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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2021

Stable and Extremely Unequal

Résumé

We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.
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Dates et versions

hal-03936184 , version 1 (12-01-2023)

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Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

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  • HAL Id : hal-03936184 , version 1

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Alfred Galichon, Octavia Ghelfi, Marc Henry. Stable and Extremely Unequal. 2021. ⟨hal-03936184⟩
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