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Introduction: All to the right? The 2024 European Parliament elections

Nonna Mayer, Gilles Ivaldi

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ALL TO THE RIGHT? THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

Thematic section edited by
Nonna Mayer & Gilles Ivaldi

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**ALL TO THE RIGHT?
THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS**

Thematic section edited by
NONNA MAYER & GILLES IVALDI

INTRODUCTION

BY NONNA MAYER & GILLES IVALDI

Context

The European Parliament (EP) elections of June 2024 marked a significant milestone for the European Union (EU). The elections took place amidst a prolonged period of “polycrisis” shaped by the Great Recession, the migration crisis, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and, more recently, the wars in Ukraine and in Gaza.

These multiple and interrelated international disruptions have deeply changed the European political landscape, offering both opportunities and constraints for political parties across Europe (Nicoli and Zeitlin, 2024; Genschel, 2025; Moise and Wang, 2025). They have heightened voter anxiety and socio-economic vulnerability, while also increasing the salience of issues such as inflation, migration, climate change, and foreign policy.

Such issues were pivotal in the 2024 EP elections (Beaudonnet *et al.*, 2025), more broadly reflecting the deeper “existential crises” that trouble European voters, *i.e.* migration, economy, climate, health, and security (Krastev and Leonard, 2024). Across Europe, inflation and the rising cost of living, weakening the most vulnerable segments of the electorate, came ahead of voters’ motivations in those elections. In countries like Germany and France immigration resurfaced as an impactful issue, fueling support for the far-right.¹ The farmers’ protests of winter 2023 further illustrated growing resistance to EU environmental policies and called into question the very goals of the European Green Deal. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and the Hamas-Israel conflict emerged as major geopolitical issues, exposing deep fault lines within European political parties and public opinion.

¹ On European voters’ motivations see the post electoral Eurobarometer (<<https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3292>>). And on the French voters motivations Ipsos’s detailed post electoral survey (<<https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/europeennes-2024/comprendre-le-vote-des-francais-2024>>).

A shift to the right in European politics

Against this backdrop, the June 2024 EP elections represented a crucial test for the EU and for many European governments grappling with global and domestic uncertainties.

The elections results revealed significant voter mobilization across most EU member states, with turnout reaching 50.7% EU-wide—matching the rate seen in 2019. Five years earlier, the elections had been marked by a revival in participation (+8 percentage points), reversing a decades-long decline in turnout. As in 2019, however, abstention rates remained highly uneven across EU member states. Leaving aside countries with compulsory voting such as Belgium and Luxembourg, turnout rates varied from 64.7% in Germany down to only 29% in Lithuania, with France at 51.5%, just above the European average.

Regarding the party balance, the mainstream political blocs in the EP—the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), and Renew Europe—retained a majority, collectively securing just over 55% of seats in the new legislature. The EPP conservative right reaffirmed its dominance not only in Parliament but also within the European Council, holding 11 seats, compared to only 4 for the left and 5 for centrist-liberals in Renew. Despite the ongoing economic crisis, the European left failed to present itself as a credible alternative during these elections. Meanwhile the Greens and Renew Europe emerged as the biggest losers, falling to 53 and 77 seats respectively—down from 70 and 98 in 2019.

The center of gravity in the new EP thus shifted to the right in a European context increasingly marked by political polarization and the rise of radical and Eurosceptic parties (Hix and Cunningham, 2025). In addition to the strong performance of conservative parties, the results confirmed the anticipated progression of radical and populist actors (Ivaldi and Zankina, 2024). Throughout Europe, parties of the far-right were the most successful in capitalizing on perceived failures of EU governance (Nicoli and Zeitlin, 2024), making significant gains in countries like France, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The far-right surge did not amount to a sweeping wave, however, and it varied also in magnitude from one country to another (Mudde, 2024; Ivaldi and Zankina, 2024). In total, these parties secured 183 seats, or 25% of the Parliament, however spread across three groups—the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, 79 seats including other non-far-right parties), Patriots for Europe (85 seats), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (27 seats)—without counting the Non-Registered.

What can we learn from the 2024 EP elections?

