution, Libyan Islamists fared poorly at the first elections; in July 2012, the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, running as the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), won only 17 out of 80 party seats in the General National Congress (GNC); 120 seats of the 200-member GNC were allotted to individuals not affiliated with any party. But the JCP was much better structured than its rival organisations and soon gained the loyalty of a sizeable number of ‘independent’ members of the Congress.

Belhaj’s Watan Party received less than 4% of the votes in the same contest. Nevertheless, he remained the only leader to play a significant role in both parliament and on the streets of Tripoli. The revolutionary militias (thuwar) continued to be the main source of power in the major cities.

In September 2012, the dissemination on the internet of a video slandering the Prophet Muhammad was seized as a pretext by extremist groups to stir violent protests against US embassies and consulates in the region. On the 11th anniversary of 9/11, the US consulate in Benghazi came under attack and the United States’ ambassador was killed, along with three of his compatriots. The Obama administration held Ansar al-Sharia responsible, suggesting an al-Qaeda connection to the attacks.

However, it appeared that local militia leaders, already responsible for summary executions of ‘traitors’ (revolu-
tionary renegades from Gadhafi’s regime involved in earlier anti-Islamist crackdowns), had launched the deadly attack. US intelligence, focused on global threats, had underestimated the dangers of Benghazi warlords. In June 2014, the US captured a key suspect involved in the attacks, Ahmed Abu Khattala, and transported him to New York to face trial.

In Tunisia, there was no doubt that Ansar al-Sharia led an assault on the US Embassy in Tunis on 14 September 2012. The presidential guard had to intervene, killing five protesters. Abou Iyad staged a last defiant rally in a mosque in central Tunis before going underground. Jebali and Laarayedh had finally prevailed against Ghannouchi in imposing a tough line against Ansar al-Sharia. The Islamist-led government even let two Ansar al-Sharia hunger-strikers die in jail, rejecting their demands.

Then, in February 2013, Chokri Belaïd, a prominent leftist leader, was shot dead next to his home in Tunis. The murder was blamed on a Salafist death squad, but the political crisis, with a general strike and mass protests in the capital, led to the downfall of the Jebali government. Jebali tried to form a new technocratic cabinet without party representation, but Ghannouchi refused any devolution of power by Ennahda.

Eventually, the former minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh, became prime minister and pursued a showdown with Ansar al-Sharia. The group’s annual conference in the city of Kairouan was banned and ensuing riots were supressed. The Tunisian public overwhelmingly supported this ‘iron fist’ policy, since Ansar al-Sharia had been accused of killing yet another prominent leftist activist. For months, the security forces hunted down Ansar al-Sharia militants, eventually killing some of their armed hardliners.

But another shadow was looming on the horizon of the Tunisian revolution; AQIM, after repeated infiltrations, had
managed in June 2013 to consolidate a base in the Jebel Chambi, a mountainous range on the border with Algeria. Skirmishes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inflicted an unprecedented toll on the Tunisian military and police, who in turn protested against the Islamist-led government. The jihadist stronghold was eventually neutralised, although escape routes to Algeria did not allow the poorly equipped Tunisian forces to eliminate the threat once and for all.

Again, Algeria appeared to be the source of the jihadist spillover into neighbouring countries. The incapacity of post-Gadhafi Libya to disarm the militias had also created fertile ground for cooperation between warlords, jihadists and smugglers. This created serious security concerns in southern Tunisia.9

In October 2013, US special forces captured Abou Anas al-Libi outside his Tripoli home. Abou Anas was a Libyan al-Qaeda associate wanted for the 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, who had returned to his native country after Gadhafi’s fall. But his capture aggravated the power struggle in Libya, prompting the brief abduction of the prime minister himself by a militia that accused him of complicity with the CIA.10

In January 2014, three years after the Tunisian revolution, a new constitution was finally adopted and Ennahda relinquished the presidency, opening the way for a technocratic cabinet. This globally recognised success proved to be the best antidote to jihadist destabilisation for more than a year. But in March 2015, two jihadist commandos attacked the Bardo National Museum, in the same grounds as the Tunisian parliament. They killed more than 20 people before being gunned down by local security. Just three months later, a lone Tunisian gunman attacked tourists at a beach resort in Sousse, killing 39 people.
All three Tunisian terrorists had been trained in neighbouring Libya, where the fight between the Tripoli-based Dawn coalition and its Tobruk-based Dignity alliance degenerated into a full-fledged civil war in 2014, with direct Egyptian and Emirati support on behalf of Dignity and long-stalled efforts by the United Nations (UN) to broker a national unity agreement. Dignity brands all its opponents as terrorists, while Dawn accuses former Gadhafi supporters of not being sufficiently committed to the revolution. Despite these mutual accusations, both Tripoli and Tobruk have been targeted by jihadist attacks. The political impasse, decline in governance and widespread warlordism has made Libya the most fertile ground for jihadism in North Africa, even allowing ISIS to take root in 2015.

