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Did the Job Ladder Fail After the Great Recession?*

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Abstract

We study employment reallocation across employers through the lens of a dynamic job-ladder model. Workers always agree on a ranking of employers at all points in time, and search for better jobs both off and on the job. Because higher-ranked employers attract and retain more workers, an employer’s size is a relevant proxy for its rank. We exploit newly available U.S. data from JOLTS on employment flows by size of the establishment. A parsimonious job ladder model fits the facts quite well, and implies ‘true’ vacancy postings by size that are more in line with gross flows and intuition than JOLTS’ actual measures of job openings, previously criticized by other authors. Focusing on the U.S. experience in and around the Great Recession, our evidence indicates that the job ladder stopped working in the GR and has not yet fully resumed.

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1 Introduction

The persistence of high unemployment in the US and in many other countries after the 2007-2009 Great Recession (henceforth GR) is currently the central issue for macroeconomic policy around the world. In previous work (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2009, 2012, 2013, resp. MPV09, MPV12 and MPV13) we document empirically and formulate a hypothesis to explain the pattern of employment decline and recovery during and after a typical recession. In a nutshell, in a tight labor market high-paying, large employers overcome the scarcity of unemployed job applicants by poaching employees from smaller, less productive and lower-paying competitors, whose employment share then shrinks in relative terms. When the expansion ends, large employers, that were less constrained, have more employment to shed than small ones. In addition, the resulting high unemployment relaxes hiring constraints on all employers, particularly the small ones that are less capable of poaching from other firms. As a result, small employers downsize less in the recession and grow faster (still in relative terms) in the early recovery. According to this hypothesis, in a prolonged phase of high unemployment, as we witnessed since 2009, small firms should be leading the charge in job creation, followed years later by upgrading to larger, better-paying employers.

We call this hypothesis a “dynamic job ladder”. The idea of a stationary job ladder, a uniform ranking of jobs by all workers, who climb it slowly via job-to-job quits while occasionally falling off it, is well established in the literature. Our previous work introduced a business cycle dimension to this hypothesis on worker turnover. In this paper, we confront this hypothesis with more demanding empirical tests. We still adopt employer size as an empirical measure of the job ladder ‘rung’, based on the simple fact that employers higher up in a ladder tend to be larger, as they attract and retain more employment, and also based on the observed wage/size relationship. We go beyond the net worker flows by size that we studied in our previous work, and here consider also the model’s implications for gross worker flows (hires, quits, layoffs) and vacancy postings by employer size. These times series have been recently made available by the BLS’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) program. Specifically, we calibrate the key turnover equations implied by a generic dynamic job ladder model to fit the monthly time series of net and gross employment flows by employer size. We extend our investigation to examine the GR and its aftermath, in comparison with previous cyclical episodes.

We reach the following conclusions. First, the dynamic job ladder model, a parsimonious setup built on some very strong assumptions, such as homogeneous labor and time-invariant rank of each employer in the ladder, does a remarkable job at fitting the dynamics of employment across size classes. The estimated hiring intensity by employer size resembles vacancies
by establishment size measured in JOLTS, but resolves some puzzling aspects of these data, specifically the lack of vacancies at the small employer end. Second, a comprehensive assessment of the evidence indicates that the job ladder has slowed down considerably since the GR. The drastic decline in labor market turnover affected especially direct movements from smaller, lower-paying to larger, higher-paying employers. Small employers suffered unusual job losses, relative to large employers and a typical recession, mostly through an increase in their layoffs, only partially compensated by resilient vacancy posting and hiring.

Further support to our hypothesis has been recently offered by Kahn and McEntarfer (2014). They exploit the matched employer-employee microdata from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics at the US Census Bureau, to isolate the firm component of wages and to track worker turnover over 1998-2011 at quarterly frequency. Like us, they are interested in testing our dynamic job ladder hypothesis. They find that high-paying firms grew faster during aggregate expansions, and shrank more quickly in the 2001 and 2008 busts. Low-paying firms were less sensitive to the aggregate unemployment rate. Furthermore, this was due entirely to reduced separations in recessions: while low-paying firms cut hiring more, their separations declined even more, relative to high-paying employers. Because separations include layoffs, quits to non-employment, and quits to other jobs, and the first two components are well-known to be countercyclical, this collapse in separations at the bottom of the wage ladder in recessions could only be caused by a collapse in quits to higher-paying firms.

We now provide details on our contributions. From an aggregate perspective, the GR impacted the labor market as would any (deep) recession: job openings went down across the board, job finding rates plummeted, and layoff rates temporarily spiked around the Fall of 2008, as the financial crisis burst. As a result, unemployment soared. As we argued and documented in our previous work, which covered past recessions, this pattern created relatively favorable conditions for small, low-paying, less productive employers. High unemployment meant that there was plenty of cheap labor for them to hire. The collapse in aggregate job market tightness reduced not only the workers’ exit rate from unemployment, as is well understood, but also the job-to-job quit rate. That is, employers at the bottom of the job ladder were losing fewer workers to their larger, more productive, higher-paying competitors.

Evidence on job openings and gross worker flows from JOLTS, the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) largely corroborates this view. Job-to-job transitions indeed went down markedly during the GR. The ‘poaching intensity’ (share of new hires that come through a job-to-job transition) declined sharply during and after the GR, especially so for larger employers. Finally, while
the share of small establishments in total job openings remained roughly stable throughout the GR (if anything, it went up a little), the vacancy yield of small employers sky-rocketed, in sharp contrast to the comparatively modest (and vanishing) increase in the vacancy yield of large establishments.

Yet — and this is where the GR differs from previous recessions — small employers fared worse than large ones in terms of net employment growth. This unusually poor job creation performance was the result of a brutal (temporary) increase in the layoff rate of small employers around the Lehman Brothers episode (September 2008), the peak of the financial crisis. While at that point layoff rates rose sharply at employers of all sizes, small establishments stand out, possibly because they were hit especially hard by the credit crunch. Those small employers that were still hiring did so relatively easily, and benefited from relatively favorable conditions on the hiring and retention margins.

These findings suggest the following interpretation of the GR and its aftermath. Small employers, especially existing ones, faced an unusual credit crunch that led to a wave of layoffs, while the class of small employers as a whole, including entrants, kept hiring at a healthy pace. The collapse in hiring by large employers froze job-to-job upgrading and attrition up the job ladder, further taming the incentives of small employers to hire, despite the abundant unemployment pool.

In Section 2 we present descriptive evidence on labor market flows across employers of different sizes before, during and after the GR. In Section 3 we present the turnover equations describing the business cycle dynamics of gross and net workers flows in a dynamic job ladder model. We also briefly discuss structural equilibrium foundations for this process, and relate it to the descriptive evidence. In Section 4 we describe our methodology to calibrate turnover parameters and hiring intensity by firm size in the dynamic job ladder model, so that it replicates the observed net and gross flows of employment by firm size. In Section 5 we discuss our empirical results.

2 The dynamic job ladder: Descriptive evidence

We examine the cyclical reallocation of employment among firms and establishments, especially around the Great Recession, through the lens of the job ladder, namely, the turnover process that occurs when all workers agree on a ranking of employers and face frictions in finding and retaining jobs. We begin with descriptive empirical evidence. In order to make the notion of a job ladder empirically operational, we need a measure of a ladder’s “rung”. As workers move up the ladder, employers high in the ladder tend to accumulate more employment, thus to be larger. We focus on an employer’s size as the main empirical
counterpart of its position in the job ladder, because size is accurately and easily measurable in the data, unlike other natural candidates such as productivity\(^1\) or compensation policy. We present new evidence on the cyclicality of four relevant types of aggregate labor market statistics, all broken down by employer size: employment shares; net job creation; gross job flows (hires, quits, layoffs); and vacancy postings.

Before we proceed, as an important caveat, we emphasize that in our analysis we focus on continuing employers and abstract from entry and exit. The reason for this choice is threefold. First, and foremost, given our focus on cyclical employment variation, entry and exit play a relatively minor role. While they are extremely important to determine \emph{average} job and worker flows,\(^2\) their contribution to \emph{cyclical} movements in aggregate employment is modest. In the Business Employment Dynamics\(^3\), the standard deviation of the net job creation rate, HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1600, is .48; if we focus on continuing establishments, it drops, but to only .435. So the net contribution of entry and exit to total net job creation is procyclical, but small.\(^4\) Second, the prime novel dataset that we employ in this paper, JOLTS by establishment size, is a survey of pre-existing establishments, where exit is by and large offset by a monthly sample rotation/refreshment scheme, while entry does not contribute to the observations. Third, the equations describing workers’ movement on a dynamic job ladder that we use for our calibration exercise are much simpler when ignoring entry and exit, although both of them could be accommodated in a limited sense.

To begin, we motivate our hypothesis that size is one relevant (albeit, by no means, the only possible) empirical counterpart of a job ladder rung. In the Appendix we provide corroborating empirical evidence, drawing from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)\(^5\) for establishments, and from Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB), an annual census of all employers, for firms. First, it has long been documented that employer size correlates positively with wage rates, after controlling for observable worker characteristics

\(^1\)In the US, information on sales at the firm level, necessary to compute TFP, is not available for a representative sample of firms from all industries.

\(^2\)Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) document from an annual longitudinal census of US employers that in fact entrants create on average more jobs than the whole economy, as continuing establishments and exits on net destroy jobs.

\(^3\)A collection of quarterly gross job flows published by the BLS, currently covering 1992Q3-2013Q1 and nearly the entire US private sector.