The aim of this thematic section of the *European Journal of Social Sciences* is to draw the main lessons of the June 2024 EP elections. Adopting a comparative lens with a special focus on the French case, the articles examine the key electoral dynamics of the 2024 vote, looking at patterns of both participation and electoral choice. The methods across the ten articles that constitute this thematic section also reflect a variety of approaches—survey analysis, ethnography, electoral geography, political institutions—which are key to understanding the electoral outcomes of the 2024 EP elections, and their broader implications for the future of the EU.

Drawing from the classic “second-order” election model (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), **Filip Kostelka and André Blais** examine how political and institutional factors may differently affect voter turnout in national and EP elections. They show that political and institutional factors such as low election frequency, proportional electoral system, simultaneous national election, and compulsory voting, influence voting rates in a similar way across both election types. But the magnitude of such effects varies considerably, with factors decreasing participation weighing more in European elections and factors increasing it in national ones.

Turning to vote choice, using electoral survey data from France and other European countries, the following articles pay attention to variables—such as gender, age, and socioeconomic precarity—which international research has consistently identified as influential factors in shaping electoral behavior.

Age figures prominently across three of the articles. Recent literature has emphasized the role of generational differences in political behavior and attitudes (Van der Brug and Kritzinger, 2025). **Damien Bol, Pierre-Henri Bono, and Can Zengin** explore voting regret during the 2024 EP in France, Germany, and Italy, focusing on differences across age groups. They find that abstainers are more likely to regret their decision than voters, and that younger individuals experience more voting regret than those in the older cohorts. Their results highlight a democratic vulnerability, suggesting that electoral outcomes may not fully capture stable political preferences, especially among young people.

Anne Muxel and Kevin Arceneaux examine how age shapes European identity in France, Germany, and Italy, tapping into its relational, symbolic, cognitive, and mobility components. While younger voters tend to show higher levels of EU identity than older ones, the differences appear relatively small. The study essentially confirms that the link to Europe is built primarily through symbolic and cognitive factors, far more than through the materialist benefits (relations, travels) citizens can draw from the EU.

Using a generational lens, **Vincent Tiberj** tackles an apparent paradox, *i.e.* that the younger cohorts are at the same time more tolerant than the older ones and increasingly prone to vote for an intolerant party like the RN. The analysis follows the progression of this trend cohort after cohort since the 2012 French presidential election, identifying a critical shift towards the far-right among boomers in the 2024 EP elections. The paper more generally reflects on the growing weight of cultural values in shaping electoral choice, particularly authoritarian and xenophobic positions—surpassing socio-economic values—, and on the growing politicization of these issues by the far-right and other actors in French politics.

Age interacts with other social characteristics in structuring electoral preferences (Schäfer and Steiner, 2025) and particularly with gender, another crucial issue that is given attention in this volume.

Anja Durovic, Nonna Mayer, and Noémie Piolat point to a significant reconfiguration of gendered voting behavior in France in 2024. In sharp contrast to the radical right gender gap persisting in many European countries, and the emergence of a modern gender-youth gap, French women were more likely than men to vote for the RN, and young women not more likely to vote for parties of the left. Additionally, the authors find that antifeminism or “modern” sexism was a strong predictor of support for radical right parties in those elections, while conversely making such voters turn away from support for left parties in general.

Tristan Haute, Emma Nemesien, Yann Le Lann, and Hugo Touzet investigate the link between voting and working conditions, measured by fine-grained indicators, in Germany, France, and Spain. Their study shows that poor working and employment conditions in the three countries reduce electoral participation in the EP elections as well as support for center and right-wing mainstream parties. But in contrast to what is observed in many European countries, such conditions increase the probability to support the far-right, however only in Germany, and the far-left, but only in France.

Beyond key socio-demographics, the contributions to this thematic section explore the interaction between national and European-level issues in structuring electoral choices—including the economy, the environment, immigration, and the war in Ukraine, while considering the role of the 2024 EP elections within national political cycles and the relevance of protest or sanction voting across different actors and contexts.

