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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2017

Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Abstract

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

Dates and versions

hal-03261595 , version 1 (15-06-2021)

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Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon. Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 101, pp.63 - 77. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002⟩. ⟨hal-03261595⟩
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