\(^4\)This conclusion is based on the extreme view that, one quarter after entry, new establishments are similar to incumbent ones of the same size. More generally, entrants may face a different growth process than incumbents early in their life cycle; in this case, a cyclical decline in entry may have long run effects on aggregate job creation that are significantly larger than the small immediate impact that we document here.

\(^5\)QCEW is the primary source of information on businesses from the BLS. It publishes a quarterly count of employment and wages reported by establishment size, covering 98% of U.S. jobs, both private and public sector, available at the county, MSA, state and national levels by industry.
(Brown and Medoff, 1989). We confirm that larger employer pay more. Second, as predicted by the dynamic job ladder hypothesis, the share of employment at large firms or establishments is procyclical: workers climb the job ladder faster in tight labor markets, when they can make contact with employers at higher rate.

2.1 Worker flows by size

Our main focus in this paper is on business cycles and the resulting dynamic job ladder. In order to measure worker flows by employer size, we need at least a modicum of longitudinal links on firms/establishments and workers. JOLTS comprises about 16,000 establishments, a size-stratified sample from the QCEW frame, surveyed every month according to a rotating panel structure. JOLTS measures job openings, hires, layoffs, quits, and other separations at the establishment level. Recently, the BLS published this information also by size of the establishment, in one of six size classes, with lower bounds equal to 1, 10, 50, 250, 1000, and 5,000 employees. This dataset is central to our exercise.

In JOLTS, an establishment is assigned to a size class according to the maximum size it attained in the 12 months preceding its inclusion in the sample, independently of how its size changes while it is part of the sample. So, within each survey year we know that the identity, hence the size quantiles of establishments in each size class are fixed. In the analysis that follows, we will aggregate the largest two size categories available in the JOLTS sample (1,000-4,999 and over 5,000 employees) into one single category (over 1,000 employees). We do this for two main reasons. First, the largest size cutoff in the QCEW sample described above is 1,000 employees. As we get our shares of private sector establishment counts from QCEW, we will need to merge information from QCEW and JOLTS, which constrains us to use size cutoffs that are available in both data sets. Second, the 5,000+ category in JOLTS is very small (it accounts for less than 2.5% of total employment in the JOLTS sample and covers few establishments), and the data pertaining to this category are somewhat noisy. The loss of information implied by our aggregation of the largest two size classes into one is therefore arguably relatively minor.

Finally, and importantly, we should mention that JOLTS by size class covers only the private sector, while aggregate JOLTS data cover also the public sector, just like its QCEW

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6 JOLTS (re-)sampling dates are December 2000, December 2003, February 2005, March 2006, and every March until 2013. A new JOLTS sample is put in place in the month following each re-sampling.

7 Because this size classification follows an “initial employment” criterion, it is known to be subject to a mean reversion bias creating the illusion of a negative size-growth relationship in the presence of a transitory component to firm size. This issue is likely to matter more in narrower size classes, at the bottom of the size distribution, where establishment size is more volatile. We will return to this issue when discussing size misclassification.
frame. This is an important caveat for the GR, where the public sector played a disproportionate role in first buffering employment losses and then dragging on the employment recovery.

**Net flows.** The cyclicality of employment shares of different firm size classes, presented in the appendix, provides limited information on the size of businesses that were most affected by the Great Recession: as we discussed in MPV12, to avoid the so-called reclassification bias we need to study business dynamics for at least two consecutive periods among classes to which employers are assigned based on their initial size. We showed there that the annual growth rate of employment at initially large (>1,000 employees) minus small (<50 employees) firms in the US is strongly negatively correlated with unemployment in 1979-2010. Here we zoom in on the Great Recession using higher frequency, monthly data updated to cover the post-GR recovery. Figure 1 repeats the exercise using JOLTS data by establishment size (we remark again that these are establishments, not firms). The differential net job creation series on Figure 1 follows a similar pattern as for previous recessions (see MPV12), but peaks later in the GR, in fact at the very end of it, than one would have expected based on the evidence reported in MPV12 for previous recessions. It thus appears that small establishments were hit especially hard by the credit crunch.

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**Fig. 1:** Differential employment growth between establishment size classes.
**Gross flows.** To examine in more detail the nature of these patterns, we turn to gross worker flows. This is a unique advantage of JOLTS and, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document the behavior of these flows by employer size around the GR. By definition, net employment growth in JOLTS equals hires minus the sum of layoffs, quits and other separations (such as retirement). The latter category is small and fairly acyclical, thus we focus on hires, layoffs and quits. Figure 2 plots hire rates (new accessions divided by employment) by establishment size.

Hire rates begin to decline before the GR. Surprisingly, during the deepest phase of the financial crisis following the Lehmann Brothers episode, hire rates collapse at the larger establishments and not at the smaller ones; they even briefly spike up in the smaller class in late 2008-early 2009. Given that in Figure 1 smaller establishments fared worse in terms of net employment growth, especially from the last quarter of 2008 on, it must be the case that their separations rose disproportionately, and more than compensated their brisker hiring pace. We in fact see in Figure 3 that layoff rates rose sharply and temporarily, *especially* at small establishments. Although not immediately evident from the figure, the increase in layoff rates was almost exactly proportional across all size classes. Because smaller establishments report higher layoff rates on average, the absolute increase in layoff rates during the GR was more pronounced at the bottom of the size ladder.

The third gross worker flow available in JOLTS, the quit rate, is shown on Figure 4. This adds quits to non-employment and quits to other employers. While quit rates fell markedly across the board both in 2001 and around 2008, the figure clearly suggests that the fall during the GR was *less sharp* for small establishments than for large ones. This corroborates the hypothesis that the worse performance of small establishments during the GR was entirely driven by a spike in layoff rates, as opposed to higher quits or reduced hiring, which actually worked in the opposite direction.

JOLTS, as a survey of employers, provides a meaningful distinction between layoffs and quits, but not between quits to (or hires from) non-employment, as opposed to (from) other jobs, a distinction that is crucial to the job ladder. We supplement JOLTS with information on gross worker flows from the monthly CPS. Specifically, we use the hazard rates of transition between Employment (E), Unemployment (U) and Non participation (N) estimated by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) from gross flows (using monthly matched files), starting in January 1994 and updated by the authors through May 2014. This series begins with the 1994 re-design of the CPS, which introduced a question on the change of employer that made it possible to measure the EE hazard, and which greatly improved the reliability of employment status and thus reduced margin error. Figure 5 plots the EE hazard. While it is clearly procyclical and dropped significantly during the GR, the most striking aspect is the
Fig. 2: Hire rates by establishment size class.

Average hire rate by size class, MA−smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.

Fig. 3: Layoff rates by establishment size class.

Average layoff rate by size class, MA−smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 4: Quit rates by establishment size class.

Average quit rate by size class, MA-smoothed.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.

Fig. 5: Total employment-to-employment hazard.

Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: CPS compiled by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 6: Share of hires from other employers, by employer size

declining trend. Off that trend, the decline during the GR was not especially pronounced, and the recovery afterwards was significant. But in absolute terms, i.e. without detrending, the EE hazard remains at an all-time low almost five years into the post-GR recovery. It is known that EE transitions include involuntary reallocation and other events that reduce worker’s earnings (our model explicitly accommodates this possibility through reallocation shocks — see Section 3). Therefore, per se they provide only limited information on the extent to which workers climb the job ladder. It is, however, striking that this rate is the most lagging labor market indicator post GR.

The CPS has no information on the size of a worker’s employer. For this, we turn to SIPP, starting with the 1996 panel. We exploit the availability of start and end date of each job to construct EE transition rates by size of the hiring “workplace”, the phrasing in the SIPP questionnaire that we interpret to be an establishment. In Figure 6 we show the share of all hires that are not from unemployment but directly from other employers, thus entail an EE transition, by size of the hiring establishment. As predicted by the job ladder model, larger employers always hire more from other employers, and less from non-employment, especially so late in expansions when the market tightens and competition for workers stiffens. In the GR, this “poaching” inflow share collapsed for all size groups. Since total hires also declined sharply, this is the strongest evidence that the job ladder came to a grinding halt.
Fig. 7: Vacancies by establishment size class.

Vacancies by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS, and authors’ calculations.

Fig. 8: Vacancy shares by establishment size class.

Vacancy shares by size class.
Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions.
Source: JOLTS, and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 9: Vacancy weights by establishment size class.

Average vacancy weights by size class. Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions. All series normalized at 1 in 01/2001. Source: JOLTS, CEW, and authors’ calculations.

Fig. 10: Vacancy yields by establishment size class.

Average vacancy yield by size class, MA-smoothed. Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions. Source: JOLTS and authors’ calculations.
To take stock, we showed that net job creation by small establishments was especially poor during the GR, relative to larger establishments and to a typical US recession, and that this is due entirely to spike in their layoffs, while hires, total quits and quits to other employers declined much less at the bottom of the size distribution.

2.2 Vacancies by size

We now return to JOLTS to describe the behavior of measured job vacancies by size class. Vacancies are uniquely valuable as a direct measure labor demand, or intensity of hiring effort, as opposed to outcomes. Figure 7 reports the time series of total job openings for each JOLTS size class. Figure 8 further shows vacancy shares by size class, i.e. vacancies in each size class divided by total aggregate vacancies. If recorded job openings are an accurate measure of hiring effort, then the series plotted on Figure 8 will represent the sampling probabilities of each size class. Next, Figure 9 shows vacancy shares divided by the number of establishment in each class from QCEW, and normalized at one in January 2001 to harmonize scales. We refer to those series as the vacancy weights by size class. These weights measure average hiring effort in each establishment size class, relative to aggregate hiring effort.