Gilles Ivaldi looks at the effect of individual voter support for the EU’s military assistance to Ukraine on populist voting in the 2024 EP elections. The paper finds that voter support for Ukraine is systematically associated with a lower likelihood of voting for populist parties across Europe, however with significant regional variations, and in relation to party-level positions regarding the economic costs of EU sanctions on Russia. These findings invite further research into the impact of foreign policy attitudes on populist politics.

Looking more specifically at Italy, **Carmelo Lombardo** and **Francesco Giovanni Truglia** highlight patterns of change and continuity in the geography of political conflicts across EP elections since the early 2000s. Their analysis documents significant changes that have happened in Italian electoral politics in recent years, both within and across political blocs, and how such changes were reflected in the 2024 EP elections that saw the rise of Giorgia Meloni's *Fratelli d'Italia*. Their paper suggests a shift from bipolarism to tripolarism with abstention as an increasingly politically connoted actor reshaping representation and participation.

The two last papers reflect on the consequences of the new political balance within the Parliament elected in June 2024, and the realignments underway, particularly within the constellation of Eurosceptic and far-right parties. Notably, two new groups emerged from the former Identity and Democracy group: Patriots for Europe, built around France's *Rassemblement National* (RN) and Hungary's *Fidesz*, and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), centered on Germany's *AfD* and Poland's *Confederation*.

Estelle Delaine looks at such reconfiguration of far-right parties in the EP. Her long-term ethnographic approach sheds light on the continuous gain in expertise, legitimacy and influence by far-right parties in the EP over the last decade. Departing from traditional analyses of the far-right in EU institutions, her paper looks at the accumulation of rewards and competences, and it offers a new perspective on the diversity of assets and resources that such parties may use to become genuine "insiders" within European institutions.

Finally, **Olivier Costa** asks whether the 2024 EP elections have marked a new advancement in the parliamentary dynamics of the EU. His analysis shows how parliamentarization operates alongside other trajectories of inter-governmentalism and autonomy and leadership by the Commission within the EU. Most importantly, the paper underlines the crucial significance of such increasing parliamentarization as a foundational issue for the EU's democratic legitimacy and future trajectory.

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Appendix

Official results: <<https://results.elections.europa.eu/en>>

MEPs by Member State and political group:

<<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/table>>.

Seats in the European Council

European People's Party (EPP)	11
Party of European Socialists (S&D/PES)	4
Renew Europe / ALDE	4
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	2 (CZ and IT)
Patriots for Europe (Pfe)	1 (HU)
Independent / Non-affiliated	5

Political Groups in the European Parliament 2019, 2024

GROUP	2019*	2024**
European People's Party (EPP)	179	188
Party of European Socialists (S&D/PES)	138	136
Patriots for Europe (Pfe)	—	84
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	69	78
Renew Europe / ALDE	98	77
Greens / European Free Alliance (EFA)	70	53
The Left (GUE/NGL)	37	46
Identity and Democracy (ID)	49	—
Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN)	—	25
Non-inscrits	63	33

*Outgoing members as of June 2024; **Constitutive session as of July 2024 (N=719 MEPs)

DOES PARTICIPATION FOLLOW THE SAME LOGIC ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS?

DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS (1975-2024)

FILIP KOSTELKA & ANDRÉ BLAIS

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Abstract. Do political and institutional factors influence voter turnout in the same way in national and European Parliament (EP) elections? We hypothesise that these factors exert broadly similar but asymmetrical effects, due to differing baseline turnout levels. For the purposes of this study, we conducted time-series cross-sectional analyses of an original dataset covering 508 national lower house and EP elections held in European Union member states between 1975 and 2024. Our independent variables include election frequency, based on data from 2,487 major elections and referendums held in these countries. The results support our hypotheses. Political and institutional factors exert similar effects in both election types, but their magnitude varies as hypothesised. Factors that increase participation show stronger effects in EP elections, while those that reduce turnout are more pronounced in national contests. As a secondary finding, we show that these factors account neither for the long-term turnout gap between EP and national elections nor for its recent decline.

Keywords: asymmetric effects, election frequency, Euro-gap, European Parliament elections, legislative elections, voter turnout.

