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Journal Articles Economic Theory Year : 2005

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Mich Tvede
  • Function : Author
Hervé Crès
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 954777

Abstract

An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at mostpercent of the shareholders. It is shown that a-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists ifwhereSis the number of states at the last date andJis the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller’s.

Dates and versions

hal-03598171 , version 1 (04-03-2022)

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Mich Tvede, Hervé Crès. Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets. Economic Theory, 2005, 26 (4), pp.887 - 906. ⟨10.1007/s00199-004-0537-x⟩. ⟨hal-03598171⟩
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