Figure 7 clearly shows that vacancies plummeted across the board during the GR, with vacancy levels seemingly tracking each other across the various size classes. At first glance, Figures 8 and 9 reinforce that impression, as the movements in vacancy shares and weights appear small relative to the absolute decline seen in Figure 7 which, to a first approximation, was uniform. On closer inspection, Figures 8 and 9 further suggest that there is no evidence of a disproportionate impact of the financial crisis (post-September 2008) on the hiring effort of small establishments: the movements are relatively modest, and the 10-49 employee class shows the largest change, but upwards. Overall, we conclude that hiring effort fell proportionally at establishments of all sizes.

Finally, Figure 10 plots the vacancy yield, namely the ratio between hires and vacancies reported a month before, by establishment size. Vacancy yields are countercyclical; specifically, during and after the GR the aggregate yield rose enormously with unemployment duration, and it became as easy for firms to fill vacancies as it was difficult for the unemployed to find work. Importantly, Figure 10 shows that this phenomenon was more pronounced the smaller the establishment. During the acute phase of the GR, from the Fall

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8There are good reasons to believe that they are not, as we discuss below in Section 4.

9Note that the yield is greater than 1 for many dates and size classes (Figure 10), suggesting that the JOLTS measure of job openings misses something about true establishment hiring effort. This ties in with the results of Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010), who report that around 40% of hires occur at establishments that do not report any job openings to JOLTS. We return to this issue below in Section 5.
of 2008 onwards, the vacancy yield literally took off at establishments employing 1-9 workers. At the largest establishments, however, the yield stopped rising. This surprising set of facts is consistent with the collapse in hires from employment, on which larger establishments rely more, but can also be explained by tightening hiring standards by those large employers.

3 The dynamic job ladder: Model

3.1 Flow equations

In order to interpret the evidence laid out in Section 2, we now propose a turnover accounting framework. This is a reduced-form model of employment dynamics, which is a shared equilibrium prediction of several models of the labor market with on-the-job search. Time \( t = 0, 1, 2 \ldots \) is discrete. The labor market is populated by a unit measure of workers, who can be either employed or unemployed, and who face a unit measure of firms. Workers agree on a ranking of employers, which gives rise to a job ladder. Let \( x \in [0, 1] \) be the rank of a firm in the job ladder: workers always prefer firms with higher \( x \). The labor market is affected by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only sample job offers sequentially with some probability \( \lambda_t \in (0, 1) \) at time \( t \). Employed workers draw each period with probability \( s \in (0, 1] \) an i.i.d. opportunity to search on the job, thus face a per-period sampling chance of job offers of \( s\lambda_t \). Workers can only send one job application per period and can never receive more than one offer in any period. Conditional on a contact, workers draw offers from a sampling distribution with c.d.f. \( F_t(\cdot) \), so \( F_t(x) \) is the chance that the worker meets an employer of rank below \( x \). An employed worker is exogenously separated from his employer and either, with probability \( \delta_t(x) \), enters unemployment, or, with probability \( \rho_t \), is immediately reallocated to another job, drawn randomly from the available ones, without going through unemployment. The displacement shock \( \delta_t(x) \) encompasses both layoffs and quits to non-employment that result in a measurable unemployment spell. The reallocation shock \( \rho_t \) captures such events as moves due to spousal relocation, or displacements followed by immediate re-hiring by another employer. The objects that govern worker turnover, \( F_t(\cdot), \delta_t(\cdot), \lambda_t, \rho_t \) are time-dependent realizations of stochastic processes. We are particularly interested in their business cycle fluctuations.

Let \( N_t : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \) denote the c.d.f. of employment across firm types. So \( N_0(x) \) is the date-0 measure of employment at firms of rank weakly below \( x \), a given initial condition, \( N_t(x) \) is the same measure at time \( t \), \( N_t(1) \) is total employment, and \( u_t = 1 - N_t(1) \) is the unemployment stock (or rate). Let

\[
\tilde{\delta}_t(x) = \frac{1}{N_{t-1}(x)} \cdot \int_0^x \delta_t(q) dN_{t-1}(q)
\]
denote the average transition rate into unemployment by workers currently at employers of rank up to \( x \). Applying a Law of Large Numbers to each firm rank, and the definition of rank in a job ladder, we obtain equations for net and gross workers flows. We present the equations in terms of cumulated employment \( N_t \). Taking derivatives with respect to rank \( x \) would provide the equivalent equations at each rank \( x \) (for each employer) in the job ladder.

We start with gross flows, the inflow into (outflow from) Unemployment from (resp., into) employers of rank up to \( x \):\(^{10}\)

\[
\text{E to U flow: } \quad EU_{t+1} (x) = \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (x) N_t (x) 
\]

\[
\text{U to E flow: } \quad UE_{t+1} (x) = \lambda_{t+1} F_{t+1} (x) [1 - N_t (1)] 
\]

In the first line, the chance of exogenous separation \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (x) \) into Unemployment multiplies the measure of employed workers. In the second line, the chance of job contact times the chance that the contact is with a firm of rank no more than \( x \) multiplies the measure of unemployed job searchers.

The third gross flow comprises workers who leave employers of rank at most \( x \) to join another employer of any rank. In turn, this flow includes forced reallocations with chance \( \rho_{t+1} \) and voluntary quits:

\[
\text{E to E flow (Quits): } \quad QE_{t+1} (x) = \rho_{t+1} N_t (x) + s \lambda_{t+1} \int_0^x F_{t+1} (x') \, dN_t (x') 
\]

To understand the integral term, note that a worker employed at rank \( x' < x \) receives each period with chance \( s \lambda_{t+1} \) an outside offer, which is above rank \( x' \) (so the worker accepts) with chance \( F_{t+1} (x') = 1 - F_{t+1} (x') \). A measure \( dN_t (x') \) of workers were initially employed at rank \( x' < x \). This is a gross outflow; some of these workers join other employers whose rank is still below \( x \), in some cases even below their current job’s rank, if the reallocation is forced.

The last gross flow we could consider is the inflow from other employers into firms of rank at most \( x \). By an accounting identity, given the three gross flows above, this fourth one gives rise to net job creation by such firms. Since the net flow is easier to measure empirically, we focus on the latter, so the fourth gross flow is redundant. The net change in employment at firms of rank up to \( x \) evolves as follows:

\[
N_{t+1} (x) - N_t (x) = - \left[ \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (x) + \rho_{t+1} + s \lambda_{t+1} F_{t+1} (x) \right] N_t (x) 
\]

\[
+ \left\{ \rho_{t+1} N_t (1) + \lambda_{t+1} [1 - N_t (1)] \right\} F_{t+1} (x). \quad (4)
\]

\(^{10}\)In the notation just laid out, we use the letter U to imply non-employment. The model is silent on any possible distinction between unemployment and non-employment. We will return to this issue momentarily.
The first line includes outflow from firms of rank below \( x \) due to either exogenous turnover, to unemployment \( \delta_{t+1}(x) \) and other employers \( \rho_{t+1} \), or to outside offers received from firms of rank above \( x \). The second line includes the inflow into firms of rank below \( x \), which are sampled with probability \( F_{t+1}(x) \) either by workers who are forced-reallocated or by the unemployed. Notice that the voluntary inflow from other employer is omitted from the second line, because it can only occur from below \( x \), so it can at best reshuffle the mass of employment below \( x \), but not increase it.

To make Equations (1)-(4) empirically operational, we need a measure of job ladder rank. We do not observe the workers’ preferences that define the job ladder, so we rely on their revealed preferences. Because workers climb the job ladder, from lower to higher ranked employers, while the contact rates \( s \lambda_t \) and the forced reallocation rate \( \rho_t \) are rank-independent, this turnover process makes higher-ranked firms also larger in terms of employment measure. Thus, when given the opportunity, employed workers tend to move from smaller to larger employers. Exogenous forced reallocations to unemployment and to other employers interfere with this upgrading process, and maintain a non-degenerate ergodic size distribution of employers. In order to guarantee that higher rank means larger size in the model, thus to use firm size as an empirical proxy for rank, we further assume that the inflow rate into unemployment \( \delta_t(x) \) is non-increasing in rank \( x \). This assumption encompasses as special cases exogenous separations at flat, rank-independent probability \( \delta_t \), as well as endogenous separations due to match-specific shocks, because workers must be more reluctant to endogenously give up higher-ranked jobs if they are more willing to accept them to begin with. We can then proceed to estimate turnover rates from Equations (1)-(4) using data on employment stocks, net and gross worker flows, broken down by employer size. Before doing so, we briefly discuss structural foundations of the dynamic job ladder, namely of the accounting Equations (1)-(4), and how they relate to the descriptive evidence illustrated earlier.