Résumé. Les facteurs politiques et institutionnels influencent-ils la participation électorale de la même manière lors des élections nationales et des élections au Parlement européen? Cet article suggère que ces facteurs exercent des effets qui sont globalement similaires mais asymétriques, en raison de niveaux de participation de base différents. Nous menons des analyses en coupe transversale temporelle à partir d'un jeu de données original couvrant 508 élections nationales et européennes organisées dans les États membres de l'Union européenne entre 1975 et 2024. Nos variables indépendantes incluent la fréquence des élections, basée sur des données concernant 2487 scrutins et référendums majeurs tenus dans ces pays. Les résultats confirment nos hypothèses. Les facteurs politiques et institutionnels produisent des effets similaires dans les deux types d'élections, mais leur intensité varie comme prévu. Les facteurs augmentant la participation ont un effet plus marqué dans les élections européennes, tandis que ceux qui la réduisent sont plus prononcés dans les scrutins nationaux. Enfin, ces facteurs n'expliquent ni l'écart persistant de participation entre les élections européennes et nationales, ni son déclin récent.

Mots-clés: effets asymétriques, élections européennes, élections législatives, Euro-gap, fréquence des élections, participation électorale.

ARE YOUNG VOTERS MORE LIKELY TO REGRET THEIR CHOICE?

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Abstract. According to classical theories of political representation, electoral outcomes are expected to reflect the genuine political preferences of the population. This, in turn, presupposes that citizens cast meaningful votes that they do not come to regret in the days following the election. In this paper, we assess the extent to which voters and abstainers experienced regret in the week following the 2024 European Parliament elections, based on samples from Germany, France, and Italy. We find that levels of regret are substantial, particularly among abstainers and young voters, who are specifically oversampled in our data. In all three countries, young respondents are more likely to regret having voted, or having abstained, than older ones. These findings suggest that, beyond higher levels of abstention, the youth vote conceals another form of democratic deficit, as young citizens exhibit higher levels of voting regret.

Keywords: abstention, electoral behavior, European Parliament elections, regret, youth vote.

Résumé. Selon les théories classiques de la représentation politique, les résultats électoraux sont censés refléter les préférences politiques authentiques de la population. Cela suppose, en retour, que les citoyens expriment des votes significatifs qu'ils ne regrettent pas dans les jours suivant l'élection. Dans cet article, nous évaluons dans quelle mesure les électeurs et les abstentionnistes ont ressenti du regret la semaine suivant les élections européennes de 2024, à partir d'échantillons provenant d'Allemagne, de France et d'Italie. Nous constatons que les niveaux de regret sont substantiels, en particulier chez les abstentionnistes et les jeunes électeurs, qui sont spécifiquement suréchantillonnés dans nos données. Dans les trois pays, les jeunes répondants sont plus susceptibles de regretter d'être allé voter ou de s'être abstenus que les plus âgés. Ces résultats suggèrent qu'au-delà des niveaux plus élevés d'abstention, le vote des jeunes dissimule une autre forme de déficit démocratique, car ils sont plus nombreux à regretter leur choix de vote ou d'abstention.

Mots-clés: abstention, comportement électoral, élections européennes, regret, vote des Jeunes.

HOW GENDER AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS GENDER AND SEXUALITY SHAPED VOTES IN THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN FRANCE

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Abstract. This article analyses the impact of gender and attitudes towards gender and sexuality on voting behaviour in the 2024 European Parliament elections in France, in line with recent research on electoral gender gaps, particularly youth gender gaps. Three main findings emerge. First, women did not vote more often than men for left-wing lists; in fact, they voted more often than men for Rassemblement national (RN), a finding that stands in sharp contrast to trends in modern gender gaps or to persistent radical right gender gaps observed in many European countries. Second, and most notably, in contrast again to many other countries, we found no youth gender gap in voting behaviour for the major left-wing or right-wing parties in these elections. Third, attitudes towards gender and sexuality weigh heavily on the results: modern sexism, in particular, is associated with a higher likelihood of voting for the RN list and a lower likelihood of voting for left-wing lists. Overall, the French case highlights that distinguishing between gendered political attitudes and actual gendered voting behaviour remains crucial.