The Mali Campaign and the rise of al-Mourabitoun
As the Arab uprisings were about to unfold, the two AQIM leaders in the Sahara, Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid, found safe havens in Northern Mali to pursue their own criminal activities and jihadist operations. In September 2010, Abou Zeid led an attack on the French expatriate compound in Arlit, a uranium facility in northern Mali. Seven hostages were abducted; three of them were released after several months, while the other four, all French nationals, were held captive for three years.

The complex negotiations on the fate of foreign hostages absorbed a lot of the attention of the two leaders. Belmokhtar relied on a mediator close to the president of Burkina Faso. But Abou Zeid favoured the intercession of Iyad Ag Ghali, a former guerrilla leader of the Touareg insurgency in northern Mali, who had returned home after a term as consul of Mali in the Saudi port city of Jeddah.

Touaregs have a long history of armed uprisings against the central government in Bamako since their first rebellion in 1963. Iyad Ag Ghali, a partner in the most recent peace agree-
ment with the Malian authorities (who rewarded him with the Jeddah consular assignment), with increasing frequency denounced the failure of Bamako to live up to its commitments to the Touaregs. But his association with Abou Zeid led him to adopt a sharply Islamist tone, eventually founding a new group, Ansar Eddine (Supporters of Religion).

Thousands of Malian Touaregs, including veteran anti-Bamako guerrillas, found refuge in Libya and joined Gadhafi’s mercenary units known as the Islamic Legion. When the Libyan dictatorship collapsed in the autumn of 2011, the Legion disbanded and the Touareg fighters moved back to Mali, along with weaponry seized from Gadhafi’s caches. Most of them joined Ansar Eddine, empowering Iyad Ag Ghali with unprecedented force.

In January 2012, Ansar Eddine allied with the Touareg separatist insurgency, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Azawad being the Touareg denomination for northern Mali. Ansar Eddine and the MNLA took over the cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao in a matter of weeks. A military coup in Bamako only accelerated the demise of the central government in the north of the country.

The MNLA proclaimed the independence of Azawad in March. But its victory was short lived, because Ansar Eddine, backed by AQIM and the MUJAO, turned against its former allies to consolidate full jihadist control of northern Mali. Each of the jihadist groups had its own fiefdom: Ansar Eddine in Kidal, AQIM in Timbuktu and the MUJAO in Gao. Belmokhtar had been marginalised by the close cooperation between Abou Zeid and Iyad Ag Ghali.

Abou Zeid delivered the final blow to his Algerian rival in November by convincing Droukdel to expel Belmokhtar from AQIM. The charges against him ranged from embezzlement of hostage ransoms to a poor record in jihadist activism. A defiant
Belmokhtar chose to spend more time in southern Libya, where he benefitted from the local anarchy of the post-Gadhafi power vacuum.

Algeria bet on the peace talks it had sponsored between Ansar Eddine and the Malian government. The Algerian military was therefore incensed when Ansar Eddine and its jihadist allies launched an offensive towards the south of Mali in January 2013, occupying the strategic town of Konna. Bamako called Paris for help because the road to the capital was now open to jihadist commandos.

The French response, known as Operation Serval, was swift and on a large scale. Algerian airspace was opened to the French air force, a dramatic move that underlined the shared concern about the jihadist threat. The UN, African Union and European Union endorsed the campaign and relied on US and British support with logistics and intelligence. Chadian commandos were also crucial in the ground operation.

In six weeks, the French military managed to stop the jihadist push and roll back their units, before liberating the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. A merciless offensive in the extreme northeast of the country, in the Ametetai valley, successfully destroyed the jihadist stronghold there. French sources estimated that 700 out of 2,000 jihadist fighters died in combat, and Abou Zeid was killed while trying to flee. The ‘Jihadistan’ that AQIM, Ansar Eddine and the MUJAO had established in northern Mali lasted less than a year. While no weapons NATO had delivered to the Libyan insurgents in 2011 were found in jihadist caches, they were replete with arms plundered from Gadhafi’s arsenals.