3.2 Structural foundations

Equations (1)-(4) describe the accounting of worker flows in a job ladder, namely, in an environment where all workers agree on the ranking of employers. This type of turnover process occurs in different frictional models of the labor markets. The prime, but by no means the only example is a wage-posting model. The canonical framework for the analysis of frictional wage dispersion with on-the-job search is Burdett and Mortensen (1998, henceforth BM). This setup has strong implications also for worker turnover and for the distribution of firm size, where a firm is identified by a wage policy constrained to pay all workers the same. In particular, the unique steady state equilibrium of the BM model features a job ladder by employer size. In MPV09 and MPV13 we introduce aggregate uncertainty
in BM, and accordingly identify a firm as a wage policy, which may now vary with the state of the aggregate economy, the size of the firm, and the distribution of wage offers by competitors.\textsuperscript{11} In the ergodic steady state of the stochastic economy, the unique equilibrium is always Rank-Preserving. That is, a firm that is larger, and possibly permanently more productive, will always commit to a stream of payments of higher value to workers, who then move on a dynamic job ladder, from smaller, lower-paying to larger, high-paying firms, at all points of the business cycle. Because larger firms pay more and are ranked higher by workers, equilibrium preserves a stable ranking by size, although not necessarily a stable size distribution. In this model, firm-level productivity is a natural, although by no means the only, primitive that determines the rank on the ladder.

Coles and Mortensen (2013) introduce idiosyncratic shocks to firm productivity in a model that is very close to MPV13’s wage-posting framework, and show the existence of a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium. In other business cycle models of frictional labor markets with on the job search, workers agree in equilibrium on the ranking of jobs (matches) at each points in time. The allocation of jobs into employers is somewhat indeterminate, but can be chosen to generate a dynamic job ladder and size distribution. Robin (2011) introduces aggregate uncertainty in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)’s sequential auction model of the labor market, where firms commit to wage offers but can respond to outside offers to their employees. All of these models feature random matching. Menzio and Shi (2011) obtain similar implications in a directed search framework.

\subsection*{3.3 Revisiting the descriptive evidence}

These structural models naturally dovetail with the stylized facts illustrated in the previous section. Wages are increasing in employer size, with causality running primarily from the former to the latter (paying workers more attracts and retains more of them), but also in the other direction. For example, in MPV13 a larger firm is willing to pay more its new hires to retain its larger labor force, under the equal-treatment constraint. A procyclical job contact rate $\lambda_t$ and weakly countercyclical separation rate into unemployment $\delta_t(\cdot)$ then imply that workers climb the job ladder faster, and fall off the ladder less often, in expansions, and vice versa in recessions. Hence, both the extra net job creation and the employment share of larger employers, those that are located higher on the ladder, are procyclical. Employer to employer transitions are directed up the size ladder. Job ladder models are mostly silent on separations into unemployment, which are assumed exogenous. The cyclicity of vacancy postings and hires by size are more difficult to discern qualitatively, and require estimating the model, which is the objective of the next section.

\textsuperscript{11}This structural model does not, but can easily extended to, include reallocation shocks with chance $\rho_t$.\[17]
An important role in our analysis is played by reallocation shocks, which move workers directly from employer to employer without any measurable unemployment spell. These shocks are meant to capture in the data the sizable flows of workers who move in opposite directions among employers of different sizes, a phenomenon that is inconsistent with the idea of a job ladder in its most extreme form. One restriction imposed by Equation (4) is that of a rank-independent chance \( \rho_t \) of reallocation shocks. Since employed workers voluntarily quit to accept an outside offer with probability that decreases in the rank of their current employer, they all move from job to job in the same direction (up, towards larger employers) on average, although not with probability one. This is a key prediction that we will test. Another restriction is the rank-independent relative efficiency of employed and unemployed job search, \( s \). This can be interpreted as a time endowment available to all employed workers, no matter where currently employed, to search and interview for other jobs. An alternative interpretation, which would not be consistent with our assumptions, is that workers control their job search effort, in which case we should expect \( s \) to decline in rank \( x \), as lower-ranked jobs, starting with unemployment at the bottom of the ladder, are less desirable and motivate more search effort. By assuming a constant \( s \) we attribute all time variation in job contact rates from employment to that in job market tightness, and all cross-sectional variation in turnover rates among workers to their different positions on the job ladder: all workers receive offers at the same rate, but differ in their willingness to accept them.

In the next section, we investigate whether the job ladder hypothesis can be rejected, or conversely there exists a calibration of model objects such that the resulting job ladder is consistent with gross worker flows by employer size each month over a long time period.

4 The dynamic job ladder: Calibration

We calibrate the job ladder model using a minimum distance method. Our target empirical moments are gross and net employment flows by size class of the employer observed in JOLTS. Given our strong assumptions implying that employer size is a relevant rung of the job ladder, it is far from obvious that the job ladder dynamic Equations (1)-(4) can replicate actual observations on gross and net flows, every month for 12 years, for several size classes. Among many restrictions, our theory predicts that smaller employers should lose a larger proportion of workers to job-to-job quits. Testing all joint restrictions of the job ladder equation is our main goal here. In addition to the parameter \( s \) (the search intensity of employed relative to unemployed workers), Equations (1)-(4) involve six time series — \( \delta_t (\cdot) \), \( \lambda_t \), \( \rho_t \), \( F_t (\cdot) \), \( N_t (\cdot) \), and the size of the labor force, that in the model we normalized to one,
but is time-varying in the data, or, equivalently, the size of employment and unemployment, given the unemployment rate \(1 - N_t(1)\). We now explain how we map monthly empirical observations into our time series of interest. While some of them can be estimated directly, we need the model to back up \(\rho_t\), \(F_t(\cdot)\) and \(s\).

### 4.1 Size ranks

Assuming for the time being that employer size is correctly measured, and that size does reflect rank in the job ladder (i.e., workers always prefer larger employers, when they can choose), establishments in a given JOLTS size class \(k = 1, 2, \ldots, K\) will be representative of all establishments with ranks between two unobserved cutoff values, \(x \in [X_{k-1}, X_k]\), with \(\{X_k\}_{k=1}^K\) an increasing sequence in \([0, 1]\), which remain fixed so long as the identities of establishments assigned to size class \(k\) do not change. In JOLTS, each month except at re-sampling dates, \(1/12\) of the surveyed establishments are replaced with ex ante identical establishments, which had the same size and industry at the time of sampling; under the assumption, underlying this gradual rotation scheme, that these are statistically equivalent establishments, we can effectively treat the identities and size class membership of the JOLTS establishments as constant between re-sampling times.

The JOLTS sample thus provides observations at (almost) all dates of cumulated employment \(N_t(X_k)\), layoffs, and total quits (and, potentially, sampling probabilities \(F_t(X_k)\) — see below), for \(K\) job ladder rank quantiles \(\{X_k\}_{k=1}^K\) corresponding to \(K\) size classes.\(^{12}\) In what follows, we should keep in mind that \(X_k\) is the cutoff quantile between size classes \(k\) and \(k + 1\). With \(K\) size classes, this implies that \(X_K \equiv 1\). We will also use the convention \(X_0 = 0\). We now confront Equations (4)-(3) with the JOLTS sample.

### 4.2 Separations into non-employment

A survey of employers like JOLTS reveals whether a separation is a quit or a layoff from the viewpoint of the surveyed establishment. As workers are neither interviewed nor tracked after a separation, measured quits are the sum of quits to unemployment and quits to other jobs, a distinction that is central to the logic of the job-ladder model, where the former are part of total separations into unemployment \(\bar{\delta}_{t+1}(x)N_t(x)\), and the latter are upgrades. To estimate \(\bar{\delta}_{t+1}(x)\), we thus need some way to break down quits into those to unemployment and those to other employers. To do so, we need worker-side information.

\(^{12}\)As discussed earlier, the raw JOLTS sample has six establishment size classes: 1 to 9, 10 to 49, 50 to 249, 250 to 999, 1,000 to 4,999, and over 5,000 employees. For reasons discussed earlier, we lump the largest two classes into one.
Focusing first on the aggregate separation rate (up to rank \( x = 1 \)), we seek to construct \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) \) based on Equation (1) as the ratio between the total monthly flow from employment to non-employment and the total stock of employment. The flow consists of layoffs plus quits into non-employment. We supplement the JOLTS data with the transition rates estimated from CPS by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), updated by the authors through 2014. For every month \( t \) we compute the share \( \sigma_t^{CPS} \) of total transitions that are employer-to-employer (EE), as opposed to transitions into non-employment (say, EU):

\[
\sigma_t^{CPS} = \frac{EE_t^{CPS}}{EE_t^{CPS} + EU_t^{CPS}}.
\]

All EE transitions are quits in the job ladder model; some are voluntary upgrades, others are forced reallocations. Assuming that the CPS-based share \( \sigma_t^{CPS} \) applies to the workers employed by the JOLTS sample of establishments, we multiply total separations in JOLTS by \( 1 - \sigma_t^{CPS} \) to obtain an estimate of aggregate separations into non-employment, \( EU_t (1) \), that is consistent with the JOLTS data. The corresponding aggregate separation rate is then \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) = EU_t (1) / N_t (1) \).