Keywords: European Parliament elections, France, (youth) gender gaps, left-wing vote, RN vote, sexism, (hetero)sexism.

Résumé. Cet article analyse l'impact du genre et des attitudes à l'égard du genre et de la sexualité sur les élections européennes de 2024 en France, dans la lignée des recherches récentes sur les écarts de genre en matière de vote et plus particulièrement sur les écarts de genre chez les jeunes. Trois conclusions se dégagent. Premièrement, les femmes ne votent pas plus souvent que les hommes pour les listes de gauche; elles votent même plus souvent qu'eux pour le Rassemblement national (RN), ce qui contraste fortement avec les tendances des écarts de genre modernes ou des écarts de genre persistants en faveur de l'extrême droite dans de nombreux pays européens. Deuxièmement, et c'est le plus remarquable, nous ne constatons pas d'écart de genre chez les jeunes dans le vote pour les principaux partis de gauche ou de droite lors de ces élections, ce qui contraste aussi avec de nombreux autres pays. Troisièmement, les attitudes envers le genre et la sexualité pèsent lourdement sur les résultats, le sexisme moderne en particulier entraînant une probabilité plus élevée de voter pour la liste du RN et une probabilité plus faible de voter pour les listes de gauche. Dans l'ensemble, le cas français souligne que la distinction entre les attitudes politiques genrées et le comportement de vote genré réel reste cruciale.

Mots-clés: écarts de genre (chez les jeunes), élections européennes, France, sexisme, (hétéro)sexisme, vote de gauche, vote RN.

DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THEIR ELECTORAL IMPLICATIONS AMONG YOUNGER AND OLDER COHORTS

THE CASES OF FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY

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Abstract. This article examines how different socialization processes shape European identity and support for the European Union (EU). Drawing on original survey data collected during the 2024 European Parliament elections, we develop four new measures of EU identity—relational, symbolic, cognitive, and mobility-related motivations—and assess their impact on political attitudes and voting behavior. While younger cohorts display slightly stronger identification with the EU, generational differences remain modest. Our findings show that symbolic attachment, such as valuing EU symbols, is the strongest predictor of pro-EU orientations. By contrast, personal relationships across borders and frequent mobility are weak predictors of EU support, suggesting that experiential ties often remain detached from political orientations. Cognitive identity exhibits distinct effects, being more closely linked to expressive rather than to material motivations. Overall, symbolic and expressive dimensions emerge as central drivers of EU support and citizenship.

Keywords: European Parliament elections, generational differences, identity, political socialization, youth.

Résumé. Cet article examine comment différents processus de socialisation façonnent l'identité européenne et le soutien à l'Union européenne (UE). À partir de données d'enquête originales recueillies lors des élections européennes de 2024, nous développons quatre nouvelles mesures de l'identité européenne – motivations relationnelles, symboliques, cognitives et liées à la mobilité – et évaluons leur impact sur les attitudes politiques et le comportement électoral. Si les jeunes générations affichent une identification légèrement plus forte à l'UE, les différences générationnelles restent modestes. Nos résultats montrent que l'attachement symbolique, tel que la valorisation des symboles de l'UE, est le meilleur indicateur des orientations pro-UE. En revanche, les relations personnelles transfrontalières et la mobilité fréquente sont de faibles indicateurs du soutien à l'UE, ce qui suggère que les liens expérientiels restent souvent détachés des orientations politiques. L'identité cognitive a des effets distincts, liés plus fortement aux motivations expressives qu'aux motivations matérielles. Dans l'ensemble, les dimensions symboliques et expressives apparaissent comme les principaux moteurs du soutien à l'UE et de la citoyenneté européenne.

Mots-clés: différences générationnelles, élections européennes, identité, jeunesse, socialisation politique.

