There are two dominant explanations of contemporary Muslim voting behaviour. A section of public commentators reiterates an old argument that Muslims always participate in politics to defeat the BJP. This argument is not entirely incorrect. The BJP did not deviate from its Modi-centric Hindutva-driven campaign. The party relied heavily on an apparent anti-Muslim rhetoric to reach out to its core voters. The failure of the BJP to secure an absolute majority in Lok Sabha, in this sense, is also seen as an obvious outcome of this strategy. It is claimed that the BJP’s attempt to polarize voters on religious grounds encouraged Muslims to vote for non-BJP candidates throughout the country. The second explanation is more speculative. The INDIA alliance has so far tried to avoid any discussion on the overwhelming Muslim support they have received this time. The non-BJP parties, except a few, do not want to publicly acknowledge the fact that their success was almost impossible without active Muslim support. This kind of political reluctance is justified as a strategic silence. There is an assumption that the pro-Muslim gestures of these parties will make the Hindu voters unhappy. Findings of National Election Studies (NES) 2024 take us beyond these popular descriptions of Muslim voting. This survey introduces us to the complexities of contemporary Muslim politics and its electoral manifestations. This article tries to establish a link between Muslim self-perceptions as a religious minority in India and their political behaviour. We ask three basic questions: First, did Muslim communities vote more actively this time than Hindu communities? Second, did they vote as a homogeneous community or as a vote bank? And finally, did they vote basically to defeat BJP?