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Journal Articles American Economic Review Year : 2015

Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Eduardo Perez


This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.
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hal-03392982 , version 1 (21-10-2021)



Eduardo Perez. Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps. American Economic Review, 2015, 104 (5), pp.469 - 474. ⟨10.1257/aer.104.5.469⟩. ⟨hal-03392982⟩


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