THE BITTER END? RENOUVELLEMENT GÉNÉRATIONNEL ET PROGRESSION DU RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL

RETOUR SUR UNE LECTURE TROP SIMPLISTE

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Résumé. Cet article vise à résoudre un paradoxe: d'une part, le Rassemblement national (RN) fait des scores particulièrement élevés dans les nouvelles générations et, d'autre part, plus une génération est récente moins elle est touchée par les préjugés xénophobes et le conservatisme culturel. À partir des élections présidentielles de 2012, 2017 et 2022 et des européennes de 2024, cet article démontre que l'explication réside dans la politisation des valeurs culturelles et qu'elle dépend des générations. Les générations anciennes qui sortent du jeu, bien que plus conservatrices, continuaient à faire valoir leurs préférences socioéconomiques dans les urnes, tandis que plus une génération est récente, plus les valeurs culturelles pèsent dans les choix électoraux, soit vers le RN, soit vers la gauche ou les mouvements macronistes. La grande nouveauté de 2024 tient à la politisation de ces valeurs chez les «boomers» et la bascule des plus conservateurs d'entre-eux vers l'extrême droite.

Mots-clés: politique des deux axes, Rassemblement national, renouvellement générationnel, valeurs, vote.

Abstract. This article aims to resolve a paradox: On the one hand, Rassemblement National (RN) achieves particularly high scores among new generations and, on the other hand, the more recent a generation is, the less it is marked by xenophobic prejudices and cultural conservatism. Drawing on the presidential elections of 2012, 2017, and 2022, as well as the European Parliament elections of 2024, this article demonstrates that the explanation lies in the politicization of cultural values, which varies across generations. Older generations, now leaving out the electorate, although more conservative, continued to express their socioeconomic preferences at the ballot box. By contrast, the more recent a generation is, the more cultural values influence electoral choices—whether toward RN, the left, or Macronist movements. The major innovation in 2024 lies in the politicization of these values among “baby boomers” and the shift of the most conservative among them toward the far-right.

Keywords: generational renewal, Rassemblement National, two-axis politics, values, votes.

CONDITIONS DE TRAVAIL ET D'EMPLOI ET COMPORTEMENTS ÉLECTORAUX

*LE CAS DES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2024
EN ALLEMAGNE, EN ESPAGNE ET EN FRANCE*

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Résumé. À partir des données d'une enquête post-électorale réalisée en Allemagne, en Espagne et en France à l'issue des élections européennes de 2024, cet article prolonge une littérature récente relative aux liens entre conditions de travail et d'emploi et comportement électoral. Nous réaffirmons l'existence de liens, mais montrons que leur intensité et leur forme précise varient selon le pays et la dimension du travail et de l'emploi considérée. Dans les trois pays, de mauvaises conditions de travail et d'emploi vont de pair avec un moindre vote pour le centre et la droite ainsi que, en Allemagne et en Espagne, avec une démobilisation électorale plus importante. En revanche, l'association entre de mauvaises conditions de travail et d'emploi et les votes pour l'extrême droite ou la gauche radicale, mises en avant par d'autres travaux, ne se retrouvent qu'en Allemagne pour l'extrême droite et en France pour la gauche radicale.

Mots-clés: conditions de travail, élections européennes, précarité de l'emploi, travail, vote.

Abstract. Using data from a post-election survey conducted in Germany, Spain, and France following the 2024 European Parliament elections, this article extends recent literature on the links between working, employment conditions, and electoral behavior. We reaffirm the existence of such links but show that their intensity and precise form vary according to the country and the dimension of work and employment considered. In all three countries, poor working and employment conditions are associated with lower support for centrist and right-wing parties and, in Germany and Spain, with greater electoral demobilization. Nevertheless, the association between poor working and employment conditions and voting for the far-right or the radical left—highlighted in previous studies—is only found in Germany for the far-right and in France for the radical left.

Keywords: European Parliament elections, job insecurity, vote, work, working conditions.

HOW DID VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE SHAPE POPULIST VOTING IN THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS?

