The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary, 2003–2013
Abstract
The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instrument
of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective parallel
government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of
dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though
the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more
structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the
military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population,
making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment
of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested
interests in favor of Taliban domination.
Domains
Political science
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