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Journal Articles Journal of Public Economic Theory Year : 1997

The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super-Majority Rules

Hervé Crès
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Abstract

Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!−1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionThis expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.
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Dates and versions

hal-03458336 , version 1 (30-11-2021)

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Yves Balasko, Hervé Crès. The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super-Majority Rules. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1997, 75 (2), pp.237 - 270. ⟨10.1006/jeth.1996.2233⟩. ⟨hal-03458336⟩

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