This procedure further gives us the share of all EU separations that are quits. As mentioned earlier, JOLTS has a measure of total layoffs and discharges, which we can subtract from our newly constructed time series \( EU_t (1) \) to obtain total quits into non-employment in JOLTS. Subtracting from total quits, we obtain a JOLTS-based measure of quits to other employers. We now introduce the ancillary — yet economically meaningful — parameters \( \bar{\psi}_t (x) \), defined as the share of total EU separations from employers of rank \( x \) that are quits to non-employment, and

\[
\bar{\psi}_t (x) = \frac{1}{\delta_t (x) \cdot N_{t-1} (x)} \cdot \int_0^x \delta_t (x') \cdot \psi_t (x') \cdot dN_{t-1} (x'),
\]

the same share from employers of rank up to \( x \). In this notation, \( \bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \) is the share of quits in aggregate separations into non-employment, \( EU_t (1) \), that we obtain from our procedure. The aggregate layoff probability is then \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) \cdot (1 - \bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1)) \), and the probability of quitting into non-employment is \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) \cdot \bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \). Both of those, plus the total aggregate transition rate into non-employment \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) \), are plotted in Figure 11. While most of this figure has the familiar feature of a largely a-cyclical probability of transition into non-employment, the

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13 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to exploit information from both the employer and the employee sides to draw empirically the distinction between the three main types of separations: layoffs, quits to non-employment, and quits to other employers. Worker surveys such as CPS and SIPP are notoriously plagued by noise in the layoff/quit distinction when the worker loses a job. Administrative datasets do not typically contain information about the reason for separation.

14 All the raw JOLTS series are smoothed using a 6-month moving average around each point prior to calibration, to remove the fairly large amount of high-frequency noise in those series.
GR stands out as a striking exception, with a sudden (and short-lived) surge in layoffs in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

The Fallick and Fleischman (2004) series are only available at the aggregate level. Therefore, making our quit/layoff distinction operational at lower levels of size aggregation ($x < 1$, which we shall need later in the calibration) requires additional assumptions. The identifying assumption that we opt for here is that the probability with which workers quit into non-employment, $\psi_{t+1}(x) \delta_{t+1}(x)$, is independent of their employer’s rank $x$. That is to say, for all $x$, $\psi_{t+1}(x) \delta_{t+1}(x) \equiv \bar{\psi}_{t+1}(1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(1)$. Since the total separation rate into non-employment $\delta_{t+1}(x)$ is non-increasing in (size) rank $x$, this assumption implies that both total separation rates and layoff rates are decreasing in $x$. Both implications hold in the JOLTS data. This additional identifying assumption enables us to construct total separations into non-employment from employers with rank up to $X_k$, namely $\bar{\delta}_{t+1}(X_k) N_t(X_k)$, for all cutoff quantiles $X_k$ corresponding to the JOLTS size classes, as the sum of total layoffs from employers in size classes up to $k$ (directly available from the JOLTS data), plus

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15 Any assumption we make at this point is necessarily arbitrary to some degree. An alternative is to assume that the share of EU separations that are quits is independent of rank, i.e. that $\psi_{t+1}(x) \equiv \bar{\psi}_{t+1}(1)$ for all $x$. This implies that not only the layoff rate, but also the quit rate into non-employment is decreasing in employer size, or rank thereof. Results based on this alternative assumption, available upon request, are qualitatively identical, and quantitatively very close, to the ones we present here.
total quits into non-employment from those employers, equal to \( \bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(1) N_t (X_k) \) by assumption. Given observations on the cumulated employment distribution \( N_t (X_k) \), this allows to directly estimate the desired total probability of transition into non-employment by size class, \( \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(X_k) \).

### 4.3 Job contact probability

Equation (4) applied to the top quantile \( x = 1 \) gives the law of motion of aggregate employment: 
\[
N_{t+1}(1) = \left[1 - \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(1)\right] N_t (1) + \lambda_{t+1} U_t, \text{ where } U_t = 1 - N_t (1) \text{ is non-employment.}
\]
From this equation, we can back out the job finding rate from non-employment, which is also the baseline job contact rate:
\[
\lambda_{t+1} = \frac{N_{t+1}(1) - \left[1 - \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(1)\right] N_t (1)}{U_t} = \frac{\text{UE}_t (1)}{U_t}.
\]
Construction of \( \lambda_{t+1} \) from this equation thus requires knowledge of the stock of non-employed job seekers, \( U_t \). Here again, we call on the Fallick and Fleischman (2004) CPS series, which offers a breakdown of the total non-employment to employment flow (\( \text{UE}_t (1) \) in our notation) into the flow from unemployment into employment and the flow from inactivity into employment. Taking the (average) ratio of the latter to the former gives us an estimate of the relative job finding rate of inactive workers to the unemployed, say \( s_0 \), so that the job finding probability of non-participants is \( s_0 \lambda_{t+1} \), we then construct the effective pool of non-employed job seekers as:
\[
\frac{U_t}{N_t (1)} = \frac{u_t^{\text{CPS}}}{1 - u_t^{\text{CPS}}} + s_0 \left( \frac{1 - e_t^{\text{CPS}}}{e_t^{\text{CPS}}} - \frac{u_t^{\text{CPS}}}{1 - u_t^{\text{CPS}}} \right),
\]
where \( u_t^{\text{CPS}} \) is the CPS unemployment rate and \( e_t^{\text{CPS}} \) is the CPS employment-population ratio. The value of \( s_0 \) thus calibrated is 0.2, and the resulting job finding rate series is plotted in Figure 12. While it exhibits the familiar cyclicality, including a vertiginous drop during the GR, its level is fairly low because it includes transitions to employment from inactivity, which are a small fraction of the stock of inactive individuals.

### 4.4 Sampling distribution and employer-to-employer transitions

We now turn to the last, and arguably most salient, gross flow of workers predicted by the job ladder, namely job-to-job quits \( \text{QE}_t (x) \), given in Equation (3). We show how this equation, combined with the net flow Equation (4) and with the JOLTS data, allows identification of the sampling distribution \( F_{t+1} (\cdot) \), the reallocation shock \( \rho_{t+1} \), and the relative intensity of employed search, \( s \).
One easy option to estimate the sampling distribution \( F_{t+1}(\cdot) \) would be to set it equal to the observed distribution of job openings by size class, which is readily available from JOLTS. However, the sampling distribution that is consistent with the model will only coincide with the empirical distribution of job openings if (a) job openings are measured accurately in JOLTS, and (b) job opening counts are a good measure of actual hiring effort (in particular, all vacancies have equal sampling weights). Both of these are questionable assumptions: for example, Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010) have recently forcefully argued that neither was true, especially at the low end of the establishment size distribution. Vacancies posted by different types of establishments may have different visibility, or small establishments may rely more on informal hiring channels, rather than vacancies.

Luckily, the law of motion of employment in RPE offers an alternative solution to estimate \( F_{t+1}(\cdot) \). Equation (4) defines the sampling distribution at cutoff quantiles \( X_k \) and at all dates as:

\[
F_{t+1}(X_k) = \frac{[N_{t+1}(1) - N_{t+1}(X_k)] - (1 - \rho_{t+1})[N_t(1) - N_t(X_k)] + \delta_{t+1}(1) N_t(1) - \delta_{t+1}(X_k) N_t(X_k)}{\rho_{t+1}N_t(1) + s\lambda_{t+1}N_t(X_k) + \lambda_{t+1}U_t}
\]

that we will use to estimate sampling probabilities \( F_t(\cdot) \), employed search efficiency \( s \), and
reallocation shocks $\rho_{t+1}$, using the time series for separation and accession probabilities $\bar{\delta}_{t+1}(X_k)$ and $\lambda_{t+1}$, and the stock of non-employment from CPS, $U_t$, all estimated as above, plus the stock of employment $N_t(X_k)$ in size classes up to $k$ from JOLTS. Later, we will gauge how close the estimated sampling distribution from (5) (consistent with RPE employment dynamics by construction) is to the empirical distribution of job openings across size classes.

Knowledge of the sampling distribution $F_t(\cdot)$ allows the construction of total job-to-job quits in any size class $k$ which, following Equation (3), equal

$$QE_t(X_k) - QE_t(X_{k-1}) = \rho_{t+1} [N_t(X_k) - N_t(X_{k-1})] + s\lambda_{t+1} \int_{X_{k-1}}^{X_k} F_{t+1}(x) dN_t(x), \quad (6)$$

The empirical counterpart are total quits in JOLTS size class $k$, minus quits into non-employment from employers in that size class, which were estimated in subsection 4.2 as $\bar{\psi}_{t+1}(1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1}(1) \cdot [N_t(X_k) - N_t(X_{k-1})]$. Fitting (6) to this JOLTS counterpart at each date $t$ and size class $k$ allows, in principle, to identify both the (constant across dates and classes) search intensity of employed workers $s$ and the (constant across classes) reallocation shock $\rho_t$.

This last statement must be qualified as follows. First, in order to limit the computational cost of this calibration, and to attain more precise identification, we further restrict the reallocation probability $\rho_t$ to equal a constant ($\rho$) times the baseline job finding rate $\lambda_t$. While not strictly necessary, this restriction considerably reduces the number of parameters to estimate, from one value of $\rho_t$ for each month in the sample (140 in total) down to a single scalar, $\rho$. This restriction follows, for example, if $\rho$ is the probability that the worker’s spouse is seeking a better job that would require the entire household to move, a job search that is successful with probability $\lambda_t$. Second, Equation (6) is not exactly implementable, as the transformed net flow Equation (5) only gives the sampling distribution at the cutoff quantiles $X_k$, whereas in principle we would need it over its entire support to calculate the integral in (6). We approximate the integral using a simple trapezoidal rule on the grid of points at which $F_t(\cdot)$ is known.

