The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly
Abstract
Summary:Thispaper extends thebasicunilateralaccidentmodel toallow forCournot
competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic
variablesunderasymmetriccapacityconstraints. We find thatliabilityregimesexerta
crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher
output andhigher riskcomparedto negligence. Wealsostudytheconditionsunderwhich
bothregimes converge.
KeyWords:TortLaw,Strict
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