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Abstract. This paper examines the extent to which individual support for European Union military assistance to Ukraine influenced populist voting in the 2024 European Parliament elections. It hypothesizes that such support reduced the likelihood of voting for populist parties—particularly those on the radical right—due to their dissonance with the prevailing pro-Ukraine consensus. Drawing on individual-level survey data and multilevel models, the paper finds that support for Ukraine is consistently associated with a lower probability of voting for populist parties, controlling for key socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors of populism. However, this relationship varies significantly across regions and different populist orientations. Additionally, a cross-level interaction reveals that the negative effect of Ukraine support is accentuated in cases where radical right-wing populist parties express greater opposition to the economic costs of sanctions. Overall, these findings invite further research into the role of foreign policy attitudes in shaping populist voting dynamics across Europe.

Keywords: European Parliament elections, populism, sanctions, Ukraine, voting.

Résumé. Cet article analyse dans quelle mesure le soutien individuel à l'aide militaire de l'Union européenne à l'Ukraine a influencé le vote populiste lors des élections européennes de 2024. Il part de l'hypothèse que ce soutien réduit la probabilité de voter pour des partis populistes, notamment de droite radicale, du fait de leur dissonance avec le consensus pro-Ukraine. À partir de données d'enquête individuelles et de modèles multiniveaux, les résultats montrent que le soutien à l'Ukraine est systématiquement associé à une moindre probabilité de vote populiste, après contrôle des facteurs sociodémographiques et attitudinaux clés, avec, cependant, des variations significatives selon les régions et les types de populisme. Une interaction multiniveau indique que cet effet négatif est renforcé lorsque les partis populistes de droite radicale s'opposent davantage aux coûts économiques des sanctions. Ces résultats soulignent l'importance de mieux analyser à l'avenir le rôle des enjeux de politique étrangère dans la structuration des votes populistes en Europe.

Mots-clés: élections européennes, populisme, sanctions, Ukraine, vote.

FROM BIPOLARISM TO TRIPOLARISM

ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS, ABSTENTION, AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES IN ITALY'S EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS (2004-2024)

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Abstract. This paper examines the dynamics of Italian electoral behavior during the European Parliament elections held between 2004 and 2024, with particular attention to the specific discontinuities highlighted by the 2024 elections. Multifactorial analysis (MFA), combined with exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), reveals three main axes structuring the political space: a) the opposition between the dynamic, integrated provinces of the North and the fragile, marginalized areas of the South; b) the division between pro-European but critical parties and openly Eurosceptic forces; and c) the contrast between organizationally stable parties and ephemeral political actors. Abstentionism, which is increasingly emerging as a third pole, reflects the structure of the inequalities—generational exclusion, socio-economic fragility, and territorial disparities—that cut across Italian provinces, thus marking the transition from a bipolar to a tripolar system.

Keywords: abstentionism, multifactorial models, spatial autocorrelation, territorial cleavages, voting behavior.

Résumé. Cet article porte sur la dynamique du comportement électoral italien lors des élections européennes qui se sont tenues entre 2004 et 2024, avec une attention particulière pour les discontinuités mises en évidence par le scrutin de 2024. L'analyse multifactorielle (MFA), intégrée à l'analyse exploratoire des données spatiales (ESDA), révèle trois axes principaux qui structurent l'espace politique: a) l'opposition entre les provinces dynamiques et intégrées du Nord et les zones fragiles et marginalisées du Sud; b) la division entre les partis pro-européens mais critiques et les forces ouvertement eurosceptiques; c) le contraste entre les partis organisationnellement stables et les acteurs politiques éphémères. L'abstentionnisme, qui s'impose de plus en plus comme un troisième pôle, est fonction de la structure des inégalités – exclusion générationnelle, fragilité socioéconomique, disparités territoriales – qui traversent les provinces italiennes, marquant ainsi le passage d'un système bipolaire à un système tripolaire.

Mots-clés: abstentionnisme, autocorrélation spatiale, clivages territoriaux, comportement électoral, modèles multifactoriels.