### 4.5 Misclassification

**The issue.** So far we assumed that an establishment’s size, as measured in JOLTS, is the “relevant” measure of size, in the sense that it reflects the relevant rank of that establishment. There are at least two reasons to doubt that this is always the case. The first one is random fluctuations in establishment size. While the job ladder model uses a large number approximation and treats establishment size as evolving deterministically over time, in reality establishment size will fluctuate randomly around the mean value predicted by the job
ladder. If, at the time of JOLTS re-sampling, an establishment has an exceptionally high (say) realization of the random component of its size, that establishment may be assigned to the “wrong” size class, i.e. to a size class that reflects its transitory larger size rather than its long-run smaller size. This will be especially true of smaller establishments, both because the large-number approximation is less accurate for small establishment, and also because the small size classes (1-9 and 10-49 employees) are narrower than the larger ones.\textsuperscript{16}

The second reason to suspect that establishment size does not perfectly reflect the relevant rank in the ladder is that many establishments are part of multi-establishment firms. Depending on the degree of decentralization and devolution in the parent firm’s management, the relevant rank for those establishments may be at the level of the parent firm, in which case the size measure that will best reflect rank is not the size of the establishment, but that of the parent firm, which we do not observe in JOLTS. Indeed, in MPV12 we document from the Census’ Business Dynamics Statistics that the average size of an establishment first grows with the size of the parent company, but levels at about 60 employees when the size of the firm reaches 250, and is still about 60 workers per establishment at firms employing over 10,000 workers in total. So very large firms own hundreds or even thousands of separate, relatively small establishments (national banks and retailers come to mind), whose workers benefit from the productivity and compensation policy of the parent company.\textsuperscript{17}

For both reasons, observed size classes in JOLTS and true rungs on the job ladder may not coincide. We propose to tackle those two issues and to reconcile size and rank classes by modeling misclassification explicitly. To avoid confusion, we now introduce a distinction between size class $k$, defined based on the JOLTS sample as the set of establishments whose observed size falls between two given cutoff values (e.g. 50 to 249 employees), and rank class $k$, defined as the set of establishments whose unobserved rank on the job ladder falls within the quantile interval $[X_{k-1}, X_k]$.

**Modeling misclassification.** Consider an establishment with job ladder rank $x$, whose “true” (or model-predicted) size at date $t$ is $\ell_t(x) = dN_t(x)/dx$. We assume that this establishment’s observed size is the true size $\ell_t(x')$ of an establishment with rank $x'$ drawn

\textsuperscript{16}Mean-reverting innovations in establishment size are easily detected by the size/growth relationship. While growth in an establishment’s employment is strongly decreasing in its beginning-of-period size, it is nearly uncorrelated with the average size of the same establishment over the same period. Hence, Gibrat’s law holds approximately, and the negative size/growth relationship originates from a classic regression to the mean fallacy.

\textsuperscript{17}In his discussion of our paper, using administrative data from Denmark, Rasmus Lentz mentioned that the variation of wages across the establishments of a typical firm, although not zero, is substantially lower than in the population of establishments as a whole. The variation of establishment size, on the other hand, is almost as large within a firm as in the wider population of establishments. We thank Rasmus Lentz for pointing out this evidence, which speaks to the misclassification issue.
at random from some conditional distribution $M(x'|x)$ which, to attain identification, we assume to be time-invariant. To lighten notation, we now drop the time index, but we should keep in mind that employment measures, observed or reclassified, are time-varying, while the reclassification distribution $M$ is assumed constant over time.

**Size classes with misclassification.** Next consider size classes. We can define size class $k$ as the set of all establishments whose observed size $\ell^o$ falls within some interval $[\ell(X_{k-1}), \ell(X_k)]$. Observed employment in size class $k$ is therefore:

$$n_{kt}^o = \int_0^1 m_k(x) \ell_t(x) \, dx,$$

where $m_k(x) = M(X_k | x) - M(X_{k-1} | x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$ is the probability of an establishment of rank $x$ being observed as belonging to size class $k$.

To gain some tractability and amenability to calibration, we further restrict misclassification weights $m_k(x)$ to be constant within rank classes, i.e. we impose $m_k(x) \equiv m_{k|k'}$ for $x \in [X_{k'-1}, X_{k'}]$. With this approximation,\(^{18}\) (7) becomes:

$$n_{kt}^o = \sum_{k'=1}^K m_{k|k'} n_{k't},$$

where $n_{kt} = N_t(X_k) - N_t(X_{k-1})$ is true employment in rank class $k$.

Collating all rank classes, our misclassification model implies:

$$\mathbf{n}_t^o := \begin{pmatrix} n_{1t}^o \\ n_{2t}^o \\ \vdots \\ n_{Kt}^o \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} m_{1|1} & m_{1|2} & \cdots & m_{1|K} \\ m_{2|1} & m_{2|2} & \cdots & m_{2|K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ m_{K|1} & m_{K|2} & \cdots & m_{K|K} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} n_{1t} \\ n_{2t} \\ \vdots \\ n_{Kt} \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{Mn}_t,$$

which in turn implies that “true” employment in rank class $k$ can be inferred from observed employment in size class $k$ as $\mathbf{n}_t = \mathbf{M}^{-1} \mathbf{n}_t^o$. Misclassification weights $m_{k|k'}$ (the entries of the matrix $\mathbf{M}$) are unknown, and added to the set of parameters to calibrate.\(^{19}\)

**Measurement equations with misclassification.** The transition rates $\lambda_t, \bar{\delta}_t$ (1) are estimated only off aggregate magnitudes and are not sensitive to size misclassification. With our assumption of a rank-independent probability of quitting into non-employment, neither is said probability ($\bar{\psi}_t$ (1) $\bar{\delta}_t$ (1)). Misclassification, however, does affect observed job-to-job

\(^{18}\) This is necessarily an approximation, as the boundaries of size classes in terms of productivity, the $X_k$’s, are likely to change at each JOLTS re-sampling date.

\(^{19}\) Note that by construction: $\sum_{k'=1}^K m_{k|k'} = 1$ for all $k'$. 

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quits from establishments in class \( k \). To see how, note that observed total quits, to non-employment and to other jobs, from employers in rank class \( k \) are:

\[
Q_{kt}^o = \int_0^1 [\bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) + \rho_{t+1} + s\lambda_{t+1} \bar{F}_{t+1} (x)] m_k (x) dN_t (x).
\]

Under the assumption of constant misclassification weights in each rank class and over time, the expression for total observed quits from class \( k \) becomes:

\[
Q_{kt}^o = (\bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) + \rho_{t+1}) n_{kt}^o + s\lambda_{t+1} \sum_{k'=1}^K m_{k|k'} \int_{X_{k'-1}}^{X_{k'}} \bar{F}_{t+1} (x) dN_t (x).
\]

This implies:

\[
s\lambda_{t+1} \left( \int_{X_0=0}^{X_1} \bar{F}_{t+1} (x) dN_t (x) \right) = M^{-1} Q_t^*,
\]

where \( M \) is the conversion matrix defined in (8), and the vector \( Q_t^* \) has \( K \) elements:

\[
Q_{kt}^* = Q_{kt}^o - (\bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) + \rho_{t+1}) n_{kt}^o
\]

Dividing by employment in rank class \( k \) and using \( n_t = M^{-1} n_t^o \) we thus obtain

\[
s\lambda_{t+1} \int_{X_{k-1}}^{X_k} \bar{F}_{t+1} (x) \frac{dN_t (x)}{n_{kt}} = \frac{Q_{kt}^*}{n_{kt}}. \tag{9}
\]

This equation highlights the importance of introducing misclassification in our JOLTS data. The l.h.s. of (9) is the conditional expectation of \( \bar{F}_{t+1} (x) \) within rank class \( k \); the r.h.s. is a measure of the rate of job-to-job quits from the size class that are motivated by better offers. The job-ladder model predicts unambiguously that both sides of the equation should be decreasing in size class \( k \): larger employers are ranked higher and have an easier time retaining employees. Because \( \bar{\psi}_{t+1} (1) \bar{\delta}_{t+1} (1) + \rho_{t+1} \) is constant across size classes \( k \), this requires total quits to decline in \( k \). In the JOLTS data by establishment size, which is split into six size classes, the observed quit rate, \( Q_{kt}^o/n_{kt}^o \) actually increases between size classes \( k = 1 \) and \( k = 2 \) in all months, and often during the sample period also between \( k = 2 \) and \( k = 3 \). We reconcile these observations with the job ladder by allowing some of the small establishments to be part of very large firms.

### 4.6 Implementation: Summary

For given reallocation shock arrival rate \( \rho\lambda_t \), search efficiency \( s \) and misclassification weights \( M \), using observations on employment stocks and total quits by size class, we can calculate
and the cumulated sampling probabilities at size cutoffs $F_t(X_k)$ from (5) (using $n_t = M^{-1}n^*_t$). We then look for values of $\rho_t$, $s$, and $M$ that minimize the distance between both sides of (9) over the entire sample period.\(^{20}\) This final stage of our calibration protocol thus uses $3K + 2$ parameters (the $3K$ independent entries of $M$ plus $\rho$ and $s$) to match a number of moments equal to $K$ times the number of months in our sample (the $K$ moments in (9) in each month). With $K = 4$ size classes, this adds up to 14 parameters and 580 moments.

5 Results

We find that no sensible misclassification scheme can easily remedy the basic fact that the total quit rate from the smallest establishment size class in JOLTS, “1-9 employees”, is significantly lower than that from the second-largest class, “10-49 employees”. In the data, it appears that a large group of small establishments have unexpectedly (based on the job-ladder model) low rates of attrition; therefore, their size is not an accurate reflection of their rank or desirability. The reason may be that small employers are largely of a different nature than larger one, and more likely to “break ranks” and not comply with the job ladder. For example, these small establishments may be young and growing and not have joined yet their long-run size class.\(^{21}\) At the other end, the largest class of establishments with more than 5,000 employees has a very small sample size in JOLTS and is therefore somewhat noisy.

