Production externalities: internalization by voting - Sciences Po Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2011

Production externalities: internalization by voting

Abstract

We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
externalityrr.pdf (210.92 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-00972983 , version 1 (03-04-2014)

Identifiers

Cite

Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede. Production externalities: internalization by voting. 2011. ⟨hal-00972983⟩
153 View
153 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More