BECOMING “INSIDERS” IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

*HOW THE FAR-RIGHT IS GAINING LEGITIMACY AND POWER:
AN ETHNOGRAPHY*

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Abstract. This research study examines the assets and resources that enable far-right parliamentary teams to become genuine “insiders” within the European Union. Based on an ethnography and prosopography of far-right accredited parliamentary assistants, policy advisors, and officials, I show that seniority plays a critical role in the accumulation of rewards and competencies within the field of Eurocracy, allowing far-right actors to remain within the European Parliament (EP), and even to secure prominent positions as (vice)chairs of committees. Their experiences as technocrats can then be leveraged in other European institutions, the local political arena, and the private sector. Far-right actors clearly influence the European policy agenda (anti-ecologism, anti-gender, anti-social policies, etc.), while coalitions—both among far-right parties and with other actors—can also form outside the EP. This cumulative process is likely to intensify in the context of the newly elected EP.

Keywords: European Parliament, far-right, field of Eurocracy, leadership positions.

Résumé. Cette étude analyse les capitaux et ressources dont les équipes parlementaires d'extrême droite disposent pour devenir de véritables « initiés » au sein de l'Union européenne. En m'appuyant sur une ethnographie et une prosopographie des assistants parlementaires accrédités, conseillers politiques et fonctionnaires d'extrême droite, je montre que l'ancienneté joue un rôle fondamental dans l'accumulation de rétributions et de compétences dans le champ de l'Eurocratie, permettant aux militants d'extrême droite de rester au sein du Parlement européen (PE) et même d'y obtenir des positions prééminentes comme présidents ou vice-présidents de commissions. Leurs expériences de technocrates sont alors valorisables dans d'autres institutions européennes, dans le champ politique local et le secteur privé. Les membres d'équipes parlementaires d'extrême droite pèsent clairement dans l'agenda des politiques européennes (anti-écologie, anti-genre, anti-social...), alors que des coalitions, aussi bien entre partis d'extrême droite qu'avec d'autres acteurs, peuvent également émerger en dehors du PE. Un tel processus devrait s'amplifier dans le contexte du PE nouvellement élu.

Mots-clés: champ de l'Eurocratie, extrême droite, Parlement européen, postes de direction.

LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2024 : UNE ÉTAPE DE PLUS DANS LA PARLEMENTARISATION DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE ?

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Résumé. Depuis quinze ans, l'intergouvernementalisme a retrouvé une forte actualité dans l'Union européenne (UE), porté par la multiplication des crises et la centralité du Conseil européen. Toutefois, cette tendance n'a pas supplanté la méthode communautaire ni la parlementarisation du système. Aujourd'hui, ces trois logiques coexistent : la méthode communautaire domine les politiques de routine, l'intergouvernementalisme s'impose sur les décisions régaliennes et de crise, tandis que la logique parlementaire progresse avec la politisation des institutions. Cette pluralité résulte à la fois de l'extension fragmentée des compétences de l'UE et de l'évolution de ses objectifs, désormais liés à des enjeux de légitimation démocratique. Le processus de parlementarisation demeure donc bien vivant, en particulier si l'on considère la dynamique des élections européennes et leur impact sur la marche du système politique de l'UE. Pour le démontrer, l'article revient sur l'affirmation de ce processus depuis les années 1970 et montre qu'il s'est poursuivi à quatre titres au moins à l'occasion du dernier scrutin européen.

Mots-clés : élections européennes, parlementarisation, Parlement européen, politisation, Spitzenkandidaten.

Abstract. Over the past fifteen years, intergovernmentalism has regained prominence in the European Union (EU), driven by successive crises and the central role played by the European Council. However, this trend has not supplanted the Community method or the parliamentarization of the system. Today, these three approaches coexist: The Community method dominates routine policymaking, intergovernmentalism prevails in sovereign and crisis decisions, while the parliamentary approach is gaining ground in step with the politicization of EU institutions. This plurality reflects both the fragmented extension of the EU's powers and the evolution of its objectives, which are now linked to issues of democratic legitimacy. The process of parliamentarization therefore remains very much alive, particularly when considering the dynamics of European elections and their impact on the functioning of the EU political system. To demonstrate this, the article looks back at the affirmation of this process since the 1970s and shows that it has continued in at least four ways during the last European Parliament elections.

Keywords : European Parliament, European Parliament elections, parliamentarization, politicization, Spitzenkandidaten.