For both reasons, to calibrate the model we aggregate size of JOLTS establishments into $K = 4$ classes: 1-49, 50-249, 250-999, and at least 1,000 employees. This partition, albeit coarser, still allows for significant heterogeneity, and can be fitted quite well by the job-ladder model. While we acknowledge the simple job ladder model’s inability to accurately describe quits at the lower end of the size distribution as an unambiguous failure of the model, we still argue that this model, given its parsimony, does a remarkable job of simultaneously fitting the level and cyclicality of both gross and net unemployment flows by four, very different size classes.

5.1 Calibration Results

Estimates of the various rates of separation into non-employment and of the job finding rate were already shown in Sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Here we report estimates of the

\(^{20}\)In so doing, we add a penalty term to the criterion that we minimize (the norm of the difference between the two sides of (9)) to avoid large values of $\rho_t$ that would imply negative corrected net quits $Q_{kt}^\star$ at some dates, for the highest productivity class $K$.

\(^{21}\)As a manifestation of a similar phenomenon in the Danish matched employer-employee dataset IDA, the wage-size relationship is monotonically increasing except at the very beginning, as very small firms pay higher wages than slightly larger ones. We thank our discussant Rasmus Lentz for pointing out this parallel.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Size range</th>
<th>Job ladder rank class $k$</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-49</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>250-999</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 plus</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\rho$ 0.0145  Sample mean of $\rho \lambda_t = 0.0021$

$s$ 0.2034  Sample mean of $s \lambda_t = 0.0300$

Table 1: Parameter estimates

remaining scalar parameters, namely the relative intensity of reallocation shocks $\rho = \rho_t/\lambda_t$ and search by employed workers $s$, and the conversion matrix $M$, i.e. the misclassification weights $m_{kj}$, $(k, k') \in \{1, \ldots, K\}^2$. All those values are gathered in Table 1.

The misclassification weights in Table 1 suggest that high-rank establishments (from rank class $K = 4$) have the largest (0.65) probability of being misclassified, and almost always mistaken for establishments from size class 1 (1-49 employees). Apart from rank class 4, the estimated conversion matrix $M$ has most of its weight on the diagonal, suggesting that misclassification is less of an issue for low to intermediate rank levels (classes $k = 1$ to 3). This finding is consistent with an interpretation of misclassification as arising primarily from the establishment/firm distinction, as some very productive — and large — firms are split into many small establishments, very often no larger than 50 employees. The calibrated matrix $M$ places some small weight on the subdiagonal, meaning that some establishments are actually seen as larger than their productivity would warrant under the job ladder assumption. We interpret this as a consequence of transitory noise or measurement error in establishment size: for example, an establishment whose long-run size is, say, 248 (and thus would normally belong to size class 2), can temporarily be seen reaching a size slightly above 250, and thus be misclassified into size class 3 (recall that JOLTS assigns establishments to size classes according to the largest size achieved over the 12 months prior to sampling).\(^{22}\)

The relative search intensity of employed workers is calibrated at $s = 0.203$, a value which is in the region of typical estimates based on worker micro data. This puts the sample mean monthly probability of receiving an outside offer to 0.03. Finally, the reallocation shock intensity is estimated to equal $\rho = 0.0145$. This value may seem small when compared, for

\(^{22}\)To adhere more strictly to the large firms/small establishments interpretation, we can also calibrate the model imposing that $M$ be upper-triangular. Imposing this constraint only affects the model fit very marginally, and produces visually identical results (available upon request).
instance, to the value of $s$, however it still implies that the share of EE transitions that are forced reallocations (as opposed to voluntary transitions), is about a half (49.7% on average). This share is calculated as the sample mean of

$$\frac{\rho \lambda_t N_t (1)}{\rho \lambda_t N_t (1) + s \lambda_t \int_0^1 F (x) dN_t (x)}.$$ 

The relatively large value of this share, given the relatively high odds of receiving an outside offer vs. a reallocation shock ($s: \rho$ is about 14:1), indicates that many offers are rejected by employed workers. This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that the sampling distribution of productive types $F_t (\cdot)$ is skewed toward the lower end of its support. We now turn to the analysis of that distribution, and the corresponding EE quit patterns.

### 5.2 Establishment sampling probabilities and quit patterns

Figure 13 plots the r.h.s. of (9), namely the estimated values of $s \lambda_{t+1} \overline{F} (X_k)$, for $k = 1, \cdots, 4$ (solid lines), together with the l.h.s. of (9), $Q_{kt}^{\star} / n_{kt}$ (dashed lines), thus offering a pictorial assessment of the job ladder’s capacity to fit the quit patterns by establishment size observed in the JOLTS sample. Figure 14 further plots the estimated sampling c.d.f. $F (X_k)$ for $k = 1, \cdots, 4$ (solid lines), together with $F^{\text{JOLTS}} (X_k)$ (dashed lines), the empirical c.d.f. of job openings, directly taken from the JOLTS data, corrected for misclassification using the probabilities and weights as explained earlier in this section. The vertical dotted lines on Figure 14 indicate JOLTS re-sampling dates.

We can see in Figure 13 that our calibration ensures that the sampling distribution constructed by fitting the RPE dynamic Equation (5) to net employment flow data from JOLTS is by and large consistent with the gross flow data on quits over the period covered by JOLTS. Although the data exhibit a slight downward trend in the EE quit rates of the highest two rank classes (3 and 4) which the model fails to fully capture, we still conclude that the model, including its correction for the misclassification of employers into size classes, offers a remarkably good description of this data, especially considering its parsimony. In particular, EE transition rates, once corrected for misclassification, are indeed neatly ordered by rank class, as predicted by the job ladder model. We stress that this outcome was not at all guaranteed ex-ante.

A further striking lesson from Figure 13 is that job-to-job exit rates from all but the highest rank class declined sharply during the GR, especially at the lower end, and remained low thereafter. Again, our simple job ladder model captures this pattern well, albeit with a slight lag for the lowest rank class, $k = 1$. This is one of our central findings: the GR was a time when job-to-job quit rates declined sharply, not only in the aggregate as was already
The 'Data' series are corrected for misclassification. Shaded areas indicate NBER contractions. Source: JOLTS, CPS, and authors' calculations.

Fig. 13: Rate of voluntary EE quit.
Fig. 14: The sampling distribution.

Fig. 15: Calibrated average class vacancy weights, normalized 01/2001 = 1.
known, but especially from smaller, less productive employers. Because these are always the
main source of job-to-job reallocation, we conclude that workers almost stopped climbing
the job ladder during the GR, and the recovery was almost absent.

Looking more closely at the calibrated sampling distribution (Figure 14), we first see that
the empirical distribution of job openings, $F_{\text{JOLTS}}(\cdot)$, vastly underestimates our calibrated
$F_t(\cdot)$ for all rank classes, but more severely so at the lower end of the job ladder. This is
(qualitatively) consistent with the findings of Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010), who
report that 41.6 percent of all hires occur at establishments with zero posted job opening in
the micro data underlying JOLTS, with that proportion ranging from 76.9 percent for the
small JOLTS size class down to roughly 7 percent for our largest size class. Second, there is
a very slight upward time trend in the sampling distribution at all cutoff points $X_k$.\(^{23}\) This
is consistent with the empirical observation that the average size of US establishments has
declined over recent decades, while that of the average firm has increased, so misclassification
in the sense that affects our data has arguably become worse.

Finally, Figure 15 shows the model counterpart of what we called average vacancy weights
in our description of the data (Section 2), i.e. the sampling probabilities divided by the
number of employers in each class,\(^{24}\) normalized to one in January 2001 to harmonize scales.\(^{25}\)
This is a measure of hiring effort by each employer per size class, relative to the aggregate
hiring effort. We can clearly see that, as the financial crisis unfolded, hiring effort by each
employer rose in relative terms at the bottom of the size of the distribution, and fell at the
top. This is a symptom of a failing job ladder by employer size. Comparing Figure 15 to
its empirical counterpart based on JOLTS vacancies (Fig. 9), we see that our estimated
sampling weights at the top of the size distribution are estimated to differ from the JOLTS
vacancy weights. In this sense, the model provides an important filter to the data.

5.3 Discussion

We now take stock of our results. Figure 15 indicates that the vacancy weights and sampling
probabilities of high-rank employers increased during both the 2001 recession and the begin-
ing of the 2008 recession, while those of low-rank employers stayed flat or even declined.
This fact in itself is striking in the light of MPV12’s finding that recessions are times when

\(^{23}\) A linear time trend is found positive and statistically significant for all $k$ in both $F_{t+1}(X_k)$ and
$F_{t+1}^{\text{JOLTS}}(X_k)$.

\(^{24}\) Consistently with our procedure to correct for misclassification, we use the number of establishments in
each size class in CEW, corrected for misclassification using the conversion matrix $M$, as our measure of the
number of employers in each size class.

