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Preprints, Working Papers, ... (Working Paper) Year : 2020

Information Design with Agency

Abstract

We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard problem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information that is persuasive in the continuation game, and efficiently incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. Standard concavification techniques do not apply in this environment. We provide a general methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal.
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Dates and versions

hal-03874017 , version 1 (27-11-2022)

Licence

Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03874017 , version 1

Cite

Jacopo Bizzotto, Eduardo Perez-Richet, Adrien Vigier. Information Design with Agency. 2020. ⟨hal-03874017⟩
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