As his former partners were being routed in Mali, Belmokhtar masterminded a major terror attack that returned him to the centre of the jihadist scene. In January 2013, the oil complex of In Amenas in southern Algeria was taken over by commandos
comprising Belmokhtar’s supporters. The Algerian military eventually recaptured the facilities, but 40 hostages from ten countries were killed, along with 29 terrorists.\textsuperscript{12}

Belmokhtar took credit for the operation, pushing both Droukdel and Abou Zeid into the shadows. The killing of Abou Zeid and dismantling of AQIM’s safe haven in Mali further served Belmokhtar’s plans to become the undisputed jihadist leader of the entire Sahara region. Southern Libya, in particular, offered unrivalled opportunities for the war-hardened survivor and seasoned smuggler.

In May 2013, the MUJAO proved it had outlived AQIM by launching combined suicide attacks against military targets in Niger, including the city of Arlit. In August, Belmokhtar’s group and the MUJAO announced their merger into a new organisation, al-Mourabitoun, a name that reflected the celebrated fighters who spread Islam in the Sahara in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century.

Did the French-led campaign simply displace the jihadist menace from northern Mali to southern Libya? Belmokhtar and al-Mourabitoun may have found a new safe haven in southern Libya, but they are only one group in an area complicated by rivalries between the ethnic-Tubu, Arab and Touareg tribes and feuds between revolutionaries and those nostalgic for the toppled dictatorship.

What made the prospect of a Malian ‘Jihadistan’ so dangerous was the process of association, and then identification, between Touareg irredentists and jihadists, similar to how Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan and Pakistan progressively blended with jihadist activists. Such a ‘Talibanisation’ process would have been devastating for the whole region, because sizeable Touareg communities exist not only in Mali and Libya, but also in Niger and Algeria.

\textit{Operation Serval} was therefore not purely a military success. The French move paved the way for the rapid restoration
of Malian institutions, with general elections for the presidency in August 2013 and parliament in November. The new head of state, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, won 77% of the votes. Significantly, he brought the former number two and three of Ansar Eddine into his presidential party. Although a new national pact has yet to bind northern Mali to the rest of the country, Keïta has the potential and mandate to draft and implement such a pact.

**The new global appeal of the Middle East**

The impact of Western military interventions in Libya and Mali are still difficult to evaluate. The NATO campaign against the Libyan dictatorship certainly prevented a wave of violence had Gadhafi defeated the rebels and been restored to absolute power. Jihadists could have also played a bigger role in the insurgency, especially in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), in the absence of Western interference.

Nevertheless, NATO lacked the will to ensure a stabilised post-Gadhafi Libya. And, despite its dramatic success in dismantling the AQIM stronghold, the French intervention in Mali will depend on a reconciliation process between the central power in Bamako and Touareg activists. If mediation is required, it has to be regional, and most probably Algerian – definitely not Western.

Despite an aggressive campaign on jihadist websites, the French-led operation in Mali attracted very few volunteers from abroad – in sharp contrast to the Syrian war, which became a magnet for North African militants. Libyans and Tunisians rank among the top nationalities of foreign fighters in Syria, along with Saudis and Iraqis. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS' leader, has openly challenged Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden’s official successor, for the supreme position in the globalised jihad. In this merciless feud, most North African jihadists
have tried to remain neutral, though this neutrality is already a blow to Zawahiri’s leadership. Maghrebi jihadists and volunteer fighters have more often supported ISIS, raising concerns among North African governments over how to manage these fighters when they return home.

In conjunction with its expansion in Syria and Iraq, ISIS began to establish a foothold in the Libyan city of Derna in November 2014. Local supporters of al-Baghdadi attempted to create a base of operations where other radical factions had long resisted Ghadafi’s rule. But this proved to be a failed tactic. After ISIS assassinated a local jihadist commander in June 2015, its fighters were defeated in Derna. However, ISIS regrouped and seized the central city of Sirte, Ghadafi’s hometown, which had previously been under the control of militias from Misrata. The ongoing Libyan civil war between the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based GNC and their affiliated militias exacerbated the growth of jihadism because each side prioritised defeating the other over combatting the spread of ISIS.

The ensuing power struggle for the leadership of the global jihad between Zawahiri and Baghdadi will be a major component of jihadism in North Africa in the future. National contexts and factional feuds will also complicate the jihadist equation. One sure thing is that jihadism in North Africa will remain ‘a house of many mansions’, divided primarily between the rising influence of ISIS-affiliated factions, remaining AQIM members and opportunistic elements of al-Mourabitoun.

Notes

1 The best study on that period is Luis Martinez, The Algerian civil war 1990–98 (London: Hurst, 2000), especially Chapter Four.