\(^{25}\) The non-rescaled series, available on request, are nicely increasing with productivity class. This tallies
with the prediction of the job ladder model, according to which more productive employers post more
vacancies (see MPV13).
small (or low-rank) employers are growing relative to large ones. It also suggests that the vacancy \textit{yield} of small employers must have increased by much more than that of large ones during those recessions, a hypothesis that finds some support in the raw data (Figure 10). Perhaps even more striking is the sudden \textit{reversal} of this pattern at the end of 2008, immediately after the Lehman Brothers episode: at that point, the sampling probability of the high-rank class collapses, while that of the lowest-rank class soars, in relative terms. This, combined with a very low baseline job finding rate $\lambda_t$ (Figure 12) suggests that at that point high-rank firms froze their demand for new labor, and that what little hiring took place did so at the lower-rank end of the population of employers. This in indeed what we observe when examining JOLTS hire rates by employer size after reclassifications. Even more than in the raw data (Figure 2), hire rates rise sharply and temporarily at the lower end of the size distribution, while upgrading to better jobs slow down considerably, as evidenced by the durably low EE quit rates that ensued (Figure 13). In short, the job ladder failed, starting from the upper rungs.

Reclassification does not change, and if anything reinforces, the qualitative time series pattern of layoffs by establishment size that we found in the raw data (Figure 3). Layoffs significantly contributed to the increase in unemployment during the GR, but the persistence of high unemployment in the four years after the end of the GR is entirely accounted for by the failure of job finding rates to recover and the persistent increase in unemployment duration. After reclassifying establishments into rank classes so as to fit the job ladder model, the spike in layoff rates is much sharper among low-rank employers. The contemporaneous shift in sampling weights towards the bottom of the size distribution that we documented earlier suggests that the employers that were least affected by the GR, especially after September 2008, took advantage of rising unemployment to hire; because in the job ladder model each low-rank employer is more dependent on the reservoir of unemployed, it responded more, i.e. cut its vacancies by less. In addition, recall that the job ladder has a hard time fitting the raw data at the very low end of the size distribution, as quit rates from very small establishments are low relative to those in the two subsequent size classes. This observation suggests very significant heterogeneity among small establishments. Some are small because unproductive. Others are temporarily small but very productive and attractive because still growing. Indeed, Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2012) draw a sharp distinction between the cyclical dynamics of net employment growth at young and old small firms in Census data, that break down net employment flows by age and size, but lacks information on gross workers flows. So it appears that the small class as a whole shed much more employment by actively laying workers off, but also hired more by taking advantage of high unemployment and the dynamism of young employers.
To summarize: during the GR all employers temporarily raised their layoff rates, experienced slower attrition, and reduced their vacancy postings and hire rates; small employers laid off more and simultaneously reduced less their hiring effort, even hired more, but also experienced more of the decline in job-to-job quits, because hiring effort and hires at the top almost vanished; the job ladder slowed down at the bottom and almost stopped at the top.

We can briefly speculate on the reasons behind these events. One distinguishing feature of the GR, relative to previous recessions, was the credit crunch in late 2008 and early 2009, which may have impacted especially small employers. Our evidence is consistent with a credit crunch that affected more existing businesses, particularly the older and less productive ones, than new entrants and young growing but still small businesses. After the financial crisis exploded in Fall 2008, businesses, especially small ones, had a hard time finding and revolving working capital to pay their workers, so they had to actively reduce their workforce through layoffs, in part because attrition through quits to other employers and nonemployment collapsed. The contemporaneous reduction in vacancy postings that affected disproportionately large employers does not support more traditional theories of credit constraints, where firms, especially small ones, have a hard time securing new financing to invest and create new jobs.

6 Conclusions

We study labor reallocation, both through unemployment and directly from job to job, across employers of different productivities. We focus on the US economy around the Great Recession. In order to impose structure on our empirical investigation, we formulate a dynamic job-ladder model, where employers that are ranked more highly by workers, for example because higher-paying, spend more hiring effort and, conditional on contacting another worker, are more likely to succeed in hiring. As a consequence, an employer’s size is a relevant proxy for rank. We use newly available monthly time series from JOLTS on employment net and gross flows by size of the establishment. We find that our parsimonious turnover model of a dynamic job ladder fits the facts quite well, and implies “true” vacancy postings by size that are more in line with gross flows and intuition than JOLTS’ measures of vacancies, previously criticized by other authors. Our main finding is that the job ladder stopped working in the GR and never fully resumed. Job-to-job quits, especially from the bottom of the size/rank distribution, collapsed, further reducing the incentives of small employers to post vacancies and to hire unemployed workers to offset attrition.
References


Appendix
A Additional descriptive evidence

A.1 The wage-size job ladder

It has been long documented that employer size correlates positively with wage rates, after controlling for observable worker characteristics (Brown and Medoff, 1989). In this paper we focus on employer-level data and take the extreme view that workforce quality is homogeneous across employer sizes, so that any wage differential related to size can be thought of as a wage premium. This is in the spirit of the model we presented earlier. If wage/size differentials reflected entirely different types of workers at employers of different sizes, we would still have to explain why workers sort by the size of their employer.

For establishments, we draw information from QCEW. Information is also published at annual frequency (covering the first quarter of the year) by establishment size, in one of ten size classes, with lower bounds 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 250, 500, and 1,000 employees.\textsuperscript{26} From this we draw the distribution of establishment counts, employment and weekly earnings per worker, all averaged over the first quarter of the year, by establishment size, for each year from 1990 to 2012 included, for the U.S. and all industries combined.\textsuperscript{27}

Table 2 reports the results of an establishment-level OLS regression of earnings per worker on size and other establishment characteristics. The dependent variable is a measure of real weekly earnings, the ratio between CPI-deflated total quarterly payroll and average employment among all establishments in the “cell”, for each year from 1990 to 2012 included. The cell depends on the specification, and is indicated by which dummies we include among the covariates. So the dependent variable varies across specifications, which are not directly comparable. Size dummies and year dummies are always included. In specification II, each cell includes all establishments in the same size class and 2-digit NAICS industry. In III, each cell includes all establishments in the same size class, 2-digit NAICS industry, and located in the same US state. And so on. Information on geographic location is available only at the 2-digit industry level, due to potential disclosure risk. The regression is weighted by the number of establishments per cell. The results clearly indicate a wage ladder, except at the very bottom when not controlling for industry and location. Because average weekly earnings in the omitted (smallest) size class are about $330, top-to-bottom pay differentials between largest and smallest establishments are in the order of 80% in specification I, and


\textsuperscript{27}For earnings at the national level, all industries, we find two outliers, possibly the result of some coding error in collating the semi-aggregated data, in size class “10-19 employees” in year 1999 and in size class “1,000 employees and up” in 1995. We replace those two values of earnings with the average of the entries in adjacent years for the same size class. Although this averaging introduces measurement error, the year-over-year changes implied by the BLS original entries differ from all the rest of the sample by two orders of magnitude.
<table>
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<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 to 9</td>
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Source: QCEW and authors’ calculations. Dependent variable: average weekly earnings per worker in each establishment (1983$). Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies.

Table 2: The wage-size premium.

lower when controlling for industry and location. Employer-level TFP in our model may be in part a result of the industry in which the employer operates, so controlling for industry composition may not be appropriate.

For firms, the Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB) program at the Bureau of the Census publishes annual data on total employment, payroll and (every five years) receipts by firm size, disaggregated in 17-20 size categories, from 1992 to 2010, 2004 excluded (the size classification is coarser in 1992-1993). The Census defines a firm by grouping establishments by legal form and control structure. Figure 16 reports evidence from the SUSB on wage/size premia at the firm level. We take total annual payroll per worker for each size class, divide by that of the smallest class 1-4 employees, and subtract one. We omit the size class ‘0’ employees, which includes entrants, because it reports payroll but not employment. The results speak for themselves. The wage differential between the largest and smallest firms is less than 50%, significantly smaller than or establishments, also taking into account that the largest firm size class starts at the higher 1,500 employees cutoff. As we will discuss later in more detail, this may be due to the fact that large firms that only comprise large establishments may be the highest-paying of all. So, when combining them with equally large multi-establishment firms, their average pay premium declines.
A.2 Employment and establishment shares by size class

Figure 17 illustrates that employment shares by size of the establishment in QCEW are relatively stable over time, but do exhibit the cyclical pattern documented by MPV12 for firms; namely, the share of larger employers declines in the three recessions in the sample period. The GR is no exception.\footnote{We can draw the same information on employment shares by firm size, at a finer degree of size classification, from two BLS datasets, where a firm is identified by a federal tax Employer Identification Number (EIN). First, the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) program collects information on job flows and stocks, from the same QCEW universe, at quarterly frequency starting in 1992, and presents them by size of the parent company. Second, the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program is the well-known monthly “pay-roll survey” of about 145,000 businesses and government agencies from the QCEW frame, representing approximately 557,000 individual work sites. The survey provides timely and detailed industry data on employment, hours, and earnings of workers on nonfarm payrolls. In both datasets, once again, the share of employment at small firms is countercyclical. In the GR, it rose especially in the second, deeper half of the downturn. Results are available upon request.}

Our empirical exercise is based on the assumptions that the distribution of employers by rank in worker preferences is time-invariant and coincides with their distribution by size. One implication of this assumption is that the distribution of establishment counts by size classes should be relatively stable at business cycle frequencies. This is true in JOLTS size data by construction of the dataset, so the identity of the establishments is fixed, at least within each sampling year typically March to February. Across years, Figure 18 illustrates
Fig. 17: Employment shares by establishment size class.

Fig. 18: Shares of establishments by establishment size class.
these shares in QCEW, which is the frame from which JOLTS is drawn. Shares are in log scale to make them visible, because the distribution of establishment counts is much more compressed at the low end. We can see a very modest trend and cyclical component. By and large, the distribution of establishment counts is stable, much more so than that of employment.